Eltschinger - Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part I (2009)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology ¹

Part I

Vincent Eltschinger

JIABS Vol 32 pp. 39-83

For Jacques May

1.1. Introduction

Increasingly fewer scholars would side with Edward Conze, who regarded the Buddhist epistemological school ( 6^th-13^th c. India) as, at best, paying merely lip service to the Buddha and the Buddhist ideal of salvation. But in spite of seminal pieces of scholarship by Ernst Steinkellner, Eli Franco and Helmut Krasser that offer discussions to the contrary, many if not most Dharmakīrtian scholars seem to be satisfied with conceding Dharmakīrti’s (6^th century?) Buddhist persuasion in a purely marginal or superficial way. Many of them discuss the various aspects of Dharmakīrti’s logic and theory of knowledge as if these had sprung out of the head of a philosopher trained in Vienna, Cambridge or Harvard (or in earlier days, Königsberg). Quite often, scholars label as “Buddhist” whatever theoretical posit can be located in a literary document known to have been authored by a Buddhist, and fail to wonder in which way these tenets can be said to be Buddhist at all. I readily agree that Dharmakīrti’s at times frightening philosophical genius amply deserves to be brought into a comparative and/or systematic philosophical light. It would indeed be regrettable to deprive such thought of its inspirational force by studying and preserving it as a museum piece or only in the spirit of cultural and historical relativism. Those who are willing to take Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist persuasion seriously are repeatedly confronted with fascinating areas to examine, as in Dharmakīrti’s constant merging of epistemology with soteriology, or in the manner he fits his theory of knowledge to the demands of his religious thought.

Buddhism may be defined minimally as the tracing of the unsatisfactory condition of living beings back to ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna, moha) and the prescription of a therapy against suffering (duhkha) as its eradication. ² It would indeed be surprising for an allegedly Buddhist philosopher, all the more one particularly concerned with epistēmē, to address gnoseological questions without trying to locate ignorance in the psychological machinery he describes and discuss the part played by ignorance in human error and overall dissatisfaction. And indeed, there is hardly a single page in the first two chapters of Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavārttika (PV) that does not mention ignorance and the evils it is responsible for. In the present essay, I would like, first, to draw a systematic picture of ignorance in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, and second, to examine how far Dharmakīrti’s reception of Dignāga’s (480-540?) two-headed epistemology might have been dictated by his conviction that perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) provide all the epistemic requirements for one’s achieving final liberation. In doing so, I hope I shall succeed in showing not only that the very heart of Dharmakīrti’s system is permeated by - let’s say - religious schemes, concepts and preoccupations, but also that it evidences, especially as far as perception and inference are concerned, an organic relationship to soteriology.

1.2. Ignorance as erroneous cognition (mithyopalabdhi)

1.2.1. Let me start with one of the most important stanzas Dharmakīrti ever dedicated to ignorance: “Ignorance (ajñāna) is [nothing but] erroneous cognition (mithyopalabdhi)], and this is for three reasons:] Because it counteracts vidyā; because, since it is a mental factor [associated with the mind, it can only be] perception; [and] because [the Buddha himself] has declared [this in diverse Sūtras. Any] other [account of ignorance] is ill-founded.” ³

1.2.2. In their commentaries on PV 2.213a (vidyāyāh pratipakṣatvāt), Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin criticise a (presumably) Vaibhāṣika opponent in whose opinion ignorance should be viewed as a mere lack of clarity (asamprakhyāna). ⁴ In order to do so, they take up an interesting elaboration of Vasubandhu’s (PrSVy⁵ and) AKBh on the meaning of the negation or privative prefix “a” in the Sanskrit word avidyā. Dharmakīrti’s commentators first define “knowledge” (vidyā) as the perception (darśana) or grasping (grahaṇa) of something real (sadartha, bhūtārtha), ⁶ and then ask: Does ignorance consist (1) in something other (anya) than knowledge, (2) in the mere lack (abhāva) of knowledge, or (3) in an independent cognitive event counteracting (vipakṣa) or contradicting (viruddha, virodha) knowledge? First, ignorance cannot consist of something other than knowledge, for then it would ensue that dharmas such as visible things (rūpādi) or sense faculties (caksurādi) would be ignorance too. Moreover, dharmas such as visible things or sense faculties continue to exist beyond (sopadhiśeṣa-)nirvāna, and his would be incompatible with their being ignorance since (at least some form of) ignorance is eliminated at the time of nirvāna. Second, ignorance cannot consist in the mere absence of knowledge, as the Vaibhāṣika would have us believe, for, being a blank nothing like a rabbit’s horns, it could not function as a cause or a condition. But since ignorance forms the first link in the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and serves here as the causal factor for karmic forces (saṃskāra), it cannot consist of a causally non-efficacious absence. Moreover, the mere lack of knowledge (in the form of undefiled ignorance, akliṣtājñāna) still characterizes Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas, i.e., persons who have already reached nirvāna. ⁷ We are left, then, with no other possibility than to hold ignorance to be an independent dharma that conflicts with, counteracts or opposes knowledge (vipakṣa[bhūta], pratipakṣa, pratidvandva[bhūta], viruddha). ⁸

The examples adduced by Vasubandhu, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin are worth considering. ⁹ According to Vasuban- dhu, ignorance stands in an analogous relationship to knowledge, just as amitra (enemy) to mitra (friend), anrta (untruth) to rta (truth), adharma (immorality) to dharma (morality), anartha (non-profit) to artha (profit), and akārya (crime) to kārya (duty). Words like “enemy,” “untruth,” “immorality,” “non-profit” or “crime” do not (just) denote something other than, or the lack of, a friend, truth, morality, profit or duty. To put it in other words, all these cases testify to the use of the negation (nañ) in the sense of a contradiction or incompatibility (virodha), and not in the sense of mere exclusion (paryudāsamātra). ¹⁰

1.2.3. In PV 2.213b, Dharmakīrti puts forth a second argument to prove that ignorance indeed consists in an erroneous cognition. His argument relies on the Abhidharmic classification of ignorance as a mental event (caitta, caitasika) associated with the mind (cittasamprayuktadharma). ¹¹ He says: “[And] because [ignorance] is a perception since it is a mental factor [associated with the mind, it has the nature of] an erroneous perception[, and not of a mere lack of knowledge].” In their explanation of Dharmakīrti’s argument, the commentators again refer back to Vasubandhu, for whom “[t]he mind and its mental factors are associated by reason of five equalities or identities, identity of support (āśraya), of object-support (ālambana), of aspect (ākāra), of time (kāla), and equality in the number of dravyas.” ¹² According to Yaśomitra, “a [sensory] cognition (vijñāna) cognizes, i.e., perceives something blue or [something] yellow; affective sensation (vedanā ) experiences [on an affective level] this very thing that [has] thus [been made] the ob-ject-support [as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral]; ideation (samjñā) determines [its identity, and] volition (cetanā) conditions [the mind with regard to it], and so forth. ¹³ To put this briefly, every phase (ksana) of the mind (or: cognition) is associated with a complex machinery of concomitant mental events sharing various features with this cognition, e.g., the object that has given rise to it, but also its temporal and numerical determinations. What does this argument amount to? According to Devendrabuddhi, the point at stake is that as a mental factor associated with the mind, ignorance “grasps an aspect and an object-support[, and hence] does not have the nature of a [mere] lack of cognition.” ¹⁴ As Śākyabuddhi argues, “if ignorance had the nature of a [mere] lack of cognition, then it would not be equal [to the mind] as regards [its] object-support and aspect (…). For this reason, since it is a mental factor, ignorance does not have the nature of a [mere] lack of cognition, but has the nature of a cognition.” ¹⁵

1.2.4. Dharmakīrti adds a scriptural argument against his Vaibhāṣika co-religionist: “[And thirdly] because [the Buddha himself] has declared [in diverse Sūtras that ignorance has the nature of a cognition grasping aspects that are contrary to those grasped by discernment].”¹⁶ Though I would like to postpone my inquiry into Dharmakīrti’s sources concerning ignorance, ¹⁷ let me just mention that in this connection his commentators quote from two important Mahāyānasūtras, viz. the Candrapradīpasamādhisūtra (CPSS) and the Daśabhūmikasūtra (DBhS). The CPSS says: “What does the elimination of ignorance consist in? [The elimination of ignorance consists in the fact] that [every kind of] superimposition on dharmas as they really are is [definitely] eliminated.” ¹⁸ As for the excerpt from the DBhS, it runs as follows: “The one who looks upon this world’s coming into existence and annihilation thinks in this manner (evaṃ bhavati, ‘di sñam du sems te): ‘As many as the worldly transactions/purposes [can be], all of them originate from the adherence to a self; from the elimination of [this] adherence to a self, worldly transactions/purposes do not arise [anymore].’ And he [also] thinks in this manner: ‘Here indeed [all] these [living beings] who with infantile minds adhere to a self are screened by the darkness of ignorance, crave for existence and non-existence, devote themselves to improper reflection, have wrong conduct and are sinful; [all these human beings] accumulate performances(/accumulations of karman) that are meritorious, demeritorious, or leading to immovable states. ¹⁹ For these [ignorant persons], the seed of mind that has been planted by these conditionings, which is under the sway of cankers and clinging, will one day become capable of producing birth, old age, death, and re-existence.” ²⁰ As Devendrabuddhi rightly points out, “in the [present excerpt] too, teaching the link of ignorance (avidyänga) amounts to teaching the false view of a self (ätmadrṣsti).” ²¹

1.2.5. Reasoning and scriptures lead to the same conclusion: ignorance is to be viewed as a mental factor associated with the mind that counteracts the perception of reality as it really is. Far from being a mere lack of knowledge, ignorance consists of an “antiknowledge,” or, better, a “counter-knowledge.” The commentators’ explanation of this contradictoriness is consistent throughout their glosses on PV 2. A given cognition’s erroneousness consists in its grasping an unreal (abhūta) or contrary (viparīta) aspect. ²² Can we be more precise regarding “contrariness” in this context? For two cognitions, being mutually contradictory means that they display contrary object-supports and aspects (viparītālambanākāra[tva]). ²³ In other words, ignorance and knowledge are cognitions grasping contrary aspects. ²⁴ We already know from Dharmakīrti’s commentators that knowledge is to be understood as the perception of a real object, which is tantamount to saying that it grasps the real or true aspects of an object. According to Sākyabuddhi, the aspects that are to be grasped (grāhya) by knowledge consist chiefly in selfless(ness) and painful(ness), to which we may safely add empti(ness) and momentari(ness). ²⁵ Knowledge is, then, nothing other than discernment (prajñā, vipaśyanā). ²⁶ One of Devendrabuddhi’s proofstatements puts the whole argument in a nutshell: “If it is characterized as contradictory to [a mental factor] y, a mental factor x grasps [aspects that are] contrary to the aspects grasped by y, like the [mental cultivation of the] loathsome (aśubhā) grasps [aspects that are] contrary to the aspects grasped by desire (rāga). Now, ignorance is characterized as contradictory to discernment, which grasps the true aspects [of things].”²⁷ Ignorance can be described, then, as that mental factor which, when it exists, obstructs the perception of true reality (tattvadarśana). ²⁸

1.2.6. Dharmakīrti’s understanding of ignorance as erroneous cognition, i.e., as a cognition displaying unreal aspects, has farreaching implications. On the one hand, to claim that ignorance is responsible for our grasping of unreal aspects amounts to saying that it has us superimpose erroneous constructs on the real. The entire realm of superimposition (āropa, samāropa, adhyāropa) is traditionally held to be co-extensive with the scope of samvrti, i.e., concealment, covering or convention. On the other hand, the expression “erroneous cognition” comes very close to a central concept in the epistemological theory, namely pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa). Considering that Dharmakīrti consistently defines “concept(uality)” (vikalpa, kalpanā, etc.) as pseudo-perception, we can surmise that concept(uality), as such and as a whole, falls into the realm of ignorance. This is indeed what Dharmakīrti explicitly says. According to him, terms like “concealment,” “superimposition,” “concept(uality)” and “pseudo-perception” are conceptually equivalent. Needless to say, Dharmakīrti’s frequent use of these expressions allows one to discern how deeply his epistemological doctrine is structured along such key Buddhist metaphysical assumptions.

1.2.7. Dharmakīrti was by no means the first Buddhist epistemologist to resort to the notion of samvrti(sat) or “convention(ally existent)” in this context. Dignāga had already made use of it in his treatment of pseudo-perception both in his NM and in PS 1.7 cd-8ab. Let me first quote NM 8c19-24 in Junjie Chu’s translation: “Thus it is said that memory, inference, desire, doubtful cognition, erroneous cognition, etc., [namely, the cognition of water] in respect to a mirage, etc., are not perception, because they occur as the conceptual construction of what has been experienced formerly (*pūrvānubhūtakalpanayā). In the same way all the cognitions of a jar (*ghaṭa), etc., a number (*saṅkhyā), etc., [movement such as] lifting (*utkṣepanādi), etc., existence (*sattā), etc., and jarness (*ghatatva) that belong to the conventionally existent are pseudoperceptions, because they occur as conceptual constructions in assuming a different form (*anyarūpa) [and] superimposing another object [that is not substantially existent] (*arthāntarādhyāropāt) with regard to something substantially existent (*dravyasat).”²⁹ Let me turn now to PS 1.7cd-8ab. A lot of ink has been spilled over these four pādas, where Dignāga, after defining perception as “free from conceptual construction” (kalpanāpodha, PS 1.3c) and presenting the different types of perception (PS 1.6-7ab), spells out his views on pseudo-perception. ³⁰ In Chu’s translation, these two halfverses run as follows: “Erroneous cognition, [cognition of] conventionally existing [things, and cognitions such as] inference [and] the result [of inference] as well as recollection [and] desire are pseu-do-perceptions, which have the special character of ignorance.” ³¹ All interpreters, both traditional and modern, seem to agree that the first three compounds (bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñāna, anumānānumānika, smārtābhilāṣika) refer to three types of conceptual/mental errors and that they make no mention whatsoever of the sensory illusions which might result from an impairment of the sense faculties. As for the expression sataimira, Chu’s recent in-depth study has suggested that it should be interpreted here along the lines of Jinendrabuddhi, ³² i.e., as pertaining to ignorance, and not as being related in any way to the eye-disease known as timira. ³³ Thus if Jinendrabuddhi’s (and Chu’s) interpretation is correct unlike that of Dharmakīrti, Dignāga ascribes the whole range of conceptual error (among which is included the cognition of conventionally existing things) to ignorance.

Dignāga’s own explanation of saṃvṛtisajjñāna is unfortunately too short to derive any clear idea of what he had in mind: “[As for the cognition bearing] on conventionally existing [things, it is a pseudo-perception], because it superimposes extraneous things, [and] thus functions through the conceptual construction of their [conventionally existing] natures [as something real].”³⁴ Let us, however, consider one part of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on this passage. According to him, a cognition bearing on conventionally existing things is a pseudo-perception “because this cognition superimposes extraneous things like pots on the [real] bases ³⁵ of the designations (prajñaptivastu), such as corporeality and the like, but does not cognize the bare basis of [these] designations. ³⁶ In bringing together these expressions, Jinendrabuddhi is most likely relying on an earlier work of Dignāga, the HVP. ³⁷ In this short treatise, Dignāga attempted to undermine externalist/realistic accounts of reality by proving that the three spheres of existence in the traditional Buddhist cosmology are mere illusion/error (‘khrul pa tsam). ³⁸ Stanza 2 runs as follows: “When one examines/inquires into the nature [of things] with reference to all the [different] bases of [their] designations, [one comes to the conclusion that,] as many objects of conventional cognition (saṃvṛtijñānapocara) there can be, [all of them] are [just] designated/designations on [the basis of]/from other(s)[, provisionally more real things].”³⁹ Let us now consider Dignāga’s own explanation of this verse: “When one examines/inquires into [things] such as a certain rope by analysing [it into its] parts, etc., one does not find the nature [of these things any longer]; like the [mistaken] cognition of a snake [in place of a rope], the cognition of [something] like a rope, too, is nothing but a mere error. In the same way, as many as can be the objects of conventional/practical knowledge (vyavahārajñāna) such as pots and goblets, which [only] exist on the basis of [their] parts, all of them exist as [mere] designations, too. ⁴⁰ As the evidence provided by the HVP suggests, Dignāga’s notion of saṃvṛtisaj(jñāna) can be traced back to the standard Abhidharmic interpretation of the two realities as can be found, e.g., in AK 6.4 and AKBh 334,3-14 thereon. ⁴¹ According to the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma at least, conventionally existing things are those whose idea (buddhi) ceases as soon as they are broken into pieces (as in the case of a pot) or their different properties (dharma) are mentally (buddhyā) subtracted (apoha) from them.

1.2.8. There is, however, strong evidence to suggest that this does not reflect, at least not primarily, Dharmakīrti’s line of interpreting saṃvrti. In PVin 1.33ac₁, Dharmakīrti claims pseudo-perception to be twofold, namely conceptual construct (vikalpa), “because something unreal appears in it” (avastunirbhāsāt), ⁴² and (sensory, akṣaja/indriyaja in PVin 1.29,11-12) illusion (upaplava), “because it is deceptive/unreliable” (visaṃvādāt). It is generally acknowledged that this dual account of pseudo-perception was already responsible for the framework of Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of PS 1.7 cd-8ab: “There are four kinds of pseudo-perception: three [of them] consist in conceptual cognitions, and one [of them, being] born of an impairment of the [sensory] basis [itself], is nonconceptual. ⁴³ Commenting in general terms on the three conceptual kinds of pseudo-perception, Devendrabuddhi explains first that they function through conceptualizations based on conventions and that they superimpose extraneous things on reality. ⁴⁴ Focusing then on samvrttisajjñāna, he adduces five examples directly borrowed from Dignāga’s NM, where they were meant to match Vaiśeșika ontological categories: pot, number, lifting/raising, existence, potness. ⁴⁵ His explanation of the conceptual pseudo-perception of a pot is as follows: “[Things such as] pots, since they perform one [particular] effect (ekakāryasādhana) such as carrying water, etc., commonly differ from [all the things] other than them which do not have the [said] effect (tadanyebhyo ‘tatkāryebhyah).” ⁴⁶ As is obvious, Devendrabuddhi’s explanation of conventionally real entities (at least partly) substitutes the foundations of the so-called apoha theory for the standard Abhidharma-like account favoured by Dignāga (at least in his HVP and NM). A short glance at Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha should allow us to understand his notion of samvrrti(sat). ⁴⁷

1.2.9. Be it because of their spatio-temporal location or the intrinsic nature they owe to ever changing causal complexes, bare particulars are irreducible to one another: An individual entity can only be identical with itself, and this during one and the same phase of its transient existence. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the following stanza: “Since they are fixed/established in their own [strictly individual] intrinsic nature, all entities are naturally excluded [i.e., distinct] from those whose being is [similar to] their own (svabhāva) and from those whose being is other [than their own] (parabhāva). ⁴⁸ That bare particulars can only be identical to themselves does not mean that they cannot be regarded as roughly similar to certain others in a specific respect. The causal complexes and processes that bring them into existence do indeed endow them with similar causal efficiencies or functionalities (arthakriyā). In other words, similarities and dissimilarities can only be accounted for in terms of causal efficiency, and not by resorting to real similarities (as the Sāñkhyas would have it) or to universals inhering in individuals (as the Vaiśeṣikas would assume). For instance, plants such as the gudūicī (Cocculus cordifolius), the dhātrī (= āmalakī, Emblica officinalis) or the abhaya (Terminalia chebula) can differ extremely from one another (parasparam atyantavibhinnamūrtayah, TSP 296,21), but they are possessed with a similar capacity to cure diseases (rogaśānti) or to calm fever (jvaraśamana). ⁴⁹ “In the same way - Dharmakīrti says - individuals like a śimśapā[, a khadira or a nyagrodha tree], although they are not related to one another [i.e., are devoid of any real universal such as treeness], naturally produce a uniform recognition [of them as trees], or [any] other function that according to conditions can be performed by wood, such as burning or [building] a house. But [things] like water, though they no less differ [from these individuals than these individuals among themselves], are not [capable of burning or being used in the making of a cart], in the same way as [something] like the auditory [sense faculty is not capable] of [producing] a cognition of something visible, etc. ⁵⁰ In other words, our classificatory schemes, both conceptual and linguistic, do not refer back to commonalities in re(bus), to real universals or similarities, but to our own way of accounting for the fact that things which have nothing in common perform roughly similar functions. No matter how different they are as to their colours, shapes, materials or sizes, we call “pots” or “receptacles” all those things that are capable of carrying liquids, and ipso facto single them out from all things that do not perform this function (atatkārya).

Most important in the present context is Dharmakīrti’s claim that mutually exclusive entities can give rise (in a mediate/indirect way, as we shall see) to a conceptual cognition that he variously designates as a unitary judgement (ekapratyavamarśa) or recognition (pratyabhijñāna): “Such is the nature of [real] entities[, namely,] that some [of them], although they differ [totally from one another], are naturally bound to perform one [and the same] effect such as a unitary judgement. ⁵¹ This judgement is of a determinat(iv)e character and has for one of its properties the display of a unitary image of irreducibly diverse particulars. At this stage, however, ignorance has already stepped into the process: As Dharmakīrti insists, this conceptual construct covers or conceals ( saṃ√VṚ) the bare particulars’ diversity with its own unitary aspect. Whereas this cognition is to be considered samvrti itself, its pseudo-objects are samvrttisat or conventionally existing things with no counterpart in reality. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the following passage: “On the basis of entities that are [entirely] distinct [from one another], a cognition arises which, having the appearance of a unitary object, conceals with its own [unitary] form the form of the others [i.e., the radically distinct entities; the latters’ ultimate] diversity being [thus] concealed by this [cognition, i.e., by] concealment, [these] entities, [though] in themselves distinct [from one another], appear as indistinct under a certain form [i.e., as universals constructed by their exclusion from dissimilar entities with reference to the effects they produce]. The universal is [only] reported to be real with reference to this [superimposing cognition, but] in the way in which this cognition imagines it, it is ultimately unreal. ⁵² It is to be emphasized that real entities are only indirectly or mediately the cause of this distorting cognition. What they bring about directly is a true perceptual awareness of themselves, which in turn is the cause for the awakening or actualization (prabodha) of a latent tendency (vāsanā) that has been left/imprinted (āhita) in the mind by the previous experience of functionally similar particulars. “Latent tendency” or, better, “imprint” is consistently defined as a capacity or efficiency (śakti, sāmarthya); ⁵³ in the present case, the latent tendency consists in the capacity to generate recognition. New perceptual experiences of functionally similar entities provoke the actualization of this latent tendency, i.e., its readiness to bring about ⁵⁴ the unitary judgement. ⁵⁵ As Dharmakīrti himself points out, this latent tendency towards conceptual construct is the real cause of error (viplava), or has error as its result. ⁵⁶ We are now in a position to understand the following statement concerning how conceptual construction conceals ultimate reality: “On the basis of entities that are distinct from [those] other than them[selves with respect to their functionality], a conceptual cognition arises; true to the nature of its own latent tendency[, which is its real cause and consists in the capacity to produce a unitary cognition of mutually distinct things, this cognition] obliterates the latters’ [mutually] distinct nature, ascribes [to them] its own unitary appearance, and presents them by unifying them [i.e., as if they were of a single nature]. And such is the nature [both] of the entities [themselves], which differ from others in that they share the same aim and instrument, ⁵⁷ and of the latent tendency [that is the cause] of this conceptual construct: that the [cognition] produced [by them in an indirect and a direct manner, respectively,] appears like that [i.e., by superimposing its own aspect on something else]. And it is this [conceptual cognition that we call] ‘concealment’ in that it conceals the form of [mutually distinct] others with its own form [i.e., with its own unitary aspect]. As for the [entities] whose differences have been concealed by this [conceptual cognition], they appear [in the latter] under a certain [superimposed] form as non-different [from one another,] although they are [indeed] different in themselves.”⁵⁸

1.2.10. Let us now try to summarize Dharmakīrti’s understanding of samvrrti and samvrttisat. Basically, samvrti is a cognition (buddhi, dhī, pratyaya) of a conceptual character (vikalpika). Dharmakīrti frequently calls it a unitary (eka, ekākāra, abhinnākāra) judgement (pratyavamarśa[pratyaya]), a recognition (pratyabhijñāna), or a perceptual ascertainment/judgement (niścaya[jñāna]). ⁵⁹ This cognition is variously described as erroneous (mithyāº) or as error (bhrānti, vibhrama, upaplava, viplava). As for conventionally existing things (or rather, pseudo-things), they consist in the objects (artha) or images (ākāra, rūpa, pratibimbaka) ⁶⁰ of the object as they appear in or are displayed by the conceptual cognition (jñānaº, buddhipratibhāsin, jñānanivista). ⁶¹ This object is of a purely “cognitional” nature (bauddha). ⁶² The object as it appears in this cognition is basically unreal (nistattva, nihsvabhāva, asamīksitatattva), ⁶³ but several properties are systematically ascribed (adhyavasita, āropita, adhyasta) to it: thought erroneously interprets it as being external (bāhya), real (vastu), unitary (eka), or suitable for performing a function (arthakriyākārin). ⁶⁴ Conceptual construction’s (kalpanā, vikalpana) basic and most congenital error is to conceal reality’s diversity by ascribing uniformity to it, thus construing universals or commonalities (sāmānya[lakṣana]) that it takes to be real: Many distinct things with similar functionalities are erroneously thought to share real common features that exclude them from those which lack the said functionalities. Conversely, indivisible (niramsa, eka) particulars are erroneously divided into numerous real properties (dharma) and a substantial property-bearer (dharmin), this being the basis for “co-reference” (sāmānādhikaranya) and inference itself. ⁶⁵ To put it in other words, the intrinsic error of a conceptual construction consists of unifying what is multiple and dividing what is ultimately one. Conceptuality (i.e., samvrrti) distorts reality, superimposes its own constructs (i.e., the samvrttisat) on it, and falsely ascribes erroneous aspects to it.

According to an interesting remark by Śākyabuddhi, saṃvrti is to be defined as a cognition having the appearance of a contrary aspect (viparītākāra). ⁶⁶ Let us recall here that the hallmark of ignorance is precisely that it does not grasp reality itself (avastugrahaṇa), that it consists in a cognition displaying aspects which are contrary to the ones grasped by vidyā. In the same way, a conceptual construct does not grasp reality (na… vikalpasya vastugrahanam); ⁶⁷ all of them are endowed with an erroneous object (mithyārtha eva sarvo vikalpah), ⁶⁸ and this is, according to Dharmakīrti, their intrinsic or natural error (< prakrtivibhramād vikalpānām). ⁶⁹

It comes as no surprise, then, that Dharmakīrti explicitly equates this conceptual construct with ignorance: “That conceptual constructs are incapable [of grasping reality as it is] comes from ignorance. Errors do indeed not depend just on external [things], but are also due to an internal confusion (viplava) [consisting in one’s grasping erroneous aspects], just like the error of [one’s cognition displaying] a hair-mesh, etc. ⁷⁰ [Objection: But] if confusion is produced by ignorance, it ensues that [ignorance will also] affect [perceptual awarenesses] such as visual cognitions[, which you do not accept. Answer:] No, because this [ignorance, i.e., a cognition that superimposes unreal aspects,] has the conceptual construct for its definition. ⁷¹ Ignorance indeed only consists in the conceptual construct, [and] this [ignorance] is in error by its very nature.” ⁷² A stanza quoted by Kamalaśīla, not yet identified, nicely summarizes Dharmakīrti’s understanding of conceptual construction as ignorance: “The conceptual construct falls into the nature of ignorance by its very nature, because it functions/exists by superimposing its own aspect [on reality] as [being] of an external nature.”⁷³

1.3. Ignorance as personalistic false view (satkāyadrṣ̣̣i)

1.3.1. Dharmakīrti’s understanding of ignorance as conceptual concealment reveals itself as a highly sophisticated account of the two truths, the dogmatic structure that underlies his whole philosophical enterprise. ⁷⁴ But as “religiously” relevant as the two truths may be, the theory of apoha does not seem to account for the most prominent and dramatic function of ignorance within Buddhism, i.e., its being the first link in dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda and the factor ultimately responsible for suffering. To be sure, the conceptual cognition of a pot, or even the mistaken notion of a snake, can hardly be held responsible for one’s being a slave to rebirth and samsāra. But how is it with the mistaken notion of a self, which owes its existence to psychological conditions very similar to those responsible for universals? As we shall now see, Dharmakīrti calls “personalistic false view” that part of ignorance which, superimposing a fictitious self and that which is believed to belong to this self, gives rise to all defilements and commits living beings to action and rebirth. ⁷⁵ To be more precise, Dharmakīrti consistently equates ignorance with the personalistic false view. Considering the fact that “personalistic false view” is by no means synonymous with “conceptuality,” how can Dharmakīrti equate ignorance with the personalistic false view and with conceptuality? This identification raises a second problem: Though he assents to it in his PrSVy, Vasubandhu strongly rejects the identification of ignorance with a false view (drṣsti) in his AKBh. To sum up, Dharmakīrti’s position faces both the problem of internal consistency and of Abhidharmic orthodoxy.

1.3.2. Dharmakīrti equates the personalistic false view with ignorance/ignorance/delusion in several sections of his PV. Let us review a few of them. The identification of satkāyadarśana with ignorance occurs in the following stanza: “The birth of all kinds of [moral] faults is due to the [false] view of self [i.e., to the clinging to self and one’s own, and] this [false view of self] is ignorance [itself].”⁷⁶ Its identity with ignorance is stressed in Dharmakīrti’s commentary on the same stanza: “All [moral] faults are born from the [false] view of self, and it is this [false view of self] that is called ‘ignorance’ [in our doctrinal system].”⁷⁷ As for equating personalistic belief and delusion, this occurs at least twice in PV 2: “Delusion is the root[-cause] of [moral] faults, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [personal] being.” ⁷⁸ Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that his interpretation of ignorance as the false view of self might incur criticism from many of his co-religionists, even though, as we shall see, he was by no means the first Buddhist scholar to interpret it in this manner. Whereas his general understanding of ignorance in terms of erroneous cognition was closely in line with Vasubandhu’s position, his identification of a false view with ignorance could be rejected on the grounds that Vasubandhu held the false view to be associated (samprayukta) with ignorance and not identical with ignorance; ⁷⁹ consequently, this identification could easily be found guilty of contradicting the scriptures (āgamavirodha). Dharmakīrti was thus compelled both to explain how something can be said to be associated with itself, and to account for such a loss of the meaning of “associated” (samprayuktārtha). Dharmakīrti seems to have entrusted (hypothetical) followers and/ or commentators with the task of answering these questions of a more dogmatic character. His exegetical justification for this identification occurs in the following stanza: “The contradiction [with scriptures] which [seems to ensue] on this point has to be explained. However, since [the perception of emptiness] is contradictory to this [personalistic false view], it is established that the perception of emptiness contradicts all the [moral] faults [too], which are born of this [personalistic false view].” ⁸⁰ The argument underlying this justification is the following. Most Buddhist teachings hold ignorance/ignorance/delusion to be the cause of defilements and suffering. Since the perception of emptiness (śūnyatādṛsti), or the perception of selflessess (nairātmyadṛsti), is the only means capable of uprooting defilements, it must be capable of eliminating their cause too, because the elimination of something presupposes the destruction of its cause. ⁸¹ That the perception of selflessness eliminates the cause of defilements can only be due to the fact that its objectsupport and aspect are contrary to those displayed by the cause of defilements. The only cognition whose aspects are contra(dicto)ry to those displayed by the perception of selflessness is the false view of self. The ignorance held to be the cause of defilements can, therefore, only consist in the personalistic false view. The following stanza follows the same line of argument: “Delusion is presented as the [principal] cause of moral faults [in one Sūtra, and] in another one, it is the personalistic false view, because [moral faults] are eliminated when the [personalistic false view] is eliminated.” ⁸² In his commentary, ⁸³ Dharmakīrti argues that if the Buddha has taught delusion to be the cause of defilements in one Sūtra, and in another one the personalistic false view, he could only have the same primary cause (pradhāna[hetu]) in mind, because in both cases he is pointing out the factor that, when eliminated, leads to the elimination of the defilements, i.e., the “material” cause (upādāna). In other words, “delusion” and “personalistic false view” are synonymous.

How do commentators with this type of doctrinal background explain away the contradiction to the scriptures that seems to ensue from this identification? What does “associated” mean in the Abhidharmic statement “ignorance is associated with the false view(s)” if ignorance and the personalistic false view are one and the same thing? ⁸⁴ According to Devendrabuddhi, “associated” points here to a relationship between the parts and the whole (ekadeśaikadeśibhāva); Śākyabuddhi explains it as being like the relationship between the body and its limbs (añgāngibhāva). ⁸⁵ According to Prajñākaragupta, “associated” refers to a relationship between the universal and specific instance (sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva). ⁸⁶ Ignorance and the personalistic false view stand in the same kind of relationship as a forest (vana) and palāśa-trees (Butea frondosa) in the expression: “The forest possesses palāśa-trees” (palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti), or the body (śarīra) and limbs such as hands (pāni) in the expression: “The body possesses [limbs] such as hands” (pānyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti). ⁸⁷ The apparent contradiction with scriptures can then be explained away easily: To say that ignorance is associated with the personalistic false view means that ignorance as a whole, a body or a universal possesses the personalistic false view as a part, a member/limb, or a specific instance. ⁸⁸ As Prajñākaragupta concludes, “by stating [that the personalistic false view is] a specific instance (viśeṣābhidhānena), ignorance consisting in this [i.e., a false view,] is pointed out as being primarily the cause [of defilements].” ⁸⁹ Or, according to Manorathanandin, “[Dharmakīrti’s] aim [in defining ignorance as the personalistic false view] is to show that ignorance consisting in a false view is primarily the cause of defilements.” ⁹⁰

1.3.3. According to Dharmakīrti as well as Vasubandhu, ignorance is an anti- or counter-knowledge displaying and superimposing erroneous aspects on reality. Though this understanding of ignorance is perfectly consonant with the Buddhist traditions’ insistence on conceptual construction and language providing a biased account of reality, it does not explain why true aspects such as selflessness, though perceived, never become the objects of determinate cognitions. Moreover, this account of ignorance as superimposition does not satisfactorily explain in which sense traditional accounts hold ignorance to be the cause of defilements, clinging, action and bondage. Dharmakīrti’s specification of ignorance as the personalistic false view aims at answering these two questions. This false view is made responsible for an ordinary person’s superimposition of erroneous aspects such as self and one’s own (ātmīya, i.e., what belongs to the self), which are the causes of the defilements and actions leading to painful existence. In this perspective, “personalistic false view” might well be just an arbitrary designation referring to that part of ignorance which, insofar as it superimposes such aspects, is primarily the cause of subsequent defilements.

1.3.4. Various terms refer to this kind of ignorance in Dharmakīrti’s writings: “personalistic false view” (satkāyadrṣsti, “darśana), “false view of a self” (ātmadarśana), “belief in/adhesion to a self” (ātmagraha, ātmābhiniveśa), and “false view of/belief in a living being” (sattvadrṣsti, sattvadarśana, sattvagraha). ⁹¹ According to Yogācāra and Sautrāntika definitions, the personalistic belief consists in one’s considering the five constituents to which one clings (upādānaskandha) either as a self (ātmatah) or as one’s own (ātmīyatah). ⁹²

People who are deluded by this false view hold a basically transient (sat < sīdati) collection or cluster to be both permanent (< nityasaṃjñā) and unitary (< pindasaṃjñā). Note should be made that this view does not have this perishing multitude (satkāya) as its content, but bears on it as an object in an erroneous way. Texts like the YBh and the AKBh view the personalistic false view as twofold. In its speculative (vikalpita, parikalpita) form, it characterizes the non-Buddhists’ (Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika) doctrines of the self and is to be eliminated by the path of vision (darśanaheya). As for the innate (sahaja) personalistic belief, it afflicts all living beings including animals, and can only be eliminated by the path of cultivation (bhāvanāheya). ⁹³ In other words, only Buddhas and Śrāvaka-Arhats/Pratyekabuddhas have rid themselves of it. ⁹⁴ No matter how important the speculative belief in a self can be in a philosophical and “heresiological” perspective, it is only of marginal importance in the context of Dharmakīrti’s religious thought: ⁹⁵ All he has to say about the personalistic false view pertains to its innate or natural form. According to him, the innate false view of personality is to be equated with ignorance, is the root cause of all defilements and depravities, and is the ultimate cause of suffering. As we can expect, the personalistic false view supplies the first link in Dharmakīrti’s account of dependent origination. To rid oneself of it is tantamount to freeing oneself from bondage, rebirth and saṃsāra.

1.3.5. Let me turn briefly to the vexing question of Dharmakīrti’s sources for this equation of ignorance with the personalistic false view. As we have seen above, ⁹⁶ Devendrabuddhi as well as several Indian commentators regard the DBhS as providing scriptural evidence for Dharmakīrti’s position. But many other Sūtra and śāstra texts may have been influential. In his pioneering study of Dharmakīrti’s religious thought, Tilmann Vetter has drawn the attention of scholars to an oft-quoted passage from the Śālistambasūtra, where ignorance is equated with notions such as those of a self (ātmasaṃjñā), of a (substantial) living being (sattvasaṃjñā), of an “I” (ahaṃkārasaṃj̃̃ā) and of a “mine” (mamakārasaṃj̃̃ā). ⁹⁷ However, considering Dharmakīrti’s doctrinal background, materials scattered throughout Yogācāra works (including Vasubandhu’s) are likely to have had a more direct impact on his ideas, though, as Lambert Schmithausen remarks, “the Yogācāras, like the Sarvāstivādins (…), usually distinguish clearly between avidyā / mohalajñāna and satkāyadrṣ̣ti/ātmadrṣ̣ti.”⁹⁸ According to Schmithausen, the Paramārthagāthās “lay considerable stress on the false view of Self (…) or the notion of Ego (…) and would thus seem to have, to a certain extent, affinities to a tradition like that of the Śālistambasūtra (…) to which the (innate) false view of Self is the fundamental Defilement and not distinct from avidyā (…)”⁹⁹

While dealing with dependent origination, however, the Yogācāra(/ Sautrāntika) intellectuals paid a great deal of attention to another Sūtra text, the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra of the Samyuktāgama. [^100] In my opinion, this Sūtra and/or its scholastic posterity is likely to have provided Dharmakīrti an even stronger scriptural foundation than the Śālistambasūtra or the Paramārthagāthās. The doctrinal line originating in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra permeates works like the Savitarkādibhūmi of the YBh, ¹⁰⁰ the AS, ¹⁰¹ the AKBh¹⁰² as well as the AVS(N),¹⁰³ and was commented upon at length by Vasubandhu in his PrSVy¹⁰⁴ In its vibhanga section, the Sūtra provides a list of twenty ¹⁰⁵ kinds of ignorance (ajñāna). Although the original wording and sequence of the items are uncertain, ¹⁰⁶ those of the six initial ones are reasonably clear: (1) ignorance regarding the past [life] (pūrvānte ‘jñānam); (2) ignorance regarding the future [life] (aparānte ‘jñānam); (3) ignorance regarding [both] the past and future [lives] (pūrvāntāparānte ‘jñānam); (4) ignorance regarding the internal [conditioned factors] (adhyātmam ajñānam);

[^100] T. 99 (Sūtra 298). A Sanskrit manuscript containing 25 Sūtras from the Samyuktanikāya (Sūtras 283-303 and 343-346) has been discovered in Turfan (see Waldschmidt 1957), and edited by C. Tripāṭhī (see Tripāṭhī 1962; on Tripāṭhī’s edition, see de Jong 1974). The original title of Sūtra 298 seems to be Pratītyasamutpādādivibhañganirdeśa (Ādisūtra in Tripāṭhī’s edition), “mais, dans l’usage courant, on le citait sous le titre de Pratītyasamutpādasūtra” (de Jong 1974: 145). In addition to the interest of major Buddhist intellectuals (most of them Yogācāra and/or Sautrāntika), this Sūtra seems to have enjoyed great popularity at least from the 5^th century: a Brāhmī inscription (2^nd half of the 5^th century) on a pillar near Dunhuang contains a fragment of it (see Gokhale 1944), the Sūtra’s entire text is found on both of two bricks (6^th century) found in Nālandā (see Chakravarti 1931-1932) as well as on two golden plates (between 650 and 800) located in Jakarta (see de Casparis 1956: 52). The Sanskrit text of the Nālandā brick inscriptions has been edited by Chakravarti (1931-1932: 197-199) and translated into German by Frauwallner (1958: 39-43); the Tibetan version of the Sūtra has been edited by de Jong (1974: 146-149); the Chinese text of Xuanzang’s version (T. 124) has been translated into English by Bagchi (1931-1932: 201-204).

(5) ignorance regarding the external [conditioned factors] (bahirdhā ‘jñānam); (6) ignorance regarding [both] the internal and the external [conditioned factors] (adhyātmabahirdhā ‘jñānam). These six items have been unanimously interpreted as referring to various features of the false view of self and one’s own. Leaving items (3) and (6) out of consideration, let us have a closer look, first, at the two initial ones. According to the YBh, ignorance regarding the past (life) consists in “the ignorance of the [one] who improperly conceives the past conditioned factors [by wondering]: ‘Did I exist in the past or did I not exist? Who was I, and (vā how did I exist?”¹⁰⁷ As for the ignorance regarding the future (life), it consists in “the ignorance of the [one] who improperly conceives the future conditioned factors [by wondering]: ‘Shall I exist in the future or shall I not exist? What shall I be? How shall I exist?’”¹⁰⁸ Still worthier of notice is this tradition’s explanation of items (4) and (5), with its emphasis on self and one’s own, improper reflection and personalistic belief: “What does ignorance about internal [factors] consist in? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers his conditioned factors to be a self. What does ignorance about external [factors] consist in? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers to be his own the external conditioned factors which are not included among [entities constituting] living beings. ¹⁰⁹ Vasubandhu explains these forms of ignorance as consisting in one’s giving rise to the false view of a (substantial) living being (sattvadrṣsti) regarding one’s own as well as others’ streams svaº and parasantāna). [^111]

As we can see, Dharmakīrti was by no means the first Buddhist intellectual to have connected avidyā with ātmadṛṣṭi and the like, ¹¹⁰ nor to have defined the former by means of the latter, but he seems to have been the first to have developed exegetical strategies to justify an equation that could easily be taken, at least among the Ābhidharmikas, as unorthodox. (To be continued)

Abbreviations and literature

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• AKVy — Unrai Wogihara: Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the Work of Yaśomitra. Tokyo 1989 (1936²): Sankibo Buddhist Book Store (The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā).
• AS — Prahlad Pradhan: Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asañga. Santiniketan 1950: Visva-Bharati (Visva-Bharati Studies, 12).
• ASBh — Nathmal Tatia: Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam. Patna 1976: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 17).
• AVS(N) - N.H. Samtani: The Arthaviniścayasūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana) (Written by Bhikṣu Vīryaśrīdatta of Śrī-Nālandāvihāra).
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• La Vallée Poussin 1913 - Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Bouddhisme, études
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• Mejor 2001 - Marek Mejor: “Controversy on the mutual conditioning of avidyā and ayoniśomanas(i)kāra in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa.” Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies 4 (2001), pp. 49[/292]-78[/263].
• Mejor 2002 - Marek Mejor: “On the sevenfold classification of the negative particle (nañ) (Grammatical explanation of avidyā in Vasubandhu’s Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā).” Pp. 87-100 in: Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Thought: In Honor of Doctor Hajime Sakurabe on His Seventyseventh Birthday. Kyōto 2002: Heirakuji Shoten.
• MS — See Lamotte 1973: I.
• Muroji 1991 - Yoshihito G. Muroji: “Vedanā- und Tṛ̣̣̣āvibhañga in der Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā.” Mikkyō Bunka 173 (1991), pp. 74-98.
• Muroji 1993 - Yoshihito G. Muroji: Vasubandhus Interpretation des Pratītyasamutpāda. Eine kritische Bearbeitung der Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā (Saṃskāra- und Vijñānavibhañga). Stuttgart 1993: Franz Steiner Verlag (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, 43).
• NM — Nyāyamukha (Dignāga). Referred to on the basis of Tucci 1930 and Chu 2004.
• P - Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tōkyō/Kyōto 1957: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.
• Pā — Pāṇini (Aṣtādhyāyī).
• Paramārthagāthā - The 44 stanzas, together with their commentary, have been edited and translated by A. Wayman (see Wayman 1961: 163-185); stanzas 28-41 and their commentary have been edited and translated by L. Schmithausen (see Schmithausen 1987: I.223-241).
• PrP — Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Madhyamakavṛttiḥ: Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Delhi 1992: Motilal Banarsidass (SaintPetersburg 1903-1913¹, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4).
• PrSVy — Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā (Vasubandhu). D no. 3995, Chi 1b61a, P no. 5496, Chi 1-71a.
• Pruden 1988-1990 - Leo M. Pruden: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vols. Berkeley 1988-1990: Asian Humanities Press.
• PS(V) — Ernst Steinkellner: Dignāga’s Pramānasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s Tīkā. Vienna 2005: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last accessed 06/08/2010).
• PSk - Li Xuezhu/Ernst Steinkellner: Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka. Beijing/Vienna 2008: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 4).
• PST - Ernst Steinkellner/Helmut Krasser/Horst Lasic: Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition. Beijing/Vienna 2005: China Tibetology Publishing House/ Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 1/I).
• PV 1-4 - Yūsho Miyasaka: “Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).” Acta Indologica 2 (1971-1972), pp. 1-206. See also PVV; for PV 2-3, see also PVA; for PV 1, see also PVSV; for PV 2.131cd-285, see also Vetter 1990. My numbering of the verses in PV 2 follows that of Vetter.
• PVA — Rāhula Sāñkṛtyāyana: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālañkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam). Patna 1953: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
• PVinṬ — Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara). D no. 4229, Dze 1b1-Tshe 178a3/P no. 5727, Dze 1b1-We 209b8.
• PVP — Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi). D no. 4217, Che 1-326b4/P no. 5717, Che 1-390a8.
• PVSV — Raniero Gnoli: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First
• Chapter with the Auto-Commentary. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, 23).
• PVSVṬ — Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Karnakagomin’s Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti. Kyōto 1982: Rinsen Books Co. (Allahabad 1943¹: Kitab Mahal).
• PVṬ — Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi). D no. 4220, Je 1b1-Ñe 282a7/P no. 5718, Je 1b1-Ñe 348a8.
• PVV — Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: “Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin.” Published as an appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26 (1938-1940).
• Rahder 1932 - Johannes Rahder: “La Satkāyadṛṣti d’après Vibhāṣā, 8.” Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 1 (1931-1932), pp. 227-239.
• Samtani 1971 — See AVS(N).
• Schmithausen 1987 — Lambert Schmithausen: Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy. 2 vols. Tōkyō 1987: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series, IVa/b).
• Schoening 1995 — Jeffrey D. Schoening: The Śālistamba Sūtra and its Indian Commentaries. 2 vols. Vienna 1995: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 35/1-2).
• Siddhi — Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. 2 vols. Paris 1929: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner (Buddhica, Documents et travaux pour l’étude du bouddhisme publiés sous la direction de Jean Przyluski, Première série: Mémoires, 5).
• T — Junjirō Takakusu/Kaikyoku Watanabe: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō. Tōkyō 1924-1932: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai.
• TrBh — Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (Sthiramati).
• L = Sylvain Lévi: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā. Paris 1925: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion (Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques et philologiques, fasc. 245).
• B = Hartmut Buescher: Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya. Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation. Wien 2007: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, 57).
• Tripāṭhī 1962 - Chandrabhāl Tripāṭhī: Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasamyukta = Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden VIII. Berlin 1962: Akademie-Verlag.
• TS(P) — K = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. 2 vols. Baroda 1984: Oriental Institute.
• Ś = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalshīla. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series, 1).
• Tucci 1930 - Giuseppe Tucci: The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga. The Oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, After Chinese and Tibetan Materials. Heidelberg 1930: Otto Harrassowitz (Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 15).
• Tucci 1971 - Giuseppe Tucci: “A Fragment from the Pratītya-SamutpādaVyākhyā of Vasubandhu.” Pp. 239-248 in: Giuseppe Tucci: Opera Minora. Parte I. Roma 1971 (JRAS, Calcutta 19301): Dott. Giovanni Bardi, editore (Universita di Roma, Studi Orientali Pubblicati a Cura della Scuola Orientale, 6).
• Vetter 1964 - Tilmann Vetter: Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien 1964: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., Kommissionsverlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philologisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 245).
• Vetter 1990 - Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramānavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramānasiddhi-Kapitel. Wien 1990: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 12).
• Vibh. — Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV. See PVV.
• VinSg — Viniścayasañgrahanī of the YBh. P no. 5539, Zi 1b1 - ‘i 142b8.
• Waldschmidt 1957 — Ernst Waldschmidt: “Identifizierung einer Handschrift des Nidānasamyukta aus den Turfanfunden.” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 107/2 (1957), pp. 372-401.
• Wayman 1957 - Alex Wayman: “The Meaning of Unwisdom (Avidyā).” Philosophy East and West 7/1-2 (1957), pp. 21-25.
• Wayman 1961 - Alex Wayman: Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. Berkeley/Los Angeles 1961: University of California Press.
• Wayman 1980 - Alex Wayman: “Nescience and Insight According to Asaṅga’s Yogācārabhūmi.” Pp. 251-266 in: Somaratna Balasooriya et al. (eds.): Buddhist Studies in honour of Walpola Rahula. London, etc. 1980: Gordon Fraser.
• YBh — = Yogācārabhūmi, or, followed by page/line numbers: V. Bhattacharya: The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asañga. Calcutta 1957: University of Calcutta.

Footnotes

1. This study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus”). Most sincere thanks are due to Helmut Krasser and Ernst Steinkellner. Lambert Schmithausen also deserves my wholehearted gratitude for having gone through this essay with incomparably great care and erudition. My most sincere thanks are due to Cynthia Peck, who kindly corrected my English. ↩

2. Previous studies on avidyā include La Vallée Poussin 1913: 6-9, Wayman 1957 and 1980, Matilal 1980, Mejor 2001 and 2002. On Dharmakīrti’s notion of avidyā, see Vetter 1990: 22-26, Franco 2001: 289-300, Eltschinger 2007: 503-510. The present essay does not take into consideration Dharmakīrti’s Yogācāra account of ignorance as duality; on this point, see Eltschinger 2005: 162-175. ↩

3. PV 2.213: vidyāyāh pratipakṣatvāc caittatvenopalabdhitah / mithyopalabdhir ajñānam ukteś cānyad ayuktimat //. ↩

4. Dharmakīrti’s opponent(s) is/are, according to Devendrabuddhi, (a) certain co-religionist(s) (svayūthya) (PVP D91a5/P105b1: rañ gi sde pa ‘ga’ žig), vaibhāṣikādi according to PVṬ D135b5/P167a7-8 (rañ gi sde pa ni bye brag rab tu smra ba la sogs pa’o //). Note AKBh 56,6 on AK 2.26ac (standard definition of the six kleśamahābhūmika): tatra moho nāmāvidyā ‘jñānam asamprakhyānam. asamprakhyāna (Tib. mi gsal ba) in PVP D91a5/P105a8 (mi śes pa mi gsal ba’i ño bo), PVṬ D135b4-5/P167a7 (mi gsal ba’i ño bo źes bya ba’i rtogs pa med pa’i ño bo’o //), PVV 85,5-6 (asamprakhyānamātra). ↩

5. On the PrSVy, see Frauwallner 1958: 43-48, Tucci 1971, de Jong 1974: 145, Muroji 1991 and 1993, Mejor 1997 and 2002. See also below §1.3.5 and nn. 100 and 105. ↩

6. PVP D91a7/P105b3: yañ dag pa’i don mthon் ba ni rig pa yin (*sadarthadarśanaṃ vidyā); PVṬ Je D113b7-114a1/P134b2-3 = PVSVṬ 209,20-21: bhūtārthagrahaṇaṃ vidyā. Note also PVA 145,22: vidyā nairātmyadrṣtiṣu (sic); PVV 85,5: vidyāyā nairātmyadrṣṭ̣̣̣; PVV 85,7: vidyāyāh sadarthatvāt. ↩

7. PVA 145,23: na tāvad vidyābhāvo ‘vidyā tadabhāvasya* nirvāne ‘pi bhāvāt /. *tadabhāvasya according to PVA_tib D Te 136a3 (de med pa), against tadbhāvasya Sāṅkṛtyāyana. AKBh 1,13-15: pratyekabuddhā api kāmaṃ sarvatra hatāndhakārāh / kliṣṭasaṃmohātyantavigamāt / na tu sarvathā / tathā hy eṣāṃ buddhadharmeṣv ativiprakṛ̣tadeśakāleṣv artheṣu cānantaprabhedeṣu bhavaty evākliṣtam ajñānam /. On the ignorance of the Arhat, see AKVy 4,12-5,18, Bareau 1957 and Jaini 2001. ↩

8. This manner of defining ignorance can already be found in Vasubandhu’s PrSVy 8a3-b5 (with the conclusion, 8b4: rig pa’i mi mthun pa’i phyogs kyi chos gźan ni ma rig pa yin no źes bya ba rig [P rigs] par bya ste /); but here, Vasubandhu seems to discard six hypotheses before reaching this conclusion (1. rig pa’i dños po med pa tsam 8a3-7; 2. rig pa las gźan pa gañ yin pa 8a7-8; 3. rig pa dañ ‘dra ba’i chos gźan 8a8; 4. smad pa’i rig pa 8a8-b3; 5. rig pa chuñ ba 8b3; 6. rig pa dañ bral ba gañ yin pa 8b3-4). This explanation is based on grammatical explanations on Pā 2.2.6; in this connection, Vasubandhu quotes the following unidentified stanza: pratisedhe ca sattāyā [h], anyatve, sadrśe ‘pi ca / kutsālpavirahārthesu vipakṣe cāpi nañ bhavet //. “This negative particle is [used] in [the sense of] opposition to being [i.e. absence], difference, similarity, contempt, smallness, separation, and contrariety” (Sanskrit text as quoted in Mejor 2002: 90; translation Mejor 2002: 91 and 94). On this point, see Matilal 1980: 156-157, Mejor 1997: 155-156 and especially Mejor 2002 (which contains an English translation of the entire PrSVy passage). For scholastic literature, see AKBh 140,26-141,5: athāvidyeti ko ‘rthah / yā na vidyā / cakṣurādiṣv api prasañgah / vidyāyā abhāvas tarhi / evaṃ sati na kiṃcit syāt / na caitad yuktam / … kuta etat / pratyayabhāvenopadeśāt /; PrSVy 8a7-8: rig pa las gžan pa gañ yin pa de yañ ma rig pa ma yin te / mig la sogs pa la’añ thal bar ‘gyur ba’i phyir ro //, and PrSVy 8a3: re žig rig pa’i dños po med pa tsam ni ma rig pa ma yin te / ‘di ltar dños po med pa ni ‘du byed skye ba’i bdag po’i rkyen ñid du mi rigs pa’i phyir ro //; Yaśomitra’s comments at AKVy 301,2-13, among which AKVy 301,3-5: na kiṃcit syād iti / yadi vidyāyā abhāvo ‘vidyā ‘dravyaṃ syād ity arthaḥ / na caitad yuktam iti / pratyayabhāvenopadeśāt /, as well as AKVy 301,11-13: kuta etat / pratyayabhāvenopadeśāt / avidyāpratyayāh saṃskārā iti / na cāvidyāyā anyeṣāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ pratyayabhāvenopadeśo yuktaḥ / arhatāṃ saṃskārāsambhavāt / na cābhāvasya / śaśaviṣānādīnām apratyayatvāt /). For epistemological literature, see PVP D91a7-b2/ P105b3-6: de la re žig yañ dag pa’i don mthon் ba ni rig pa yin la / ma rig pa žes bya ba’i rtogs pa de las gžan pa’am / de dañ ‘gal ba’am / de med pa’i chos yin grañ na / re žig gžan ni ma yin te / gzugs la sogs pa yañ de lta bur thal ba’i phyir ro // med pa (P pa: D pa’i) yañ ma yin te / dños po’i mtshan ñid kyi gnas skabs yin pa’i phyir ro // mi mthun pa’i phyogs su ‘gyur grañ na / mi mthun pa’i phyogs ñid kyañ ‘gal ba’i rañ bžin ñid yin no // (see also Śākyabuddhi’s comments in PVṬ D135b6-136a1/P167b2-4). PVA 145,23-25: na tāvad vidyābhāvo ‘vidyā tadbhāvasya nirvāne ‘pi bhāvāt / na cābhāvo hetuh / nāpi tadanyo rūpādīnām avidyāprasañgāt / tasmād vidyāviruddho dharmo ‘vidyā ‘dharmānṛtavat / tac ca satkāyadarśanam eva /. PVV 85,5-6: vidyāyā nairātmyadṛ̣̣ter vipakṣo ‘vidyā / sa cāprakhyānamātraṃ vā rūpādi vā na bhavati / nirvāne ‘pi tayor bhāvāt /. See also PVP D91b2-4/P105b6-106a1. ↩

9. AKBh 141,1-5: tasmāt - vidyāvipakṣo dharmo ‘nyo ‘vidyā ‘mitrānṛtādivat // (= AK 3.28cd) yathā mitraviparyayeṇa tadvipakṣabhūtah kaścid amitro bhavati na tu yah kaścid anyo mitrān nāpi mitrābhāvah / ṛtaṃ cocyate satyam / tadvipakṣabhūtaṃ vākyam anṛtaṃ bhavati / adharmānarthākāryādayaś ca dharmādipratidvandvabhūtāh / evam avidyāpi vidyāyāh pratidvandvabhūtadharmāntaram iti draṣtavyam /. PVA 145,22 (adharmānrtavat) and 145,25-27: tathā hi parānugrahalakṣaṇo dharmas tadabhāvamātram nādharmo ‘pi tu tadanyamātram / api tv* anugrahaviruddha upaghāto ‘dharmah / tathā na bhūtārthapratipādanābhāvo ‘nrtam api tv abhūtapratipādanam asatyavacanam /. * PVA_tib D Te 136a5 (chos ma yin na ni de med pa tsam ma yin la de las gźan tsam yañ ma yin gyi / ‘on kyañ…) suggests …tadabhāvamātram nādharmo nāpi tadanyamātram / api tu… PVV 85,7 (adharmānrtavat). ↩

10. AKVy 301,5-6: tadvipakṣa iti / virodhe nañ iti darśayati / na tu yah kaścid anyo mitrād iti / na paryudāsamātra iti darśayati /. ↩

11. See AKBh 56,2-6. ↩

12. AKBh 62,9 on AK 2.34d 2 : pañcabhiḥ samatāprakārair āśrayālamban ākārakāladravyasamatābhih /. Translation in Pruden 1988-1990: 206, with “factors” instead of “states.” PVP D92a1-2/P106a6-7: de ltar (D ltar: P ltar ni) rten dañ dmigs pa dañ rnam pa dañ dus dañ rdzas mtshuñs pa dag gis mtshuñs par ldan pa’i phyir* mtshuñs par ldan pa yin par ‘dod do //. PVA 146,3-4: āśrayālambanākārakāladravyasamatābhih samaṃ prayuktā iti samprayuktāh /. PVV 85,8-9: āśrayālambanākārakāladravyasamatādibhih samaṃ prayuktāh samprayuktā iti samprayuktalakṣanam /. *PVṬ D136a5-6/ P168a2-3: rten dañ dmigs pa dañ [rnam pa dañ] dus dañ rdzas mtshuñs pa dag gis mtshuñs par ldan pa’i phyir źes bya ba ni chos mñon pa las sems las byuñ ba mtshuñs par ldan pa yin par bźed do //. ↩

13. AKVy 142,1-3: vijñānaṃ hi nīlaṃ pītaṃ vā vastu vijānāty upalabhata ity arthaḥ / tad eva tathālambanaṃ (?) vastu vedanā ‘nubhavati / saṃjñā paricchinatti / cetanā ‘bhisaṃskarotīty evamādi /. ↩

14. PVP D92a1/P106a6: dmigs pa dañ rnam pa ‘dzin pa yin (D pa yin: P om. pa yin) te / rtogs (P rtogs: D rtog) pa med pa’i ño bo ni ma yin no //. Note Śākyabuddhi’s definition of ālambana and ākāra in PVṬ D117b2/P143b5: dmigs pa ni yul yin la de’i ‘dzin pa (D pa: P pa’i) rnam pa yin no //. ↩

15. PVṬ D136a6/P168a3-4 and D136b1/P168a6-7: gal te ma rig pa rtogs pa med pa’i ño bo ñid yin (yin em.: DP om. yin) pa de’i tshe dmigs pa dañ rnam par mtshuñs par mi ‘gyur ro // … de bas na sems las byuñ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ma rig pa ni rtogs pa med pa’i ño bo ñid ma yin gyi ‘on kyañ rtogs pa’i ño bo yin no //. ↩

16. According to PVP D92a5-6/P106b3-4: gsun் phyir bcom ldan ‘das kyis kyañ mdo de dañ de dag tu (= tatra tatra sūtre PVA 145,5) śes rab kyis bzuñ ba’i rnam pa las phyin ci log tu ‘dzin pa’i ño bo ñid ni ma rig pa yin no źes gsuñs pa yin te /, to be compared with PVA 146,4-5: uktam ca prajñākāraviparītapratipattir[ū]paivāvidyeti / tatra tatra sūtra ukteh*/. *ukteh according to PVA^tib D Te 136b3 (gsuñs pa’i phyir ro), against uktāh Sāñkrtyāyana. On the “aspectual” opposition between avidyā and prajñā/ vipaśyanā, see below §1.2.5. ↩

17. See below §1.3.5. ↩

18. CPSS 298,28: tatra katamo ‘jñānavigamah / yad idaṃ yathābhūtānāṃ dharmāṇām adhyāropavigamah //. PVP D92a4-5/P106b4-5: ‘di lta ste ‘Phags pa zla ba sgron ma’i tiñ ñe ‘dzin las de la mi śes pa med pa gañ źe na / gañ yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin gyi chos rnams la sgro ‘dogs pa med pa yin no źes gsuñs pa lta bu’o //. PVA 146,5-6: tatra katamo ‘jñānavigam[ah /] yo yathābhūtānāṃdharmānām adhyāropavigamah*//. *For adhyāropādhigamah in Sāñkrtyāyana’s edition. ↩

19. On punyāpunyāneñjyān abhisaṃskārān upacinvanti, see BHSD 1953: 57b. ↩

20. DBhS VI C 48,1-10: tasya lokasya sambhavam ca vibhavam ca vyavalokayata evaṃ bhavati / yāvatyo lokasamudācāropapattayaḥ sarvās tā ātmābhinivesáto bhavanti / ātmābhiniveśavigamato na bhavanti loka-samudācāropapattaya iti / tasyaivaṃ bhavati / tena khalu punar ime bālabuddhaya ātmābhiniviṣtā ajñānatimirāvrtā bhāvābhāvābhilāṣino ‘yoniśomanasikāraprasṛtā vipathaprayātā mithyānucāriṇah punyāpunyāneñjyān abhisaṃskārān upacinvanti / teṣạṃ taih samskārair avaropitaṃ cittabījaṃ sāsravaṃ sopādānam āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇapunarbhavābhinirvṛttisambhavopagataṃ bhavati /. PVP D92a7-b3/P106b5-107a2: de skad du Sa bcu pa’i mdo las de ‘jig rten gyi ‘byuñ ba (P ba: D om. ba) dañ / ‘jig pa la (D la: P las) rnam par lta ba’i tshe ‘di sñam du sems te / ‘jig rten du ‘dogs pa ‘byuñ ba ji sñed pa de dag thams cad ni bdag tu mñon par źen pa las ‘byuñ ste / bdag tu mñon par źen pa dañ bral na ‘byuñ ba yañ med par ‘gyur ro sñam mo // de ‘di sñam du sems te / byis pa’i blo can bdag tu mñon par źen pa mi śes pa’i rab rib kyis bsgribs (D bsgribs: P sgribs) pa yod pa dañ med pa la mñon par ‘dod pa can tshul bźin pa ma yin pa yid la byed pa las byuñ (D byuñ: P ‘byuñ) ba lam log par źugs pa log (D log: P ldog) pa’i rjes su ‘brañ ba de dag ni bsod nams dañ bsod nams ma yin pa dañ mi g.yo ba’i ‘du byed rnams kyañ sogs te / ‘du byed de dag gis yon’s su bsgos pa’i sems kyi sa bon zag (D zag: P zad) pa dañ bcas pa ñe bar len pa dañ bcas pa ni phyi ma la skye ba dañ rga śí’i rañ bźin yañ srid pa mñon par grub pa ‘byuñ ba ñe bar ‘gro ba yin te źes gsuñs so //. Note also Śākyabuddhi’s valuable explanations in PVṬ D136b2-4/P168a7-168b3: ‘dod pa na spyod pa’i dge ba’i las ni bsod nams so // bzlog ni bsod nams ma yin pa’o // gzugs dañ gzugs med pa na spyod pa’i las ni mi g.yo ba’o // ‘du byed de dag gis źes bya ba ni bsod nams dag gis so // yon’s su bsgos pa’i sems kyi sa bon la brten nas śes pa’i nus pa byed pa’i phyir ro // sa bon de yañ zag pa dañ bcas pa yin te / de la dmigs pa’i ñon mons pa rnams der rgyas par ‘gyur ba’i phyir ro // sred pa la sogs pa’i grogs can ni ‘bras bu ‘byin pa’i phyir ñe bar len pa dañ bcas pa’o // skye ba dañ rga śi dañ ldan pa’i ‘du byed kyi rgyun ni skye ba dañ rga śi’i rañ bźin srid pa’o // de mñon par ‘grub ciñ de ‘byuñ ba ni de ñe bar len pa’i nus pa las byuñ ba yin te / de las byuñ ba yin pa’i phyir ro // der ñe bar ‘gro ba ni ldan pa’o //. PVA 146,6-7: tathā yāh kāścana lokopacāropapattayah sarvās tā ātmābhinivesáto bhavanti / ātmābhiniveśavigamato na bhavanti. PVV 85,10-13: bhagavatāpy uktam yāh kāścana lokavyavahāropapattayah sarvās tā ātmābhiniveśato bhavanti / ātmābhiniveśavigamato na bhavantīty anena sattvadrṣṭir eva janmahetur uktā / ātmābhiniveśalakṣanatvāt tasyāh /. ↩

21. PVP D92b33/P107a2: ‘di ñid la yañ ma rig pa’i yan lag bstan pas bdag tu lta ba bstan pa yin no //. ↩

22. PVṬ D133b4-5/P164b6-7: …yod pa ma yin pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa’i phyir ro //. PVṬ D133b5/P164b8: …phyin ci log gi rnam pa la dmigs pa’i phyir ro //. ↩

23. PVP D56b1-2/P64a7: …‘gal ba yin / dmigs pa dañ rnam pa phyin ci log pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro //. PVP D56b4/P64b1-2: …‘gal ba yin te / dmigs pa dañ rnam pa phyin ci log pa ñid du bstan pa’i phyir ro //. PVV 58,5-6: viparītālambanākāratvāt /. ↩

24. PVP D91b1-2/P105b5-6: de ltar na rnam pa gañ rig pas gzuñ ba de las phyin ci log pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa can ni ma rig pa źes bya bar ‘gyur ro //. PVP D91b5-6/P106a2-3: log par dmigs pa’i mi śes pa ni ma rig pa yin no // rig pas gzuñ bar bya ba’i (D ba’i: P ba) rnam pa las phyin ci log tu rtogs pa’i ño bo ñid ni ma rig pa’o //. Note also the example adduced by Devendrabuddhi, PVP D91b6-7/P106a3-4: dper na bde ba’i ‘du śes kyis gzuñ (D gzuñ: P bzuñ) ba’i rnam pa las ‘dus byas rnams la sdug bsñal gyi ‘du śes ni phyin ci log tu rtogs pa’i ño bo yin pa lta bu’o //. ↩

25. PVṬ D136a3-4/P167b8: rig pas gzuñ bar bya ba’i rnam pa ni bdag med pa dañ sdug bsñal la sogs pa’o //. ↩

26. On prajñā/vipaśyanā, see Part II, §2.2.2. Note PVP D92a2-3/P106a7-8: rtogs pa’i ño bo yin du zin kyañ bden pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa can nam brdzun pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa can du ‘gyur grañ na / re źig de ni bden pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa ‘dod pa ma yin te / de ltar ‘dzin pa ni śes rab kyi mtshan ñid yin pa’i phyir ro // de’i phyir log (D log: P ldog) par dmigs pa ni mi śes pa yin no //. ↩

27. PVP D92a4-5/P106b1-3: sems las byuñ ba gañ źig gañ dañ ‘gal ba’i mtshan ñid can yin pa de ni des bzuñ ba’i rnam pa las phyin ci log tu ‘dzin pa yin te / dper na mi gtsañ ba ni ‘dod chags kyis bzuñ ba’i rnam pa las phyin ci log tu ‘dzin pa yin pa lta bu’o // mi śes pa yañ bden pa’i rnam pa ‘dzin pa’i śes rab dañ ‘gal ba’i mtshan ñid can yin no… Devendrabuddhi goes on stating that the logical reason is a svabhāvahetu. ↩

28. PVP D91b4-5/P106a1-2: gañ yod na don gyi de (D de: P om. de) kho na ñid mthon ba’i ‘gegs byed par ‘gyur ba de ni ma rig pa yin no… ↩

29. Chu 2004: 135. For the Chinese text of this passage, see Chu 2004: 135n. 85; see also Tucci 1930: 51-52, and Katsura 1993: 68. ↩

30. See Hattori 1968: 95-98, Franco 1986, Funayama 1999: 76-79 and Chu 2004. ↩

31. PS 1.7cd-8ab: bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikam // smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ceti pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram /. Translation Chu 2004: 143144; see also Hattori 1968: 28. ↩

32. PSṬ 64,8-9: timiraśabdo ‘yam ihājñānavacanah… ↩

33. See Chu 2004: 143-144. On timira, see Jean Filliozat’s remarks in May 1959: 226-227n. 779. ↩

34. PSV 3,19: saṃvṛtisatsv arthāntarādhyāropāt tadrūpakalpanāpravṛttatvāt. ↩

35. “Basis” is one of the two meanings of vastu in the Tattvārthapatala of the BoBh; in this meaning, it is regularly (but by no means systematically) translated by Tib. gži. See also Vasubandhu’s distinction between five meanings of vastu in AKBh 94,11-16 on AK 2.55d ². ↩

36. PSṬ 58,9-10: tad dhi prajñaptivastuṣu rūpādiṣv arthāntarabhūtān ghaṭādīn adhyāropayati, na prajñaptivastumātraṃ pratipadyate /. ↩

37. On the chronology and teachings of the HVP, see Frauwallner 1959: 127 / 803-130 / 806. ↩

38. HVP 155/831,8. ↩

39. HVP 154/830,1-4 (= k. 2): / btags pa’i dños po thams cad la // rañ gi ño bo brtags pa na // kun rdzob śes pa’i spyod yul ni // ji sñed yod pa gźan las btags /. The reading gźan las is not soundly established: (1) the wording of Dignāga’s own commentary reads (154/830,11-12) gźan du źes bya ba ni / don dam pa’i ñid las so //; as for the translation by Dānaśīla/Dpal ‘byor sñiñ po, its pādas 3-4 read (Frauwallner 1959: 154/830): gźan du kun rdzob śes pa’i // spyod yul ji sñed btags pa yin/. ↩

40. HVP 154/830,5-10: ji ltar cha śas la sogs pa’i dbye bas tha dad pa’i thag pa la sogs pa la brtags pa na rañ gi ño bo ma dmigs te / thag pa la sogs pa’i blo yañ sbrul lo sñam pa’i blo bźin du ‘khrul pa tsam du zad pa de bźin du / ños cha la sogs pa la bltos nas yod pa rdza ma dañ phor bu la sogs pa tha sñad pa’i śes pa’i spyod yul ji sñed pa thams cad kyañ btags par yod pa yin te /. ↩

41. On AK 6.4, see Katsura 1976 and 1993: 69; on the Vādavidhi’s notion of saṃvṛtijñāna, see Katsura 1993: 68-69. ↩

42. Or, according to Dharmottara’s gloss, “because it does not display the [real] entity [itself]” (cf. PVinṬ D124a4/P143b2: de yañ dños po mi snañ ba’i phyir dños po snañ ba dañ bral ba’i phyir). ↩

43. PV 3.288: trividham kalpanājñānam āśrayopaplavodbhavam / avikalpam ekaṃ ca pratyakṣābhaṃ caturvidham //. ↩

44. PVP D212a2/P248b2: rtog pa’i śes pa gsum yañ brda’i rten can dañ sgro ‘dogs pa’i rnam par rtog pas ‘jug ste /. Cf. PV 3.290ab: sañketāśrayānyārtha samāropavikalpane /. ↩

45. PVP D212a2/P248b2-3: dper na bum pa dañ grañs dañ ‘degs pa dañ yod pa dañ bum pa ñid la sogs pa lta bu’o //. On the NM passage, see above §1.2.7 and n. 29; note also Vibh. 205n. 2: sattvaṃ dravyaṃ ghaṭasañkhyākṣepaṇasattāghaṭatvādiṣu/. ↩

46. PVP D212a2-3/P248b3-4: bum pa la (P la: D las)… chu la sogs pa ‘dzin pa la sogs pa ‘bras bu gcig sgrub par byed pa’i sgo nas de las gźan pa’i de’i ‘bras bu can ma yin pa dag las tha dad pa ñid tha dad pa med pa yin no //. ↩

47. On Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha, see Frauwallner 1932, 1933a, 1933b, Vetter 1964: 41-63, Katsura 1991, Dunne 2004: 113-143. ↩

48. PV 1.40 (leaving yasmāt untranslated): sarve bhāvāh svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteh / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvrttibhāginah //. ↩

49. See PV 1.74, TS Ś722-724/K723-725 and TSP thereon, TS Ś1004/ K1005 (TSP Ś390,21/K317,11: harītakī). See also TS Ś1034/K1035 and TSP ad loc. ↩

50. PVSV 41,3-6: evaṃ śimśapādayo ‘pi bhedāh parasparānanvaye ‘pi prakṛtyaivaikam ekākāraṃ pratyabhijñānaṃ janayanty anyāṃ vā yathāpratyayaṃ dahanagrhādikāṃ kāṣthasādhyām arthakriyām / na tu bhedāviśeṣe ‘pi jalādayah / śrotrādivad rūpādijñāne /. ↩

51. PVSV 40,22-25 (together with PV 1.73ad₁): ekapratyavamarśārthaj ñānādyekārthasādhane / bhede ‘pi niyatāh kecit svabhāven[a]… //. Note also TSP Ś297,14-16/K240,8-10: …[a]nye ‘pi ghaṭādayo bhāvāh svahetupratyayebhyas tathotpatteh prakrtyaivaikākārapratyavamarśādihetavo bhavisyant [i] … ↩

52. PV 1.68-70: pararūpaṃ svarūpeṇa yayā saṃvriyate dhiyā / ekārthapratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedinah // tayā saṃvṛtanānārthāh saṃvṛtyā bhedinah svayam / abhedina ivābhānti bhāvā rūpeṇa kenacit // tasyā abhiprāyavaśāt sāmānyam sat prakīrtitam / tad asat paramārthena yathā saṃkalpitam tayā //. On this passage, see van Bijlert 1989: 139-140 and Katsura 1993: 67-68. ↩

53. See PVSVṬ 156,8 (ad PVSV 35,6-7), 206,19-20 (ad PVSV 49,22), 212,29-30 (ad PVSV 51,12-13), 298,16-17 (ad PVSV 76,9), 434,27 (ad PVSV 119,19-20), 539,19-20 (ad PV 1.286). On the metaphor of perfuming, see MS 1.15, AKVy 329,19 and Siddhi I. 120 (et passim). To be compared with the Sautrāntika doctrine stated in AKBh 278,20-24 (distinction between kleśānuśaya and kleśaparyavasthāna). ↩

54. The prabodha of a latent tendency is consistently defined as kāryotpādanam praty ābhimukhyam (PVSVṬ 206,19-20 ad PVSV 51,12-13 = PVSVṬ 540,24 ad PVSV 151,27), kāryotpādanānugunyam (PVSVṬ 156,8 ad PVSV 35,6-7), and ānugunyam (PVSVṬ 212,29-30 ad PVSV 51,12-13). Note also PVA 124,4: prabodhah kathaṃcit kadācit kenacid dhetuneti / and PVP D68a7/P78a4-5: de dag ni rnam par śes pa sna tshogs pa gźan dañ gźan bag chags rab tu sad par byed pa dag gis rab tu sad par ‘gyur ro // gañ gi tshe rkyen thag ñe ba de’i tshe ‘gyur ba… (short comments in PVṬ D123a5-6/ P151a3-4). Here, de dag refers to defilements. ↩

55. See PVSV 42,13-16: yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhinānubhaven āhitāṃ vāsanām āśritya vikalpakam utpadyate ‘tadviṣayam api tadviṣayam iva tadanubhavāhitavāsanāprabhavaprakrteh… PVSV 49,20-23: tām ekāṃ jñānādikām arthakriyāṃ teṣu paśyato vastudharmatayaivānyebhyo bhidyamānā bhāvās tadvyāvrttiviṣayadhvanisaṃsṛstaṃ tad evedam iti svānubhavavāsanāprabodhena saṃsṛ̣̣tabhedaṃ mithyāpratyayaṃ janayanti /. ↩

56. See PVSV 43,2-3: sarvaś cāyaṃ svalakṣanānām eva darśanāhitavāsanākrto viplava iti… PVSV 50,2-3: ta eva bhāvās tadekārthakāriṇo ‘nubhavadvāreṇa prakrtyā vibhramaphalāyā vikalpavāsanāyā hetutvān nimittam/. ↩

57. According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ D Je 87a3-4) and Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 198,13-14), “sādhyasādhana” is a dvandva compound; sādhya is explained as udakādidhāraṇādi, and sādhana as mṛtpinḍādi. But as Lambert Schmithausen has rightly pointed out to me, the compound may also be interpreted as: “in that they are the means(/instruments) for one and the same aim(/end).” ↩

58. PVSV 38,17-24: buddhih khalu tadanyavyatirekinah padārthān āśrityotpadyamānā vikalpikā svavāsanāprakrttim anuvidadhatī bhinnam esām rūpam tirodhāya pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam adhyasya tān saṃsrjantī saṃdarśayati / sā caikasādhyasādhanatayānyavivekināṃ bhāvānāṃ tadvikalpavāsanāyāś ca prakṛtir yad evam esā pratibhāti tadudbhavā / sā ceyaṃ saṃvrttih saṃvriyate ‘nayā svarūpena pararūpam iti / te ca tayā saṃvṛtabhedāh svayam bhedino ‘py abhedina iva kenacid rūpena pratibhānti /. ↩

59. On perceptual ascertainment/judgement, see Katsura 1993 and Kellner 2004. ↩

60. (artha)pratibimba(ka) is the word most frequently used by Śāntarakṣita in this context (see TS S̄1005b/K1006b, Ś1016b/K1017b et passim); Kamalaśīla (TSP Ś391,8/K317,16) glosses it with arthābhāsa; see PV 3.165b (together with PVP D182a1-2/P211b8-212a1), PVSVṬ 182,9, 212,17 et passim. Note also TS Ś1182/K1183: asmābhir ukta ākārah pratibimbaṃ tadābhatā / ullekhah pratibhāsaś ca saṃjñābhedas tv akāranam //. ↩

61. jñānanivista in PV 1.78a; vikalpabuddhyārūḍha in TSP Ś391,21/K318,6. ↩

62. PV 1.88a. ↩

63. nistattva in PV 1.77c, nihsvabhāva as a gloss of the latter in PVSVṬ 190,8, asamīksitatattva in PV 1.85c. ↩

64. See, e.g., PVSV 42,18-20, PV 1.77. ↩

65. See PV 1.78-79 and PV 1.82-83. Note also PVSVṬ 183,7-8: ekākāreṇa pratibhāsanāt sāmānyavyavahārah / anekākāreṇa caikasya pratibhāsanāt sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavahārah /. See also Part II, n. 125. ↩

66. PVṬ D146b6/P181a7-8: kun rdzob la źes bya ba ni phyin ci log gi rnam pa can gyi blo la’o //. ↩

67. PVSVṬ 176,26-27. ↩

68. PVSVṬ 183,9. ↩

69. PVSV 39,2-3: tam eva grhnatī sā prakrtivibhramād vikalpānām vastugrāhinīva pratibhāti /. “Though this [cognition] grasps this [conceptual representation] only, it appears as if it would grasp the thing [itself, and this] due to the intrinsic error of conceptual constructs[, i.e., due to the error consisting in grasping things without distinguishing them from their own aspect].” Note also PVSV 39,5-8 and 9-10: vyākhyātārah khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartārah / te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkrtya pravartante / tadabhiprāyavaśād evam ucyate / … pratibhāsabhedādibhyas tu tattvacintakā nābhedam anumanyante /. “[Only] the theoreticians distinguish in this way[, i.e., between the conceptual image and the thing], not those who are engaged in practice. As for the latter, they hold their own [cognitional] object to be able to perform a function and act by unifying both objects, the perceptible one and the conceptualized one. (…) On the contrary, [the theoreticians] who investigate the true nature [of things] by distinguishing between [their respective] modes of appearance [or causal efficiencies, these] do not assent to the identity [between perceptible and conceptual].” ↩

70. Note also TSP Ś396,19-20/K322,6-7: na hi sarvā bhrāntayah sādharmyadarśanād eva bhavanti / kiṃ tarhy antarupaplavād ap[i]… On internal and external causes of error, see Part II, nn. 116 and 139. ↩

71. Note also TSP Ś632,22/K519,20-21: vikalpasya cāvidyāsvabhāvatvāt /. ↩

72. PVSV 50,16-51,1: aśaktir eṣā vikalpānām avidyāprabhavāt / na vai bāhyāpekṣā eva bhrāntayo bhavanti / kiṃtu viplavād āntarād api keśādivibhramavat / avidyodbhavād viplavatve cakṣurvijñānādiṣv api prasangah / na / tasyā vikalpalakṣanatvāt / vikalpa eva hy avidyā / sā svabhāvenaiva viparyasyati /. According to his final, Yogācāra position, Dharmakīrti admits that perception, inasmuch as it presupposes a duality between an object (grāhya) and a subject (grāhaka), is affected by ignorance. See Eltschinger 2005: 162-175. ↩

73. TSP Ś633,9-10/K519,21-22: vikalpah svayam evāyam avidyārūpatām gatah / svākāraṃ bāhyarūpeṇa yasmād āropya vartate //. ↩

74. Most conspicuously in PV 3.1-3 (without 3.1c d): mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viṣayadvaividhyāc chaktyaśaktitah / arthakriyāyāṃ… sadrśāsadrśatvāc ca viṣayāviṣayatvatah / śabdasyānyanimittānāṃ bhāve dhīsadasattvatah // arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //. “There are two [and only two] means of valid cognition[, viz. perception and inference], since there are two [and only two kinds of] objects[, and this for four reasons]: because [one] is capable of performing a function, whereas [the other] is incapable [of it] (…)*; because [one] is common [to other things] whereas [the other is strictly] particular**; because [one] is the object of words, whereas [the other] is not the object [of words]; because the cognition [of the one] exists when causes other*** [than the object itself] are present, whereas [the cognition of the other] does not exist [when causes other**** than the object are present but the object itself is absent]. In this [treatise, we] term ‘ultimately real’ the [kind of object] that is capable of performing a function[, is particular, verbally inexpressible and cognized only when it is present, and we term] ‘conventionally real’ the other [kind of object]. These are[, respectively,] the svalaksana and the sāmānyalakṣana.” * Cf. PVSV 87,4: yad arthakriyākāri tad eva vastv ity uktam /. ** sadrśa is explained gźan dañ thun mon் ba in PVP D123b5/ P144a1, and sarvavyaktisādhārana in PVV 112,3-4; asadrśa is explained phan tshun ldog pa thun mon ma yin pa in PVP D123b6/P144a1-2, and sarvato vyāvṛtta in PVV 112,4. *** According to PVP D124a2/P144a6 = PVV 112,9: manaskāra[t]atsā(d)gunyasañketagrahanānām (yid la byed pa de dañ rjes su mthun pa dañ brda ‘dzin pa); Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ D152b6-7/ P188b6) explains sā(d)gunya as ‘bras bu skyed pa la nus pa yod pa, and sañketagrahaṇa as sñon gyi brda dran pa. **** According to PVP D124a3/P144a7-8, these causes consist of cakṣus, āloka, manaskāra, etc. ↩

75. On the satkāyadrṣ̣̣i, see Rahder 1932 and Kośa 5.15-17. ↩

76. PV 1.222ac₁: sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt / sāvidyā… ↩

77. PVSV 111,19-20: satkāyadarśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāh / tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate /. ↩

78. PV 2.196ab₁: mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣānām sa ca sattvagrah[ah]… PV 2.212cd: tanmūlāś ca malāh sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam //. “All the defilements have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the [false] view of self.” ↩

79. AK 3.29c: drṣtes tatsamprayuktatvāt. ↩

80. PV 2.214: vyākhyeyo ‘tra virodho yas tadvirodhāc ca tanmayaiḥ / virodhaḥ śūnyatādrṣteḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati //. ↩

81. Or, to put it in the reverse: the factor that is capable of eliminating the cause of another factor indirectly (arthāt) eliminates the latter factor too, just like fire eliminates a chill by eliminating the cold. Cf. PVP D93a6/P107b6-7: dper na grañ ba dañ ‘gal ba’i me ni grañ ba’i khyad par ba mo’i reg pa la sogs pa dañ grañ ba’i ‘bras bu spu loñ žes byed pa’i khyad par la sogs pa de’i rañ bžin dañ lhan cig ‘gal ba lta bu’o //. To be compared with PVV 86,4-5: śītaviruddhasyāgner iva tatkāry[ai] romaharṣādibhiḥ… ↩

82. PV 1.223 (leaving ata eva untranslated): moho nidānaṃ doṣānām ata evābhidhīyate / satkāyadṛṣtir anyatra tatprahāne prahāṇataḥ //. ↩

83. See PVSV 111,23-112,5, Dunne 2004: 372-373, Eltschinger 236-239. ↩

84. PVP D92b7-93a1/P107a7-8: gal te ‘jig tshogs su lta ba ñid ma rig pa yin pa de’i tshe lta ba dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa ma rig pa yin no źes bya ba’i mtshuñs par ldan pa’i don ‘thad pa ma yin te / bdag ñid bdag ñid dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa ma yin pa… To be compared with PVA 146,14-16 and PVV 85,15-17. ↩

85. PVP D93a1/P107a8-b1: phyogs dañ phyogs can gyi dños po, but PVP D93a2-3/P107b2: phyogs gcig dañ phyogs gcig pa can gyi dños po. PVṬ D137a5/P169a6: phyogs yod pas na phyogs can ni tshogs pa ste / yan lag dañ tshogs pa’i dños po źes bya ba’i don to //. Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin reflect Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation in PVA 146,14 (moh[aik]adeśabhūtā [satkāyadrṣṭih]) and PVV 85,16-17 ([satkāyadrṣṭis tu] tadekadeśah). ↩

86. PVA 146,20; see also PVV 85,20. ↩

87. palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti in PVP D93a1-2/P107b1, PVA 146,20, PVV 85,20, Vibh. 85n. 10. pānyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti in PVP D93a2/P107b1, Vibh. 85n. 10. The second example obviously does not fit together with the explanation of “associated” as sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva, and hence has been dropped in PVA and PVV. ↩

88. PVP D93a3/P107b2-3: de bźin du ‘dir yañ ma rig pa ni phyogs gcig pa can yin la / de’i phyogs gcig pa’i ño bo ni ‘jig tshogs su lta ba yin no //. PVṬ D137a5-7/P169a6-b1: de la spyir log pa ‘jug pa tsam ñid yin pa’i phyir ñon mons pa thams cad kyi bdag ñid can gyi ma rig pa ni tshogs pa’o // ‘di’i phyogs gcig ni ‘jig tshogs su lta ba la sogs pa’o // de bas na ñag gi don ni ‘jig tshogs su lta ba dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa’i ma rig pa ‘jig tshogs su lta ba źes bya ba phyogs gcig pa ni phyogs gcig pa dañ ldan par gyur pa yin pa de bas na / phyogs gcig pa can gyi ma rig pa de’i ‘jig tshogs su lta ba ni phyogs gcig pa yin no źes bya ba ‘di yin no //. Note PVA 146,21: paramārthatah palāśasvabhāvataiva kathitā… ↩

89. PVA 146,21-22: evaṃ viśeṣābhidhānena tatsvabhāv[ā] ‘vidyā nidānabhūtā prādhānyena nirdiṣtā /. ↩

90. PVV 85,20-21: drṣ̣̣isvabhāvā ‘vidyā prādhānyena kleśahetur ity upadarśanaṃ… prayojanam /. ↩

91. For the various designations of ignorance in Dharmakīrti’s works (especially in PV 2), see Vetter 1990: 23. satkāyadrṣsti in PV 1.223c, PVSV 111,24, PV 2.199; satkāyadarśana in PV 1.222b, PVSV 111,19, PVSV 112,3-4, PV 2.212; ātmadarśana in PVSV 111,18, PV 2.140; ātmagraha in PV 2.135, PV 2.211, PV 2.235, PV 2.256; ātm(ātmīy)ābhiniveśa in PVSV 8,20, PV 2.218; sattvadrṣsti in PV 2.256; sattvadarsana in PV 2.200; sattvagraha in PV 2.196. ↩

92. That satkāya should be interpreted as the five upādānaskandhas is obvious from the following definitions of this false view. (1) Maulī Bhūmih of the YBh (as edited in Ahn 2003: 62; for a German translation, see Ahn 2003: 169-172): tatra satkāyadrṣstih katamā / asatpuruṣasaṃsevām āgamya asaddharmaśravanam ayoniśomanaskāraṃ naihsargikaṃ vā punaḥ smṛtisampramoṣaṃ pañcopādānaskandhān ātmato vātmīyato samanupaśyato yā nirdhāritā vānirdhāritā vā kliṣtā prajñā /. (2) AS 7,8 (as quoted in Ahn 2003: 170n. 27; for a German translation, see Ahn ibid.): satkāyadrṣstih katamā / pañcopādānaskandhān ātmata ātmīyato vā samanupaśyato yā kṣāntī rucir matih preksā drṣstih /. (3) Vasubandhu’s treatment of the satkāyadrṣsti in the PSk echoes these Yogācāra definitions (PSk [4.1.26.1] 9,12-13; for a French translation, see Dantinne 1980: 15): satkāyadrṣstih katamā / pañcopādānaskandhān ātmata ātmīyato vā samanupaśyato yā kliṣtā prajñā /. (4) Note also Sthiramati’s comments on Tr 6cd (TrBh L23,12–14/B*14,14–16; on these four kleśas of the [klistam] manas, see Siddhi I.255-256): upādānaskandheṣv ātmeti darśanam ātmadrṣstih satkāyadrṣstir ity arthah / moho ‘jñānam / ātmany ajñānam ātmamohah / ātmaviṣaye māna ātmamāno ‘smimāna ity arthah / ātmani sneha ātmasneha ātmapremety arthah /. (5) Śākyabuddhi defines satkāya (in the expression ‘jig tshogs la chags pa =* satkāyasneha PVP D90b5/P104b7) as follows: žig pas na ‘jig pa ste / rnam par ‘jig pa žes bya ba’i don to // tshogs pa ni ñe bar len pa’i phuñ po lna ‘dus pa ste / mi rtag pa’i phuñ po lna la chags pa żes bya ba’i don to //. This matches the Sautrāntika definition provided by Vasubandhu in AKBh 281,20-21 on AK 5.7: ātmadṛṣṭir ātmīyadṛṣṭir vā satkāyadrṣstih / sīdatīti sat / cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃghātaḥ skandha ity arthah / sac cāyaṃ kāyaś ceti satkāyah pañcopādānaskandhāh / nityasaṃjñāṃ pindasaṃjñāṃ ca tyājayitum evaṃ dyotitā[h] / … satkāye drṣstih satkāyadrṣṭih / … ātmātmīyadrṣṭir eva tu satkāyadrṣṭir uktā/. ↩

93. Sahajā satkāyadrṣṭih in PV 2.199 (see below) and PV 2.200 (sukhī bhaveyaṃ duḥkhī vā mā bhūvam iti tṛsyatah / yaivāham iti dhīh saiva sahajaṃ sattvadarśanam //). Viniścayasañgrahanī of the Savitarkādibhūmi (P Zi 112b6-113a1, as quoted [together with the Chinese of T. 1579: 621b6-10] in Kritzer 2005: 293): de la ‘jig tshogs la lta ba gañ źe na / ñe bar len pa’i phuñ po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba dañ / mñon par źen pa dañ sems la ‘jog pa gañ yin pa de ni ‘jig tshogs la lta ba źes bya’o // de’añ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skyes pa dañ kun brtags pa’o // de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so’i skye bo thams cad dañ tha na ri dags dañ bya rnams kyi yañ yin no // kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi yin par blta bar bya’o //. The text continues with the distinction between avyākrtta and akuśala. PrSVy IIIv5 (Muroji 1991: 83): sahajātmadrṣti; PrSVy IIIv6-7 (Muroji 1990: 81): parikalpitātmadrṣ̣ti. AKBh 290,19-20: sahajā satkāyadrṣṭir avyākrtā / yā mrgapakṣinām api vartate / vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāh /. According to Kritzer (2005: 292), Sañghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the Sūtra-master. AKVy 463,17-18: yā ātmavādibhih kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā /. See also LAS 117,17-118,13 and ASBh 62,3-4. PV 2.199ad₁ : satkāyadrṣter vigamād ādya evābhavo bhavet / mārge cet sahajāhāner na… “[Objection:] Non-[re]existence (abhava) [i.e., liberation from samsāra,] should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., during the path of vision], for the [false] view of self[, which is the cause of the connection to a new birth,] ceases [at that time. Answer: ] No, because [at that time] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of self].” PVP D85b1-2/P98a5-7: bdag tu lta ba’i rnam pa gñis te / kun brtags pa dañ lhan cig skyes pa’o // kun tu brtags pa de ni de dag gis śin tu kun tu spyod pa’i chos ma yin pas na spañs pas de ni skye ba’i kun nas ‘chiñ ba’i rgyur mi ‘gyur ro // ‘jig tshogs su lta ba lhan cig skyes pa yañ srid pa’i rgyu gañ yin pa de ni de dag ñid kyis spañs pa ma yin no // de ma spañs pa’i rgyu’i phyir bdag tu chags pa ma log pa ñid yin pa de ltar na yañ srid pa yod pa yin no //. PVṬ D131b6-7/P162a7-b1 (ad loc.): kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa’i sgo nas byuñ ba’o // lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa’i bag chags las byuñ ba’o // de dag ñid kyis spañs pa ma yin no źes bya ba ni thog ma med pa’i bag chags las byuñ ba de ni bsgom pa’i lam ñid kyis spañ bar bya ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ro //. ↩

94. As Prajñākaragupta rightly points out, the (innate) satkāyadrṣti is nothing but defiled ignorance/delusion (PVA 145,12-13, together with stanza 886: kliṣṭo hi mohaḥ satkāyadarśanam eva / arhatāṃ tu yad ajñānaṃ na tat kliṣtam ato na te / mohe ‘py ayuktasantānā hīnasatkāyadarśanāh //). ↩

95. Except, of course, for Dharmakīrti’s long polemics against the Nyāya conception of ātman and (the path to) release in PV 2.220sq. ↩

96. DBhS VI C 48,1-10, quoted in PVP D92a7-b3/P106b5-107a2. See above, n. 20 and §1.2.4. For a brief statement about the DBhS’s doctrine of ignorance, see Kritzer 1999: 97. ↩

97. See Vetter 1990: 24 and 112-113n. 2. As quoted in PrP 562,14-563,1, this passage runs as follows: tatrāvidyā katamā / yaiṣām eva ṣanṇāṃ dhātūnām aikyasaṃj̃̃̃ā pị̣̣̣asaṃj̃̃̃ā nityasaṃj̃̃̃ā dhruvasaṃj̃̃̃ā śāśvatasamjj̃̃̃̃ sukhasaṃj̃̃̃ā ātmasaṃj̃̃̃ā sattvasaṃj̃̃̃ā j̄̄vapudgalamanujamānavasaṃj̃̃̃ā* ‘haṃkāramamakārasaṃj̃̃̃ā / evamādi vividham ajñānam ity ayam ucyate ‘vidyeti /. *Cf. Schoening 1995: II.714n. 2b: sattvajīvajantupoṣapuruṣapudgalamanujamānavasaṃj̃̃̃ā. “In that [connection], what is ignorance? The beliefs that these same six elements are a unit, a uniform mass, permanent, eternal, unchanging, pleasurable, the self, a being, a life-force, a creature, thriving, a human, an individual, Manu’s progeny, Manu’s descendant, ‘I,’ ‘mine,’ and various types of ignorance such as that are called ignorance.” Translation Schoening 1995: I.296; for Sanskrit quotations of this passage, see Schoening 1995: II.713-717; see also May 1959: 269 and 466; for Kamalaśīla’s Śālistambaṭīkā on it, see Schoening 1995: II.499,7-500,7 (Tibetan text) and 1995: I.296-299 (English translation). ↩

98. Schmithausen 1987: II.517. See also Kritzer 1999: 34. ↩

99. Schmithausen 1987: II.518, and more generally 1987: II.517-519n. 1421. On the Paramārthagāthās, see also Wayman 1961: 163-185. In this connection, one may quote (parts of) Paramārthagāthās 29-33: sarvabīje vipāke hi jāyate ātmadarśanam… kalpayanty antarātmānaṃ taṃ ca bālā ajānakāh / ātmadarśanam āśritya tathā bhavyaś ca drṣtayaḥ // pindagrahāt svabījāc ca pūrvābhyāsāt sahāyatah / śravaṇād anukūlāc ca jāyate ātmadarśanam // snehas tatpratyayaś caiva adhyātmam upajāate / anugrahābhilāṣāc ca bahiḥ sneho mamāyitam // (Sanskrit text as edited in Schmithausen 1987: I.228). “The [Result-of-]Maturation containing all Seeds comes to be looked upon as a Self (…). Not only do ignorant fools imagine this [Result-of-Maturation] to be [their] inner Self, but many [other false] views too arise on the basis of [this] view of Self. The view of Self arises from apprehending solid things, from its own Seed, from previous habit, from [bad] companion(s), and from listening [to doctrines] which favour [the arising of the view of Self]. Conditioned by this [view of Self], there arises, furthermore, attachment to oneself, and, because one is eager to benefit [oneself], attachment [to what is] outside [consisting in] claiming (or coveting) [it] as one’s own.” ↩

100. See YBh 204,1-212,4. ↩

101. See Kritzer 1999: 33 (together with nn. 63-64) and ASBh 32,11-12. ↩

102. See AKBh 140,6 (vibhañge mahānidānaparyāye caivaṃ nirdeśāt /) together with Kośa II.85, and (at least according to AKVy 289,1: iheti pratītyasamutpādasūtre), AKBh 135,8 together with Kośa II. 70. ↩

103. See AVS 5,15-7,1 (purporting to quote the whole section of the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra dedicated to ignorance), as well as AVSN 203,1-211,3 (with many Sanskrit fragments of Vasubandhu’s PrSVy). ↩

104. See above, n. 5. The section on avidyā covers PrSVy P6a4-13b5. In his commentary, Vasubandhu holds the YBh, from which he quotes long excerpts, to be authoritative (see, e.g., PrSVy 11b3sq, and 13a1). ↩

105. Twenty according to PrSVy 10a3-4 (yan lag bcu gñis). Lambert Schmithausen informs me that while YBh 205,10-11 reads viṃśatyākāram ajñānam, the manuscript consistently reads thrice ekānnavimśatiº, a reading confirmed by Xuanzang’s Chinese translation (T. 30.1579, 322c20, etc.). In the second (= B) Nālandā brick inscription, the avidyāvibhanga reads as follows (Chakravarti 1931-1932: 198; the numbering of the items as well as the references to the YBh are mine): yat (1 - YBh 204,2-5) pūrvānte ‘jñānam (2 - YBh 204,6-8) aparānte ‘jñānaṃ (3 - YBh 204,8-10) pūrvāntāparānte ‘jñānam (4 - YBh 204,10-11) adhyātmam ajñānaṃ (5 - YBh 204,11-13) bahirdhā’jñānam (6 - YBh 204,13-15) adhyātmabahirdhā’jñānaṃ (7 YBh 204,15) karmaṇy ajñānaṃ (8 - YBh 204,16-17) vipāke ‘jñānaṃ (9 YBh 204,17-18) karmavipāke ‘jñānaṃ (10 - YBh 204,18-20) buddhe ‘jñānaṃ (11 - YBh 204,20-21) dharme ‘jñānaṃ (12 - YBh 204,22-23) sanghe ‘jñānaṃ (13 - YBh 204,23-205,1) duhkhe ‘jñānaṃ (14 - YBh 205,1) samudaye ‘jñānaṃ (15 - YBh 205,2) nirodhe ‘jñānaṃ (16 - YBh 205,2) mārge ‘jñānaṃ (17 - YBh 205,3-4) hetāv ajñānaṃ (18 - YBh 205,4-5) hetusamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv* ajñānaṃ (19 - YBh 205,6-8) kuśalākuśaleṣu sāvadyānavadyeṣu sevitavyāsevitavyesu hīnapranītakrṣnaśuklasapratibhāgap ratītyasamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv ajñānaṃ ([20?] - YBh 205,9-10) ṣaṭsu vā punaḥ sparśāyataneṣu yathābhūtasamprativedhe ‘jñānam iti / yat tatra tatra yathābhūtasyājñānam adarśanam anabhisamayas tamaḥ saṃmoho ‘vidyāndhakāram iyam ucyate ‘vidyā /. *YBh saṃskāreṣ[v] for dharmeṣv. If reading the Sūtra as involving 19 rather than 20 items, the list proper would stop after hetusamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv ajñānam, the remaining part (kuśalākuśalesu…) being then a general explanation. ↩

106. Whereas the YBh’s explanations closely follow the order and wording of the Sūtra (at least as far as the Sanskrit text of the Nālandā brick inscription and the Tibetan text edited by de Jong are concerned), AVS 5,15-7,1 as well as AVSN 103,2-110,11 diverge as to the order, the wording and the number of the items. ↩

107. YBh 204,2-5: pūrvānte ‘jñānaṃ katamat / atītān saṃskārān ayoniśah kalpayatah kiṃ nv aham abhūvam atīte ‘dhvany āhosvin nāham abhūvam atīte ‘dhvani / ko nv aham abhūvam / kathaṃ vābhūvam iti yad ajñānam /. To be compared with Vasubandhu’s quotation in PrSVy 11b3-4. See also PrSVy 9b2-3, which provides Vasubandhu’s own commentary on pūrvānte ‘jñānam: gañ ‘di sñon gyi mtha’ mi śes pa ni ci bdag ‘das pa’i dus na byun் ba zig gam zes (P om. zes) bya ba la sogs par the tshom za ba’i phyir ro //. AVSN 103,5-6: pūrvāntam atītaṃ janma / tatrājñānaṃ kiṃ nv aham abhūvam atīte ‘dhvanīty evamādi vicikitsatah /. See Samtani 1971: 103n. 3. ↩

108. YBh 204,6-8: aparānte ‘jñānaṃ katamat / anāgatān saṃskārān ayoniśo kalpayatah kiṃ nv ahaṃ bhaviṣyāmy anāgate ‘dhvany āhosvin nāhaṃ bhaviṣyāmy anāgate ‘dhvani / kiṃ bhaviṣyāmi kathaṃ bhaviṣyāmīty ajñānam/. To be compared with Vasubandhu’s quotation in PrSVy 11b4-6. See also PrSVy 9b2-3, which provides Vasubandhu’s own commentary on aparānte ‘jñānam: phyi ma’i mtha’ mi śes pa ni ci bdag ma ‘oñs pa’i dus na ‘byun் bar ‘gyur ram zes bya ba la sogs par the tshom za ba’i phyir ro //. AVSN 103,6-7: aparāntam anāgataṃ janma / tatrājñānaṃ kiṃ nv ahaṃ bhaviṣyāmy anāgate ‘dhvanīty evamādi vicikitsatah/. ↩

109. YBh 204,10-13 (Schmithausen 1987: II.518): adhyātmam ajñānaṃ katamat / pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa ātmato manasikurvato yad ajñānam / bahirdhājñānaṃ katamat / bāhyān asattvasaṃkhyātān saṃskārān ātmīyato ‘yoniśo manasikurvato yad ajñānam /. To be compared with Vasubandhu’s quotations in PrSVy 11b6-7 (with sems can gyi grañs su ma gtogs pa providing evidence for Schmithausen’s asattvasañkhyātān). See also Kritzer 1999: 96-97. Schmithausen (ibid.) quotes passages from the YBh testifying to a similar interpretation, as, e.g., BoBh D167,5/W243,10sq (…ātmabhāve ‘ham iti vā mameti vā saṃmūdhah…), and YBh 212,18sq (pūrvam ātmabhāve ātmagrāhādibhiḥ saṃmūdhah). Dharmakīrti’s claim that the first result of the notion of a self is the notion of the other, i.e., the external, provides an interesting echo to this passage. According to Kritzer (1999: 96), this interpretation provides the basis for a passage of the AKBh “in which Vasubandhu gives his own, as opposed to the orthodox Vaibhāṣika, explanation of pratītyasamutpāda” (AKBh 139,25-26: bālo hi pratītyasamutpannaṃ saṃskāramātram idam ity aprajānan… “[A]n ignorant person, not understanding that what originates conditionally is merely the conditioning factors (…) ” Translation Kritzer 1999: 96). According to Yaśomitra, the word “merely” has here the meaning of a negation of self, whereas “not understanding” refers to the āveniky avidyā* (AKVy 299,8-9: bālah prthagjanah saṃskāramātram iti / mātragrahaṇam ātmapratiṣedhārtham / aprajānann ity āveṇikīm avidyāṃ darśayati /. See also Kośa 3.84). In Vasubandhu’s own account of ignorance as the first link of dependent origination, the said ignorant persons thus give rise to the (false) view of a self (ātmadṛṣṭi) and then engage in action in order to benefit this self (AKBh 139,27: ātmanah sukhārtham … karma ārabhate), which matches perfectly Dharmakīrti’s view of dependent origination. *On the āveṇikī ignorance, see Siddhi I.276-280 (note Siddhi I.276: “L[e] Pratītyasamutpādasūtra enseigne: ‘L’Avidyā dite āveṇikī, subtile, toujours en activité, offusque la réalité, empêche qu’elle soit connue.’”), and below, n. 111. [^111] PrSVy 9b5: nañ mi śes pa ni rañ gi rgyud la sems can du lta bar bsams pa’o //. (Note AVSN 104,4-5: adhyātme ‘jñānam iti / svasantāne sattvadṛstimato yad ajñānam / satkāyadrṣ̣tisamprayuktā veyam avidyoktā /.) PrSVy 9b5: phyi mi śes pa ni gźan gyi rgyud la sems can du lta bar bsams pa’o //. ↩

110. It may not be out of place to briefly mention the Sautrāntika (AKVy 302,33-34: mayatā punaḥ sautrāntikair avidyā prakārabhinnā varṇyate /) view held by Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, according to whom ignorance is to be defined as an inclination for/engagement in (mayatā? see Kośa 3.93n. 1) [the belief in] a living being in the form of “I am” (AKBh 142,9: asmīti sattvamayatā ‘vidyeti bhadantadharmatrātah /). To be sure, Vasubandhu criticises Dharmatrāta’s view on the grounds that this mayatā (mayanā according to de La Vallée Poussin) cannot be different from the asmimāna, and hence cannot define ignorance. That Vasubandhu was nevertheless in trouble with this definition is testified by his premature interruption of the discussion (AKBh 142,13-14: atra punar vicaryamāne bahu vaktavyam jāyate / tasmāt tiṣthatv etat /). ↩