Eltschinger - Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part II (2010)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology ¹ Part II

Vincent Eltschinger

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 33 Number 1-2 2010 (2011)

JIABS Vol 33 pp. 27-74

For Jacques May

The first part of this essay (Eltschinger 2009) concentrated on the basic features and likely sources of Dharmakīrti’s understanding of ignorance (avidyā). Against the Vaibhāṣikas, but with Vasubandhu the Kośakāra, Dharmakīrti defines ignorance as a “counter-” or “anti-knowledge,” i.e., as a cognition that counteracts true (perceptual) knowledge (vidyā) by displaying contrary/erroneous objectsupports and aspects (viparītālambanākāra). According to him, ignorance amounts to pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa), hence conceptual construction (vikalpa), superimposition (samāropa) and concealment (samvrti). The core of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, the so-called apoha theory, provides an exhaustive picture of both ignorance as conceptuality and inference as a corrective (though conceptual) principle. This conception of ignorance, however, fails to account for the most dramatic form of the Buddhist ignorance, viz. its being responsible for defilements, rebirth and suffering. In order to account for this eschatologically valued form of ignorance, Dharmakīrti equates avidyāwith the personalistic false view (satkāyadrṣ̣ti). Consistently enough, ignorance as satkāyadrṣ̣ti is but a specialization or instantiation of ignorance as conceptuality insofar as the satkāyadrṣ̣ti exhausts itself in one’s superimposing such conceptual constructs as “self/I” (ātman, aham) and “one’s own/mine” (ātmīya, mama) on reality. Both Dharmakīrti and his commentators evolved exegetical strategies in order to argue for the orthodoxy of this equation of ignorance with a false view (drṣsti), which Vasubandhu clearly refuses in the Abhidharmakośa (but not in his commentary on the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra). As for the sources of Dharmakīrti’s conception, they are very likely to consist of the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra and its numerous “idealistic” interpretations (Yogācārabhūmi, Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyā). In the second part of this essay, I shall first inquire into Dharmakīrti’s account of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), viz. his interpretation of ignorance as the origin of defilements (craving, etc.), clinging and rebirth. I shall then turn to the philosophical core of this study by attempting to show how Dharmakīrti’s views on ignorance and the two truths/realities provide the basic framework of his epistemological theory. This is tantamount to claiming that Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, in locating ignorance and defining the cognitive means of opposing it and entering the path toward salvation, is Buddhistic in both its inspiration and its finality. As a consequence, his philosophy should cease to be regarded as a dry academic endeavour deviating from the spirit of Buddhism as a salvation system.

2.1. Dependent origination

2.1.1. In his account of the future Buddha’s philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakīrti presents the cause of suffering (duhkhahetu) in the following way: “The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in self and one’s own.” ²

According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from one’s adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from self and one’s own, under the aspects of self and one’s own. ³ This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on dharmas, specifically on the five constituents one clings to, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from one’s superimposing aspects such as permanent, pleasurable, self and one’s own on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents. ⁴ One may adduce here a huge number of passages presenting one and the same idea: The personalistic belief is responsible for one’s superimposing contrary aspects such as self and one’s own on the selfless and empty constituents. ⁵ As Dharmakīrti himself has it, “desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature on something (dharma) that does not have this nature.” ⁶ PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakīrti’s most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been ascribed to reality: “Having[, due to ignorance,]”⁷ superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. ‘lasting,’ ‘pleasant,’ ‘mine,’ ‘I,’ etc., on the four [Nobles’] Truths, ⁸ one experiences craving [for superimposed objects such as delight, etc.]. ⁹ According to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, ignorance, ¹⁰ i.e., the false view of self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., superimpose an “I” on what is selfless and a “mine” on what is empty. But ignorance is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (sthira) or even unchangeably permanent (kūtasthanitya), ¹¹ or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers (sāsrava) or dependent on causes (hetuparatantra) in each of their successive phases (pratikṣanam). ¹²

2.1.2. According to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (nidāna), the origin (yoni, prabhava), or the root (mūla) ¹³ of all (kinds of) moral faults (doṣa), defilements (kleśa, upakleśa) or moral impurities (mala). ¹⁴ Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of self, one also meets with “cause” (kārana, alone or with preceding utpattiº, pradhānaº; hetu), ¹⁵ “arising” (jāti, utpatti) ¹⁶ and suffixal elements such as ºpūrvaka,ºmaya,¹⁷ºhetuka, ºja, ºmūla, or ºkṛta. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (satkāyadarśanaja, ‘jig tshogs su lta ba’i rañ bžin), are (causally) preceded/accompanied by the false view of self or by the adherence to self and one’s own (bdag tu lta ba sñon du soñ ba can, ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvaka), arise from the false view of self (bdag tu lta ba las byun ba), or have ignorance for their cause (avidyāhetuka). ¹⁸ They are all based on the beliefs in “I” and “mine” (ñar ‘dzin pa dañ ña yir ‘dzin pa dag la gnas pa) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of self and one’s own (bdag dañ bdag gir lta ba’i rjes su ‘brel ba’i sems la ltos nas … ‘gyur ba). ¹⁹

2.1.3. As we have seen, the belief in self and one’s own is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, ignorance is the cause of craving (tṛṣṇā), which is nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both function as the cause of suffering: As defilements, they give rise both to other defilements (e.g., tṛṣṇā → upādāna) and to act(ion)s (kriyā, e.g., avidyā → samskāra, or upādāna → bhava), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (vastu) of existence (e.g., saṃskāra → vijñāna, or bhava → jāti). ²⁰ Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, ignorance and craving ²¹ are the two causes of (re)birth ([punar] janman) and transmigration (samsāra), ²² which are the hallmarks of suffering. ²³ Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines suffering as (re)birth (skye ba’i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsnial), Dharmakīrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (duhkhaṃ saṃsārinah skandhāh). ²⁴ It comes as no surprise, then, that Dharmakīrti declares that “as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in samsāra.”²⁵ According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom “the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (pratisandhi) to a new existence (punarbhava),”²⁶ “the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of self has the notion of pleasure (sukhasamjñā) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence.” ²⁷ The link between the false view of self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows: “Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of [moral] faults such as attachment to one’s own arise, and the attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (sthāna).”²⁸

2.1.4. Let us consider now the genealogy ²⁹ of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakīrti provides a coherent picture of the sequence avidyā–(ṣaḍāyata na–sparśa–vedanā–)tṛṣṇā–upādāna–bhava–jāti, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelve-membered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakīrti’s opinion, the false view of self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in one’s own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakīrti points out that “once [the notion of] a self exists, the notion of the other (parasaṃjñā) [arises, and] from this distinction between self and other [is born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the moral faults arise. ³⁰ For reasons that I shall explain below, I am inclined not to follow the traditional explanation that links grasping/attachment to (the notion of) the self and aversion to the notion of the other. ³¹ For the time being, let us leave this problem out of consideration and focus on the genealogy of otherness: “As long as the mind adheres to a self (ātmeti), [it has] the notion of a self (ātmasamjñā), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the mind] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.” ³² In another statement, Dharmakīrti declares that “the false view of self generates the belief in one’s own (ātmīyagraha).”³³ Persons deluded by the false view of self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed “desire” (rāga), “craving” (trṣṇā), “grasping” (parigraha) or “attachment”/“love” (sneha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, I am inclined not to consider these terms as (always) synonymous, and to believe that Dharmakīrti introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If I am correct, from the false view of self arises first attachment or love for the self and one’s own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza: “The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self, thinking of it as] ‘I.’ Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves for the delights [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the drawbacks [of the things he deems conducive to these delights].” ³⁴ Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret “love” as “love for the self.” ³⁵ Whereas attachment is directed to the self (but bears upon the conditioned factors), craving is directed to the delights (sukha) of the self, ³⁶ i.e., to the things that are deemed conducive to these delights, ³⁷ or to impure (sāsrava) things that are (deemed) favourable (anugrāhaka) in that they are conducive to the delights (of the self). ³⁸ Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions such as ātma sne ha,³⁹ ātmātmīyasneha⁴⁰ or even sat kāyasneha,⁴¹ we also find Devendrabuddhi’s definition of sneha: “[We call] ‘love’ an inclination for self and one’s own which presupposes the [aforementioned delusion].” ⁴² According to Dharmakīrti, self-love and attachment for what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of aversion (pratigha) and hatred (dveṣa): “Indeed, the one who, without grasping (parigraha), sees that there is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unattached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for that which does not hinder the self or one’s own, nor for that which opposes the [said] hindrance. ⁴³ One can show aversion or hatred only for that which hinders (< uparodha) or harms (<pīdā) what has been taken as self and one’s own:⁴⁴ “Hatred [arises] with regard to that alone which offers opposition (pratikūlavartin) by its hostility to that which love for the self and one’s own bears upon (viṣayabhūta). Therefore, there is no hatred without love for the self and one’s own.” ⁴⁵ Dharmakīrti’s unambiguous derivation of aversion from love is the reason why I cannot agree with Devendrabuddhi’s and Manorathanandin’s interpretation of PV 2.219b (svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau), which presupposes that what is other than the self can only arouse hatred. In Dharmakīrti’s eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the delights of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies one’s running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhāṣika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (upādāna), ⁴⁶ and what Dharmakīrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab: “Seeing [but] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] ‘mine,’ and appropriates (upā√dā) the means [that are conducive] to them.” ⁴⁷ But Dharmakīrti also holds love for the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (paunarbhavika): craving for (future) existence (bhavatṛsnā), craving for sensual pleasures (kāmatrṣsnā), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (vibhavatṛsnā). ⁴⁸ According to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (pravrtti) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (sukhāpti), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (duhkhānāpti). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhāsika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. bhava (literally “existence”), which is to be understood as the “act(ion) that results in future existence” (bhavisyadbhavaphalam karma): bhava refers to the act(ion)s resulting in rebirth (paunarbhavika) that are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst. ⁴⁹ In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti brings together both meanings of bhava, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self, and the (future) existence that they inevitably lead to: “The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire of obtaining pleasure and avoiding suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since love for the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unpleasurable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].”⁵⁰

2.1.5. Although the standard formulation of dependent origination is traditionally held to range over three (Vaibhāṣika) or two (Yogācāra, Sautrāntika) lifetimes, ⁵¹ at least some of its members can also be seen at work on the much shorter sequence of a few interdependent psychological events. According to Vasubandhu, desire follows (anuśete, or: is connected to, samprayukta) a pleasant sensation (sukhā vedanā), whereas aversion follows (or: is connected to) an unpleasant sensation (duḥkhā vedanā). [^52] Dharmakīrti agrees with this commonsense statement. ⁵² Depending on whether a given tangible object (spraștavya) is considered favourable (anugrāhaka) or unfavourable to the self, the pleasant or unpleasant sensations born from the contact between this object and the sense faculties are conducive to the rise of defilements such as desire or hatred. ⁵³ This obviously conforms to the pratītyasamutpāda sequence linking a sensory basis (āyatana), contact (sparśa) between the former and an object, sensation, and craving. But as we have seen, to deem a given object favourable or unfavourable to the self belongs to the personalistic false view. Note should be made here that the erroneous aspects which the personalistic false view consists of overlap in part with those traditionally called “wrong notions” or “misconceptions” (viparyāsa), which amount to four ⁵⁴ and are regularly held to be caused by imagination (sañkalpa). ⁵⁵ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla provide interesting materials regarding the rise of defilements from wrong notions. According to Śāntarakṣita, “defilements such as desire arise once [erroneous aspects] such as beautiful, one’s own, lasting [or pleasant] have been superimposed on a woman, etc.” ⁵⁶ A little later, he says: “[A sensation] such as a pleasant or unpleasant [one] arises in the presence of a [sensory] object[, say a woman]. For those who despise [suspending] wisdom (pratisañkhyāna) [and] are subject to improper reflection, this [sensation] gives rise to defilements such as desire or hatred, which are [themselves] born from the ripening of a homologous latent tendency.” ⁵⁷ What does this amount to? The contact between an object and a sense faculty generates an affective sensation (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral). People who do not devote themselves to meditative practices such as the contemplation of the loathsome (aśubhabhāvanā), ⁵⁸ and are therefore under the sway of improper reflection, superimpose erroneous aspects on the object: that it is a women, of course, but also that she is attractive, desirable, (at least virtually) one’s own, etc. Affective sensation as well as the superimposed aspects is in turn responsible for the actualization of the latent tendency of desire. ⁵⁹ Commenting on his master’s two stanzas, Kamalaśīla provides us with a more systematic account of the sequence at stake: “For such is the sequence [of events]: When an object is present, a pleasure born of the sense faculty arises. And for those who, in the absence of any [suspending] wisdom, abide in the improper reflection consisting of wrong notions such as self, this pleasure brings to maturity (vipāka) the latent tendency imprinted by previous desire, etc. From this [coming to] maturity, defilements such as desire arise. Therefore, the objects [themselves] are not directly the cause [of defilements].”⁶⁰ How should we understand this strong insistence on the responsibility of improper reflection in the rise of defilements?

2.1.6. That improper reflection ⁶¹ is closely connected with ignorance/personalistic belief and is part of the process leading to the rise of defilements can be easily substantiated. ⁶² The problem raised by the source materials is rather that they testify to contradictory views regarding the relationship between improper reflection and ignorance/personalistic belief. Some sources (mainly Yogācāra) introduce improper reflection in the definition of the personalistic belief, which is held to be the manner deluded people improperly consider the five constituents of being as self and one’s own. ⁶³ Some materials regard improper reflection as caused by ignorance: this is the case of the Sūtra quoted in the AKBh, according to which, “depending on the eye and visible [objects,] an incorrect (āvila) reflection born of delusion (mohaja) arises.” ⁶⁴ Much more common seem to be sources viewing improper reflection as the cause of ignorance/personalistic belief: this is the case in a Sutta of the MN and two Suttas from the AN, ⁶⁵ in the MS, ⁶⁶ in the Satyadvayanirdeśa(sūtra) as it is quoted by Kamalaśīla in BhK 1, ⁶⁷ and in the Sahetusapratyayanidānasūtra as it is quoted in AKVy 288,26-29 and used by Bhadanta Śrīlāta to demonstrate that ignorance (as the first link of dependent origination) has indeed a cause. ⁶⁸ Having quoted and commented on various excerpts of the Sūtra, Yaśomitra comes to the conclusion of a circularity (cakraka), i.e., that improper reflection and ignorance condition each other. [^70] This is indeed the position most clearly exhibited by the Paramārthagāthās. [^71]

To the best of my knowledge, Dharmakīrti alludes only twice to improper reflection in the context of the rise of defilements. Unfortunately, both statements are far from unambiguous. In PVSV 8,20-21, Dharmakīrti says that “[moral faults] such as desire presuppose [one’s] adherence to self and one’s own, for the rise of all moral faults presupposes improper reflection.” [^72] A little later, he refers to a “specific condition for the rise of desire, viz. improper reflection that consists in the false view of self/viz. the false view of self and improper reflection. [^73] Commenting on the first passage, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin clearly equate the personalistic belief with improper reflection. [^74] But commenting on the second passage, they allow both a dvandva and a karmadhāraya analysis of the compound ātmadarśanāyoniśomanaskāra. [^75] Though I am inclined to interpret these two passages as involving an equivalence between the false view of self and improper reflection, I would like to refrain from any conjecture regarding Dharmakīrti’s position on this issue. [^76] In the same way, I would like to postpone any attempt at organizing the above-mentioned (§2.1.5-6) psychological events into a sequence of phases exhibiting their mutual relationships. At the present state of research, such an attempt would only be idle speculation. [^77]

[^70] AKVy 290,5-7: tad etac cakrakam uktaṃ bhavati / ayoniśomanaskārād avidyā / avidyāyāś cāyoniśomanaskāra iti/. This is, indeed, the position of the Sahetusapratyayasanidānasūtra (1. [moha] → āvilo manasikāra → ayoniśomanaskāra → avidyā → tṛ̣̣nā → karman → cakṣus [but also ear, nose, tongue, body and mind]; 2. cakṣus → karman → tṛ̣̣nā → avidyā → ayoniśomanaskāra); see above, n. 69, and Mejor 2001: 58 and 65-69 (Mejor’s translation of the Sūtra from Tibetan and Chinese sources). [^71] Paramārthagāthā 20 (Wayman 1961: 170): ayoniśomanaskārāt saṃmoho jāyate sa ca / ayoniśomanaskāro nāsaṃmūḍhasya jāyate //. [^72] PVSV 8,20-21: ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayo ‘yoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt sarvadoṣotpatteh /. [^73] PVSV 10,11: rāgotpattipratyayaviśeṣenātmadarśanāyoniśomanaskārena yogāt /. [^74] PVṬ Je D23b1-2/P28a1-2 = PVSVṬ 51,12-13: ātmādijñānam ayoniśomanaskāras tatpūrvakatvāt sarvarāgādidoṣotpatteh /. [^75] PVṬ Je D27a2-3/P32a5-7 = PVSVṬ 55,29-56,12: ātmadarśanaṃ satkāyadrṣṭih / nityasukhādiviparyāso ‘yoniśomanaskārah / dvandvasamāsaś cāyam / ātmadarśanam evāyoniśomanaskāra iti viśeṣanasamāso vā/. Interestingly enough, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin explain “improper reflection” as a “wrong notion such as permanent or pleasant,” which matches perfectly Kamalaśīla’s definition of “improper reflection” as “wrong notion such as self.” According to these authors, then, improper reflection and wrong notions are conceptually equivalent. See above, n. 61. [^76] Lambert Schmithausen (personal communication) has drawn my attention to the possibility that in the first passage (PVSV 8,20-21), Dharmakīrti may not be providing a logical justification, but rather a legitimation of his position by resorting to a more traditional phraseology involving a co-extensivity of the two concepts: “d.h. weil sie [bekanntermaßen] ayoniśomanaskāra voraussetzen(, und dieser in nichts anderem besteht als eben dem ātmātmīyābhi niveśa).” By interpreting the compound in the second passage (PVSV 10,11 ) as a karmadhāraya, one may, then, read the two passages as exhibiting a homogeneous perspective.

2.1.7. Both wrong notions and the personalistic false view consist in the superimposition of erroneous aspects. Both are born of the actualization of a homogeneous latent tendency, which is the hallmark of conceptual construction. In other words, they are but conceptual constructs distorting both internal (the upādānaskandhas) and external reality. Dharmakīrti’s understanding of the personalistic belief harmonizes perfectly well with his overall conception of ignorance as the concealing conceptuality. As for his commentators, they seem to be justified in holding the satkāyadrṣti to be a part, a branch or a specific case of ignorance as a whole. That all conceptual constructs misrepresent reality, and sometimes are even deceiving from a practical point of view, does in no way mean that they are morally and (hence) eschatologically harmful. The superimposition of ego-related aspects alone results in the rise of defilements and reinforces one’s entanglement in samsāra. Dharmakīrti singles out this kind of harmful conceptual distortion as the personalistic belief. ⁶⁹

[^77] To the best of my knowledge, no study has ever been dedicated to the issue of the Buddhist epistemologists’ way(s) of dealing with the Abhidharmic cittasamprayuktasaṃskāras. Their assent to Vasubandhu’s treatment of them cannot be taken for granted. To adduce but one example: samjñā is classified as a mahābhūmika, and as such, should occur together with vijñāna/citta/ manas; but niścaya(jñāna), the Buddhist epistemologists’ equivalent of saṃjñā, takes place after the sensory awareness (the latter giving rise to the vāsanāprabodha of the conceptual construct). In the present context, I think we should refrain from modelling the epistemologists’ conception of ignorance and improper reflection on Bhadanta Śrīlāta’s above-mentioned (see n. 69) elaborations on this topic. According to him, the improper reflection that is present at the moment of contact (sparśakāle) is the condition (pratyaya) for the ignorance that coexists with sensation (vedanāsahavartiny avidyā) and in turn gives rise to craving. On the contrary, an Arhat’s unbiased (aviparīta) contact does not give rise to a defiled sensation (klisṭ̄a vedanā), which in turn does not provide a condition for craving. As both Śrīlāta (at least Vasubandhu’s Śrīlāta) and Yaśomitra describe it, Arhats do have sensations, but these do not generate craving, for only sensations that are accompanied by ignorance (sāvidya) give rise to craving (AKVy 290,13-15: arhatām asti vedanā / na ca sā tṛ̣̣nāyāh pratyayībhavatīti / sāvidyaiva vedanā tṛ̣̣nāpratyaya iti gamyate /.) Śrīlāta adduces a reasoning (yukti) in order to make his point (AKBh 135,20-22: kayā yuktyā / na hi niravadyā vedanā tṛ̣̣nāyāh pratyayībhavaty arhatāṃ na cāviparītaḥ sparśaḥ kliṣtāyā vedanāyāḥ / na ca punar niravadyasyārhataḥ sparśo viparīta ity anayā yuktyā /).

2.2. Ignorance, inference, and the path toward salvation

2.2.1. Like most Indian systems of salvation, Buddhism traces human beings’ unsatisfactory condition back to ignorance, and presents itself as a cleansing and illuminative therapy aimed at uprooting ignorance and the evils it is responsible for. Though the Buddhist epistemologists do not (even pretend to) bring any doctrinal or practical innovation into traditional Buddhist soteriologies, they lay strong emphasis on the means of valid cognition (pramāna) as being instrumental in salvation. As is well known, Dignāga reduced the number of genuine pramannas from three (perception, inference, and scriptures [āgama]) to two (perception and inference). At the present state of our knowledge about Dignāga, however, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which non-epistemological, i.e., religious (lato sensu) considerations played a role in this epistemological reduction. If one cannot question Dharmakīrti’s endorsement and consolidation of Dignāga’s two-headed system as far as the epistemology is concerned, one might still argue that Dharmakīrti’s religious ideas, as they are known to us, provided, if not the basic framework, at least a strong additional motivation for sticking to this epistemology. This two-headed system could, after all, lay no claim to traditionally sanctioned authority before Dignāga. ⁷⁰ In my opinion, Dharmakīrti was deeply convinced that perception and inference are enough both to shape and bring about the path to salvation and to provide the basic gnoseological features of the liberated yogin. To put it in a nutshell: Although it is conceptual in nature and thus belongs to ignorance, inference is the means through which perception, which is nothing but “knowledge,” can be brought to function in its most genuine manner. Dharmakīrti’s system is in a way analogous to Tathāgatagarbha patterns of thought: though polluted by (ultimately adventitious) false views and defilements, the condition of the liberated mind is already here at hand. To be more precise, perception is basically the same with regard to its operation and objects before and after the revolution of the basis (āśrayaparivrtti). The only (but admittedly crucial) difference is that, at the completion of the path, it is no longer adulterated and contradicted by the counteracting cognitive factor called “ignorance.” Correcting erroneous superimpositions of all kinds and substituting them with true/validated intellectual contents is the basic task of inference. Far from being a means of investigating the world and improving knowledge, inference aims first and foremost at discarding the erroneous superimpositions that ignorance is ultimately responsible for. ⁷¹

2.2.2. As we have seen, ignorance basically amounts to superimposition, concealment/covering, conceptual construct and pseudoperception. As such, ignorance is of a cognitional character and consists in an “anti-knowledge,” in a mental event counteracting, contradicting or conflicting with “knowledge.” What does, then, “knowledge” consist in? As we have seen, Dharmakīrti’s commentators define it as the “vision/perception of a real object” (bhūtārthaº /sadarthadarśana), or the “grasping of a real object” (bhūtārthagrahaṇa). ⁷² In these expressions, darśana and grahaṇa hint at perception and direct cognition (vijñāna), two terms denoting immediate sensory awareness of an object. ⁷³ According to Dharmakīrti, the nature of an object is undivided and amenable to sense perception. ⁷⁴ This is tantamount to claiming that a single act of perception is enough to grasp this nature, and that it grasps it in its entirety (sarvātmanā), in all its aspects (sarvākāreṇa), so that no other means of valid cognition is needed for cognizing this nature in a positive way (vidhinā): Perception leaves no part of this undivided nature unknown, so that, say, inference or verbal knowledge might be needed in order to gain access to it. ⁷⁵ In other words, a single perception grasps an object as selfless and momentary, or, to be more precise, grasps a selfless and momentary thing. ⁷⁶ This can, of course, be traced back to Dharmakīrti’s “Sautrāntika” assumption that a perceptual awareness results directly from a real thing’s causal efficiency. According to a well-known statement, “experts in reason(ing) hold that [for a given thing] to be a graspable [object] consists in being a cause capable of casting (arpana) [its own] aspect into cognition. ⁷⁷ That real things cast their own aspect into the consciousness, thus giving rise to perceptual awareness, is the basic meaning of the description of this awareness as arising by the force of something real (vastubalapravrtta). Dharmakīrti makes it especially clear in the following statement: “The property of a [perceptual] cognition is to grasp an object; [as for] this [object, it] is grasped as it is, and it generates this [cognition of itself] through [its truly] existing nature. Such is the nature [of the cognition and of the object].” ⁷⁸ Devendrabuddhi (as well as Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla) exhibits the rationale behind Dharmakīrti’s (provisio- nal) position as follows: ⁷⁹ “When he is asked about the property of a cognition, the one who accepts that a cognition really grasps an object must answer that the property of a [perceptual] cognition is to grasp an object (= PV 2.206ab₁). [And] if the property of all the cognitions possessing an object is to grasp an object, then they grasp [their] objects as they [really] are, (…) under an aspect such as impermanence, not under an unreal aspect. For in this way, if it is rationally established that a cognition cognizes (vişayikaroti) an object as it [really] is, that which is not cognized in this way is due to an external ⁸⁰ or internal ⁸¹ adventitious cause of error, just as the [erroneous] cognition of a snake in the case of a rope in a dark place abundant in/suitable for snakes. Therefore, to grasp the real aspect of an object is the nature of a cognition. If on the contrary (atha ca) [its] nature were to grasp [an object] erroneously, then it would not have the property of grasping any object [at all]. Because in this way the object would not be as the cognition cognizes [it], and because [the cognition] would not cognize the object as it [really] is, cognitions would be devoid of object, (…) [and] hence all entities would be unestablished (…) Therefore, the one who accepts a relationship between object and object-possessor has to hold that the property of a cognition is to grasp an object, [and] thus the nature of this [cognition] is to grasp the real aspect of an object. That which is other than this [i.e., unreal,] is produced by a [purely] adventitious condition.” ⁸² This argument draws a sharp delineation between non-erroneous cognitions, which result directly from their objects’ causal efficiency, and erroneous cognitions, which result from a cause of error (bhrāntinimitta, pratyaya). Whereas the former are termed vastubalapravrttta, true (bhūtārtha), and (being the mind’s) nature, the latter, which arise, among other factors, from the latent tendencies of erroneous conceptual constructs, ⁸³ are described as avastubalapravrtta, as not agreeing with (means of) valid cognition (pramānāsaṃvādin) and as adventitious (āgantu[ka]). According to Dharmakīrti’s followers, this delineation only holds good provided perceptual cognitions cognize their objects in their real aspects.

Claiming that a perceptual cognition grasps the real aspect of an object ⁸⁴ is tantamount to saying that it grasps aspects such as impermanence or selflessness. ⁸⁵ As Kamalaśīla nicely puts it, “it is firmly established that the intrinsic nature of the [mind] is to grasp the real aspect of an object; but it has been explained [earlier] that the real nature of an object consists of [its being] momentary, selfless, etc.; therefore, the mind has the grasping of selflessness for its nature. ⁸⁶ In other words, the nature of the mind is to perceive reality/the true nature (tattvadarsana) of things. ⁸⁷ And granted that selflessness is the true nature of things, the mind turns out to be nothing other than discernment (vipaśyanā) itself, ⁸⁸ which Śākyabuddhi defines as wisdom (prajñā) bearing upon selflessness. ⁸⁹ This “Sautrāntika” epistemology forms the background of Dharmakīrti’s well-known allusion to the canonical topos of the mind’s being radiant (prabhāsvara) by its very nature (prakrtyā). “Radiant” is to be understood as “having the nature of grasping [entities] as they really are” (yathābhūtagrahanasvabhāva), or “consisting in the perception of reality/the true nature [of things]” (tattvadarśanasātmaka). ⁹⁰ “Knowledge” is nothing but direct perceptual awareness, i.e., the mirror-like mind grasping the true nature of real entities. ⁹¹

What can be regained from Dharmakīrti’s understanding of “knowledge” seems to mirror a significant shift from the ideas held by his Yogācāra predecessors. Defining a threefold ignorance, the YBh declares its antidotes (vipakṣa) to be the insights born of audition, reflection and (mental) cultivation. ⁹² In his PrSVy, Vasubandhu defines “knowledge” as the insight born of reflection and (mental) cultivation. ⁹³ Dharmakīrti assents, of course, to the fact that ignorance can only be eliminated by the practice of the path and its three (or at least two) successive types of insight. But according to him, soteric practice does not aim at developing entirely new cognitive modalities, but rather, at freeing from all counteracting factors a type of cognition that has already been here at hand.

2.2.3. Contrary to “knowledge,” which, qua perception, is a cognition that is free of conceptual construction (kalpanāpodha) and non-erroneous (abhrānta), ⁹⁴ the realm of ignorance is coextensive with conceptuality and error. “Error,” however, is not necessarily synonymous with “unreliability” (visaṃvāda, visaṃvāditva): Whereas “erroneous” is to be said of any cognition that does not arise from and hence display a bare particular, “unreliable” denotes those cognitions that are not conducive to a successful practical interaction with the particulars (or, as Dharmottara will say, that do not allow one to reach/obtain [pravāp ] the concrete particular). ⁹⁵ All conceptual constructs are erroneous by their very nature and origin, but some of them are reliable (and hence valid cognitions, pramāna), ⁹⁶ whereas others are not. Śākyabuddhi and Karnakagomin have an opponent ask the following question: “[But] if every conceptual construct is simply erroneous, why [do you hold] conceptual constructs such as [being] impermanent or selfless [to be] valid cognitions, but not conceptual constructs such as [being] permanent?”⁹⁷ Dharmakīrti’s answer is as follows: “And since all this is an error due to the latent tendencies imprinted by [previous] perceptions of the particulars themselves, [those] conceptual constructs whose arising is [indirectly] bound to these [particulars] are reliable with regard to the thing [itself] although they do not display it, just like the error [consisting] of [cognizing] a gem [is reliable] with regard to the radiance of that gem. [But] others [such as permanence] are not [reliable with regard to the thing itself] because, (…) disregarding (parityajya) the conformity ⁹⁸ with the specific [property] as it has been perceived, they superimpose another[, erroneous] specific [property] by [arbitrarily] grasping any sort of universal (kimcitsāmānya). [These conceptual constructs are as unreliable with regard to the thing itself] as the notion of a gem [is unreliable] with regard to the radiance of a lamp.” ⁹⁹ Inasmuch as they do not display bare particulars and owe their existence to latent tendencies, all conceptual constructs are error. Some of them, however, are valid cognitions: Because the aspect they ascribe to the thing exists in it, ¹⁰⁰ and because they are indirectly related (pratibaddha) to the bare particular, they are reliable with regard to the thing itself, i.e., allow a successful practical interaction with it. ¹⁰¹ Other conceptual constructs are not valid cognitions: because they superimpose an aspect that is not found in the thing itself, ¹⁰² and because what they ascribe to it is not even indirectly related to it, ¹⁰³ they are unreliable with regard to the thing itself, i.e., are deceiving in practice.

2.2.4. In our philosophers’ linguistic usage, however, “error” (bhrānti) quite often occurs as a shorter term for “unreliable cognition,” and is equated with “wrong notion” or “misconception” (viparyāsa). A similar semantic shift can be observed in connection with “superimposition” ([sam]āropa), no longer used in the general sense of conceptuality and concealment, but in the sense of a mistaken identification barring determinate cognition (niścaya). In the present context, “error,” “superimposition” (both in this specialized meaning), “wrong notion,” and “lack of determinate cognition” can be considered to be equivalent. Two kinds of situation are responsible for the rise of error: the presence of a cause of error (bhrāntinimitta) ¹⁰⁴ and the lack of the causal conditions needed for determinate cognition (niścayapratyayavaikalya). ¹⁰⁵ Together with Śākyabuddhi, we may consider the cause of error as twofold: The internal cause of error consists in the latent tendency of a contrary conceptual construct (viparītavikalpavāsanā); ¹⁰⁶ as for the external cause of error, it is most often exemplified as the arising of ever new similar phases (sadrśāparāparotpatti) in a continuum, ¹⁰⁷ which leads to the superimposition of aspects such as permanent (nitya), enduring (sthira), and non-momentary (aksanika). ¹⁰⁸ Be it internal or external, this cause of error impedes determinate cognition (niścayapratirodhin,º vibandhaka). ¹⁰⁹ The lack of (conceptual) habitus (abhyāsa) is most often quoted as being among the conditions that, when lacking, prevent determinate cognition from arising. ¹¹⁰ Just as determinate cognition bears upon one specificity (bheda) or aspect (ākāra) of a previously cognized particular, wrong notion superimposes one partial erroneous/contrary aspect (amśasamāropa) ¹¹¹ and associates (< samyojyeta, PV 1.44b) another, i.e., a false quality (guṇa; glossed as rūpa, dharma), ¹¹² to the thing. As Dharmakīrti himself has it, “though it has been perceived as distinct from all [other entities], an entity is not [necessarily] recognized in this way [i.e., in all its aspects], because an obstruction (vyavadhāna) to [the recognition of] a certain specificity [such as momentariness] may occur.” ¹¹³ Determinate cognition (niścaya, °jñāna, °manas) and superimposition (samāropa, °jñāna; āropa-manas) are mutually exclusive and stand in a relationship of mutual annulment (bādhyabādhakabhāva): ¹¹⁴ When aspects such as lasting, endowed with a self (sātmaka), or unconditioned (akrtaka) are superimposed, (real) contrary aspects such as impermanent/ momentary, selfless (nirātmaka), or conditioned (krtaka) are not made the objects of determinate cognitions. ¹¹⁵

2.2.5. According to Dharmakīrti, the function (vyāpāra) and aim (phala, artha) of inference ¹¹⁶ (anumāna, linga, sādhana) as a means of valid cognition is not to cognize something in a positive way (vidhinā) or to determine the nature of an entity (vastusvabhāvaniścaya), ¹¹⁷ but to rule out, negate, or exclude (vyavaccheda, niṣedha, pratiṣedha, nivṛtti, apoha) unreliable superimpositions and wrong notions: ¹¹⁸ “Superimpositions endowed each with its own cause are as many as the alien natures (parabhāva) [wrongly ascribed] to the [entity]. In that they exclude these [superimpositions], the means of valid cognition [named ‘inferences’] can therefore be useful. But these [inferences,] aiming (º phala) [as they do] at the exclusion [of superimpositions,] are not employed in order to cognize a [supposedly still] uncognized part of the entity, because this [part has already been] perceived, and because an indivisible [entity] cannot be perceived in a partial way (ekadeśena).” ¹¹⁹ Dharmakīrti spells out the same argument in the following three stanzas: “[If] the undivided (eka) nature of an object is in itself perceptible, which other unperceived part [of it] would there be left for [further positive] investigation by the [other] means of valid cognition [i.e., by inference]? [There would be none,] if another [unreal] quality were not associated [with this nature] due to [some] cause of error, just like the aspect of silver [is associated] with a conch-shell due to one’s observing a similarity of colour [between them]. Therefore, all the qualities of the perceived entity are perceived, [but] due to some error, they are not determined. Thus one undertakes an [inferential] proof [in order to determine what the error has left undetermined].” ¹²⁰ To be more precise, inferences, like conceptual constructs and words, perform both a direct, positive (< vidhinā vidhirūpeṇa) and an indirect (< arthāt), negative function. ¹²¹ In its positive function, inference aims at the conceptual determination of those aspects of the perceived particular that have escaped determination (aniścitaniścaya). ¹²² But inference ipso facto negates the conceptual constructs wrongly ascribed to the perceived entity, and such is its indirect function. In this respect, inference does not differ from words and concepts, which refer simultaneously to positive intellectual constructs and indirectly exclude other, unfitting constructs. It is hardly surprising, then, that Dharmakīrti repeatedly describes inference, too, as the exclusion of another (anyāpoha): Inference aims at determination, but to determine amounts to holding off superimposition (samāropaviveka), i.e., to excluding another, superimposed aspect. That inference always presupposes a wrong notion is the point at stake in the following discussion: “[Objection:] The [inferential] determination of [something previously] uncognized does not necessarily presuppose a wrong notion, as [in the case of one] suddenly (akasmāt) knowing from [the presence of] smoke [that there is] fire [in a certain place], for in this case, the [previous] superimposition of the absence of fire (anagni) [in this place] is not possible. Therefore, [inference] does not always (sarvatra) exclude [a previous superimposition]. [Answer:] (…) In this case too, the [person] who sees this [spot] lacks a determinate cognition of its nature [i.e., of this spot’s indeed possessing fire. And] why [does he lack it]? Because of a wrong notion! ¹²³ And [insofar as] this [person] determines this place as free of [fire] (tadviviktena rūpena) through a cognition that does not presume [by any means] that fire exists [there], how can it be said [that this person is] not mistaken (aviparyasta)? And a [person] who would neither superimpose this aspect nor doubt [the existence of fire] would [certainly] not resort to an inference (linga) in order to know that [there is fire in this place].” ¹²⁴

2.2.6. We are now in a position to grasp one of the fundamental trends of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. Perception provides an unmediated and unbiased access to reality, especially to the so-called vastudharmas (impermanence, selflessness, painfulness, emptiness), those ultimately real aspects that entities themselves cast into the consciousness. But ignorance (qua conceptuality and concealment) first has us ascribe erroneous intellectual constructs to reality, both by unifying the many and by dividing the indivisible. Second, ignorance (especially as the personalistic false view) has us fail to identify, recognize, or determine the entities’ real aspects by superimposing contrary qualities. Now, aspects such as self, pleasure, or one’s own are the root causes of craving, appropriating, acting and finally being reborn, i.e., suffering. From this perspective, the value of inference as a correcting, error-eliminating principle cannot be overestimated. In a very interesting passage in PV 3, Dharmakīrti clearly connects error, its elimination by inference, and the (yogic, i.e., Buddhist) strengthening of an (inferentially based) conceptual habitus: “Because of the error that is due to the [immediate] occurrence of a new (apara) similar [phase, someone] fails to see [i.e., determine] the difference [between two phases as long as the continuum is not interrupted; this person thus] lacks the [determinate] knowledge of a certain [aspect like impermanence, although (s)he has grasped it perceptually (…) But if the continuum is interrupted by an interval of non-existence,] it is indeed without [resorting to any] inference that down to a child, [any] person determines, upon seeing the rise of a new (uttara) [phase of light] disconnected [from the preceding one], that the light [of a lamp], etc., is perishable. [Or,] failing to see the effect [of an entity] because of the interval [implied by the causal process], an ascertainer [can also], due to dullness (apātava), be mistaken with regard to [this entity’s very] capacity [to bring about its effect,] although it is inherent to the entity [itself]. It is in order to remove just this [kind of error] that inference is [so] minutely described. [As for] those of great understanding, they determine all aspects [of an entity] by [just] seeing [it].” ¹²⁵ The intimate connection between inference and the search for the structure of ultimate reality and hence soteriology is emphasized in the following statement by Dharmakīrti: “The differentiation between the probandum and the probans is used by/ allows wise people to penetrate ultimate reality.” ¹²⁶ In determining what had remained unidentified and hereby excluding wrong notions, inference indeed restores, still on a purely conceptual level, the most fundamental features of reality. The sequence linking the obliteration of perception and an inference’s corrective function is outlined by Dharmakīrti in a highly suggestive statement of PV 2: “The property of [all] cognition is to grasp an object; this [object] is grasped as it [really] is [i.e., as impermanent, etc.], and it generates this [cognition of itself] by [its] real nature. And such is [the object’s and the cognition’s original] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as it really is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object. But] on account of another cause [i.e., on account of a cause of error], the [mind] shifts (skhalat) from this [inherently veracious nature, superimposing such erroneous aspects as permanence on the object,] and becomes uncertain, requiring a [cognitive] condition for the removal [of this state], like the cognition of a piece of rope [as a snake].”¹²⁷ There is little doubt that the condition alluded to here, explained by Devendrabuddhi as “a means of valid cognition annulling error,” ¹²⁸ is none other than inference. And given the soteriological context (description of the final revolution of the basis, āśrayaparivrtti) in which this statement occurs, it is no less obvious that Dharmakīrti holds that this condition provides the first impetus toward establishing the mind (vijñāna, i.e., perception), at the completion of the path, in its genuine radiant condition. Taking Dharmakīrti’s epistemological interpretation of the mind’s natural radiance seriously, but also his insistence on perception’s non-erroneousness and its giving access to the ultimate structure of reality, we are left with no other possibility than to hold perception before and after the āśrayaparivrtti to be one and the same with regard to its content and operation. As we have seen, ignorance as “anti-knowledge” neither impedes nor obliterates perception itself, but is responsible for subsequent errors and superimpositions. The main difference between cognition before and after the āśrayaparivrtti, i.e., between cognition-cum-ignorance and cognition-sine-ignorance, does not pertain to perception itself, or, as Dharmakīrti himself would have it, to the nature of the mind, but to the subsequent treatment of perceptual data. Inference is responsible for bringing out the intellectual contents that correct erroneous superimpositions; it makes determinate cognition possible, and further, endows the yogin with true conceptual counterparts of the entities’ real aspects. In other words, inference sets the path in motion ¹²⁹ that will first enable the yogin to determine the real aspects of entities upon perceiving them, ¹³⁰ and then free his mind from all those adventitious factors that counteracted perception. To the best of my understanding, the perception of the liberated saint is to be equated with the paramārthikapramāna that Dharmakīrti touches upon at the end of PVin 1.¹³¹

I do not intend to claim, in contrast to most scholars and the textual evidence, that Dharmakīrti’s inference has only soteriological meaning and relevance. By pointing out Dharmakīrti’s insistence upon the vastudharmas in his treatment of both perception and inference, and by putting to the fore the corrective function of inference, I would like to emphasize the fact that Dharmakīrti never lost sight of soteriology in his elaborations on epistemology. According to him, there is at least one set of cases (the most important ones indeed) in which the use of inference coincides with, or impinges upon, the precincts of the wisdom born of rational reflection (yukticintāmayī prajñā). ¹³² The wisdom born of rational reflection traditionally consists (at least in connection with the socalled upapattisādhanayukti) in an analysis carried out on the basis of the means of valid cognition. This holds true of the Buddhist epistemologists, according to whom rational reflection basically aims at bringing out intellectual contents that have been thoroughly examined and made immaculate by means of valid cognition (pramānaparidrṣtārtha, pramāṇapariśuddhārtha), i.e., by inference. ¹³³ Though still strictly conceptual in nature, these contents (the vastudharmas again) “co-function” as the antidote (pratipakṣa = nairātmyadarśana, etc.) to the cause of suffering, i.e., ignorance in the form of personalistic belief. Most ordinary people may well show no interest at all for evolving determinate cognitions of momentariness and selflessness. But to the Buddhist yogin still in the stage of being an ordinary person, investigating the most intimate structure of reality by means of inferences is the first significant step towards the path of vision and liberation.

References

Abbreviations

BHSD	Franklin Edgerton: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Volume II: Dictionary. Delhi 1970: Motilal Banarsidass.
D	Jikido Takasaki/Zuiho Yamaguchi/Noriaki Hakamaya: sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka bsTan ‘gyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 1977-1981.
ms	Manuscript
P	Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tōkyō/Kyōto 1957: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.
s.v.	sub voce
Tib	Tibetan

Primary sources

• AK(Bh) - Prahlad Pradhan: Abhidharmakośabhāsyam of Vasubandhu. Patna 1975: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8).
• AKVy - Unrai Wogihara: Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the Work of Yaśomitra. Tokyo 1989: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store (The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā).
• AN - R. Morris/E. Hardy/M. Hunt/C.A.F Rhys Davids: Añguttara Nikāya. 6 volumes. London 1885-1910: The Pali Text Society.
• ASBh - Nathmal Tatia: Abhidharmasamuccayabhāsyam. Patna 1976: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17).
• BhK 1 - First Bhāvanākrama (Kamalaśīla). Pp. 497/187-539/229 in Giuseppe Tucci: Minor Buddhist Texts. Delhi 1986: Motilal Banarsidass.
• BhK 3 - Giuseppe Tucci: Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III: Third Bhāvanākrama. Roma 1971: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 43).
• HV - Hetuvidyā Section of the Yogācārabhūmi. Hideomi Yaita: Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāna-Tradition: The Hetuvidyā Section of the Yogācārabhūmi, the Dharmottaratippanaka, and the Tarkarahasya. Narita 2005: Naritsan Shinshoji (Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 4). The Sanskrit text of the HV can be found on pp. 98/1*-124/27*.
• MMK - See PrP.
• MN I - V. Trenckner: The Majjhima-Nikāya. Vol. 1. London 1935: Pali Text Society.
• MS - See Lamotte 1973: I.
• NB(Ṭ) - Th. I. Ščerbatskoj: Nyāyabindu. Buddijskij učebnik” logiki sočinenie Dharmakirti I tolkovanie na nego Nyāyabindutī̄kā sočinenie Darmottary. Osnabrück 1970: Biblio Verlag.
• Pā - Pāṇini (Aṣtādhyāyī).
• PrP - Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Madhyamakavṛttiḥ: Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Delhi 1992: Motilal Banarsidass.
• PrSVy - Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā (Vasubandhu). D no. 3995, Chi 1b61a, P no. 5496, Chi 1-71a.
• PV 1-4 - Yūsho Miyasaka: Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2 (1971-1972), pp. 1-206. See also PVV; for PV 2-3, see also PVA; for PV 1, see also PVSV; for PV 2.131cd-285, see also Vetter 1990. My numbering of the verses in PV 2 follows that of Vetter.
• PVA - Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Pramānavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālañkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavārtikam). Patna 1953: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
• PVin 1-2 - Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2. Beijing/Vienna 2007: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 2).
• PVinṬ - Pramāṇaviniścayatī̄kā (Dharmottara). D no. 4229, Dze 1b1-Tshe 178a3/P no. 5727, Dze 1b1-We 209b8.
• PVP - Pramānavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi). D no. 4217, Che 1-326b4/P no. 5717, Che 1-390a8.
• PVSV - Raniero Gnoli: The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-Commentary. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 23).
• PVSVṬ - Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Karnakagomin’s Commentary on the Pramānavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti. Kyōto 1982: Rinsen Books Co.
• PVṬ - Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi). D no. 4220, Je 1b1- Ñe 282a7/P no. 5718, Je 1b1- Ñe 348a8. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the PVṬ belong to Ñe.
• PVV - Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin. Published as an appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26 (1938-1940).
• SAS - F.I. Ščerbatskoj: Tibetskij perevo” sočinenij Samtānāntarasiddhi Dharmakīrti i Saṃtānāntarasiddhiṭīkā Vinītadeva. Delhi 1992: Motilal Banarsidass.
• TS(P) - K = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. 2 vols. Baroda 1984: Oriental Institute.
• *UH - *Upāyahrdaya/*Prayogasāra. Giuseppe Tucci: Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources. Baroda 1929: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad Oriental Series 49).
• Vibh. - Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV. See PVV.
• VY - Jong Cheol Lee: The Tibetan Text of the Vyākhyāyukti of Vasubandhu. Tōkyō 2001: The Sankibo Press (Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 8).
• YBh - Yogācārabhūmi, or, followed by page/line numbers: V. Bhattacharya: The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asanga. Calcutta 1957: University of Calcutta.

Secondary sources

• Collins 1982 - Steven Collins: Selfless Persons. Imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge/New York 1982: Cambridge University Press.
• Eltschinger 2005 - Vincent Eltschinger: Études sur la philosophie religieuse de Dharmakīrti: 2. L’āśrayaparivrtti. Journal Asiatique 293/1 (2005), pp. 151-211.
• Eltschinger 2009 - Vincent Eltschinger: Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology - Part I. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32/1-2 (2009 [2010]), pp. 39-83.
• Eltschinger 2010 - Vincent Eltschinger: Studies in Dharmakīrti’s Religious Philosophy: 4. The Cintāmayī Prajñā. Pp. 553-591 in Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy. Delhi 2010: Motilal Banarsidass.
• Frauwallner 1959 - Erich Frauwallner: Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 3 (1959), pp. 83-164.
• Funayama 1992 - Toru Funayama: A Study of kalpanāpodha. A Translation of the Tattvasamgraha vv. 1212-1263 by Śāntarakṣita and the Tattvasamgrahapañjikā by Kamalaśīla on the Definition of Direct Perception. Kyoto 1992: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyūsho, Kyōto University.
• Funayama 1999 - Toru Funayama: Kamalaśīla’s Interpretation of ‘Non-Erroneous’ in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems. Pp. 73-99 in Shoryu Katsura (ed.): Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference (Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997). Vienna 1999: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philologisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 281).
• Jaini 2001 - Padmanabh S. Jaini: On the Ignorance of the Arhat. Pp. 167-179 (= Chapter 9) in Padmanabh S. Jaini: Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies. Delhi 2001: Motilal Banarsidass.
• Kellner 2004 - Birgit Kellner: Why Infer and not just Look? Dharmakīrti on the Psychology of Inferential Processes. Pp. 1-51 in: Shoryu Katsura/Ernst Steinkellner (eds.): The Role of the Example (drṣtānta) in Classical Indian Logic. Vienna 2004: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 58).
• Kośa - Louis de La Vallée Poussin: L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Bruxelles 1980: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises (Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 16).
• Krasser 1991 - Helmut Krasser: Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis - Laghuprāmānyaparīkṣā. Teil 2: Übersetzung. Vienna 1991: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 7).
• Krasser 1995 - Helmut Krasser: Dharmottara’s Theory of Knowledge in his Laghuprāmānyaparīkṣā. Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995), pp. 247-271.
• Krasser 2004 - Helmut Krasser: Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation. Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur 11 (2004), pp. 129-146.
• Kritzer 1999 - Robert Kritzer: Rebirth and Causation in the Yogācāra Abhidharma. Vienna 1999: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 44).
• La Vallée Poussin 1913 - Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Bouddhisme, études et matériaux. Théorie des douze causes. Gand 1913: Librairie scientifique E. van Goethem (Université de Gand, Recueil de travaux publiés par la Faculté de philosophie et des lettres 40).
• Lamotte 1973 - Étienne Lamotte: La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asañga (Mahāyānasañgraha). 2 vols. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1973: Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste (Publications de l’IOL 8).
• Lamotte 1987 - Étienne Lamotte: Le troisième Bhāvanā-krama de Kamalašīla. Traduction de la version tibétaine. Pp. 336-353 in Paul Demiéville: Le Concile de Lhasa, une controverse sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine au VIII siècle de l’ère chrétienne. Paris 1987: Collège de France, Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises (Publication de l’Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises 7).
• May 1959 - Jacques May: Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti. Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d’une introduction, de notes et d’une édition critique de la version tibétaine. Paris 1959: Adrien Maisonneuve (Collection Jean Przyluski 2).
• McClintock 2010 - Sara L. McClintock: Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalašila on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority. Boston 2010: Wisdom Publications (Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism).
• Mejor 2001 - Marek Mejor: Controversy on the mutual conditioning of avidyā and ayoniśomanas(i)kāra in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa. Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies 4 (2001), pp. 49[/292]-78[/263].
• Pruden 1988-1990 - Leo M. Pruden: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vols. Berkeley 1988-1990: Asian Humanities Press.
• Ś = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalshīla. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series 1).
• Schmithausen 1977 - Lambert Schmithausen: Zur buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit. Pp. 918-931 in Wolfgang Voigt (ed.): Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Supplement III,2 (XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag). Wiesbaden 1977: Franz Steiner Verlag.
• Steinkellner 1979 - Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścayah. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Vienna 1979: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens 15).
• Vetter 1990 - Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramānavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramānasiddhi-Kapitel. Vienna 1990: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 12).
• Wayman 1961 - Alex Wayman: Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. Berkeley/Los Angeles 1961: University of California Press.
• Wayman 1980 - Alex Wayman: The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3/2 (1980), pp. 67-76.

Footnotes

1. This study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus”). Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Ratié, Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser and Ernst Steinkellner. Lambert Schmithausen also deserves my wholehearted gratitude for having gone through this essay with incomparably great care and erudition. My most sincere thanks are due to Cynthia Peck, who kindly corrected my English. ↩

2. PV 2.135ac₁: ātmātmīyagrahakrtaḥ snehah samskāragocarah / hetuh … sneha = trṣṇā according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PVṬ D117b3-4/P143b7; Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ D117b4/P143b7-8) unambiguously explains gocara as viṣaya. ↩

3. PVP D56b1/P64a5-6: sdug bsnial du gyur pa’i ‘dus byas bdag dañ bdag gi dañ bral ba la bdag dañ bdag gi’i rnam par mñon par źen pas ‘jug pa źes bya ba’i don to //. ↩

4. PVP D60b2-3/P69a4-5: mi rtag pa dañ sdug bsnial ba dañ ston pa dañ bdag med pa’i phuñ po rnams la rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ bdag gir sgro btags nas ‘jug pa ‘dod chags la sogs pa de dag … ↩

5. E.g., PVP D88a4-5/P101b4: ñe bar len pa’i phuñ po lña la gañ rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ bdag gi rnam pa yod pa ma yin no //. PVP D88a6/ P101b5-6: ñe bar len pa’i phuñ po lña la rtag pa la sogs pa’i rnam par ‘dzin pa’i śes pa yañ rnam pa med pa ‘dzin pa can yin no //. ↩

6. PV 2.196ab: ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme ‘tadātmake /. Devendrabuddhi explains (PVP D84a7-b1/P97a1-2): ‘dod chags la sogs pa’i ran bźin du yañ ‘gyur ba ma yin te / ‘di ltar de bdag med can te / rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ bdag gi dañ bral ba’i yul du gyur pa’o // chos la ste phuñ po la sogs pa’i rañ gi ño bo la’o // bdag gźan sgro btags phyir te rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ bdag gi’i rañ bźin gźan du sgro btags pa’i rgyu’i phyir mñon par źen pa’i mtshan ñid kyi chags pa skye bar ‘gyur ro //. ↩

7. PVP D116a1/P134b2: sgro btags nas ni mi śes pa’i phyir … ↩

8. At least according to the Vaibhāsikas, each of the four Nobles’ Truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the Truth of suffering under the aspects “impermanent,” “painful,” “empty” and “selfless;” the Truth of origin under the aspects of “(distant/material) cause” (as a seed), “arising,” “(serial) causation” and “(joint) condition;” the Truth of extinction, under the aspects of “extinction,” “calm,” “excellent” and “salvation;” the Truth of the path under the aspects of “path,” “fitness,” “access” and “conducive to release” (AKBh 343,16-19 on AK 6.17c₁ : duhkhaṃ caturbhir ākāraiḥ paśyaty anityato duḥkhataḥ śūnyato ‘nātmataś ca / samudayaṃ caturbhir hetutah samudayatah prabhavatah pratyayataś ca/ nirodhaṃ caturbhir nirodhatah śāntatah pranītato niḥsaranataś ca / mārgaṃ caturbhir märgato nyāyatah pratipattito nairyānikataś ca/. The sixteen aspects are listed at PVP D62a3-7/P71a1-6). The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh 400,1-401,17 on AK 7.13a, Kośa 7.30-39, Pruden 1988-1990: IV.1110-1116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (pratipakṣa) a particular false view (drṣsti): The aspects anitya, duhkha, śūnya and anātman counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurableness, one’s own, and self; the aspects of hetu, samudaya, prabhava and pratyaya contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,30-31), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects nirodha, śānta, pranīta and niḥsarana oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of dhyānas is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects mārga, nyāya, pratipad and nairyānika, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression; see AKBh 401,11-17, Kośa 7.38-39, Pruden 1988-1990: IV.1115-1116. The explanations provided by Dharmakīrti’s commentators are too few to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three Truths (see PVP D115b6-7/P134a8-b2 and PVṬ D147b3-5/P182a8-b2). On the sixteen aspects, see Wayman 1980. ↩

9. PV 2.270: sthiram sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣtaye / abhūtān ṣodaśākārān āropya paritṛsyati //. Note PVṬ D147b5-7/P182b2-4: sgro btags nas ni yon’s su sred ces bya ba’i tshig gis log par sgro ‘dogs pa snion du soñ ba can gyi sred pa ñid gsal bar bstan pa yin no // sgro ‘dogs pa’i yul la ‘jug pa’i sred pa de yañ sgro ‘dogs pa’i rnam pa ñid yin la / sgro ‘dogs pa’i rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi ñon moñs pa dañ ñe ba’i ñon moñs pa thams cad ñid ma rig pa ñid yin pa … “And with the pāda (= PV 2.270d) āropya paritrsyati, [Dharmakīrti] clearly indicates craving, which presupposes erroneous superimposition. As for this craving, directed [as it is] to an object of superimposition, it also has the aspect of superimposition, and all the kleśas and upakleśas, which bear on an aspect of superimposition, are [nothing] but ignorance …” ↩

10. PVP D115b3-4/P134a4: ma rig pa des kyañ sdug bsnial la rtag pa źes bya ba’i rnam par ‘dzin par byed do //. PVP D115b6/P134a7-8: re źig de ltar sdug bsnial gyi bden pa la mi śes pa mi rtag pa la sogs pa’i rnam pa las phyin ci log tu sgro ‘dogs pa yin no //. See also PVṬ D147a1-2/P181b3-5. ↩

11. According to Devendrabuddhi, all that is produced and lasts more than one moment is permanent (PVP D115b4/P134a5-6: skad cig ma las dus phyis gnas pa’i ñañ tshul can du skyes pa thams cad rtag pa ñid do //. To be compared with Vibh. 102 n. 1: nityam iti vācye kṣanāt param sthāyī sarvo nitya ity arthah /). According to Śākyabuddhi, all that is either unchangeably permanent or lasts for at least a second moment is permanent (PVṬ D147a6-7/P182a2-3: ther zug tu gnas pa’i rtag pa gañ yin pa dañ skad cig ma gñis pa la sogs par gnas pa’i ñañ tshul can dus gźan du gnas pa can gañ yin pa de thams cad ni ‘dir rtag par ‘dod pa yin gyi ther zug tu gnas pa ñid ni ma yin no źes de bstan par ‘gyur ro //). ↩

12. According to PVP D115b5/P134a6: bde ba źes bya ba’i zag pa dañ bcas pa ma yin pa’am skad cig ma re re la rgyu’i gźan gyi dbañ la[s] phyin ci log tu btags pa’o //. duhkha(bhūta) is regularly explained as sāsrava in PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5. ↩

13. Respectively PV 1.223ab (nidāna gl. pradhānakārana PVSVṬ 402,2324), PV 2.211a, PVSV 111,11, PV 2.197ab₁ (mūla gl. dañ po’i rten PVP D84b2/ P97a4), PV 2.212c. ↩

14. E.g., PV 2.197a (doṣa), PV 1.222a (sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnām), PV 2.214d₁ (sarvadosa), PVSVṬ 401,24-25 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 ([sarva]kleśa), PVP D60a2-3/P68b4 (ñon moñs pa dañ ñe ba’i ñon moñs), PV 2.212c (malāh sarve). On upakleśa, see also PVṬ D133a4-5/P164a4. ↩

15. E.g., PVSVṬ 50,28 (kārana), PVSVṬ 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (utpattikārana), PVSVṬ 402,23-24 (pradhānakārana), PVSVṬ 401,21 (hetu). ↩

16. E.g., PV 1.222b (jātih), PVSVṬ 401,22 and 26 (utpatti). ↩

17. Rendered in Tib. as rañ bžin (can). But note PVṬ D137b3/P916b6: rañ bžin ni ño bo ñid dam rgyu yin no //. ↩

18. Respectively PVSV 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on rañ bžin, see above, n. 17), PVP D60a2-3/P68b2-3, PVSV 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSVṬ 401,24 and 25 . ↩

19. Respectively PVP D93b1-2/P108a1-2 and PVP D67b4/P77a6-7. ↩

20. See AK 3.27 and AKBh 134,26-135,3, Kośa 3.69, Pruden 1988-1990: II.407. ↩

21. PVP D56a6/P64a3: skye ba’i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsnial gyi rgyu; PVP D57b3/P65b4: bdag dañ bdag gi la chags pa’i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsnial gyi rgyu; PVP D115b6/P134a8: sred pa’i mtshan ñid can sdug bsnial gyi rgyu; PVP D116a1/P134b3: sred pa sdug bsnial gyi rgyur gyur pa; PVP D115b2/P134a2-3: sdug bsnial gyi rgyu ni sred pa yin no zes bstan zin to // de yañ ma rig pa las byun ba … According to Śākyabuddhi, craving is kun nas ‘chin ba’i rgyu, “the cause of bondage,” and according to PVP D58b1/P66b4, attachment leads to kleśas, punarbhava and janmaparigraha. ↩

22. Dharmakīrti’s commentators provide us with various definitions of samsāra. (1) PVP D62b3-4/P71b2-3: ‘khor bar ‘khor bas na ‘khor ba ste / skye ba dañ ‘chi ba’i rgyun no //, to be compared with PVV 62,11-12: janmamaranaṇaprabandhaḥ saṃsāraḥ /. (2) PVP D95b6/P110b3: (bdag gir yon̉s su ‘dzin pa) rtsom pa la sogs pa’i mtshan ñid can gyi ‘khor ba …, which Sākyabuddhi (PVṬ D138b6-7/P171a7-8) comments as follows: bdag gir yon’s su ‘dzin pa la sogs pa rtsom pa la sogs pa’i mtshan ñid can gyi ‘khor ba zes bya ba la bdag gi ñid du gzuñ ba’i srid pa’i lon’s spyod kyi mtshan ñid can gyi dn’os po la mñon par chags pa sñon du soñ ba can gyi ‘dzin pa ni yon’s su (P om. su) ‘dzin pa’o // rtsom pa ni mñon par bsgrub pa’o //. Tib. mñon par bsgrub pa may translate either abhinirhāra (BHSD s.v., 52b-53a) or (more surely) abhisaṃskāra (BHSD s.v., 57b): Defining “[re]existence” (bhava) in the context of dependent origination, Vasubandhu (Vaibhāṣika definition, AKBh 132,20-21) says: sa … paunarbhavikaṃ karmopacinoti …, “he accumulates action(s) that is/are conducive to rebirth.” Note also TSP Ś230,8-9/K184,2122 (unidentified quotation): cittam eva hi saṃsāro rāgādikleśavāsitam /. ↩

23. PVṬ D148a1/P182b6: ma rig pa dañ sred pa ni sdug bsnial gyi rgyu ñid yin te / phyin ci log pa’i rañ bźin can zes bya ba’i don to //. Suffering is also defined in terms of duhkhatātraya. PVP D62b4/P71b3-4: sdug bsnial rnam pa gsum gyis dn’os sam brgyud pas sdug bsnial ba yin no //, which Śākyabuddhi, having named the three “painfulnesses” (PVṬ D120b5/P147b5), comments as follows (PVṬ D120b6-7/P147b5-7): (1) duhkhā vedanā is suffering in a direct way as duhkhaduḥkhatā (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (2) sukhā vedanā is suffering in a direct way as parināmaduhkhatā (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (3) asukhāduḥkhā vedanā is suffering in a direct way as saṃskāraduḥkhatā (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way). On duḥkhatātraya, see Schmithausen 1977. ↩

24. Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c. ↩

25. PV 2.218 cd (leaving tena untranslated): tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa samsāre //. ↩

26. PVP D85a6-7/P98a3-4: ‘jig tshogs lta ba yañ srid par ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba’i rgyur gyur pa … Note also, referring to the sahajaṃ satkāyadarśanam (PV 2.200d), PVP D85b5/P98b2-3: de yañ srid pa’i rgyu yin no //. ↩

27. PVP D85a6/P98a3: gañ la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsnial la bde ba’i ‘du śes can yin te / yañ srid par mtshams sbyor bar ‘gyur ro //. ↩

28. PVP D58a7-b1/P66b3-4: de ltar na bdag tu mñon par žen pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pa’i skyon gyi tshogs ‘jug par ‘gyur žiñ / bdag tu chags pas kyañ gnas yon̉s su len par byed do //. ↩

29. “Genealogy” as a free rendering of Karṇakagomin’s krama (lit. “sequence,” “succession;” PVSVṬ 401,25-26: kena punaḥ krameṇa doṣānāṃ satkāyadarśanād utpattiḥ /). ↩

30. PV 2.219 (āryā metre): ātmani sati parasaṃjñā̄̄ svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau / anayoḥ sampratibaddhāh sarve doṣāh prajāyante //. Delusion (moha), covetousness (lobha) and hatred/aversion (dveṣa) are traditionally held to be the three root-defilements (mūlakleśa) or roots of evil (akuśalamūla); see AK 5.20c and AKBh 291,8. Note, e.g., AK 5.48a b b: rāgotthā āhrīkyauddhatyamatsarāh. “From out of lust there proceeds disrespect, dissipation, and avarice” (Pruden 1988-1990: III.843, Kośa 5.91). For definitions of āhrīkya, auddhatya and matsara, see AKBh 59,19-20 (Pruden 1988-1990: I.200, Kośa 2.170), AKBh 312,17 (Pruden 1988-1990: I.194, Kośa 2.161) and AKBh 312,16-17 (Pruden 1988-1990: III.842, Kośa 5.90). AK 5.48a b b: krodherṣye pratighānvaye. “From out of hatred there proceeds envy and anger” (Pruden 1988-1990: III.843, Kośa 5.91). For definitions of krodha and īrṣyā see AKBh 312,16 (Pruden 1988-1990: III.842, Kośa 5.90) and AKBh 312,19 (Pruden 1988-1990: III.842, Kośa V.90). ↩

31. PVP D95b1/P110b5-6: bdag ñid du bzuñ ba la yoñs su ‘dzin pa ni mñon par chags pa’o // gźan ñid du rnam par phye ba la sdañ ba yin te / yoñs su dor ba’o //. PVV 87,15-16: svaparavibhāgāc ca kāraṇāt svaparayor yathākramaṃ parigraho ‘bhiṣvañgo dveṣah parityāgas tau bhavatah /. ↩

32. PVP D95a7/P110b4-5: ji srid du blo bdag ces mñon par źen pa de srid du bdag tu ‘du śes pa dañ de yod na de ltar mi ‘dzin pa gañ yin pa de thams cad gźan yin no //. ↩

33. PVSV 111,18: ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte /. ↩

34. PV 2.217: yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvatah snehah / snehāt sukheṣu trṣyati trṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute //. Note that Śākyabuddhi interprets doṣa as jātijarāmaraṇa (PVṬ D138b1/P170b8). ↩

35. PVP D95a6/P111a2, PVV 87,3. ↩

36. PVP D95a6/P111a2: bdag gi bde la sred ‘gyur … ↩

37. PVV 87,3-4: sukhasādhanatvenādhyavasitānāṃ vastūnām … ↩

38. PVP D95b1/P111a4-5: bde ba sgrub par byed pa ñid du ñe bar ‘gro ba zag pa dañ bcas pa’i dños po … On anugrāhaka, see also PVSVṬ 402,8: ātmāt mīyatvena tadanugrāhakatvena parikalpya … ↩

39. E.g., PVP D58a1-2/P66a3. ↩

40. PVP D57b3/P65b4. Love for self and one’s own is said to be directed to the object that is clung to as self and one’s own (ātmātmīyatvābhiniviște viṣaye ātmātmīyasnehah, PVSVṬ 401,26-27). ↩

41. E.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7: ‘jig tshogs la chags pa. ↩

42. PVP D60a2/P68b2-3: de sñon du soñ ba can gyi bdag dañ bdag gir źen pa ni chags pa’o //. Note also PVP D94b7/P109b4-5: chags pa ni bdag tu mñon par chags pa’o // (maybe: sneha ātmany abhiṣvañgah). ↩

43. PVSV 111,15-17: na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyatah parigraham antarena kvacit snehah / na cānanurāginah kvacid dveṣah / ātmātmīyānuparodhiny uparodhapratighātini ca tadabhāvāt/. ↩

44. According to PVSVṬ 402,12: ātmātmīyatvena gṛhītasya ya uparodhaḥ pīḍā /. Note also Devendrabuddhi’s definition of dveṣa at PVP D60a2/P68b3: de (= chags pa) sñon du soñ ba can rjes su chags pa’i yul la gnod par byed pa la mnar sems pa ni źe sdañ ño //. “Hatred is maliciousness with regard to that which injures the object of attachment[, a maliciousness] that presupposes the [afore-mentioned love].” The Sanskrit original for Tib. mnar sems pa is unclear. I would conjecture vyāpannacitta, although, to the best of my knowledge, mnar (ba) is not attested as a translation of vyāpanna(/vyāpāda): vyāpannacitta = gnod sems at AKBh 251,10 and 12 on AK 4.81ac₁ (“de pensée méchante” in Kośa 4.178) as well as in the Saṃcetanīyasūtra quoted in AKVy 400,9-15 on AKBh 237,18. Jaini 2001:221: “The kleśas are like roots which produce as well as sustain an evil volition. Abhidhyā, vyāpāda, and mithyādṛsti are not called roots, but are recognized as intensive states of the three roots of evil (akuśalamūla), viz. lobha, dveṣa, and moha respectively. All evil volitions are essentially rooted in and spring from one or another of these three basic passions (mūlakleśa).” ↩

45. PVSVṬ 402,13-15: ātmātmīyasnehaviṣayabhūtavirodhena yaḥ sthitah pratikūlavartī tatraiva dveṣah / tasmān nātmātmīyasneham antarena dveṣa iti /. ↩

46. AK 3.23cd: upādānaṃ tu bhogānāṃ prāptaye paridhāvatah /. ↩

47. PV 2.218ab (āryā metre): gunadarśī paritṛsyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte /. ↩

48. PVP D79b3-4/P91a7-8: de la sdug bsnial kun ‘byun ‘phags pa’i bden pa gan் źe na / gan் sred pa ‘di ni yañ srid par ‘byun ba can dga’ ba’i ‘dod chags dañ bcas pa de dañ de la mñon par dga’ ba’i ñañ tshul can / ‘di lta ste ‘dod pa’i sred pa dañ srid pa’i sred pa dañ ‘jig pa’i sred pa yin no źes gsuñs so //. PVA 134,33-135,2: uktaṃ hi bhagavatā tatra katamat samudaya āryasatyam / yeyaṃ tṛṣnā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī / yad uta kā[m]atrṣṇā bhavatṛ̣ṇā vibhavatṛ̣ṇā ceti … PVV 74,10-11: nanūktaṃ bhagavatā tatra katamah samudaya āryasatyam paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī yad uta kāmatṛ̣ṇā bhavatṝ̣̣̣̄a vibhavatṝ̣̣̣̄ ceti … For the Pāli text, see Vetter 1990: 87, n. 1. ↩

49. AKBh 132,19-21 (together with AK 3.24ab): sa bhavisyadbhavaphalam kurute karma tad bhavah / sa viṣayānām prāptihetoh paridhāvan paunarbhavikam karmopacinoti so ‘sya bhavah/. ↩

50. PV 2.183a₂185: hetur bhavavāñchā parigrahaḥ / yasmād deśaviśeṣasya tatprāptyāśākrto nṛnām // sā bhavecchā ‘’ptyanāptīcchoḥ pravṛttiḥ sukhaduhkhayoḥ / yato ‘pi prāṇinah kāmavibhavecche ca te mate // sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetutvāt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasamjñasya tasmāt tṛ̣̣̣ā bhavāśrayah //. ↩

51. For a useful overview, see Kritzer 1999: 67-72. 52 AK:Bh 312,1-2: trivedanāvaśāt trīni bandhanāni / sukhāyām hi vedanāyām rāgo ‘nuśete ālambanasamprayogābhyām / duḥkhāyām dveṣah /. AK 5.55ab + AKBh 316,6 and 8: sukhābhyām samprayukto hi rāgah / sukhasaumanasyābhyām rāgah samprayuktaḥ / dveṣo viparyayāt / duḥkhābhyām ity arthaḥ / duḥkhena daurmanasyena ca /. ↩

52. See PV 2.151c₂d: rāgāder vikāro ‘pi sukhādijah /, and the discussion below. ↩

53. According to PVP D66a5-6/P75b5-6: reg bya’i khyad par gyi don phan ‘dogs par byed pa dañ de las gźan pa’i rjes su byed pas bde ba’am sdug bsnial lam (sic) ‘dod chags la sogs pa skye ba dañ rjes su mthun pa yin pa … ↩

54. To take the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as pure, and the selfless as a self (AKBh 283,5-7: catvāro viparyāsāh / anitye nityam iti / duḥkhe sukham iti / aśucau śucīti / anātmany ātmeti /). With the exception of the (im)pure, they correspond to the erroneous aspects one superimposes on the Truth of suffering (see above, n. 8). ↩

55. On sañkalpa, see May 1959: 181n. 586, PrP 451,9 ff., and the following excerpts: PVP D68a4-5/P77b8-78a1: ci ste ‘di la yañ kun tu rtog pa yañ yan lag ñid du rtog par ‘gyur ba de’i tshe kun tu rtog pa yañ bdag dañ bdag gi dañ gtsañ ba dañ bde ba la sogs pa’i miñ can gyi mtshan ñid kyi sa bon yin no //. PVP D67a3-4/P76b5-6: gañ gis bud med ‘ga’ žig gi gzugs la sogs pa la kun tu rtog par byed ciñ ‘dod chags kyis gduñs pa de ni … TSP Ś666,25-667,9/ K547,8-9: atītānāgate ‘pi viṣaye sañkalpavaśād abhivṛddhasukhādiviparyāsasya pumsah pratisañkhyānanivṛttau teṣạṃ rāgādīnāṃ prabalatvaṃ dṛśyate /. MMK 23.1: sañkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate / śubhāśubhaviparyāsān sambhavanti pratītya hi //. PrP 452,4-5: tatra hi śubham ākāraṃ pratītya rāga utpadyate / aśubhaṃ pratītya dveṣah / viparyāsān pratītya moha utpadyate / sañkalpas tv eṣạṃ trayānām api sādhāraṇakāraṇam utpattau /. PVSVṬ 166,29-167,2 gl. sañkalpita (PV 1.70d) as āropita. To sum up, sañkalpa is the bīja of the wrong notions or, equivalently, of the erroneous aspects, which in turn form the bases (āśraya < āśritya) or conditions (pratyaya < pratītya) of the defilements; to put it as shortly as Candrakīrti, sañkalpa is the common cause (sādhāraṇakāraṇa) for the rise of the defilements. On sañkalpa, see also below, nn. 68 and 69. ↩

56. TS Ś1951ac/K1952ac: śubhātmīyasthirādīṃś ca samāropyāñganādiṣu / rāgādayah pravartante … “Pleasant” according to TSP S667,13-14/ K547,12-14 thereon: ātmā*tmīyanityasukhādyākārān abhūtān evā ro payanto ’ṅga nā di ṣu pra vartante, na ca śubhādirūpā viṣayāḥ /.
    *TSP_K with no equivalent of ātmāº. ↩

57. TS Ś1953-1954d,/K1954-1955d, (leaving tu untranslated): viṣayopanipāte tu sukhaduhkhādisambhavāh / tasmāt samānajātīyavāsanāparipākajāh // rāgadveṣādayah kleśāh pratisañkhyānavidviṣām / ayoniśomanaskāravidheṛānām … Note also PV 2.157ac: sajátivāsanābhedapratibaddhapravṛttayah / … rāgādayah … PVV 66,8-10: sajátivāsanā ‘tmātmīyagrahamūlasya sajāteh (Vibh. 66 n. 1: satkāyadarśanasya) pūrvapūrvābhyastasya rāgāder vāsanā ‘parāpararāgādijanikāh śaktayas tāsām bhedah parasparatas tatra pratibaddhā pravṛttir janma yeṣạ̣̄ te tathā … Here, sajātivāsanā is analysed as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “latent tendencies of the homologous [defilements which are rooted in the belief in self and one’s own].” But according to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, the compound is to be analysed as a dvandva (PVṬ D123a2-3/P150b7): sajāti refers to the satkāyadrṣ̣̣i (ātmātmīyadrṣ̣ti in PVP D68a6-8/P78a35) whereas the vāsanā(bheda) consists in the pūrvarāgādyāhitabīja. ↩

58. TSP Ś666,22-23/K547,6: aśubhādipratisañkhyāna. According to PVP D67a6-7/P77a1-2, rāgādi do not occur in those who have the aśubhādisaṃjñā. Note also Kamalaśīla’s definition at TSP Ś666,23/K547,6-7: aśubhādyālambanā rāgādipratipakṣabhūtā prajñā pratisañkhyānam /, which may be compared with AKVy 389,13 on AKBh 226,13-14: pratisañkhyānasya tatpratipakṣabhāvanālakṣanasya, where tat = kleśa (context: nirvāna). Note also AKBh 4,1 on AK 1.6ab₁ : duhkhādīnām āryasatyānām pratisañkhyānaṃ pratisañkhyā prajñāviśeṣah … (see also Kośa 1.8, and AKVy 16,4-7). ↩

59. On latent tendencies and their actualization, see Eltschinger 2009: 5758, nn. 53-55. ↩

60. TSP Ś667,19-22/K547,26-548,2: eṣa hi kramah - viṣayopanipāte satīndriyajaṃ sukham utpadyate, tasmāc ca sukhāt pratisañkhyānavaikalye saty ātmādiviparyāsalakṣanāayoniśomanaskāre sthitānāṃ pūrvarāgādyāhitavāsanāparipāko bhavati, tato rāgādayah kleśāh pravartanta iti na sākṣād viṣayāh kāraṇam /. Note also Prajñākaragupta’s remarks while commenting on Dharmakīrti’s polemics against a Materialist upholding medical ideas (PVA 122,22-23): sukhādijo hi rāgādir na kaph[ā]dibhāvī / sukhaṃ ca kasyacit kathaṃcid upalabdham āntaravāsanāprabodhāt / tato na rāgādayo doṣebhya iti yuktam /. Though Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cannot be suspected of allegiance toward Vaibhāṣika thought, their views are reminiscent of an interesting passage in the AK(Bh), according to which a defilement arises out of three factors: first, its propensity (anuśaya) has not been eliminated; second, an object (vişaya, dharma) that is conducive to the actualization of desire for sensual pleasures (kāmarāgaparyavasthānīya) is present and perceived (ābhāsagata); thirdly, an improper reflection occurs with regard to the said object. AK 5.34, together with AKBh 305,19-20: aprahīnād anuśayād viṣayāt pratyupasthitāt / ayoniśomanaskārāt kleśah - tad yathā rāgānuśayo ‘prahīno bhavaty aparijñātaḥ kāmarāgaparyavasthānīyāś ca dharmā ābhāsagatā bhavanti tatra cāyoniśomanaskāra evaṃ kāmarāga utpadyate /. ↩

61. AKBh 54,23: manaskāraś cetasa ābhogah /. AKVy 127,33-128,2 thereon: manaskāraś cetasa ābhoga iti / ālambane cetasa āvarjanam / avadhāranam ity arthaḥ / manasah kāro manaskārah / mano vā karoty āvarjayatīti manaskārah /. PVSVṬ 50,29-51,12: ayoniśa ityādy asyaiva samarthanam / yoniḥ padārthānām anityaduhkhānātmādi / samyagdarśanapras[ū]tihetutvāt / taṃ śaṃsaty ālambata iti yoniśah / yoniṃ yoniṃ manaskarotīti saṃkhyaikavacanād vīpsāyām (Pā 5.4.43) iti śaspratyayo vā / tathābhūtaś cāsau manaskāraś ceti yoniśomanaskāro nairātmyajñānam /. ↩

62. On ayoniśomanaskāra and avidyā, see La Vallée Poussin 1913: 8-9, and especially Mejor 2001. On the improper reflection’s conditioning and reinforcing drstis, see the passage of AN I. 31 alluded to by Mejor (2001: 50 + n. 5); see also AKBh 5.32-33 in Mejor 2001: 51. ↩

63. See Eltschinger 2009: 68-69, nn. 92 and 110. ↩

64. AKBh 135,13-14 and AKVy 288,30-31: cakṣuh pratītya rūpāni cotpadyate āvilo manaskāro mohaja iti/. Note also AKBh 135,7 (in a quotation): avidyāhetukaś cāyoniśomanaskārah/. ↩

65. MN I. 6 ff. (no. 2, Sabbāsavasutta). Here, the ayoniso manasikāra is held to be responsible for the rise (uppajjhanti) and the increase (pavaddhanti) of the three cankers (kāmāsava, bhavāsava and avijjāsava), which are in turn responsible for the rise of false views (dittthi) concerning personal identity in the past (atītaṃ addhānam), in the future (anāgatam addhānam) and in the present (paccuppannam addhānam), such as atthi me attā ti and na-tthi me attā ti. On this passage, see Collins 1982: 118-119; for similar expressions of the satkāyadrṣ̣ti/sakkāyaditṭhi, see Eltschinger 2009: 73-75. AN V. 113 ff. (no. 61, Avijjāsutta) and V. 116 ff. (no. 62 Taṇhāsutta). According to the Avijjāsutta, ayonisomanasikāra belongs to the eight aliments (āhāra) of avijjā; see Mejor 2001: 52-55. ↩

66. MS 2.20.9 (Lamotte 1973: I.34): mñon par žen pa’i rnam par rtog pa ni ‘di lta ste / tshul bžin ma yin pa’i yid la byed pa las byuñ ba’i ‘jig tshogs la lta ba’i rtsa ba las byuñ ba lta bar soñ ba drug cu rtsa gñis dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa’i rnam par rtog pa gañ yin pa’o //. See also Lamotte 1973: II.115. ↩

67. BhK 1.215[/525],7-14: kathaṃ mañjuśrīh kleśā vinayaṃ gacchanti/ kathaṃ kleśāh parijñātā bhavanti / mañjuśrīr āha / paramārthato ‘tyantājātānutpannābhāveṣu (sic, <Tib, but °nabhā° ms) sarva dhar meṣu saṃvṛtyāsadviparyāsaḥ / tasmād asadviparyāsāt saṃkalpavikalpaḥ / tasmāt saṃ kalpa vikalpād ayoni śo ma na sikāraḥ / tasmād ayoniśomanasikārād ātma samāropaḥ / tasmād ātmasamāropād dṛṣṭi pary utthānam / tasmād dṛṣṭi paryutthānāt kleśāḥ pravartante /. ↩

68. anyah in AKBh 135,12, Bhadanta Śrīlāta according to AKVy 289,23; AKBh 135,12-17: anyah punar āha / ayoniśo manaskāro hetur avidyāyā uktah sūtrāntare / sa cāpi sparśakāle nirdiṣtaḥ / cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāni cotpadyate āvilo manaskāro mohaja iti / vedanākāle cāvaśyam avidyayā bhavitavayam / avidyāsaṃsparśajaṃ veditaṃ pratītyotpannā tṛ̣̣neti sūtrāntarāt / ataḥ sparśakāle bhavann ayoniśomanaskāro vedanāsahavartinyā avidyāyāh pratyayabhāvena siddha iti nāsty ahetukatvam avidyāyāh … See Kośa 3.71n. 4. The whole discussion starts with the Sthavira Vasubandhu’s (AKVy 289,6: sthaviro vasubandhur ācāryamanorathopādhyāya evam āha…) claim that ignorance is not causeless on the basis of a Sūtra (the Sahetusapratyayasanidānasūtra according to AKVy 288,25-26; AKBh 135,7: ayoniśomanaskārahetukā ‘vidyoktā sūtrāntare /). As quoted by Yaśomitra (AKVy 288,26-29), this Sūtra runs as follows: avidyā bhikṣavaḥ sahetukā sapratyayā sanidānā / kaś ca bhikṣavo ‘vidyāyā hetuḥ kaḥ pratyayaḥ kiṃ nidānam / avidyāyā bhikṣavo ‘yoniśomanaskāro hetur ayoniśomanaskārah pratyayo ‘yoniśomanaskāro nidānam iti sūtre vacanāt /. This passage is also quoted in PrP 452,7-9 (avidyāpi bhikṣavaḥ sahetukā sapratyayā sanidānā / kaś ca bhikṣavo ‘vidyāyā hetuḥ / ayoniśo bhikṣavo manaskāro ‘vidyāyā hetuḥ / āvilo mohajo manaskāro bhikṣavo ‘vidyāyā hetur iti), but as coming from the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra (PrP 452,6 [but see n. 3 thereon], Kośa 3.70n. 3). Immediately after the quotation, Candrakīrti remarks (PrP 452,9): ato ‘vidyā sañkalpaprabhavā bhavati /. Note also Yaśomitra’s (AKVy 289,1) reference to the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra. Mejor (2001: 61-65) has translated Vasubandhu’s polemics against Śrīlāta (AKBh 134,20-25 and 135,7-27). ↩

69. PVSV 110,20-21: te [= doṣāh] vikalpaprabhavāh /. PVSVṬ 398,23-25 thereon: vikalpād ayoniśomanasikāravikalpāt prabhava utpāda eṣām iti vigrahaḥ / tathā hy ayoniśomanaskāram antarena saty api bāhye ‘rthe notpadyante rāgādayah … ↩

70. According to Frauwallner (1959), Vasubandhu had already restricted the number of pramānas from three to two in his Vādavidhi. But this might well be another case of Frauwallner’s use of the argumentum ex/a silentio: the fact that no fragment dealing with (āpt)āgama is available to us does not mean that the original Vādavidhi did not address scripture as a third genuine means of valid cognition. At any rate, Vasubandhu seems to acknowledge three means of valid cognition in his AKBh (76,24-25: pramānābhāvāt / na hi … pramānam asti pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo vā …) as well as in VY 173,16-17: mdor na rigs pa ni ‘dir tshad ma rnam pa gsum po mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa dañ yid ches pa’i gsuñ ño //). Buddhist eristic-dialectical treatises are at great variance concerning the number (and definitions) of the pramannas: four (or five) in the HetuvidyāSection of the YBh (see, e.g., HV [§3.2] 4*,15-16, where the last five items of the list defining sādhana must be considered as pramannas because of their functional similarity (providing evidence [yuktivāda] for the hetu, see HV [§3.22] 5*,3-5): sārūpyam vairūpyam pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamaś ca; to the best of my knowledge, the HV only uses the term pramāna with regard to pratyakṣa; therefore, the number of the pramannas here is either five [or four if we consider that sārūpya and vairūpya occur once in a singular dvandva compound] or only one), four in the *Upāyahrdaya/*Prayogasāra (*pratyakṣam anumānam upamānam āgamaś ca; see *UH 6,10-11 and 13,5 ff.), three in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (which, maybe on the basis of the BoBh and the Madhyāntavibhāga, sets the standard number for all subsequent Yogācāra treatises), i.e., pratyakṣa, anumāna and āptāgama (see ASBh 152,27, 153,1 and 153,5 ). ↩

71. On the corrective function of inference, see Kellner 2004: 4-9. ↩

72. See Eltschinger 2009: 41-42, n. 6. ↩

73. AK 1.16a: vijñānaṃ prativijñaptih; AKBh 11,7: viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñā̄naskandha ity ucyate /. AKVy 38,24: upalabdhir vastumātragrahaṇam /. ↩

74. PV 1.43: ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya satah svayam /; PVSV 26,4: eko hy arthātmā / sa pratyakṣah … ↩

75. PV 1.45: drṣṭasya bhāvasya drṣ̣ta evākhilo gunah /; PVSV 26,5-6: tasya pratyakṣenaiva siddheh sarvākārasiddheh / tadanyasyāsiddhasyābhāvāt /; PVSV 26,9-11: tasmāt pratyakṣe dharmiṇi tatsvabhāvasākalyaparicchedāt tatrānavakāśāpramāṇāntaravṛttiḥsyāt /; PVSVṬ 121,17-18: pratyakṣadṛṣṭāt svabhāvāt ko ‘nyah /. Through perception, bare particulars are grasped in their entire true nature (drṣtasarvatattva PVSV 26,14). ↩

76. PVSV 43,8-11: nāpi svalakṣaṇasyānityatvādyabhāvah / yasmān nānityatvam nāma kiṃcid anyac calād vastunah / kṣanapratyupasthānadharmatayā tasya tathābhūtasya grahanād etad evaṃ bhavaty anityo ‘yam anityatvam asyeti vā/. “Neither does the bare particular lack impermanence, etc., for what we call ‘impermanence’ is nothing other than the transient entity [itself. But] this is so because [those who see the last phase* of a continuum] grasp such an [entity] as having the property of being present [during only one] phase, [and thus say, ascribing properties]: ‘This is impermanent,’ or: ‘This has impermanence’.”
    *The last phase (antyakṣana) is defined in the following way by Śākyabuddhi and Karnakagomin (PVṬ Je D48a7/P56b8 = PVSVṬ 95,30): sadrśakṣanāntarāpratisandhāyī kṣano ‘ntyakṣanah … “The last phase [of an entity] is the phase which is not connected with a new (antara) similar phase.” According to PVSVṬ 184,5-6, PVSV 43,8-11 answers the objection formulated in PVSV 42,11-12: svalakṣane cānityatvādyapratīter atādrūpyam / teṣạṃ cāvastudharmatā /. “And since one does not cognize impermanence, etc., in the bare particular, [the bare particular] does not have this nature[, viz. impermanence, etc.], and [hence impermanence, etc.] are not properties of [real] entities.” Note also PVSV 21,4-6: sa eva hi bhāvah kṣanasthitidharmā ‘nityatā vacanabhede ‘pi dharmidharmatayā nimittaṃ vakṣyāmah /. ↩

77. PV 3.247b d: grāhyatāṃ viduh / hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpanakṣamam //. See Hattori 1968: 53. ↩

78. PV 2.206-207a₁: viṣayagrahaṇaṃ dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti sah / grhyate so ‘sya janako vidyamānātmaneti ca // eṣā prakrtiḥ … See also below, §2.2.6 and n. 136. ↩

79. In an introductory statement, Śākyabuddhi reminds his audience that the following argument does not match Dharmakīrti’s final, Yogācāra position in epistemological matters. PVṬ D133b2-3/P164b3-5: don dam par rnam par śes pa ni don ‘dzin par ‘dod pas źes bya ba la / don dam par rnam par śes pa don ‘dzin pa ñid ni ma yin te / gzuñ ba ma grub pa’i phyir ro // ‘on kyañ re źig phyi rol gyi don yod par ‘dod pa gañ yin pa des ‘di ltar ‘dod par bya’o źes bstan pa’i phyir de skad du brjod pa yin no //. ↩

80. PVṬ D133b3-4/P164b5: phyi rol lam źes bya ba ni ‘dra ba gźan dañ gźan ‘byuñ ba la sogs pa’i ‘khrul par byed pa’i rnam pa’o //. See below, nn. 116 and 139. ↩

81. Tib. cig śos = Skt. itara, lit. “other [than external].” ↩

82. PVP D87b5-88a4/P101a2-b3: rnam par śes pa’i chos kyañ gañ źe na / źes dris pa na don dam par rnam par śes pa ni don ‘dzin par ‘dod pas rnam śes yul ‘dzin pa’i chos śes brjod par bya’o // gañ gi tshe rnam par śes pa yul can du gyur pa thams cad kyi chos yul ‘dzin pa yin pa de’i tshe / mi rtag (D rtag: P rtag rtag) pa la sogs pa’i rnam pa gañ gis … yul yod pa de bžin du ‘dzin ‘gyur gyi med pa’i rnam pas ni ma yin no // de de ltar na śes pa don ji lta ba bžin du yul du byed par rigs pas thob pa na / de ltar na (D na: P om. na) rtogs pa ma yin pa gañ yin pa de ni phyi rol lam cig śos glo bur ba’i ‘khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis yin te / dper na sbrul du ‘dris pa’i phyogs mi gsal bar thag pa la sbrul gyi (D gyi: P mi) śes pa lta bu’o* // de bas na yul gyi rnam pa yod pa ‘dzin pa gañ yin pa de ni sems kyi rañ bžin no // ci ste yañ log par ‘dzin pa ñid rañ bžin yin pa de’i tshe yul ‘dzin pa’i chos ma yin no // de ltar na ji ltar śes pas yul du byed pa de ltar don de ma yin ziin ji ltar don de yin pa de ltar yul du byed pa ma yin pa’i phyir / śes pa dag yul med pa can du ‘gyur bas … de ltar na dños po thams cad ma grub pa yin te … de bas na yul dañ yul can gyi dños po ‘dod pa ñid kyis rnam par śes pa’i chos yul ‘dzin pa yin par brjod par bya’o // de ltar na ‘di’i rañ bžin ni yañ dag pa’i yul gyi rnam pa ‘dzin pa yin no // de rnam pa gžan du ‘gyur ba gañ yin pa de ni glo bur gyi rkyen gyis byas pa ñid yin no //.
    * Vibh. 82 n. 4: mandamandaprakāśe sarpopacite pradeśe /.
    Note also TSP Ś1056,21-1057,5/K872,27-873,7: tathā hi - viṣayaviṣayibhāvam icchatā cittaṃ viṣayagrahaṇasvabhāvam abhyupeyam, anyathā viṣayajñānayor na viṣayaviṣayibhāvah / arthagrahaṇasvabhāvatvenāngīkriyamāne yas tasya svabhāvas tenaivātmano ‘ṃśo ‘rthas tena grhyata iti vaktavyam / anyathā katham asau grhītah syāt / yady asatākāreṇa grhyeta tataś ca viṣayaviṣayibhāvo na syāt / tathā hi - yathā jñānaṃ viṣayīkaroty arthaṃ na tathā so ‘rthaḥ, yathā so ‘rtho na tathā taṃ viṣayīkarotīti nirviṣayāny eva jñānāni syuḥ / tataś ca sarvapadārthāsiddhiprasañgah / tasmād bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitä ‘sya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam / bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat / tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva cittaṃ* nātmagrahaṇasvabhāvam /.
    * TSP_K reads eveti tan against TSP_Ś and TSP_Tib eva cittaṃ; both the Jaisalmer ms and the Pāṭan ms read eve₁ cittaṃ. On this passage of the TSP, see McClintock 2010: 213-214. ↩

83. PVṬ D133b4/P164b5-6: cig śos źes bya ba ni nañ gi bdag ñid can gyi phyin ci log gi rnam par rtog pa’i bag chags źes bya bas bslad pa’o //. In an etymologizing vein, Devendrabuddhi explains āgantuka as follows (PVP D89a5/P103a2): rkyen gžan gyi rgyu mtshan las ‘oñs pa ñid yin pa’i phyir (*pratyayāntaranimittād āgatatvāt). Erroneous cognitions and defilements are due to rañ dañ rigs mthun pa’i ñe bar len pa’i rgyu (PVP D89a5-6/P103a2-3; *svasamānajātīyopādānakārana; note PVṬ Je D251b6/P299a4-5 = PVSVṬ 400,30-431,9: upādānabalabhāvīti vitathavikalpavāsanābalabhāvi). ↩

84. PVP D87b7/P101a6: yul gyi rnam pa yod pa …; PVP D88a3/P101b2 = PVP 89a1/P102b3: yañ dag pa’i yul gyi rnam pa … ↩

85. PVP D88b3-4/P102a3-4: mi rtag pa la sogs pa’i rnam pa yod pa’i yul …; PVP D87b6/P101a4 = PVP D90a4/P104a4: mi rtag pa la sogs pa’i rnam pa …; PVP D89a6/P103a3: bdag med pa …; PVP D89b3/P103a8: bdag med pa ñid … ↩

86. TSP Ś1057,2-5/K873,5-7: bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitā ‘sya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam / bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣanikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat / tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva cittam … For the context of this statement, see above, n. 91. ↩

87. PVP D87a7/P100b3: sems kyi rañ bžin ni de kho na ñid mthoñ ba’i bdag ñid can yin … (PVṬ D133a3-4/P164a2-3: de kho na ñid mthoñ ba’i bdag ñid can yin gyi žes bya ba ni dños po ji lta ba bžin du gnas pa’i ‘dzin pa’i* bdag ñid can žes bya ba’i don to)
    *Cf. PVV 82,14: yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇam; PVP D89b1/P103a6: sems ni ño bo ñid kyis de kho na ñid mthoñ ba’i bdag ñid can yin … ↩

88. PVP D90a1/P103b8: rañ bžin yañ lhag mthoñ yin … ↩

89. PVṬ D134b3/P166a1: lhag mthoñ ba yin la źes bya ba bdag med pa la (D la: P la bya ba) dmigs pa’i śes rab bo. Discernment is described in BhK 1.219,23-220,4 as sarvadharmanihsvabhāvatālambana, and defined in BhK 3.5,17-20 as follows: bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate / bhūtaṃ punaḥ pud gala dhar ma nairātmyam / tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ y ā skandhānām ātmātmīyarahitatā / dharmanairātmyaṃ y ā te ṣām eva māyopamatā /. For a French translation, see Lamotte 1987: 340. On vipaśyanā/prajñā, see Eltschinger 2009: 57-58 (§1.2.5) and nn. 26-27. ↩

90. PVP D89a5/P103a1: ‘od gsal te / yañ dag pa ji lta ba bźin du ‘dzin pa’i rañ bźin yin no //; TS Ś3434ac₁/K3435ac; prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ tattvadarśanasātmakam / prakrtyaiva sthitam … ↩

91. On this point, see Eltschinger 2005: 190-192. ↩

92. YBh 206,6-7: śrutamayyāś cintāmayyā bhāvanāmayyāś ca prajñāyā vipakṣena trayaḥ paryāyā yathākramaṃ yojyante /. ↩

93. PrSVy 9a1: bsams pa dañ bsgoms pa las byuñ ba’i śes rab ni rig pa źes bya’o //. ↩

94. PVin 1.4 ab₁ ~ NB 1.4: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpodham abhrāntam … On kalpanāpodha, see Funayama 1992; on abhrānta, see Funayama 1999. ↩

95. See Krasser 1995. Note also TSP Ś479,23-24/K392,7: avisamvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpanaśaktiḥ/. “Being non-deceptive’ means the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfilment of a desired purpose.” Translation Funayama 1999: 79. On the differences between Dharmottara’s and Kamalaśīla’s interpretations of abhrānta, see Funayama 1999: 80-81. ↩

96. PV 2.5a: vyavahāreṇa prāmānyam … “Epistemic validity [is known] through practical activity.” Most important in this connection is the case of inference. PVin 2 46,5-8 (including PVin 2.1cd): tad etad atasmiṃs tadgrahād bhrāntir api sambandhatah pramā // svapratibhāse ‘narthe ‘rthādhyavasāyena pravartanād bhrāntir apy arthasambandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramānam/. “Die (Schlußfolgerungserkenntnis) ist wegen der Verbindung [mit dem Gegenstand] eine gültige Erkenntnis (pramā), obgleich sie wegen des Erfassens von etwas als etwas, was es nicht ist, Irrtum ist. (Das heißt:) Obwohl sie Irrtum ist, weil sie in der Weise auftritt, daß sie ihr eigenes Erkenntnisbild, das nicht der (wirkliche) Gegenstand ist, als [diesen Gegenstand] bestimmt, ist sie als mit dem Gegenstand verbundene (dennoch) gültige Erkenntnis.” Translation Steinkellner 1979: 26-27. See also PV 3.55-63. ↩

97. PVṬ̣ Je D95b3-4/P112a8-b1 ~ PVSVṬ 183,9-10: yadi mithyārtha eva sarvo vikalpah kasmāt … anityānātmādivikalpāh pramānaṃ nityā[di] vikalpās tu neti … ↩

98. PVṬ Je D96a3/P113a1 = PVSVṬ 183,23-24: anusaranaṃ niścayaṃ parityajya … ↩

99. PVSV 43,2-7: sarvaś cāyaṃ svalakṣanānām eva darśanāhitavāsanākṛto viplava iti tatpratibaddhajanmanāṃ vikalpānām atatpratibhāsitve ‘pi vastuny avisaṃvādo maniprabhāyām iva manibhrānteh / nānyeṣām / … yathādrṣtaviśeṣānusaranaṃ parityajya kimcitsāmānyagrahaṇena viśeṣāntarasamāropād dīpaprabhāyām iva manibuddheh /. On manibhrānti, see Krasser 1991: 65-66n. 121. ↩

100. PVṬ Je D95b6-7/P112b4-5 ~ PVSVṬ 183,16-17: anityādirūpasya vastuni vidyamānatvāt … ↩

101. PVin 2 48,1-5 (together with PVin 2.7a): ata eva prāmānyam vastuviṣayaṃ dvayoḥ pratyakṣānumānayoḥ, arthakriyāyogyaviṣayatvād vicārasya / sukhaduhkhasādhane jñātvā yathārhaṃ pratipitsavo hi kimcit parīkṣante prekṣāpūrvakāriṇah, na vyasanitayā/. “Eben daher bezieht sich die Gültigkeit der beiden, Wahrnehmung und Schlußfolgerung, auf das Wirkliche, denn eine prüfende Erkenntnis hat ein Objekt, das fähig ist einen Zweck zu erfüllen. Vernünftig handelnde Leute, die (auch nur) ein wenig abwägen, (tun dies), wenn sie die Mittel für Lust und Leid (einmal) erkannt haben, aus der Absicht, [diese] nach Vermögen zu erreichen, aber nicht aus [bloßer] Neigung.” Translation Steinkellner 1979: 29 (slightly modified). ↩

102. PVṬ Je D96a1/P112b7 ~ PVSVṬ 183,20-21: teṣạṃ [= nityādivikalpānām] … vastuny avidyamānasyaivākārasya samāropāt /. ↩

103. PVṬ Je D96a4/P113a2 ~ PVSVṬ 183,26-27: pāramparyenāpi … apratibaddhatvāt /. ↩

104. PV 1.44a, PVSV 26,15, and passim. ↩

105. PVSV 26,19. ↩

106. See above, n. 92. ↩

107. PVSV 26,20-21; sadrśāparotpatti at PVṬ Je D61a3/P72a2 = PVSVṬ 122,10-11, PVṬ Je D61a5/P72a5 = PVSVṬ 123,8-9; note also PVṬ Je D61b4/P72b5 = PVSVṬ 123,27-28: sadrṣasya dvitīyasya kṣanasyotpattyā bhrāntinimittena … See also above, n. 89. Locus classicus for sadrśāparotpatti is PVSV 21,6-9: tāṃ punar asya kṣanasthitidharmatāṃ svabhāvaṃ svahetor eva tathotpatteh paśyann api mandabuddhih sattopalambhena sarvadā tathābhāvaśañkāvipralabdho na vyavasyati sadrśāparotpattivipralabdho vā /. Translated according to Śākyabuddhi’s explanation (PVṬ Je D46b2-47a1/P54b6-55a6): “However, although (s)he experiences this property of lasting [only] one phase[, a property which is] the nature of the [entity] since [this entity] is produced such [i.e., momentary,] by its own cause, a [person] of weak intellect fails to determine [it in the same way as (s)he has just experienced it; this failure occurs] either [because this person,] due to having perceived the existence [of this entity at one phase, is] mistaken by the supposition that it permanently (sarvadā) exists in this [very] way, or [because this person is] mistaken by the rise of a new (apara) phase similar [to the former one].” According to Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation (PVṬ Je D47b6-48b1/ P56a6-57al), the first cause of error (* vipralambhanimitta) is proper to the outsiders (tīrthika) professing the doctrine of non-momentariness (akṣanikavāda), and points to their internal *kudrṣtyabhiniveśavāsanābīja (or else: *anādikudrṣtyabhiniveśabīja), which is reinforced by the false views propagated by wrong treatises (*kuśāstradrṣti). As for the second cause of error, it is aimed at explaining why the Buddhists, who follow sound reasoning and scripture (yuktyāgama) professing momentariness, still do not ascertain momentariness upon perceiving the real entity. Karnakagomin’s explanation (PVSVṬ 91,23) of mandabuddhi is worth noticing: anādisamsārābhyastayā nityādirūpāvidyāvāsanayā mandā buddhir yasya … “Whose intellect is [made] weak by the latent tendency, repeated [and reinforced] in the beginningless samsāra, of ignorance in the form of [mistaken aspects] such as ‘permanent’.” This ignorance (or rather, its latent tendency) being the internal cause of error, the two causes mentioned by Dharmakīrti point to external causes of error (bāhyam api bhrāntibījam, PVSVṬ 91,27). Note also PVSV 100,4-7 = PVin 2 82,7-9: tam asya mandāh svabhāvam ūrdhvaṃ vyavasyanti / na prāk / darśane ‘pi pāṭavābhāvād iti tadvaśena paścād vyavasthāpyate / vikāradarśaneneva viṣam ajñaih /. “Weak[-minded people] identify this [transient] nature of the [entity only] later [i.e., at the time of the interruption of the continuum, but] not before [i.e., at the time of the existence of the entity], because even though they [directly] experience [this nature], they lack [intellectual] sharpness. Therefore, [this transient nature] is ascertained [only] later on account of this [determination], just as ignorant [persons identify a poisonous substance that they have seen only] by experiencing a [morbid] affection [such as over-salivation].” See also Steinkellner 1979: 98. Note Karnakagomin’s explanation of mandāh in PVSVṬ 366,27:āsamsāram avidyānubandhān mandāh … This explanation is borrowed from Dharmottara’s PVinṬ Dze D249b5/P301b3-4: ‘khor ba ji srid par ma rig pa dañ rjes su ‘brel pa źan pa … Note also the various interpretations of the fact that the determinate cognition arises only at the time of pravāhaviccheda: (1) PVṬ Je D227a3-4/P263b7-8: mthoñ ba’i dus su ñes pa yod pa ma yin te / ma rig pa’i mun pa ñid kyi phyir dañ gźan rgyun ‘dra ba skye ba’i phyir ro // mthoñ ba gsal ba med pa’i phyir ro //. (2) PVSVṬ 366,28-29: na darśanakāle ‘dhyavasāyo ‘sti / avidyā(sāma)rthyāt sadṛsāparotpattyā ca darśanapātavasyābhāvāt /. (3) PVinṬ Dze D249b6-7/P301b5: ma rig pa dañ ldan pa’i źan pa rnams la mthoñ ba gsal ba med pa’i phyir ro //. Here again, both Śākyabuddhi and Karnakagomin suggest that the absence of niścaya proceeds from an internal (ignorance) and an external (the rise of a new similar phase) cause. ↩

108. See also above, §2.1.1. and n. 11. ↩

109. PVSV 26,14, PVṬ Je D61a5/P72a5 = PVSVṬ 123,8. ↩

110. PVṬ Je D61b2-3/P72b3 = PVSVṬ 123,21. On niścayapratyayas, see Kellner 2004: 19-32. ↩

111. PV 1.50a; PVSV 27,22-28,1: ākārasamāropa; PVṬ Je D62b3/P73b6 = PVSVṬ 125,28-29: tadviparītākārasamāropī viparyāsah. ↩

112. PV 1.44b, PVṬ Je D64b7/P76a8-b1 = PVSVṬ 131,11, PVV 306,6. ↩

113. PVSV 28,13-14 (leaving hi untranslated): na hi sarvato bhinno drṣto ‘pi bhāvas tathaiva pratyabhijñāyate / kvacid bhede vyavadhānasambhavāt/. ↩

114. PV 1.49ab: niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvatah/; PVSV 28,16-17: samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhakabhāvāt/. ↩

115. niścitākāras: krtakatva (PVSVṬ 124,26 and 125,23-24), anityatva (PVSV 26,5), kṣanikatvādi (PVSVṬ 130,28), kṣanikatvānātmādi (PVSVṬ 124,12), asthira (PVSVṬ 129,28), nirātmaka (PVSVṬ 129,28); samāropitākāras: sthira (PVSV 28,11, PVSVṬ 122,12), sātmaka (PVSV 28,11), sthiti (PVSV 26,21), akrtaka (PVSVṬ 125,23-24), nityādi (PVSVṬ 124,13 and 125,24). ↩

116. Note should be made that inference is itself strictly of a conceptual nature, and as such is basically on the side of error and ignorance. An inference indeed mobilizes two properties (dharma, a probans [sādhanadharma, hetu, linga] and a probandum [sādhyadharma]) that are thought to belong to a single property possessor (dharmin, or “subject”). Both of these two properties are universals (sāmānya) unduly ascribing a single unitary aspect to the many. At the same time, these two different properties are tied to one and the same subject, thus unduly dividing the indivisible. To unify the many (the seed of the use of universals*) and divide the undivided (the seed of co-reference [sāmānādhikaranya]**) are indeed the two main psychological operations giving rise to conceptual constructs.
     *According to PVṬ Je D101a6/P119a4 and D101a7/P119a5: spyi’i tha sñad kyi sa bon … (sāmānyavyavahārabīja); the psychological genesis of universals is presented in a nutshell in PV 1.82.
     **According to PVṬ Je D101b4/P119b3: gži mthun pa ñid … [kyi] sa bon (sāmānādhikaranyabīja); the psychological genesis of co-reference is presented in a nutshell in PV 1.83. See also Eltschinger 2009: 59-62 (§1.2.10). ↩

117. Resp. PVSV 27,10 and PVSV 28,20. ↩

118. vyavacchedaphala (PVSV 26,24); samāropavyavaccheda (PVSV 27,13; 27,14); vyavacchedakṛt (PVSV 27,10); anyavyavaccheda (PVSV 27,14); vyavacchedavisaya (PVSV 28,9; PV 1.56a); anyavyavacchedavisaya (PVSVṬ 127,10); anyasamāropavyavacchedaphala (PVSV 31,12-13); samāropapratisedhaphala (PVSVṬ 124,16); bhrāntinivṛttyartham (PVSV 31,12); apohagocara (PV 1.48d; PVSV 28,19); apohavisaya (PV 1.47a); anyāpohavisaya (PVSV 31,13). See Kellner 2004: 4-9. ↩

119. PVSV 26,22-27,2: yāvanto ‘sya parabhāvās tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinah samāropā iti tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni saphalāni syuh / teṣạṃ tu vyavacchedaphalānāṃ nāpratītavastvaṃśapratyāyane pravṛttis tasya dṛ̣̣tatvāt / anaṃśasya caikadeśena darśanāyogāt /. ↩

120. PV 1.43-45: ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya satah svayam / ko ‘nyo na dṛ̣̣to bhāgah syād yah pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate // no ced bhrāntinimittena saṃyojyeta gunāntaram / śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt // tasmād dṛ̣̣tasya bhāvasya dṛ̣̣ta evākhilo gunah / bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanaṃ sampravartate //. ↩

121. This is made especially clear by Karnakagomin, who regularly (e.g., PVSVṬ 124,14, 124,22, 124,24, 125,14, 125,15, 125,21, 126,9) adds vidhinā/ vidhirūpena after words denoting niścaya or adhyavasāya, and arthāt after words denoting vyavaccheda, etc. Interestingly enough, close comparison with the PVṬ reveals that this is never done by Śākyabuddhi. Commenting on PV 1.45d (sādhanam sampravartate), Karnakagomin (PVSVṬ 124,2122) says: tanniścayārtham sādhanam anumānaṃ vidhirūpenaiva pravartate …, whereas Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ Je D62a2/P73a4) has: sgrub pa źes bya ba ‘khrul pa sel bar byed pa’i rjes su dpag pa rab tu ‘jug pa yin /. For a similar observation, see Kellner 2004: 5n. 3. ↩

122. Note, e.g., PVSVṬ 184,8-11 (with no equivalent in PVṬ): tena pratyakṣena svalakṣane grhyamāne ‘nityatvaṃ grhītam eva kevalam bhrāntinimittasadbhāvād aniścitam / atas tanniścayamātre ‘numānavyāpāras / tena tanniścaya eva svalakṣaṇe ‘nityatvapratītir iti siddham/. ↩

123. I.e., because this person grasps this place as identical with a spot without fire. ↩

124. PVSV 27,15-28,1: nanu nāvaśyaṃ viparyāsapūrvaka evāpratītaniścayo bhavati / yathā ‘kasmād dhūmād agnipratipattih / na hi tatrānagnisamāropah sambhāvyate / tan na sarvatra vyavacchedaḥ kriyate / … tatrāpi taddarśinas tatsvabhāvāniścayah / kutah / viparyāsāt / sa ca taṃ pradeśam tadviviktena rūpena niścinvann agnisattābhāvanā*vimuktayā buddhyā katham aviparyasto nāma / tadākārasamāropasaṃśayarahitaś ca tatpratipattau na lingam anusaret /.
     *On bhāvanā, see Gnoli 1960 (= PVSV): 27-28n. 22. This passage has also been translated and discussed by Kellner (2004: 10-19). ↩

125. PV 3.104ac and 105-107: kvacit tad aparijñānaṃ sadṛśāparasambhavāt / bhrānter apaśyato bhedam … // tathā hy alingam ābālam asaṃślistottarodayam / paśyan paricchinatty eva dīpādiṃ nāśinaṃ janah // bhāvasvabhāvabhūtāyām api śaktau phale ‘dṛśah / anāntaryato moho viniścetur apātavāt // tasyaiva vinivrttyartham anumānopavarṇanam / vyavasyantīkṣanād eva sarvākārān mahādhiyaḥ //. See PVP D162b6-163b5/ P189a7-190b1 and PVV 148,19-149,17. Note that both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin analyze the compound asaṃślistottarodayam as a bahuvrīhi. Whereas Devendrabuddhi does not elaborate on mahādhiyaḥ, Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ D178a6/P219b7) explains: blo gros chen pos źes bya ba ni dbañ po las ‘das pa’i don mthoñ ba’o (*mahādhiya ity atīndriyārthadarśinaḥ), and Manorathanandin (PVV 149,16), more convincingly: mahādhiyo viparītavyavasāyānākrāntapratyakṣā yoginah. ↩

126. PV 1.86bd: sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //. Skt. samsthiti is not entirely clear, but must be semantically near vyavasthāna (PV 1.85). Manorathanandin explains samsthiti (PV 3.214, 3.315, 3.319, 4.15, 4.64) as vyavasthā (PVV 182,25, 213,14-15, 214,22, 419,11-12, 437,3), “settlement, establishment; statute; fixed rule.” On avatāra, see BHSD s.v., 71^a. ↩

127. PV 2.206-207: viṣayagrahaṇaṃ dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti saḥ/ grhyate so ‘sya janako vidyamānātmaneti ca // eṣā prakṛtir asyās tan nimittāntaratah skhalat / vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam adṛ̣̣haṃs sarpabuddhivat //. See above, §2.2.2 and n. 87. ↩

128. PVP D89a2-3/P102b5-6: rkyen la ltos pa yin te / de ltar … ‘khrul pa gnod pa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa dañ bcas pa yin no //. ↩

129. Note PVṬ Je D252a1-2/P299a8-b1 = PVSVṬ 401,12-13: pramānāny anityādibhūtākāragrāhīṇi pratipakṣamārgam āvahanti /. ↩

130. Note, e.g., PVṬ Je D70b4-5/P83a4-5 = PVSVṬ 142,15: yathā yogināṃ buddhipāṭavād darśanamātrena kṣanikatvādiniścayah /. That perception as such does not differ between ordinary people (prthagjana) and yogins is also Karnakagomin’s opinion in two interesting statements. (1) PVSVṬ 91,24-25: yogināṃ saty api sadṛśadarśane mandabuddhitvābhāvāt kṣanikatvaniścayo bhavati … “The yogins do determine momentariness because, though [their perceptual] experience is the same [as that of ordinary persons], they lack [this] being of weak intellect.” (2) PVSVṬ 92,19-21: mandabuddhir (PVSV 21,7) iti / tena bāhyādhyātmikavipralambhanimittasadbhāvāt prthagjanānāṃ [na] niścayah / yogināṃ tu saty api sadṛśadarśane paṭubuddhitvān niścayo bhavaty eva /. “By ‘of weak intellect,’ [Dharmakīrti means the following:] Because of the presence of both external [i.e., the rise of a new similar phase, etc.,] and internal [i.e., ignorance,] causes of error, ordinary persons fail to determine [momentariness in the same way as they have experienced it], but the yogins, though [their perceptual] experience is the same [as that of ordinary persons], do indeed determine [momentariness] because they are of sharp intellect.” According to Karnakagomin, then, perception itself does not differ between those who have reached the darśanamārga and those who have not; what indeed differs is the degree of their intellectual sharpness, the increase of which can only be due to the habitus (abhyāsa) or cultivation (bhāvanā) that comes along the path. On the context of these statements and the issue of internal as well as external causes of error, see above, n. 116; on abhyāsa as a condition for determinate cognitions to arise, see Kellner 2004: 19-32. ↩

131. PVin 1 44,4-5: cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramānam abhimukhīkurvanti/. On this passage, see Krasser 2004: 142-144 and Eltschinger 2005: 155-158. That liberated perception comes about through the yogin’s initially resorting to inferences is clear. How it can be equated with omniscience remains, however, obscure. But does not Dharmakīrti himself term “unfathomable” (acintya) the cognition of (liberated) yogins and the Buddha’s omniscience? PV 3.532d: acintyā yogināṃ gatih //; SAS 94: bcom ldan ‘das kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du śes pa dañ brjod pa’i yul las ‘das pa’i phyir ro //. ↩

132. PVin 1 27,9. ↩

133. On the cintāmayī prajñā in the Buddhist epistemologists, see Eltschinger 2010. ↩