Greater Magadha

Handbook of Oriental Studies Handbook of Oriental Studies

Section Two - India

Edited by J. Bronkhorst

VOLUME 19

Studies in the Culture of Early India

by Johannes Bronkhorst

BRILL

LEIDEN - BOSTON 2007

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication data

Bronkhorst, Johannes, 1946-
Greater Magadha : studies in the culture of early India / by Johannes Bronkhorst. p. cm. - (Handbook of oriental studies, Section two, India ; v. 19= Handbuch der Orientalistik)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15719-4 (alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 90-04-15719-0 (alk. paper)

Magadha (Kingdom)—Civilization. I. Title.

DS426.B76 2007
934’.04-dc22

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

For Joy

Acknowledgments … xi
Abbreviations … xiii
Introduction: The separate culture of Greater Magadha … 1
PART I. CULTURAL FEATURES OF GREATER MAGADHA
Introduction … 13
Chapter I.1. The fundamental spiritual ideology … 15
Early Jainism. … 15
Knowledge of the self … 28
The Bhagavadgītā … 35
Ājūvikism … 38
Buddhism. … 52
Conclusions … 52
Chapter I.2. Other features … 55
Funerary practices … 55
Medicine … 56
Kapila … 61
Cyclic time … 69
Chapter I.3. Conclusions to Part I … 72
PART II. BRAHMANISM VIS-Ā-VIS REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION
Introduction … 75
IIA. REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION HESITANTLY ACCEPTED … 77
Chapter IIA.1. A Dharma Sūtra … 79
Vedic asceticism … 79
The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra … 85
Confirmation in Greek sources … 92
Chapter IIA.2. A portion from the Mahābhārata … 94
The chronological position of the Mahābhārata … 94
The Rājadharmaparvan … 97
Chapter IIA.3. The early Upaniṣads … 112
The first occurrences of the new doctrine … 112
Rebirth and karmic retribution in relation to Vedic thought … 120
The self in the early Upanisads … 126
Vedic antecedents … 130
IIB. REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION IGNORED OR REJECTED … 137
Chapter IIB.1. Rebirth and karmic retribution ignored … 139
Chapter IIB.2. Rebirth and karmic retribution rejected … 142
Criticism of rebirth and karmic retribution in anonymous literature. … 142
The Cārvākas … 150
IIC. URBAN BRAHMINS … 161
PART III. CHRONOLOGY
Chapter III.0. Introduction. … 175
Chapter III.1. Linguistic considerations … 179
Chapter III.2. The Vedic texts known to the early Sanskrit grammarians … 183
Pānini and the Veda: introduction … 183
Pānini and the Veda (1) … 192
Pānini and the Veda (2) … 199
The Ṛgveda at the time of Pānini … 204
Patañjali and the Veda … 205
Conclusions … 206
Chapter III.3. The Vedic texts known to the early Buddhists … 207
Chapter III.4. Some indications in late-Vedic literature … 219
The Yājñavalkya-Kānda. … 219
A reference to the early grammarians in the Upanisads? … 240
Conclusion … 247
Chapter III.5. Urban versus rural culture … 248
The second urbanization. … 249
Magical thought in the Veda. … 255
Chapter III.6. Conclusions to Part III … 258
PART IV. CONCLUSION
DISCWORLD MEETS ROUNDWORLD … 265
PART V. APPENDICES
Appendix I: The antiquity of the Vedānta philosophy … 279
Were the Pūrua- and Uttaramīmāmsā originally one system? … 280
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Uttara-Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the teacher quotations … 295
Conclusions … 307
Appendix II: A Cārvāka in the Mahābhārata … 309
Appendix III: Vedic texts known to Pāṇini … 329
Appendix IV: The form of the Rgyeda known to Pāṇini … 335
Appendix V: Vedic texts known to Patañjali … 348
Appendix VI: Brahmins in the Buddhist canon. … 353
Appendix VII: Brahmanism in Gandhāra and surrounding areas … 357
Appendix VIII: Cārvākas and the Śābarabhāṣya. … 363
References … 367
Index … 401

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A review of the original German version of my forthcoming book Buddhist Teaching in India convinced me that the present book had to be written. The author of the review regrets that the work he reviews says nothing about the ideas that constitute the background of early Buddhism, a lacuna which he obligingly fills. The three pages which he reserves for this purpose express views that are widely held, but which I consider largely mistaken. This book is meant to fill the lacuna my way. I express my indebtedness to the author of the review for this no doubt unintended encouragement.

Where possible or convenient, I have used material that I have already published elsewhere. This earlier material has been thoroughly reworked, revised, abbreviated, rewritten or translated where necessary, and adapted to its new environment. The following publications in particular have been used:

“The orthoepic diaskeuasis of the Ṛgveda and the date of Pānini.” IIJ 23, 1981, pp. 83-95. (ch. III.2)
“The variationist Pānini and Vedic.” IIJ 24, 1982, pp. 273-282. (ch. III.2)
Review of Die vedischen Zitate im Vyākarana-Mahābhāṣya (Wilhelm Rau), Kratylos 32, 1987, pp. 52-57. (ch. III.2)
“L’indianisme et les préjugés occidentaux.” Études de Lettres (Faculté des lettres, Université de Lausanne), avril-juin 1989, pp. 119-136. (ch. III.0)
“Pānini and the Veda reconsidered.” Pāninian Studies. Professor S.D. Foshi Felicitation Volume. Edited by Madhav M. Deshpande and Saroja Bhate. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan. Number 37. 1991. Pp. 75-121. (ch. III.2)
The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. Second edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1993. (ch. I.1)
“Upaniṣads and grammar: On the meaning of anuvyākhyāna.” Langue, style et structure dans le monde indien: Centenaire de Louis Renou. Actes du Colloque international (Paris, 25-27 janvier 1996). Édités par Nalini Balbir et Georges-Jean Pinault. Paris: Honoré Champion. 1996. Pp. 187-198. (ch. III.4)
The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism. Second edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1998. (ch. IIA.1)
“Is there an inner conflict of tradition?” Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia: Evidence, Interpretation and Ideology. Proceedings of the Michigan-Lausanne International Seminar on Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 25-27 October 1996. Edited by Johannes Bronkhorst & Madhav M. Deshpande. Cambridge: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University. 1999. (Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora Vol. 3.) Distributed by South Asia Books, Columbia, Missouri. Pp. 33-57. (ch. I.2)
“Ājīvika doctrine reconsidered.” Essays in Faina Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Piotr Balcerowicz. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2003. (Lala Sundarlal Jain Research Series, 20.) Pp. 153-178. (ch. I.1)
“Vedānta as Mīmāṃsā.” Mīmāmsā and Vedānta. Ed. J. Bronkhorst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2006. Pp. 1-91. (Appendix I)
“Jainism, window on early India.” Proceedings of the 8th Jaina Studies Workshop: Jainism and Society. Ed. Peter Flügel. Forthcoming. (Introduction)

A number of colleagues and friends have commented on earlier versions of this book. I have presented parts of its contents in courses given in Lausanne and Leiden. Earlier versions of chapters have been presented as papers at various occasions, allowing me to profit from critical questions and remarks from the audience. It is not possible to enumerate all those who have helped me through their comments and criticism. I mention here in particular Greg Bailey, Madeleine Biardeau, James L. Fitzgerald, Arlo Griffiths, Jan E. M. Houben, Gananath Obeyesekere, Ferenc Ruzsa, François Voegeli. I have learned a lot from all the critical comments I have received. I have not accepted them all. I hope my critics will forgive me.

I thank the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lausanne which gave me sabbatical leave for the semester during which I conceived of this book. A stay at the Liguria Study Center for the Arts and Humanities in Bogliasco, Italy, was ideal for the finishing touches. I thank all persons and institutions that have contributed in one way or another. I thank most of all my wife for her indefatigable encouragement. I dedicate this book to her.

ABBREVIATIONS

	ABBREVIATIONS
AAWG	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl.
AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
Abhidh-k-bh(P)	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya, ed. P. Pradhan, rev. 2nd ed. Aruna Haldar, Patna 1975 (TSWS 8)
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
AitĀr	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
AitBr	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
AKM	Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Wiesbaden; earlier Leipzig
AL	Abhyankar and Limaye’s edition of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā
ALB	The Brahmavidyā, Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras
AN	Aṅguttara Nikāya
ANISt	Alt- und Neuindische Studien, Hamburg
AO	Acta Orientalia, Copenhagen
ĀpDhS	Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra
ĀpŚS	Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra
Apte	V. S. Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, 3 vols., Poona 1957-1959
ĀrsBr	Ārṣeya Brāhmaṇa
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
ĀśvŚS	Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra
AVP	Atharvaveda (Paippalāda)
AVŚ	Atharvaveda (Śaunakīya)
Āyār	Āyāraṃga
B	Bombay edition
BĀrUp	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BĀrUp(K)	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Kāṇva)
BĀrUp(M)	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Mādhyandina; see Böhtlingk, 1889)
BaudhDhS	Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra
BaudhŚS	Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra
BCE	before the Common Era
BD	I. B. Horner (transl.), The Book of the Discipline, Vinaya Piṭaka, vols. 1-6, London 1938-1966 (SBB)
BDCRI	Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, Poona
BEFEO	Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Paris
BEHE	Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Paris
BEI	Bulletin d’Études Indiennes, Paris
BezzB	Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen, ed. A. Bezzenberger und W. Prellwitz, Göttingen
Bhag	Bhagavadgitā
BHSD	Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. 2: Dictionary, New Haven 1953
BIS	Berliner Indologische Studien, Berlin
BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
BraSū	Brahmasūtra
BST	Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga
BSūBhā	Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara
CEd	”Critical edition” of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā
CE	Common Era
ChānUp	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
D	Delhi edition
DN	Dīghanikāya, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, J.E. Carpenter, 3 vols. 1890-1911 (PTS)
DPPN	G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, 2 vols., London 1937-1938
DrāŚS	Drāhyāyaṇa Śrauta Sūtra
EĀc	Ekottara Āgama (TI 125)
EFEO	École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Hanoi, Saigon, Paris
EIP	The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, ed. Karl H. Potter, Delhi 1970 ff.
EJVS	Electronic Journal of Vedic Studies
EncBuddh	Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalase- kera, vol. 1 ff., Colombo 1961 ff.
EpInd	Epigraphia Indica, Delhi
GautDhS	Gautama Dharma Sūtra
GPaBr	Gopatha Brāhmaṇa
HBI	Étienne Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, des origines à l’ère Śaka, Louvain 1958
HIL	A History of Indian Literature, ed. J. Gonda, Wiesbaden 1973 ff.
HirŚS	Hiraṇyakeśi Śrauta Sūtra
HistDh	See Kane, HistDh
IA	Indian Antiquary, Bombay
IC	Indian Culture, Calcutta
IIJ	Indo-Iranian Journal, Den Haag, Dordrecht
IT	Indologica Taurinensia, Torino
JA	Journal Asiatique, Paris
Jā	Jātaka, together with its Commentary, ed. V. Fausbøll, 6 vols., London 1877-1896; vol. 7 (Index, D. Andersen), 1897
JaimBr	Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society, New Haven
JĀrBr	Jaiminīya-Ārṣeya-Brāhmaṇa, edited by Bellikoth Ramachandra Sharma. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha. 1967
JBBRAS	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JEAS	Journal of the European Āyurvedic Society
JIABS	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JOIB	Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JUpBr	Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa
Kane, HistDh	Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, second edition, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 5 vols., 1968-1977
KapS	Kapiṣthala Saṃhitā
Kāś	Kāśikā of Vāmana and Jayāditya
KāṭhS	Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā
KaṭhUp	Kaṭha Upaniṣad (ed. Limaye & Vadekar)
KātŚS	Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra
KauṣBr	Kauṣ̄taki Brāhmaṇa
KauṣUp	Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad
KlSchr	Kleine Schriften [in der Serie der GlasenappStiftung], Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
L	Ladnun edition
LātŚS	Lātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra
MĀc	Madhyama Āgama (TI 26)
Macdonell- Keith,VI	Arthur Anthony Macdonell and Arthur Berriedale Keith, Vedic Index of Names and Subjects, 2 vols., London 1912; reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1982
Mahā-bh	Patañjali, (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābhāṣya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885
MaitS	Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
MaitUp	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad
MānŚS	Mānava Śrauta Sūtra
Manu	Mānava Dharma Śāstra, ed. Olivelle, 2005
Mhbh	Mahābhārata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar a.o., Poona 1933 ff. (BORI)
MīmSū	Mīmāṃsāsūtra
MN	Majjhima-Nikāya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, 3 vols., London 1888-1899 (PTS)
Ms	Manuscript of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā
MSS	Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft, München
MunUp	Munḍaka Upaniṣad
Mvu	Mahāvastu-Avadāna, ed. Émile Senart, 3 vols., Paris 1882-1897
Mvu(B)	Mahāvastu-Avadāna, vol. 1, ed. S. Bagchi, Darbhanga 1970 (BST 14)
MW	Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1899
NBh	Nyāya Bhāṣya of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, in the following edition: Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara’s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra’s Tātparyaṭ̄̄ā & Viśvanātha’s Vrtti. Chapter I, section I critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and chap-
	ters I-ii-V by Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with an introduction by Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1936.
Nir	Nirukta
ÖAW	Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
P.	Pāṇinian sūtra
PañBr	Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa
PDNRL	Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, Vienna
PEFEO	Publications de l’École Française d’ExtrêmeOrient, Paris
PICI	Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris
PMS	Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra
PTC	Pāli Tipiṭakaṃ Concordance, ed. F. L. Woodward, E. M. Hare, London 1952 ff.
PTS	Pali Text Society, London
Pupph	Pupphiyāo (= Deleu, 1966: 117-124)
PW	Otto Böhtlingk, Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch, 7 Bde., St. Petersburg 1855-1875
pw	Otto Böhtlingk, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung, 4 Bde., St. Petersburg 1879-1889
Rām	Rāmāyaṇa, crit. ed. G. H. Bhatt a.o., Baroda 1960-75
RV	Ṛgveda
RVePrā	Ṛgveda-Prātiśākhya. The sūtra numbers both according to Mangal Deva Shastri’s and Max Müller’s editions are given.
S	ed. Schubring
SĀc	Saṃyukta Āgama (TI 99)
ṢaḍBr	Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa, edited by Bellikoth Ramachandra Sharma. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha. 1967.
SāmBr	Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa
ŚāñĀr	Śāñkhāyana Āraṇyaka
ŚāñGS	Śāñkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra
ŚāñŚS	Śāñkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra
ŚAśUp	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Sb.	Sitzungsbericht
SBB	Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series, London
SN	Saṃyutta-Nikāya, ed. L. Feer, 5 vols., London 1884-1898 (PTS), vol. 6 (Indexes by C.A.F. Rhys Davids), London 1904 (PTS)
Sn	Suttanipāta, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, London 1913 (PTS)
SNR	N. Stchoupak, L. Nitti, L. Renou, Dictionnaire sanskrit-français, Paris 1932
SPaBr	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
SPaBrK	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Kāṇva)
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Sūy	Sūyagaḍaṃgasutta = Sūtrakṛtāngasūtra
SVJ	Sāmaveda (Jaiminīya)
SVK	Sāmaveda (Kauthuma)
Sw	Swaminathan’s edition of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā
TaitĀr	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
TaitBr	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
TaitS	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
TaitUp	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Thāṇ	Thānaṃga Sutta
TI	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō oder Taishō Issaikyō, 100 vols., Tōkyō 1924 ff.
TSWS	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna
UMS	Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra
Utt	Uttarajjhayaṇa / Uttarajjhāyā
Uvav	Uvavāiya (see Leumann, 1883)
VādhŚS	Vādhūla Śrauta Sūtra
VājS	Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā
VājSK	Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā (Kāṇva)
VājSM	Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā (Mādhyandina)
VaṃBr	Vaṃśa Brāhmaṇa
VārŚS	Vārāha Śrauta Sūtra
VasDhS	Vasiṣṭha Dharma Sūtra
Vin	Vinayapitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, 5 vols., London 1879-1883 (PTS)
Viy	Viyāhapannatti
VKSKS(O)	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen
vt.	vārttika
VWC	A Vedic Word Concordance, by Vishva Bandhu, 5 vols., Hoshiarpur: V.V.R. Institute, 1955-1965
WI	Word Index to the Praśastapāda Bhāṣya: a complete word index to the printed editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994
Winternitz, GIL	Moriz Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, 3 Bde., Leipzig 1908, 1913, 1920
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Wien
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Wien
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig, later Wiesbaden

INTRODUCTION

THE SEPARATE CULTURE OF GREATER MAGADHA

Not long after the year 150 BCE, the grammarian Patañjali gave the following description of the “land of the Āryas” (āryāavarta): ¹

Which is the land of the Āryas? It is the region to the east of where the Sarasvatī disappears (ādarśa), west of the Kālaka forest, south of the Himalayas, and north of the Pāriyātra mountains.

Not all the terms of this description are clear, ² but whatever the precise meaning of “Kālaka forest”, this passage states clearly that the land of the Āryas had an eastern limit. Three to four centuries later, the situation has changed. The Mānava Dharma Śāstra (2.22) characterizes Āryāvarta as extending from the eastern to the western sea: ³

The land between the same mountain ranges [i.e., Himalaya and Vindhya] extending from the eastern to the western sea is what the wise call “Āryāvarta”-the land of the Āryas.

The immediately preceding verse (Manu 2.21) shows that the Mānava Dharma Śāstra was familiar with the description of Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, or with one similar to it, but that it reserves the designation “Middle Region” (madhyadeśa) for what Patañjali calls Āryāvarta: ⁴

The land between the Himalaya and Vindhya ranges, to the east of Vinaśana and west of Prayāga, is known as the “Middle Region”.

It seems likely that Patañjali’s Kālaka forest was near Manu’s Prayāga, situated at the confluence of the two rivers Gangā and Yamunā-in English: Ganges and Jumna-near the present Allahabad. ⁵

These passages suggest that an important change took place between the second century BCE and the second or third century CE. While the Brahmins of the second century BCE looked upon the eastern Ganges valley as more or less foreign territory, the Brahmins of the second or third centuries CE looked upon it as their land.

The passage from Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya occurs in virtually identical form in some other texts, viz., the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra (1.2.9) and the Vasiṣṭha Dharma Sūtra (1.8-12). Both these texts add that, according to some, Āryāvarta is the land between the Gangā and the Yamunā, which supports the idea that the Kālaka forest was indeed situated at or near the confluence of these two rivers. Olivelle (2000: 10) argues that these two Dharma Sūtras are later than Patañjali. If this is correct, it supports the view that the region east of the confluence of the Gangā and the Yamunā was still more or less foreign territory for many Brahmins even after Patañjali.

The change that is recorded here concerns the eastward spread of Brahmanism. This spread cannot be dissociated from individual Brahmins moving eastward. However, the arrival of individual Brahmins does not, of itself, gain a territory for Brahmanism. For this to happen, Brahmins have to be recognized as Brahmins, i.e., as people who are members of the highest group of society by birthright. This recognition has to come from other members of society, to begin with local rulers. All this takes time, and a prolonged presence of Brahmins.

According to the passages cited above, the region east of the confluence of the Gangā and the Yamunā was not considered Brahmanical territory at the time of Patañjali. This does not exclude that there were Brahmins living there. Rather, it suggests that the Brahmins living in it did not receive the esteem which they deemed themselves entitled to. In Patañjali’s Āryāvarta, on the other hand, we may assume that they did receive this esteem, at least to some extent. ⁶ The Brahmins’ predominant social position in this region allows us to use the expressions “Brahmanical society” or “Vedic society” for the period during which Vedic texts were still being composed. These expressions do not, of course, imply that all members of this society were Brahmins, even less that they were all Brahmins who performed Vedic rituals.

That the region east of the confluence of the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā was not Brahmanical territory is supported by the little we know about the political history of the Ganges valley east of the confluence with the Jumna. It is here that the foundations were laid for the Mauryan empire that came to cover a large part of the South Asian subcontinent. If our sources can be believed, none of the rulers involved were especially interested in the Brahmins and their ideas. The early kings of Magadha-Śreṇika Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru-were claimed as their own by Buddhists as well as by Jainas. The Nandas, who consolidated imperial power at Pātaliputra around 350 BCE, appear to have become zealous patrons of the Jainas. Candragupta Maurya overthrew the Nandas, but may have had no more interest in the Brahmins than those whom he replaced. He himself is said to have converted to Jainism and died a Jaina saint. His son Bindusāra patronized non-Brahmanical movements, particularly the Ājīvikas. Aśoka was interested in Buddhism; his immediate successors in Ājīvikism and Jainism. It is only with the Suingas, who were Brahmins themselves, that Brahmins may have begun to occupy the place in society which they thought was rightfully theirs. This happened around 185 BCE. ⁷ Forty or fifty years later, as we have seen, Patañjali the grammarian was still not ready to look upon the Ganges valley east of the confluence with the Jumna as being part of the land of the Āryas. (It is perhaps no coincidence that Puṣyamitra, the Śunga general who killed the last Maurya and created the Śunga dynasty, settled, if Kālidāsa’s Mālavikāgnimitra can be trusted, not in Pātaliputra, but far from it, in Vidiśā.)

Until Patañjali’s date and perhaps for some time after him, our sources suggest, the region east of the confluence of the Gangā and the Yamunā was not primarily Brahmanical. I will henceforth refer to this area as Greater Magadha. ⁸ It serves no purpose at this point to define exact limits for it. Greater Magadha covers Magadha and its surrounding lands: roughly the geographical area in which the Buddha and Mahāvīra lived and taught. With regard to the Buddha, this area stretched by and large from Śrāvastī, the capital of Kosala, in the north-west to Rājagṛha, the capital of Magadha, in the south-east. ⁹ This area was neither without culture nor religion. It is in this area that most of the second urbanization of South Asia took place from around 500 BCE onward. ¹⁰ It is also in this area that a number of religious and spiritual movements arose, most famous among them Buddhism and Jainism. All these events took place within, and were manifestations of, the culture of that part of northern India. We know very little and have to depend on indirect evidence for information about the aspects of this culture that preceded Buddhism and Jainism, and about those that did not find direct expression in these two religions.

What can we learn from early Brahmanical literature about this culture that existed-and flourished-on its eastern flank? Vedic and early post-Vedic literature contains very little that can inform us about the culture of its eastern neighbours. There is, however, one important exception. One passage of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (13.8.1.5) speaks about the “demonic people of the east” (āsuryah prācyāh [prajāh]). These demonic people from the east, we learn, were in the habit of constructing sepulchral mounds that were round. These round sepulchral mounds are contrasted with those in use among the followers of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The passage concerned reads, in Eggeling’s translation: ¹¹

Four-cornered (is the sepulchral mound). Now the gods and the Asuras, both of them sprung from Prajāpati, were contending in the (four) regions (quarters). The gods drove out the Asuras, their rivals and enemies, from the regions, and being regionless, they were overcome. Wherefore the people who are godly make their burial-places fourcornered, whilst those who are of the Asura nature, the Easterners and others, (make them) round, for they (the gods) drove them out from the regions.

Round sepulchral mounds are a well-known feature of the religions that arose in Greater Magadha. Often called stūpas, they have accompanied Buddhism wherever it went during its historical expansion. Jainism, too, had its stūpas, as had Ājīvikism, it seems. ¹² We may conclude that round sepulchral mounds were a feature of the culture of Greater Magadha, presumably already before these three religions. The passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa clearly refers to this feature, ¹³ and attributes it to people who do not adhere to Vedic religion.

A passage of the Mahābhārata which may be late and deals with the end of the Yuga shows that the worship of stūpa-like constructions was still associated with godlessness and social disorder at that date: ¹⁴ “This world will be totally upside down: people will abandon the Gods and worship charnel houses (edūka), and the Sūdras will refuse to serve the twice-born at the collapse of the Eon. In the hermitages of the great seers, in the settlements of the Brahmins, at the temples and sanctuaries (caitya), ¹⁵ in the lairs of the Snakes, the earth will be marked by charnel houses, not adorned by the houses of the Gods, when the Eon expires, and that shall be the sign of the end of the Eon.”

In Part III questions concerning the chronology of late-Vedic literature will be dealt with. Here it must suffice to state that it is possible, though not certain, that this passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is older than the Buddha and the Jina. If this is indeed the case, we can conclude from it that Buddhism and Jainism arose in a culture which was recognized as being non-Vedic, and as having funerary practices and, no doubt, other customs which distinguished it from Vedic culture.

Another passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (1.4.1.14-17) confirms that there was an eastern limit to the area which the Brahmins considered their own, but also that there were Brahmins beyond this “own” territory: ¹⁶

Māthava, the Videgha, was at that time on the [river] Sarasvatī. He (Agni) thence went burning along this earth towards the east; and Gotama Rāhūgaṇa and the Videgha Māthava followed after him as he was burning along. He burnt over (dried up) all these rivers. Now that [river], which is called Sadānīra, flows from the northern [Himālaya] mountain: that he did not burn over. That one the Brahmins did not cross over in former times, thinking, “it has not been burnt over by Agni Vaiśvānara”.

Now-a-days, however, there are many Brahmins to the east of it. At that time it (the land east of the Sadānīra) was very uncultivated, very marshy, because it had not been tasted by Agni Vaiśvānara.

Now-a-days, however, it is very cultivated, for the Brahmins have caused [Agni] to taste it through sacrifices. Even in late summer that [river], as it were, rages along: so cold is it, not having been burnt over by Agni Vaiśvānara.

Māthava, the Videgha, then said [to Agni], “Where am I to abide?” “To the east of this [river] be thy abode!” said he. Even now this [river] forms the boundary of the Kosalas and Videhas; for these are the Māthavas (or descendants of Māthava).

This legend, Michael Witzel remarks (1997: 311; cp. 1997c: 50 f.), “is the Brahmanical version of a tale of ‘origin’ of the Videha kings. It is presented as their justification of rule, through orthoprax Fire (Agni) […] and with the help of the Brahmins (Gotama) […] [The] purohita, the well known Ṛ̣̣i Gotama Rāhūgaṇa, links the Videha dynasty with the sacred time of the Ṛgveda. Chieftain and Brahmin move eastwards only when they are preceded by Agni Vaiśvānara, the embodiment of ritual fire that is necessary in all śrauta rituals. This fire is not the wildly burning forest fire (dāva) and thus not the fire used for primitive slash and burn agriculture, and it clearly is also not the fire used to clear the eastern territories of their dense jungle. […] [T]his is not a legend of the Indo-Aryan settlement of the east in (early post-Rgvedic) times but it is a tale of Sanskritization, of the arrival of Vedic (Kuru-Pañcāla) orthopraxy in the east.” Kulke and Rothermund (1998: 48-49), while referring to this passage, comment: “The events reported here are of great significance. At the time when this text was composed there was obviously still a clear recollection that the land to the east of the river Sadanira (Gandak) was originally unclean to the Brahmins because their great god Agni had not traversed this river.” In spite of this, Māthava the Videgha had settled to the east of this river. Kulke and Rothermund therefore continue: “So, by the time this Brahmana text was written [composed might be better, JB] this land was considered to be acceptable to the Brahmins. But, because the god of the Brahmins had not stepped into this land, it was considered to be inferior to the land in the west.”

Since I will deal with chronological issues in Part III, I will not here try to draw precise conclusions on that subject from the above passage. Note, however, that the general situation it depicts corresponds to the situation which we are led to believe was valid at least until the time of the grammarian Patañjali, the middle of the second century BCE.

One more passage from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (3.2.1.23) may be briefly mentioned. Like the first one, it speaks about Asuras (this time the Asuras themselves, not humans who are of Asura nature). It tells us that the Asuras use barbarous language, viz., he ‘lavo he ‘lavah. ¹⁷ This, as Paul Thieme (1938: 4 (10)) has argued, stands for Māgadhī he ‘layo he ‘layah (so cited by the grammarian Patañjali), ¹⁸ corresponding to Sanskrit he ‘rayo he ‘rayah “hail friends!”. If this is correct, this passage testifies to the fact that its author, too, looked upon the inhabitants of Magadha as demonic, and what is more, that he was aware of, and looked down upon, their “incorrect” speech habits, as did the grammarian Patañjali.

Finally, a passage from the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa shows that others, too, among them a certain Brahmin called Brahmadatta Caikitāneya, felt disdain for the speech habits of the easterners. This passage reads, in the translation of H. W. Bodewitz: ¹⁹ “Now this Brahmadatta Caikitāneya was appointed Purohita by the king of the Kosalas Brahmadatta Prāsenajita. His (i.e. the king’s) son talked like an Easterner. He (Caikitāneya) spoke: ‘This man (i.e. the son of the king) is not to be understood. Yoke my chariot. I shall come back.’ He went away.” This purohita, it appears, was not willing to live among people who spoke like easterners.

This is what the Vedic Index of Names and Subjects by Macdonell and Keith has to say about Magadha and its inhabitants: ²⁰

Magadha is the name of a people who appear throughout Vedic literature as of little repute. Though the name is not actually found in the Rigveda, it occurs in the Atharvaveda (5.22.14), where fever is wished away to the Gandhāris and Mūjavants, northern peoples, and to the Añgas and Magadhas, peoples of the east. Again, in the list of victims at the Puruṣamedha (“human sacrifice”) in the Yajurveda (VājS 30.5.22; TaitBr 3.4.1.1), the Māgadha, or man of Magadha, is included as dedicated to ati-kruṣta, “loud noise” (?), while in the Vrātya hymn of the Atharvaveda (15.2.1-4) the Māgadha is said to be connected with the Vrātya as his Mitra, his Mantra, his laughter, and his thunder for the four quarters. In the Śrauta Sūtras (LāṭŚS 8.6.28; KātŚS 22.4.22) the equipment characteristic of the Vrātya is said to be given, when the latter is admitted into the Āryan Brahminical community, to a bad Brahmin living in Magadha (brahma-bandhu Māgadha-deñya), but this point does not occur in the Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa (17.1.16). On the other hand, respectable Brahmins sometimes lived there, for the Kauṣītaki Āraṇyaka (7.13) mentions Madhyama, Prātībodhī-putra, as Magadha-vāsin, “living in Magadha”. Oldenberg, however, seems clearly right in regarding this as unusual.

[…]

The dislike of the Magadhas […] was in all probability due, as Oldenberg thinks, to the fact that the Magadhas were not really Brahmanized. This is entirely in accord with the evidence of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (1.4.1.10 ff.) that neither Kosala nor Videha were fully Brahmanized at an early date, much less Magadha.

These remarks confirm our impression that Magadha-and by extension, Greater Magadha - was not part of the land which the Brahmins considered their own during the Vedic period and, we may add, right up to a time close to the beginning of the Common Era. We may see this as a confirmation of our earlier conclusion that Greater Magadha had a culture of its own which was different from the culture of the authors of Vedic and early post-Vedic literature. This was the culture of those who were responsible for the second urbanization in India, the rise of new political structures and the creation of the Mauryan empire and its successors. It was also the culture of those who founded, or joined, various religious movements, among which Buddhism, Jainism, and Ājīvikism are best known. In this book I will try to piece together what can be known about the culture of Greater Magadha that preceded, or existed beside, Buddhism and Jainism, and to trace the influence it exerted on what we may call classical Indian culture.

Some of the following chapters will be more technical than others. Some portions of Part III, for example, will be tough going for those who are not familiar with the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. Issues that are particularly technical, or relatively peripheral to the task at hand, have been relegated to the Appendices. Readers who wish to arrive at an in-depth judgment of the ideas here presented will have to read the whole book along with the appendices, to be sure. Others who are less demanding may be well advised to be eclectic in their choice of readings from this book.

PART I - CULTURAL FEATURES OF GREATER MAGADHA

INTRODUCTION

The sources for our knowledge of the culture of Greater Magadha before and beside Buddhism and Jainism are extremely limited. However, if we make full use of the sources at our disposal, we may be able to extract enough information from them to justify a number of conclusions.

These sources are primarily of two types: archaeological and literary. The archaeological evidence does not show a clear division between the Doab situated between the Ganges and the Jumna on the one hand, and Greater Magadha on the other, during the time of the Buddha, the Jina, and Patañjali. It does, however, show that such a distinction existed until the middle of the first millennium BCE. Until that time the Doab was characterized by what is called Painted Grey ware, ¹ the area east of the confluence by Black and Red ware. Around the year 500 BCE both were replaced by Northern Black Polished ware. ² From the literary evidence we learn that this common use of Northern Black Polished ware hid major differences in intellectual and spiritual culture between the two regions.

The literary sources that can be used to study the culture of Greater Magadha are primarily the canonical texts of the two religions that arose in that area, Buddhism and Jainism. The Vedic corpus can be used, too, as can some of the more recent Brahmanical texts that have survived, but to a lesser extent. The fact that much of our information comes in this way from religious texts, has the unavoidable consequence that our knowledge of the culture of Greater Magadha will be top-heavy: there will be much more information about the milieus from which Buddhism and Jainism arose than about other aspects of this culture. This is an element to be kept in mind in what follows. Attempts can, and will, be made to extract information from various sources that concern these other aspects, and it will become clear that Buddhism and Jainism and their ancestors and competitors do not exhaust the culture of Greater Magadha. The results will, however, be limited, and not always certain. Nevertheless, it will be our first task to analyse the canonical texts of Buddhism and Jainism, and discover the fundamental ideology underlying these two religions.

CHAPTER I.1 - THE FUNDAMENTAL SPIRITUAL IDEOLOGY

Buddhism and Jainism share two features which we can provisionally attribute to the culture of Greater Magadha that preceded them: (1) belief in rebirth and karmic retribution; (2) use of round funerary mounds (the predecessors of the later stūpas). This chapter will concentrate on the first of these two, belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. It will become clear that this belief was interpreted in different ways by the religious currents about which we can obtain information. This difference of interpretation does not primarily concern the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution itself, but rather what one can do about it. Only Buddhism interprets the belief itself differently. All the currents except Buddhism share the belief that all deeds bring about karmic retribution; those people who wish to avoid karmic retribution are therefore confronted with the challenge to put an end to all activity.

Early Jainism

The most characteristic trait of early Jainism is that it teaches a way of asceticism in which, especially in its more advanced stages, suppression of all activity is central. Abstaining from all activity has the obvious consequence that there will be no new deeds that would lead to karmic retribution. To this must be added that the painful nature of these ascetic practices - in which practitioners would remain motionless for very long stretches of time, in spite of heat, cold, exhaustion, attacks by insects and interference by meddlesome bystanders - was interpreted to bring about the destruction of the traces of earlier deeds that had not yet suffered retribution. Our sources of information about the Jaina way are the earliest books of the Śvetāmbara Jaina canon, and certain passages from the Buddhist canon that talk about Jainas.

Probably the earliest surviving detailed description of the road leading to liberation in the Jaina texts occurs in the Āyāraṃga (Skt. Ācārānga Sūtra): ¹

A monk who has this idea: “Truly, I get tired of it to drag around this [my] body further under the present circumstances”, he should more and more reduce the amount of food, and when he has thereupon reduced his passions, “when he has with energy adjusted his body [to it], when he has [become] thin as a plank, when his body is almost extinguished” then he should […] beg for [a layer of] grass; with this he should go into solitude, spread it out […] and there, when the time has come, carry out renunciation [1.] of his body, [2.] of the movement of the limbs and [3.] of walking. [For, the following has been said:] “One after the other [I want to describe] the methods of liberation by means of which the prudent ones [reach the goal], after they have overcome both [birth and death], the awakened ones, who have come to the bank of the doctrine. One rich [in spirit], a prudent one, if he has recognized all that is incomparable [and] has thought it through logically, he transcends karman.

[1.] If he has reduced the passions then he should bear with little food. When the monk gets sick in view of the [scanty] food, then he should not yearn to live, but also not desire to die: to both, life as well as death, he should not be attached. Indifferent, concerned only with the removal of karman, may he maintain the pious attitude; by making himself free internally and externally, may he search [only] for the pure heart. Whatever he recognizes as a means to support his life [still] for a while, this he quickly employs prudently in favour of a period of time.

In a village or forest a monk should examine a spot, and when he has found it free of living beings, then he should spread out his [layer of] grass [there]. He should lie there without food; if temptations affect him in this regard, then he should bear them; he should not go [among people] before the [fixed] time, even if he is affected by human things. Animals which crawl and those which fly sometimes high, sometimes low, if they feed on his flesh and blood, then he should not kill them and should not wipe them away. Animals wound his body, but he should not jump up from his place; tormented by influences of many kinds, he [indeed] should endure.

[2.] [So] he arrives at the end of his life-time, away from the many fetters. But the following is to be preferred by the competent and informed ones: it is a further practice which the Nāya-son has preached. In the twice three cases he should get rid of movement [of the limbs], unless it is for the sake of his life. He should not lie on living plants, carefully he should lie down on a prepared abode, become free [of needs], without food; if temptations affect him in these [last] respects, then he should bear them. If he loses his sense [because of hunger] then he should eat accordingly; indeed, he is without blame who is unaffected [and] completely devoted. He might step forwards [and] backwards, bend [and] stretch himself in order to maintain the body [still] in alliance [with the soul], or even [for a while lie] there unconscious. He might walk around if he tired [of lying down], or he might adopt an ascetic position and keenly adhere to it. If he finally tired of the ascetic posture then he may sit down. If he sits, then he should direct all his senses at the way of dying to which nothing can be compared. If [in grasping for a support] he stumbles upon a piece of wood full of worms, then he should look for one that is not so; he should not support himself on anything out of which something can arise that is to be avoided; he gets up from there [and rather] bears all temptations.

[3.] He, however, who performs the following action, exerts himself even more. In complete command of his limbs he should not stir from his place: this is the highest practice, superior to the previous one. Without searching far away the pious one dwells standing, but if he has found a place that is free of living beings, then he should adopt a posture there. He abandons his body completely, thinking: “I do not have any temptations of the body anymore”. Whereas he [previously] thought one would experience temptations and attacks lifelong, he [now] bears them withdrawn [and] insightfully, [because, after all, they contribute] to the destruction of the body. He should not hang on to the cravings for the transitory, even if they come ever more numerously; he should not cultivate desire and yearning, by aiming at the essence which is constant. [A god] may offer him [supposedly] “eternal” things: he should not believe the divine deceit. Recognizing this the pious one should shake off all deception. Not deluded by anything, he reaches the end of his lifetime. If he has recognized only perseverance as the main thing, then [every] such [way to] liberation is proper.

Here we find a description of a voluntary starvation to death, accompanied by almost total restraint with regard to all activity and movement. It is the culmination of a life of training and preparation. ²

The emphasis on restraint of activity and movement should not surprise us. We read repeatedly in the Āyāramga that suffering is the result of activity (āraṃhha, kamma): “knowing that all this suffering is born from activity”; ³ “no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the condition [for rebirth] originates on account of activity”. ⁴

The most obvious remedy against such a situation is to abstain from activity: “therefore he who does not act has ceased [from activity]; he who has ceased from that is called ‘homeless’” ⁵; “free from activity he knows and sees, he does not long for [anything] because of his insight; he is called ‘homeless’” ⁶; “But he is wise and awakened [who] has ceased from activity. […] Looking at those among the mortals in this world who are free from activity, having seen the result connected with activity, he who really knows turns away from that [activity]”; ⁷ etc.

All this gives us a clear and intelligible picture of the way to liberation in early Jainism. Activity being the source of all unhappiness, the attempt is made to put a stop to it. ⁸ This is done in a most radical way. The monk abstains from food and prepares for death in a position which is as motionless as possible.

The early Buddhists did not share this understanding of the way to liberation. For them desire, or intention, was crucial. An early Buddhist sermon - the Upāli Sutta ⁹ - contrasts the two interpretations, or attitudes. It points out that physical activity is central for the Jainas, while for the Buddhists it is mental activity. Other passages allow us to interpret this more precisely. The Jainas did not only try to suppress bodily but also mental activity. The Buddhists, on the other hand, did not count mental activity as such as essential, but rather the intention behind it. Some Buddhist texts do not hesitate to ridicule the Jaina emphasis on bodily motionlessness and its resulting extreme discomfort. In the Devadaha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha is recorded to have said: ¹⁰ “If the pleasure and pain that beings feel are caused by what was done in the past, then the Niganthas [i.e, the Jainas] surely must have done bad deeds in the past, since they now feel such painful, racking, piercing feelings.” An early Jaina text pays back in kind by pointing out that a Buddhist who grills a child and eats it, but without knowing that he does so, is supposedly free of guilt, whereas that same Buddhist is guilty if he eats a gourd while thinking it is a baby. The passage, which occurs in the Sūyagaḍa (Skt. Sūtrakṛtānga), reads, in Bollée’s (1999: 411-413) translation: ¹¹ “If someone puts a ball of oilcake on a spit and roasts it with the idea: this is a man, or a gourd, thinking it to be a baby, he becomes for us soiled/soils himself for us with killing a living being. On the other hand, however, if a non-aryan puts a man on a spit and roasts him, taking him for an oil-cake, or does the same to a child he thinks is a gourd, in our opinion he is not soiled with killing a living being. If (ca) someone puts a man or a child on a spit and roasts it on a fire taking it for a lump of oilcake, it would be fit for Buddhists to end their vow of fasting with.” Passages like these, by contrasting the positions of Buddhists and Jainas, allow us to arrive at a clear picture of early Jainism. ¹²

A somewhat later Jaina text, the Uttarajjhayaṇa (Skt. Uttarādhyayana), chapter 29, contains further information which confirms what we know from the Āyāraṃga and adds to it. We read here, for example: “What does the soul produce by renouncing activity? By renouncing activity it produces a state without activity. By being without activity the soul does not bind new karman and destroys the karman that was bound before”. ¹³ “By renouncing food it stops the many hundreds of existences (which it would otherwise be doomed to live)”. ¹⁴ “By the possession of right conduct [the soul] produces the state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains. Having reached the state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains, the homeless [monk] destroys the four parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses. After that [the soul] becomes perfected, awakened, freed, completely emancipated, and puts an end to all suffering”. ¹⁵ These passages confirm that liberation is effected by bringing all activity to a standstill. They are more specific about an essential role which abstention from activity is expected to play, viz., the destruction of (traces of) former deeds. This role is essential, for without it the asceticism of the Jainas would be useless.

The link between suffering and the destruction of earlier karma is also clear from a passage in the Thānaṇga (Skt. Sthānānga) which talks about the four kinds of antakriyās or acts that bring an end to saṃsāra. ¹⁶ Padmanabh S. Jaini (2003: 5) rephrases them as follows: “The first describes a person who has shaven his head, who has renounced the household to become an anagāra, who practices various kinds of restraints and meditations, etc., who because of his small amount of karma remaining from the past attains mokṣa at the end but without experiencing any great pain [because he has exhausted a great many karmas in previous lives] like the Cakravartin Bharata. The second is a similar anagāra who has a great many karmas to be exhausted and undergoes very severe forms of pain but attains siddhahood in a short time, for example the anagāra Gaja-sukumāla (Kṛ̣̣na’s younger brother). The third is the case of a similar anagāra who has a great amount of karma that remains to be exhausted and he undergoes a long period of asceticism with severe forms of suffering, for example, the Cakravartin Sanatkumāra, who suffered from a variety of diseases. The fourth is […] the case of a person (purise) with very little karma remaining [to be exhausted] who shaves his head, renounces the household life to become anagāra, and practices a variety of restraints but does not practice that kind of tapas nor experience that kind of pain. However, in a very short period of time, during that human existence, such a person attains siddhahood, as for example, Marudevā(ī) Bhagavatī.”

Some portions of the early Buddhist canon confirm the double role which the Jainas believed asceticism could play. Of particular interest is the following passage, where the Buddha is in conversation with the Sakka named Mahānāma: ¹⁷

At one time, Mahānāma, I resided in Rājagaha on the mountain Gijjhakūṭa. At that time there were many Niganthas on the black rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili, standing erect, ¹⁸ refusing to sit down, and they experienced painful, sharp, severe sensations [which were] due to [self-inflicted] torture. Then, Mahānāma, having arisen in the evening from my retirement, I went to the black rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili where those Niganthas were; having gone there I said to those Niganthas: ‘Why, dear Niganthas, are you standing erect, refusing to sit down, and do you experience painful, sharp, severe sensations [which are] due to [self-inflicted] torture?’ When this was said, Mahānāma, those Niganthas said to me: ‘Friend, Niganṭha Nāthaputta, who knows all and sees all, claims complete knowledge and insight [saying:] “Always and continuously knowledge and insight are present to me, whether I walk, stand still, sleep or be awake.” He (i.e., Niganṭha Nāthaputta) says: “Formerly, Niganthas, you performed sinful activities; you must exhaust that [sinful activity] by means of this severe and difficult practice. Being here and now restrained in body, speech and mind, amounts to not performing sinful activity in the future. Thus, as a result of the annihilation of former actions by asceticism, and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no further effect in the future; as a result of no further effect in the future there is destruction of actions; as a result of the destruction of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the destruction of suffering there is destruction of sensation; as a result of the destruction of sensation all suffering will be exhausted.” And this [word of Niganṭha Nāthaputta] pleases us and is approved of by us, and therefore we are delighted. […] Happiness, dear Gotama, should not be reached through happiness, ¹⁹ happiness should be reached through hardship. ²⁰

The Jainas, we read here, were “standing erect, refusing to sit down”, and we are given to understand that they did so for the purpose of ‘the non-performing of new actions’ and ‘the annihilation of former actions by asceticism’. ²¹

Returning now to the Jaina canon, consider the following description of the end of life of a successful practitioner given in Uttarajjhayaṇa, chapter 29: ²²

Then having preserved his life [long enough], the remainder of life being less than the time of a muhūrta, he stops [all] activities and enters pure meditation (sukkajjhāna) in which only subtle activity remains and from which one does not fall back; he first stops the activity of his mind, then of his speech and body, then he puts a stop to breathing out and breathing in. During the time needed to pronounce hardly five short syllables the homeless [monk], being in pure meditation in which [all] activity has been cut off and from which there is no return, simultaneously destroys the four parts of karman [which remain]: pertaining to experience, span of life, name and lineage.

Here we meet with the term ‘pure meditation’ (sukkajjhāna / Skt. śukladhyāna). It is clear from the text that in this stage of pure meditation little or no activity remains. Initially only subtle activity remains, later all activity is cut off. The text adds, almost superfluously, that the monk stops the activities of his mind, speech and body, and even stops breathing. All this is exactly what we had expected on the basis of the supposition that early Jainism strives to obtain complete inactivity. This inactivity includes cessation of the mental processes. Meditation, i.e. the attempt to stop the mental processes, constitutes no more than one aspect of the road to liberation.

A more detailed description of ‘pure meditation’ is found in the Thānaṃga Sutta, which is no doubt later. Like the Aṅguttara Nikāya of the Pāli canon, it classifies and orders subject matters on the basis of the number of their subdivisions. Here we read: ²³

Pure meditation is of four kinds and has four manifestations: 1 . in which there is consideration of multiplicity and changes of object; 2 . in which there is consideration of oneness and no change of object; 3 . in which activity has become subtle and from which there is no return; 4. in which [all] activity ˝has been cut off and from which one does not fall back. These are the four characteristics of pure meditation: absence of agitation, absence of delusion, discriminating insight, renunciation. These are the four supports of pure meditation: forbearance, freedom, softness, straightness. These are the four reflections of pure meditation: reflection on infinity, reflection on change, reflection on what is inauspicious, reflection on sin.

The third and fourth kinds of pure meditation are here described as in the passage from the Uttarajjhayaṇa (29.72 / 1174) studied above. The only difference is that the words “from which one does not fall back” (appadivätti-vāi) and “from which there is no return” (anivattī) have changed places. There is therefore no reason to doubt that the Thānaṃga Sutta follows in this point an older tradition.

In order to find out whether pure meditation already existed in early Jainism, we shall compare the above description with some passages from Āyāraṃga I, probably the oldest texts of the Jaina canon. All occurrences of ‘meditation’ (jhāna), ‘meditate’ (jhāti) etc. in Āyāraṃga I are found in the ninth (in some editions eighth) chapter, which describes the vicissitudes of Mahāvīra and may be a later addition. Of this Great Hero it is said that “he meditates with care and concentration, exerting himself day and night”. ²⁴ Here meditation is said to be possible for long stretches of time, not, e.g., merely for a muhürta as maintained by the later tradition.

Another passage from the Āyāraṃga reads: ²⁵ “Further, the Great Hero meditates on what is above, below, beside, while remaining in his position, motionless, observing his concentration, without desires.” This indicates that meditation can have an object in the outside world. This fits the second kind of pure meditation described in the Uttarajjhayaṇa. In this form of meditation there is “consideration of oneness and no change of object”. A single object, we may assume, is made the focus of attention and this causes the mind to come to a standstill. The first kind of pure meditation must then be an introductory stage to the second one.

We see that the four kinds of pure meditation can be looked upon as stages on the road to complete motionlessness and physical death. At the first stage the mind still moves from one object to another.

At the second stage it stops doing so and comes to a standstill. At the third and fourth stages motionlessness of the body comes about in addition to motionlessness of the mind. When complete motionlessness of body and mind has been reached, physical death takes place.

It will be clear from these passages that early Jainism had a straightforward answer to the problem posed by the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. Those who did not want to be reborn had to abstain from all activity, bodily as well as mental. The result would be twofold. On the one hand there would, naturally, be no more deeds that would clamour for retribution; on the other, earlier deeds would be rendered ineffectual by the same ascetic practices. Together these two aspects of asceticism might lead the ascetic to the point where, at death, no more karmic retribution is required. This ascetic would then not be reborn: he would be freed from the cycle of rebirths.

This answer to the problem also teaches us something about the kind of karmic retribution from which liberation was sought. Obviously the complete immobilization practised by the early Jaina ascetics only makes sense on the assumption that all deeds, both bodily and mental, were deemed to lead to karmic retribution. It was evidently not sufficient to merely abstain from certain deeds. No, even the most innocent deeds, right down to breathing itself, had to be stopped by those who seriously aspired for liberation.

There will be occasion in later chapters to discuss the way in which the culture of Greater Magadha came to interact with the Brahmanical tradition that originally belonged to its western neighbours. Here it will be useful to point out that various features that we associate with the culture of Greater Magadha show up in texts that belong to the Brahmanical tradition. This is also true of the form of asceticism, with its emphasis on bodily and mental immobilization, that characterized early Jainism. We are under no obligation to believe that this kind of asceticism ever was the exclusive property of the latter. The lacunary information we possess about the culture of Greater Magadha does not allow us to prove that there were others in early days who practised similar forms of asceticism, but there are reasons to think that this was actually the case. One reason is that Buddhism, which came from the same region, was clearly influenced by the ideology underlying Jainism, without there being any proof that this influence must have come directly from Jainism. Another reason is that such forms of asceticism found their way into certain Brahmanical texts. Let us consider some examples of these.

The main idea of the road to liberation which we know from early Jainism is expressed in Bhagavadgītā: ²⁶ “Some wise men say that [all] activity is to be abandoned as evil.” More details are given in a passage from the Mahābhārata, which emphasizes motionlessness of body and mind: ²⁷

Freed from all attachments, taking little food, having conquered the senses, he should fix his mind on his self in the first and last part of the night (13). Having made his senses firm with his mind, o lord of Mithilā, and having made his mind (manas) firm with his intellect (buddhi), he is motionless like a stone (14). He should be without trembling like a pillar, and motionless like a mountain; the wise who know to follow the precepts then call him ‘one engaged in Yoga’ (yukta) (15). He neither hears nor smells nor tastes nor sees; he notices no touch, nor does [his] mind form conceptions (16). Like a piece of wood, he does not desire anything, nor does he notice [anything]. When he has reached the Original Nature (prakrti), then sages call him ‘engaged in Yoga’ (yukta) (17). And he looks like a lamp shining in a place without wind; not flickering and motionless it will not move upward or sideward (18).

The Kaṭha Upaniṣad is probably the earliest Upaniṣad which gives some detailed information about meditation. The concluding verse (6.18) declares that ‘the whole method of Yoga’ (yogavidhim krtsnam) has been presented. The most informative verses are 6.10-11: ²⁸

When the five organs of knowledge stand still together with the mind (manas), and the intellect (buddhi) does not stir, that they call the highest course (10). This they consider as Yoga, a firm fixing of the senses. Then one becomes careful, for Yoga is the origin and the end (11).

Verse 3.6 has the same tenor: ²⁹

But he who has discernment, with an ever controlled (yukta) mind (manas), his senses are subdued, like the good horses of a charioteer.

The following description in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad also gives the bodily practices their due: ³⁰

Holding the body straight, three parts of it stretched up, causing the senses to enter into the heart by means of the mind, the wise one should cross over all the frightening streams with the help of the raft which is Brahman (8). Having here suppressed his breaths and having brought his movements under control (yuktacesta), when his breath has been diminished, he should take breath through his nose. Being careful, the wise one should restrain (dhārayeta) his mind like that chariot yoked with vicious horses (9).

The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad ³¹ speaks of a six-membered Yoga, consisting of restraint of the breath, withdrawal of the senses, meditation, fixing the mind, insight (tarka), and concentration. All these terms, with the single exception of tarka, are known from the other early passages on meditation which we have studied. The explanation of ‘fixing the mind’ (dhāraṇā) is interesting (MaitUp 6.20): ³²

And elsewhere also it has been said: After this, the fixing of it (i.e., of the mind). As a result of pressing the tip of the tongue against the palate and suppressing speech, mind and breath, one sees Brahman through insight (?; tarka).

Details of meditation are found in the following verses: ³³

When [someone], having made his mind (manas) completely motionless, without dissolution or distraction, goes to a state without mind, that is the highest place (7). The mind has to remain suppressed until it is destroyed in the heart. This is knowledge, this is liberation; the rest, on the other hand, is bookish proliferation ³⁴ (8).

Restraint of breath is a recurring theme. The Bhagavadgītā speaks of those “who having stopped the movements of breathing in (prāna) and breathing out (apāna) are devoted to prānāyāma”. ³⁵ The term prānāyāma here refers to a complete cessation of breathing. This agrees with the definition of prānāyāma in the Yoga Sūtra as “cutting off the movement of breathing out and breathing in”. ³⁶

The following passage from the Mahābhārata connects restraint of breath with fixing the mind: ³⁷

But they say in accordance with the teaching of the sacred books that the highest Yoga-activity among [the different forms of] Yoga is of two kinds: with properties (saguna) and without properties (nirguna) (8). [These two are] fixing the mind and restraint of breath (prānāyāma), o king; restraint of breath is with properties, fixing the mind ³⁸ is without properties (9). Where [a Yogin] would be seen leaving his breaths free, o best among the people of Mithilā, there is certainly an excess of air (vāta); therefore one should not act [in such a manner] (10).

The passage is obscure, but appears to consider prānāyāma less than and probably preparatory to fixing the mind. Verse 10 indicates the need for prānāyāma: otherwise there would be an excess of air. This indicates that apparently prānāyāma remains a necessity also in the state ‘without properties’, i.e., fixing the mind. It certainly shows that here too prānāyāma concerns the breath, not, or not only, the senses. ³⁹

The following passage comes closer to the idea that saints stop their breathing moments before death: ⁴⁰

Having reached equilibrium of the gunas, performing [only] such actions as concern sustaining the body, and pushing at the time of death the breaths into the artery of the heart (manovahā) with merely the mind, one is liberated.

It is clear that all the important features of early Jaina asceticism are found in the early (but post-Vedic) Brahmanical scriptures. Here, too, meditation is only one aspect of a more general process in which all bodily and mental activities are stopped. Fasting to death and stopping the breath, both of which we had come to recognize as characteristics of early Jaina asceticism, are also present in these Brahmanical scriptures. The same is true of bodily motionlessness, which is compared with the state of a stone, of a pillar, of a mountain. As in early Jainism, meditation aims at the motionlessness of the mind. Here too the sense organs are conquered. As a result the adept is said not to hear, to smell, etc.

There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions. These assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage. No, they should be considered as having been current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition. Details of this process will be considered in later chapters. Here we will first turn to a related feature of the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, the belief that liberation can be attained through knowledge of the self.

Knowledge of the self

Beside Jainism, there are other religious movements which originated in Greater Magadha, most notably Ājīvikism and Buddhism. We will deal with both of them below. There is however one reaction to the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution-one method as to what one can do about it - which we cannot associate with any single known movement, but for which there is nevertheless sufficient evidence to accept that it is a product of the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha. It is the conviction that a certain kind of knowledge of the true nature of the self can bring about, or assist, liberation.

The difficulty which this method presents to the modern researcher is that it is only weakly attested in the Buddhist and Jaina canons, and much more strongly in early Brahmanical texts. Indeed, we find it already in some passages of the old prose Upaniṣads. An example is the teaching of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. We will study this section in detail in chapter III.4. Here it suffices to recall that the self, according to this teaching, is not touched by good or bad actions. It will be clear that there are great advantages in knowing such a self when put against the background of the belief that all deeds have karmic consequences. The self, after all, is what one really is, different from one’s body and even from one’s mind. This core of one’s being, this self, that what one really is, does not act. It is easy to understand that, seen from the vantage point of this knowledge, all karmic retribution is, in the end, based on an colossal misunderstanding. Deeds are carried out by the body and the mind, both of which are not to be identified with the self, which is different from both of them.

Knowledge of the self, seen in this way, offers extremely interesting perspectives for all those who wish to escape from karmic retribution. The idea was adopted by the Yājñavalkya of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda, but not only by him. Numerous presumably more recent Brahmanical sources show the importance of this idea, which sometimes presents itself as a competitor of the path of extreme asceticism. In Part IIA we will study the ways in which ideas that originally belonged to Greater Magadha came to be adopted in texts of the Brahmanical tradition. At this moment we will look at some passages that give expression to the idea that knowledge of the true nature of the self can lead to liberation.

The idea that liberation from the effects of activity is obtained by abstaining from activity may have been criticized from the earliest period. We find such criticism in the Bhagavadgītā: ⁴¹

A man does not reach the state free from activity by not performing actions; and he does not attain perfection by merely abandoning [activity] (4). For no one ever remains without activity even for a moment, because everyone, being powerless, is made to perform activity by the gunas which are born from Original Nature (prakrti) (5). He who sits, restraining his organs of action [but] thinking with his mind of the objects of the senses, he is said to be deluded and of improper demeanour (6). But he, Arjuna, who performs discipline of action (karmayoga) with his organs of action, restraining his senses with his mind, unattached, he excels (7).

The same criticism is expressed elsewhere in the same text: “For it is not possible for an embodied being to abandon completely all actions”. ⁴²

Criticism of this kind has to answer the question whether liberation can be attained in another way, and if yes, which one. The answer which is often given is surprisingly simple. Liberation from the results of one’s actions is possible because in reality no actions are ever performed. They are not performed because man’s inner self, his soul, is completely different from his body and never acts. The Bhagavadgītā puts it like this: ⁴³

Actions are, all of them, undertaken by the gunas of Original Nature (prakṣti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the doer’.

It is sufficient to know that in reality one never performs any actions: ⁴⁴

But he […] who knows the truth about the category guṇa and the category action, knowing that the gunas move about among the gunas, he does not get attached (28). Those who are confused by the gunas of Original Nature (prakṣti) get attached to the gunas and their actions. He who knows all should not disturb those dull [people] who do not know all.

It is clear that in this way an altogether different road to liberation is introduced. The Bhagavadgītā calls it jñānayoga ‘discipline of knowledge’ and mentions it together with the ‘discipline of action’ (karmayoga) which enjoins disinterested activity: ⁴⁵

In this world a two-fold foundation (of religious salvation) has been expounded by Me of old: by the discipline of knowledge of the followers of Sāṅkhya, and by the discipline of action of the followers of Yoga.

This ‘discipline of knowledge’ is, of course, the sāṃkhya ⁴⁶ which is so often referred to in the Mahābhārata, as has been shown by Edgerton in an important article (1924).

If the knowledge that one’s real self is by its very nature free from activity is sufficient for being freed from the results of actions, one would think that no place is left for austerities and meditation. There can be no doubt that indeed knowledge fully replaces these alternative methods in the opinion of some. Others prefer a combination of knowledge and ascetic and meditative practices. A justification for combining these two is given in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: ⁴⁷

Not one who does not abstain from bad acts, nor one who has not come to peace, nor one who is not concentrated, nor one whose mind has not come to peace, shall reach this [Self] by means of knowledge.

In this passage ascetic practices are a precondition for the acquisition of knowledge. The two ways are also combined, e.g. in the following passage of the Mahābhārata: ⁴⁸

He who looks upon this collection of gunas as being the soul, due to wrong points of view, his suffering is infinite [and] does not cease (14). But when [suffering] for you (te) [= by you] is seen as not the soul, not as I, nor as mine, on what basis does [then] the stream of suffering continue? (15) Hear in this connection the supreme teaching of renunciation called ‘Right Mind’, which when declared shall result in liberation for you (16). For mere renunciation (without knowledge of the soul) of all actions, also of the ones prescribed [by the Veda], is considered as an affliction of the wrongly educated which always brings suffering (17). When objects are renounced (dravyatyāge), however, [sacrificial] activities [are involved]; when property is renounced, also vows [are involved]; when happiness is renounced, this is the exertion of asceticism; when all is renounced, this is perfection (18). This one and only way of renunciation of all (viz. the one called ‘Right Mind’) is taught as leading to freedom from suffering; any other way leads to misery (19).

A consequence of the fact that practice leads to liberation only in combination with the knowledge of the immovable nature of the soul is that practice no longer has to be predominantly of a bodily nature. ⁴⁹ Where practice is expected to bring about this knowledge, the mental part is bound to gain prominence. This means that now meditation can become the main means of liberation, at the expense of physical austerities. It can lead to knowledge of the true nature of the self virtually on its own. The following passage, which describes Yoga-activity (yogakrtya) according to verse 2, illustrates this: ⁵⁰

Meditation, study, liberality, truth, modesty, sincerity, forbearance, purification, purity of food, and restraining the senses (10); by these [means] the fire increases and removes sin. To him [who practises these means] all things are obtained and knowledge comes about (11). Acting the same way toward all beings, with [things] obtained or not obtained, having shaken off sin, full of fire, taking little food, having conquered the senses, having brought desire and anger under control, he should wish to bring [himself] to the place of Brahman (12). Having brought about one-pointedness of his mind and senses, concentrated, he should fix his mind with his self in the first and last parts of the night (13). If one sense leaks of this man possessed of five senses, then his insight flows away, like water from the bottom of a bag (14). But he should first take hold of his mind, just as a killer of fish [first takes hold of] small fish; then the knower of Yoga [should take hold of] his ear, then his eye, tongue and nose (15). Then, holding these together, the ascetic should place them in his mind; removing in the same way his volitions, he should fix his mind in his self (16). Bringing the five [senses] together with his knowledge, the ascetic should place them in his mind; and when these [five senses] with the mind as sixth stay in the self, and come to rest staying together, then Brahman shines forth (17). Like a shining flame without smoke, like the bright sun, like the fire of lightning in the sky, he sees the self with the self.

Knowledge of the self as requirement for attaining liberation became a potent force in classical Brahmanism, and is a fundamental ingredient of all the classical schools of Brahmanical philosophy, with the exception of Mīmāṃsā. The notion of an inactive soul is also known to the early Buddhist texts, where it is criticized. Buddhism taught a different method to attain liberation, and rejected therefore both the asceticism of the Jainas, with its emphasis on immobilization, and the notion of a self which by its very nature is inactive. Only one relevant passage from the Buddhist canon will here be discussed. ⁵¹ Criticism of the notion of such a self is implicit in the second sermon which the Buddha is supposed to have given after his enlightenment, in Benares. Here he applies the following analysis to the five constituents of the person: ⁵²

“What do you think about this, monks? Is body (rūpa) permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, Lord.”

“But is that which is impermanent painful or pleasurable?”

“Painful, Lord.”

“But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, painful, of a nature to change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?”

“It is not, Lord.”

“Is feeling (vedanā) […] perception (sañ̃̃ā, Skr. samjñā) […] are the habitual tendencies (samkhāra, Skr. samskāra) […] is consciousness (viññāna, Skr. vijñāna) permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, Lord.”

“But is that which is impermanent painful or pleasurable?”

“Painful, Lord.”

“But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, painful, of a nature to change, as ‘This is mine, this am I, this is my self’?”

“It is not so, Lord.”

“Wherefore, monks, whatever is body, past, future, present, or internal or external, or gross or subtle, or low or excellent, whether it is far or near - all body should, by means of right wisdom, be seen, as it really is, thus: This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self.

Whatever is feeling […] whatever is perception […] whatever are the habitual tendencies […] whatever is consciousness, past, future, present, or internal or external, or gross or subtle, or low or excellent, whether it is far or near-all consciousness should, by means of right wisdom, be seen, as it really is, thus: This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self.”

Underlying this passage a notion of the self presents itself as something permanent, unchanging and pleasurable. The passage does not say that it accepts the existence of such a self; it merely states that anything which is impermanent, painful, and of a nature to change cannot be the self. This rules out the five constituents of the person. Since no other candidates are mentioned, this may imply that a self of this nature does not exist at all; this is not however explicitly stated. In this way the passage betrays that the early Buddhists were acquainted with precisely that notion of the self (permanent, unchanging) which, by its very nature, cannot be touched by the activities carried out by its body. Knowledge of such a self signifies the end of rebirth and karmic retribution for certain seekers (who are obviously not Buddhists). The further qualification, pleasurable, is no absolute requirement for the attainment of this goal. We do however find it occasionally mentioned in texts belonging to the Brahmanical tradition. The notion of the self underlying this passage is therefore precisely the one which was an essential element of the road to liberation for certain non-Buddhists. The Buddhists did not follow this road, and had therefore little use for it. But they knew it, and that is most important at present.

Early Jainism, too, may have had, and accepted, a notion of the soul that was not dissimilar to the one we have studied in this section. Dalsukh D. Malvania (1981) and others have pointed out that the early Jaina concept of the soul was very different from the classical concept which developed in the course of time. He points out that Āyāraṃga 176 describes the soul in the following terms: ⁵³ “It is not long nor small nor round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor green nor white; neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth. It does not have a body, is not born again, has no attachment and is without sexual gender. While having knowledge and sentience, there is nonetheless nothing with which it can be compared. Its being is without form, there is no condition of the unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like that.” (tr. Jacobi, 1884: 52, emended as in Dundas, 1992: 37-38; 2002: 43). Āyāraṃga 171, moreover, states: ⁵⁴ “That which is the soul is that which knows, that which is the knower is the soul, that by which one knows is the soul.” (tr. Dundas, 1992: 38; 2002: 44). It is not therefore impossible that the soul at this early period was believed not to participate in the activity of the body, even though this is not explicitly stated. A passage in Āyāraṃga 3 which describes the Jaina as ātmavādin, lokavādin, karmavādin and kriyāvādin is not necessarily in conflict with this. ⁵⁵ The first chapter of the Sūyagaḍa, on the other hand, does reject the notion of a self that does not act. ⁵⁶

We will see below that Ājīvikism appears to have known, and accepted, the notion of an inactive self.

The Bhagavadgītā

Some related but different answers to the problem of rebirth and karmic retribution are associated with the Bhagavadgītā, whence they spread and gained extensive recognition. The position (or positions) of the Bhagavadgītā must primarily be looked upon as Brahmanical elaborations of the notions we discussed above. However, it will become clear that they may yet throw light on the religious quest of the Ājivikas, to be examined below.

The general theoretical background of the Bhagavadgītā is close to Sāṃkhya: the self is different from material nature, and this difference is to be realized. The question that presents itself is how matter, and more in particular the body accompanying a self (which includes in this discussion the mind), will continue once this difference is realized. Does the body have a nature of its own that determines its activity independently of the involvement of a self? For the Bhagavadgītā it does. It is the “own duty”, the svadharma, of each person. Sometimes it is characterized as the nature (prakṛti, 3.33; svabhāva, 18.41) of the person concerned. It is different for Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras: “Calm, [self-] control, austerities, purity, patience, and uprightness, theoretical and practical knowledge, and religious faith, are the natural-born actions of Brahmins. Heroism, majesty, firmness, skill, and not fleeing in battle also, generosity, and lordly nature, are the natural-born actions of warriors. Agriculture, cattle-tending, and commerce are the natural-born actions of artisans; action that consists of service is likewise natural-born to a serf.” ⁵⁷

What counts in the Bhagavadgītā is the attitude with which these duties are to be carried out. A right attitude ensures that material nature acts without involvement of the self. Non-involvement is central. It is fundamental that one dissociate oneself from one’s actions, or rather from their fruits. Actions which are not inspired by the desire to obtain happiness or to avoid suffering do not produce karmic effects. They are as good as complete inactivity. The Bhagavadgītā poignantly impresses its message upon the warrior (kṣatriya) Arjuna who is about to destroy a major part of his family, and this makes the point very clear. Arjuna must carry out this task without concern for the disturbing results. “Holding pleasure and pain alike, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then gird thyself for battle; thus thou shalt not get evil.” ⁵⁸ The trick in all this is a certain state of mind, a mental attitude, which we may call non-attachment: “In the mental attitude seek thy [religious] refuge; wretched are those whose motive is the fruit [of action].” ⁵⁹

Obtaining this mental attitude can be facilitated in various ways. Acting as an offering to Krṣna is recommended: “Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou offerest in oblation or givest, whatever austerity thou performest, son of Kuntī, that do as an offering to Me.” ⁶⁰ Action is also depicted as a sacrifice: “Except action for the purpose of sacrifice, this world is bound by actions; action for that purpose, son of Kuntī, perform thou, free from attachment [to its fruits].” ⁶¹ Sacrifice implies giving to the gods, who in return give to the sacrificer. Devotion is a central theme of the Bhagavadgītā. Related to it is the notion of casting, or depositing, one’s actions on Krṣṇa, or on Brahman. In verse 3.30 Krṣṇa invites Arjuna to cast all actions onto him, then to fight, free from longing and from selfishness. ⁶² Verse 5.10 speaks, similarly, of “putting [all] actions in Brahman”. ⁶³

In the Bhagavadgītā the right mental attitude is more important than the activity actually carried out. Once the mental attitude is in order, actions will follow suit: “Even if a very evil doer reveres Me with single devotion, he must be regarded as righteous in spite of all; for he has the right resolution. Quickly he becomes righteous (dharmātmā) and goes to eternal peace.” ⁶⁴ This suggests that the evil doer will soon turn to his svadharma. Right action is clearly the result of right attitude, not vice-versa.

Though the role of devotion to the Lord should not be underestimated, the Bhagavadgītā often creates the impression that this is just one means, perhaps beside others, for obtaining the right mental attitude. This right mental attitude is, we have seen it before, non-attachment to the fruit of action. The Bhagavadgītā contains passages which present knowledge of the inactive nature of the soul as a means to obtain this mental attitude. “Actions”, verse 3.27 (cited above) explains, “are, all of them, undertaken by the gunas of Original Nature (prakrti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the doer’.” The immediately following verses then continue: “But he, o long-armed one, who knows the truth about the category guna and the category action, knowing that the gunas move about among the gunas, he does not get attached. Those who are confused by the gunas of Original Nature (prakrti) get attached to the gunas and their actions. He who knows all should not disturb those dull [people] who do not know all.” ⁶⁵ Here, then, the message of the Bhaga-vadgītā-cultivating a mental attitude of non-attachment with regard to the fruit of one’s actions - is no longer an appendage to the way of insight. Insight is here a means (beside others) that may help a person to cultivate this mental attitude.

The method of the Bhagavadgītā is to be distinguished from other contemporary methods. The method of physical and mental immobility demanded extreme physical and mental control. Ideas and emotions played no active role in it, for they had to be suppressed. The method of insight into the true nature of the self, on the other hand, emphasized the intellectual element. Here understanding the true composition of the world, and the place of the soul in it, was deemed to secure liberation. The method of actions without consequences, propagated in the Bhagavadgītā, finally, put almost exclusive weight on what may be called an emotional state, an attitude of devotion, or sacrifice, of non-attachment with regard to the fruit of one’s actions. We have seen that insight into the true nature of the soul may help to obtain this state, and may indeed be a precondition for doing so, yet it would be a mistake to identify the two. The basically intellectual insight may help to bring about an emotional state which is not intellectual.

The Bhagavadgītā addresses an important problem connected with the belief in the possibility of liberation through insight: what happens to body and mind and their activities once insight is obtained? or perhaps: how do body and mind act of their own, when the person identifies with his real self and no longer with his body and mind? The answer of the Bhagavadgītā can easily be interpreted to mean that body and mind, when left to their own devices, automatically carry out their caste duties. In other words, we are not far removed from a fatalistic view of activity. Acts themselves, since they belong to the material world and not to the self, do not contribute to obtaining liberation. The self obtains liberation precisely because it leaves acts to the material world, where they will take a certain direction (that of the caste duties) without affecting the self.

Ājivikism

So far we have considered different methods which were thought to allow the interruption and cessation of the cycle of rebirths determined by one’s deeds. Surprisingly, we have reason to think that Ājīvikism was a movement that denied that any such method could possibly be effective. The sources for our knowledge of this movement are essentially limited to the criticisms addressed to it by its two rival movements, Jainism and Buddhism. An analysis of these sources provides the following picture.

The Ājīvikas, ⁶⁶ like the early Jainas and Buddhists, were Śramanas, ascetics who left their homes in order to find some kind of highest goal by practising various forms of asceticism. Unlike the early Jainas and Buddhists, however, none of their literature (if they had any) has survived. Worse, there are no Ājīvikas left today. The last Ājīvikas may have lived in the first half of the second millennium in the south of India. After that period they disappeared. What we know about them mainly derives from Buddhist and Jaina literature, which felt little sympathy for the Ājīvikas and presents their doctrines in a biased and often caricatural fashion. Ājīvikism is - as A. L. Basham calls it in the subtitle of his classical study-a vanished Indian religion.

⁶⁷

The sources of information about the religion of the Ājīvikas have been collected and studied in exemplary fashion by A. L. Basham in his book History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas. This book came out in 1951 and has been reprinted several times since then. No study has appeared during the next half century that substantially adds to its conclusions. Basham also wrote the contribution on the Ājīvikas in Mircea Eliade’s Encyclopedia of Religion (New York and London: Macmillan, 1987). It does little beyond summing up the contents of his book. The same is true of his article on Ājīvikas in the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (EncBuddh I, 1961-1965, pp. 331-333). More recently, Gustav Roth (1993) has restudied the Jaina sources on Gosāla Mañkhaliputta and arrived at the conclusion that “the most ancient and the most primitive doctrine of the Ājīvikas which originally existed before the development of a more elaborate system” is to be found in the “doctrine of the six ‘Unavoidables’: Gain and Loss, Happiness and Distress, Life and Death” (p. 420); this may be true, but tells us little about how the original system hangs together. While some authors-most notably Claus Vogel in his The Teachings of the Six Heretics (1970)-have criticized Basham’s exclusive use of the Pāli sources and his neglect of the Tibetan and Chinese translations, they have added but little to our understanding of Ājīvikism. ⁶⁸ A study by Graeme MacQueen which compares the different versions of the Sūtra which is our most important source (1988: 195) arrives at the conclusion “that [the Pāli version], of all the versions, preserved the most ancient state of the text”. ⁶⁹ Basham’s study is therefore reliable after all, despite the fact that he did not take all the source material into consideration.

Does this mean that Basham has said all that can be said about this mysterious vanished religion? Has the last word really been said about it unless some new sources which throw new light on this particular movement are discovered? I do not think so. The remainder of this section will try to interpret the sources known to us in the light of what we know about their cultural and religious contexts. This task has not so far been carried out.

What then did the Ājīvikas do, and what did they believe? To begin with the latter of these two questions, Basham points out that ” [t]he cardinal point of the doctrines of its founder, Makkhali Gosāla, ⁷⁰ was a belief in the all-embracing rule of the principle of order, Niyati, which ultimately controlled every action and all phenomena, and left no room for human volition, which was completely ineffectual. Thus Ājīvikism was founded on an unpromising basis of strict determinism, above which was developed a superstructure of complicated and fanciful cosmology, incorporating an atomic theory which was perhaps the earliest in India, if not in the world.” (pp. 3-4). This is clear, and even though it is not immediately clear why anyone in ancient India should accept such a system of beliefs, it does not by itself present a major problem of understanding.

Such a problem comes up when we consider what the Ājīvikas did. It is clear from the sources that the Ājīvikas practised asceticism of a severe type which often terminated, like that of the Jainas, in voluntary death by starvation. This is peculiar. The Jainas, too, practised asceticism which might culminate in death by starvation, but in their case this made sense, as we have seen. In the case of the Ājīvikas the meaning of death by starvation is by no means obvious. If it makes no difference what one does, why should one choose severe asceticism and death by starvation rather than a more agreeable form of life? Not surprisingly, to some scholars “it seems doubtful whether a doctrine which genuinely advocated the lack of efficacy of individual effort could have formed the basis of a renunciatory path to spiritual liberation”. ⁷¹ And yet we have independent evidence regarding the religion of Makkhali Gosāla in the following statement by the grammarian Patañjali (2nd cent. BCE): mã kṛta karmāṇi mã kṛta karmāni sāntir vaḥ śreyasīty āhāto maskarī parivrājakah “because he said ‘do not perform actions, do not perform actions, peace is better for you’, he is Maskarin the wandering mendicant” (Mahā-bh III p. 96 1. 13-14, on P. 6.1.154). ⁷²

Basham’s study throws no light on this riddle. It points out that the Buddhists, too, were perplexed. Basham tries to make sense of the situation in the following passage (p. 228): “The usual Buddhist criticism of the Ājīvika Niyati doctrine was pragmatic. […] Since there is no possibility of modifying one’s destiny by good works, self-control, or asceticism, all such activity is wasted. The Ājivika doctrines are, in fact, conducive to luxury and licentiousness. This practical criticism of the Ājivika philosophy might have been easily countered by the Ājivikas with the claim that ascetics performed penances and led righteous lives under the compulsion of the same all-embracing principle as determined the lives of sinners, and that they were ascetics because Niyati so directed it. This very obvious argument occurs nowhere in the Buddhist texts, though it was known to the Jaina commentator Śīlānka, who quoted it as one of the arguments used by the niyativädins.” This argument may seem obvious, yet it is unconvincing. It is and remains difficult to believe that the early Ājīvikas engaged in painful asceticism for no other reason than that they thought that fate obliged them to do so. Even if this position turns out to be correct, it remains unintelligible without additional information as to its intellectual context.

Ājīvikism and Jainism appear to have been very close to each other in the early days. Indeed, early Jaina texts present the founder of Ājīvikism, Makkhali Gosāla, as a pupil of Mahāvīra. Gosāla subsequently broke away from Mahāvīra, but it seems a priori not unlikely that an understanding of the fundamental doctrines and practices of early Jainism will help us to reach a better understanding of Ājīvikism. Our first task therefore is to determine in what essential respects Jainism and Ājīvikism differed from each other.

Early Jaina asceticism was an attempt to stop activity and to put an end to karmic traces acquired earlier, as we have seen. It was a direct response to the challenge posed by the doctrine of karma, interpreted in a literal way: acts-i.e. physical and mental acts-produce results in this or a next life. Physical and mental immobility discards the traces left by earlier acts, and purifies the soul from all acts, with total liberation as ultimate outcome. It is in this way possible to see the “logic” (if this is an appropriate term in this context) behind the tendency of Jaina ascetics to practise immobility, in the extreme case until death. This practice has a double objective: it destroys the traces of earlier deeds, and it binds no new karma. It is also clear that Jainism accepted the doctrine of karma in a form in which bodily and mental movement play a central role. Bodily and mental movements lead to results, and in order to avoid those results all movement has to be halted.

Let us now turn to some of the textual passages that inform us about the doctrine of the Ājīvikas. Basham’s locus classicus is the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhist Dīgha Nikāya. In this sermon the views of the so-called six heretics are recorded. One of these is Niganṭha Nātaputta, who is the same as Mahāvīra, the last Jaina tīrthankara who was a contemporary of the Buddha. His views should correspond at least to some extent with what we know about early Jainism, but the correspondence is not immediately obvious. Basham comments by saying (p. 17): “The teaching ascribed to Niganṭha Nātaputta is very obscure, but, as Jacobi has pointed out, while it is not an accurate description of the Jaina creed it contains nothing alien to it.” ⁷³ This may be a somewhat optimistic characterization of the situation, ⁷⁴ yet it is clear that the teaching attributed to the Jaina leader is recognizably Jaina. We may be well advised to take a similar stance with regard to the teachings supposedly characterizing Äj̈vikism: These teachings may not be an accurate description of the Ājīvika creed, but they may contain little that is alien to it.

The following is, in Basham’s paraphrase (pp. 13-14), the teaching attributed to Makkhali Gosāla: ⁷⁵

There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings; they become sinful without cause or basis. Neither is there cause or basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess. ⁷⁶ All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance, and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six classes (of existence).

There are 1,400,000 chief uterine births, 6,000 and 600; 500 karmas, 5 karmas, 3 karmas, a karma, and half a karma; 62 paths; 62 lesser kalpas; 6 classes (of human existence); 8 stages of man; 4,900 means of livelihood (?); ⁷⁷ 4,900 ascetics; 4,900 dwellings of nägas; 2,000 faculties; 3,000 purgatories; 36 places covered with dust (?); 7 sentient births; 7 insentient births; 7 births from knots (?); 7 gods; 7 men; 7 pisāca (births?); 7 lakes; 7 knots (?), and 700; 7 precipices, and 700; 7 dreams, and 700 ; and 8,400,000 great kalpas through which fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow. There is no question of bringing unripe karma to fruition, nor of exhausting karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or by chastity. That cannot be done. Samsāra is measured as with a bushel, with its joy and sorrow and its appointed end. ⁷⁸ It can neither be lessened nor increased, nor is there any excess of deficiency of it. Just as a ball of thread will, when thrown, unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.

Beside this passage from Buddhist literature, there is a passage in the Śvetāmbara Jaina canon that informs us about the teachings of Gosāla. It occurs in the Viyāhapannatti (= Bhagavatī) and reads as follows: ⁷⁹

All those who have reached or are reaching or will reach salvation must finish in order 8,400,000 mahākappas, seven divine births, seven groups, seven sentient births, seven ‘abandonments of transmigration’ (paūttaparihāra), 500,000 kammas, and 60,000 and 600 and the three parts of kamma. Then, being saved, awakened, set free, and reaching nirvāna they have made or are making or will make an end of all sorrow.

A comparison of these two passages leads Basham to the undoubtedly correct conclusion (p. 219): “The close similarity shows that both passages are garbled borrowings from a common source.” It also constitutes an important argument to look upon the passage in the Pāli Sāmaññaphala Sutta as providing historical information about the Ājīvikas, even though there appear to be no precise parallels in Chinese and Tibetan. ⁸⁰

An analysis of these two passages induces Basham to conclude that Gosāla opposed the doctrine of free will. All and sundry are completely subject to the one principle which determines all things. He cites here once again the following words from the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (p. 224-225): “Just as a ball of thread when thrown will unwind to its full length, so fool and wise alike will take their course, and make an end of sorrow.” However, according to Basham “[t]his absolute determinism did not preclude a belief in karma, but for Makkhali Gosāla the doctrine had lost its moral force. Karma was unaffected by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penances, or by chastity, but it was not denied. The path of transmigration was rigidly laid out, and every soul was fated to run the same course through a period of 8,400,000 mahākalpas.” He cites in this connection another portion of the passage from the Sāmaññaphala Sutta: “There is no question of bringing unripe karma to fruition, nor of exhausting karma already ripened, by virtuous conduct, by vows, by penance, or by chastity. That cannot be done.”

A closer consideration of this portion suggests that Basham may have overstated his case. The portion speaks of “bringing unripe karma to fruition” and of “exhausting karma already ripened”. We have seen that this is precisely what the Jainas tried to do. Asceticism in Jainism had a double function, as we have seen: “the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions”. Makkhali Gosāla, we now learn, maintains that the former of these two is impossible. Our two passages do not contradict the view that karma determines the future condition of an individual. They, or at any rate the first one of them, reject the possibility that this process can be precipitated, but this may mean that karmic retribution takes its time, and that virtuous conduct, vows, penance, and chastity do not hasten the process. ⁸¹

In this way an interesting contrast between Ājīvikism and Jainism becomes visible. The Jaina ascetic, by practising immobility, aspired to bring about a twofold effect: the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions. His inactivity was not only meant to avoid producing karmic effects in the future, but also to destroy actions carried out in the past. The Ājivika, on the other hand, denied that present inactivity can destroy actions carried out in the past. For him these former actions will carry fruit whatever one does. However, there is no reason to believe that he rejected the possibility of non-performance of new actions. ⁸² We may therefore formulate the hypothesis that both Jainism and Ājīvikism interpreted the doctrine of karma in the same way, believing that bodily and mental movements were responsible for rebirth. But whereas the Jainas believed that motionlessness might destroy past karma, the Ājivikas did not accept this.

This does not yet solve all the problems surrounding Ājīvikism. The central question remains unanswered: why did the Ājīvikas adhere to their strict determinism? It is here that the preceding section on the Bhagavadgītā proves helpful. Let us recall the main points.

We have seen that there were people in ancient India who were neither Buddhists nor Jainas, but who shared with the Jainas the conviction that the doctrine of karma concerns physical and mental acts; these people had nonetheless found another way to reach liberation, viz., insight into the true nature of the self. One aspect of this solution is not very often addressed in the earliest texts, but must have confronted everyone who took this solution seriously. Knowing the true nature of one’s self means: no longer identifying with the activities of body and mind. What happens at that moment to the activities of body and mind? Classical Sāṃkhya-one of the Brahmanical philosophies just referred to-offers the following answer: the material world will stop being active once the self withdraws itself, just as a dancer stops dancing when the spectators lose interest. This does not however provide much help to those who look for practical guidance after obtaining the desired insight.

There is reason to believe that the Ājīvikas shared certain notions with the author(s) of the Bhagavadgītā, whose views we studied above. Both, it appears, believed that bodies can act according to their own natures. For the author of the Bhagavadgītā this only happens when people realize their true identity; the activity they engage in will then be in accordance with their caste. The Ājīvikas may not have believed that any special insight was called for. The real self being in any case inactive, bodies will always act according to their natures, which means that they will pass through all the stages specified in the passages studied earlier, and will reach, after 8,400,000 great kalpas, the stage where all karma has run its course.

The reason to think that the Ājīvikas thought so is the following enigmatic passage, which is part of the passage from the Sāmaññaphala Sutta cited earlier: ⁸³ “There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess.” The authenticity of this passage is confirmed by its parallel in the Saṅhabhedavastu. ⁸⁴

This passage stands out in comparison to its surroundings, for it does not, unlike its surroundings, speak about living beings (Skt. sattva; Pāli satta) but about the self (Skt. ātman, Pāli atta; beside the other: para) and the person (Skt. purusa, Pāli purisa). Basham’s translation may not draw sufficient attention to this change of terminology, which may yet be vital. Ātman and purusa are precisely the terms used by those schools and thinkers (such as Sāṃkhya) which maintain that the self does not act, and that activity belongs to material nature. ⁸⁵ What the present passage states is precisely this, that the self does not act. The following translation makes this clearer: “There is no deed performed either by [one’s own] self or by [the self] of others, no action belonging to the purusa, no strength, no courage [belonging to the purusa], no endurance connected with the purusa or prowess connected with the purusa.” ⁸⁶

It cannot be denied that the choice of terminology of the present passage is suggestive. It also supports the interpretation proposed here. According to the Ājīvikas, the real self does not act. Activity belongs to the material world, which includes body and mind. According to the Bhagavadgītā, a body (and mind) left to its own devices follows its nature, which is the rules of the caste into which one is born. This very Brahmanical and caste-oriented way of looking at the nature of the material world was not shared by the Ājīvikas, who had different ideas about this issue. According to them, a body that is left to its own devices - i.e., for them, every body-will make its owner pass through a large number of mahākalpas, specified in the passages examined above.

The comparison with the Bhagavadgītā may explain another piece of information about the Ājīvikas as well. Pūraṇa Kassapa, another heretic whose views are described in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, appears to have been a teacher who was held in respect by the Ājīvikas. ⁸⁷ His views, as presented in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta and paraphrased by Basham, are as follows: ⁸⁸

He who performs an act or causes an act to be performed […] he who destroys life, the thief, the housebreaker, the plunderer […] the highway robber, the adulterer and the liar […] commit no sin. Even if with a razor-sharp discus a man reduce all the life on earth to a single heap of flesh, he commits no sin […] If he come down the south bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming, and torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed, or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him. Likewise if a man go down the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms and sacrificing, and causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence, and honesty is derived neither merit, nor the approach of merit.

It is more than probable that Pūraṇa’s position is not presented here in the most favourable light. Moreover, we have seen that the Jainas did not shy away from accusing the Buddhists of being able to eat babies without incurring sin. The Jainas had a point, which they however exaggerated beyond all reasonable proportions. It makes sense to assume that the Buddhist texts that describe the position of Pūraṇa Kassapa do the same. They exaggerate beyond reasonable proportion a position, or the consequences of a position, which did, in fact, belong, in this or in a closely similar form, to Pūraṇa Kassapa, and therefore probably to the Ājīvikas.

Let us now draw the Bhagavadgītā into the picture. Kṛ̣̣na encourages Arjuna not to avoid battle and the killing of his relatives, and says: ⁸⁹ “He who thinks of him (i.e., the soul inhabiting the body) as killer, he who deems him killed, both of these possess no knowledge; he does not kill and is not killed. Never is he born or does he die; he has not come to be, nor will he come to be; unborn, permanent, eternal, ancient, he is not killed when the body is killed.” Here we meet with a statement - not this time from a critic but from the author of the Bhagavadgītā himself-to the effect that killing is allowed in certain circumstances, or more appropriately, that killing has no karmic consequences-i.e., it is no sin-in Arjuna’s situation.

Both Ājīvikism and the Bhagavadgītā, then, allow for the possibility that the body, when left to its own devices, will kill its fellow human beings. For both there is nothing wrong with this; the Bhagavadgītā goes to the extent of warning Arjuna not to try to stop this process. Pūraṇa may have thought that there was no way this process could be stopped. The parallelism appears to go further. The Bhagavadgītā, as we have seen, denies that actions are carried out by the self; they “are, all of them, undertaken by the gunas of Original Nature (prakṛti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the doer’”. The account of Pūraṇa is, similarly, resumed in the one word akiriya “non-action”. ⁹⁰

What is the place of asceticism in the Ājīvika vision of the world? If our reflections so far are correct, the answer must now be evident. Asceticism cannot destroy the traces of acts committed in previous lives, or even earlier in the present life. But asceticism in Jainism had a double function: “the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions”. Annihilating former actions is not recognized as possible by the Ājīvikas, but non-performing new actions is possible. It is even essential at the end of the long series of lives during which, at last, all former actions have borne fruit. The Ājīvika takes longer, much much longer, than his Jaina confrere to annihilate former actions, because he does not recognize asceticism as a means to accomplish this. He has to live through 8’400’000 great kalpas to bring this about. But at the end he too, like the Jaina monk, has to abstain from further activity. Like the Jaina ascetic who is close to his goal, also the Äjīvika who is close to it must starve himself to death, without doing anything whatsoever.

The above considerations, it is hoped, have made Ājīvika doctrine somewhat more comprehensible in its historical context than it has been so far. Basham’s excellent study had left us with the idea that a fatalistic doctrine, whose links with other contemporary doctrines and with the ascetic practices of the Ājīvikas themselves remained unclear, had somehow been able to establish itself as the core of a new religion. Basham may not be blamed for this, for the textual evidence is incomplete, biased, and far from perfect. Yet it is to be kept in mind that religious currents do not normally crystallize around just any idea. More often than not religious doctrine-especially the doctrines of “new religions”-shares features with other contemporary religious currents, or addresses issues that are somehow felt to be important in the society concerned. Ājīvikism, it now appears, shared a concern for the doctrine of karma with the other religious currents known to have existed in its time: Buddhism, Jainism, and even some of the contemporary developments of Vedic religion. From among these religious currents it was closest by far to Jainism, which is hardly remarkable in view of the fact that the Jaina tradition presents Makkhali Gosāla as a one-time pupil of Mahāvīra. The most important difference between Ājīvikism and Jainism appears to have been the Ājīvikas view that asceticism cannot annihilate former karma. The automatic consequence of this position is that the Ājīvikas, in order to reach liberation, will have to wait for former karma to run its own course. This takes long, but not forever: the Ājīvikas somehow came up with a total duration of 8’400’000 great kalpas. Once arrived at the end of this period, the Ājīvikas, like their Jaina counterparts, will have to engage in asceticism, more precisely: in the non-performing of new actions. They, like the Jaina ascetics, will choose a way of dying that is as inactive as possible: the Jainas through starvation, the Ājīvikas, it appears, through thirst.

Linked to this particular notion as to how liberation can be attained, the Ājīvikas appear to have believed in the inactive nature of the self. This, if true, would point to a resemblance between the main message of the Bhagavadgītā and the doctrine of the Ājīvikas. Both would then recognize in each individual a self that does not act, and a bodily part (which includes the mind) that does act. Knowing that one’s self is essentially different from one’s body induces people to let the body follow its own nature; this own nature of the body is in the Bhagavadgītā one’s svadharma, one’s caste duties, and for the Ājīvikas something else, most probably expressed in the long list of incarnations one has to pass through.

The main reason for believing that the self, for the Ājīvikas, was by its nature inactive, is the phrase preserved in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta describing their position: “There is no deed performed either by [one’s own] self or by [the self] of others, no action belonging to the purusa, no strength, no courage [belonging to the purusa], no endurance connected with the purusa or prowess connected with the purusa.” We have seen that there is some reason to think that earliest Jainism, too, may have had a similar conception of the self. Classical, i.e. later, Jainism has a different conception of the soul, as is well known. This classical conception, however, appears to have developed at a later time. ⁹¹

It will be clear from what precedes, that the Bhagavadgītā, in spite of its undoubted originality, has not invented all its new ideas from scratch. The idea, in particular, that there is a behaviour that is proper to the person, a behaviour which he will carry out if not interfered with, may have been derived from Ājivikism or related movements. We will see in a subsequent chapter that there is reason to think that Ājīvikism exerted an influence on other parts of the Mahābhārata as well. At this point it is important to remain aware of a vital difference between Ājīvikism and the Bhagavadgītā: in the former the sequence of karmic retributions could not be interfered with, in the latter such interference was a temptation to which wise people should resist.

Buddhism

Buddhism constitutes another answer to the problem of rebirth and karmic retribution. It is not however necessary to say much about it here, for there is good reason to think that the Buddhist path tells us relatively little about the culture of Greater Magadha. This reason lies primarily in the fact that Buddhism presents not only an altogether different solution, but has changed the problem to begin with. All the movements we have so far considered start from the assumption that all acts - whether good, bad or neutral, whether carried out intentionally or otherwise-have karmic consequences. This explains how the suppression of all acts, as in Jainism, or the realization that one’s self never acts, can be thought of as providing a solution. Early Buddhism rejects both these solutions and the problem they are supposed to solve along with them. No, excessive asceticism as exemplified by the Jainas does not lead to liberation. And no, knowledge of the self has no liberating effect. These two methods are useless because the real problem does not lie with one’s acts as such, but with the driving force behind those acts. The term often used in this context is ‘thirst’ (tr3nā). Liberation is obtained when this driving force is eliminated. This requires a psychological process, not just immobilization of body and mind, or knowledge of the true nature of the self. The Buddhist texts describe this psychological process, but in doing so they follow a course which is essentially different from the other ones available in their time. They emphasize that the Buddha taught an altogether new path, and we have no reason to doubt that they were right. It follows that an analysis of the Buddhist method teaches us little about the ideology that prevailed in Greater Magadha before Buddhism appeared on the scene. ⁹²

Conclusions

The various responses which were proposed to the problem of rebirth and karmic retribution show that all the ones considered, with the sole exception of Buddhism, share a set of beliefs which we call the fundamental ideology of the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha. The fact that this ideology manifests itself in several otherwise distinct movements allows us to infer that these movements had inherited it from an earlier period. This in its turn entitles us to ascribe this ideology to the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha which existed prior to the appearance of Jainism, Buddhism, and the other currents which we have considered.

This ideology, which presumably existed at least for a while simultaneously with Vedic culture, though different from it, can be characterized in few words. The belief in rebirth and karmic retribution was central to it. Perhaps the emphasis should here be put on karmic retribution rather than on rebirth, for the different methods considered, all of them meant to put an end to rebirth and karmic retribution, are variants of one sole theme: activity has to be stopped. This shows the central importance of the belief in karmic retribution, which cannot be detached from the belief in rebirth in this culture. We further learn from it that karmic retribution originally followed all deeds, not just morally good and bad ones. Only thus could it make sense to abstain from all activity, or to realize that the core of one’s being is totally inactive.

This fundamental ideology was taken over, with few discernible variations, by all religious movements that we have considered in this chapter, with the exception of Buddhism. ⁹³ Buddhism, too, started from a belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, to be sure, but this was not quite the same as the corresponding belief in the other currents. Karmic retribution was here limited to deeds that are the result of desire or intention. Buddhism distinguished itself in this respect from the other religious currents that had originated in Greater Magadha. As a result, its method for obtaining liberation was different, too.

The deviant interpretation of karmic retribution in early Buddhism should not confuse us. The fact that the vicissitudes of history have increased the number of followers of Buddhism to the extent that there are nowadays far more Buddhists than Jainas and Ājīvikas, does not tell us anything about the situation several centuries before the Common Era. Indeed, we will learn in a later chapter that during the early centuries Buddhists remained unnoticed by outside observers who nevertheless perceived with clarity the difference between some of the competing methods. ⁹⁴

CHAPTER I.2 - OTHER FEATURES

Attempts will be made in this chapter to find further features of what must have been the culture of Greater Magadha. The inhabitants of Greater Magadha, it may be recalled, were not all ascetics and renouncers. On the contrary, the ascetics and renouncers can only have constituted a small minority of this society. It also had other concerns beside that of putting an end to karmic retribution. The vicissitudes of history have lent much emphasis to its beliefs about human fate after death, but this should not mislead us into thinking that this was all these people were concerned about. Many other features of this society may be forever lost to us, or at present unrecoverable. Nevertheless, some of its features may be recovered. This chapter will briefly present four features which appear, with some degree of likelihood, to have characterized Greater Magadha. It should however be kept in mind that the limited testimony at our disposal does not allow us to reach certainty in this matter.

Funerary practices

The only early source that gives us direct evidence about the funerary practices current among the inhabitants of Greater Magadha is the passage from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa which we discussed in the introduction. All we learn from this passage is that the sepulchral mounds of these people were round (parimandala). We know a great deal about the treatment which the mortal remains of respected persons received among the cultural heirs of these early inhabitants, especially among the Buddhists. Since these later manifestations were not simple imitations of the original practices, and underwent important modifications in the course of time, they add little of value for the investigation of the culture of Greater Magadha, even though they do yield information about the interaction between Brahmanism and Buddhism in particular. They will not be dealt with in this book. ⁹⁵

Medicine

There are reasons to think that there were differences in the practice of medicine between the Vedic cultural area and Greater Magadha. The material which testifies to this difference has been studied by Kenneth G. Zysk (1988, 1990, 1991), whom we will follow in many respects. Āyurveda, Zysk argues, does not have its roots in Vedic medical practices. ⁹⁶ Quite on the contrary, for information about the early history of Āyurveda one has to look elsewhere, in the early surviving texts of Buddhism and Jainism, i.e., of the religions that arose in Greater Magadha. Zysk concentrates on the texts of the Pāli Tipitaka, and finds there many striking parallels to classical Āyurvedic literature.

Vedic medical practices and those originally from Greater Magadha coexisted for a while. Evidence for this is found in two Greek passages preserved by the historian and geographer Strabo. The first one is a well-known account by Megasthenes. It describes one kind of Brahmanical ascetic, and two kinds of Śramaṇas. We will see in a later chapter that these three kinds of ascetics agree in many details with a similar division found in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra. The second kind of Śramaṇa is described as surviving by begging, and as remaining motionless for long periods of time. Interestingly, Śramanas of this kind are here called ‘physicians’ (iatrikol). The passage further specifies (I use Zysk’s translation, p. 28): “and [he says that] they are able to bring about multiple offspring, male offspring and female offspring, through the art of preparing and using drugs; but they accomplish healing through grains for the most part, not through drugs; and of the drugs [he says that] the most highly esteemed are the ointments and the plasters”. ⁹⁷

Zysk’s comments on this passage are worth quoting (p. 28-29): “The śramanic healers are said to effect their cures mostly through grain foods (sitia), and when they employ drugs (phärmaka), the most esteemed are ointments (epikhrista) and poultices (katapläsmata). Inherent in this distinction is the internal dietary use of foods and the external application of drugs, both of which are fundamental to the rational therapy (yukticyapāśraya) of Āyurvedic medicine. The former helps to sustain and regulate the internal functions of the human organism by restoring a balance to the bodily elements, while the latter eradicates afflictions located on the body’s surface. Medical passages contained both in the Buddhist monastic code (Vinaya) and in the early Āyurvedic treatises are replete with illustrations of the medicinal use of foods and the therapeutic application of remedies such as ointments and poultices.”

Zysk is also no doubt right when he states (p. 28): “The passage clearly points to a connection between the physicians […] and the śramanas […], recognizing the former as a subgroup of the latter.” One may have doubts as to whether healers in the time of Megasthenes were really a subgroup of the Śramanas, and whether they really all survived by begging, and remained motionless for long periods of time. Perhaps Megasthenes’ testimony is not reliable in all these details. It must however be admitted that these kinds of healers are said to be connected (in one way or another) with the Śramanas.

More interesting for our present purposes is another passage from Strabo’s Geography (15.1.70). The following translation is based on the one proposed by Zysk, with modifications: ⁹⁸

In classifying philosophers, [the writers on India] set the Pramnai (i.e., śramanas) in opposition to the Brachmanes (i.e., Brahmins). [The Pramnai] are captious and fond of cross-questioning; and [they say that] the Brachmanes practice natural philosophy and astronomy, but they are derided by the Pramnai as charlatans and fools. And [they say that] some [philosophers] are called mountain dwelling, others naked, and others urban and neighbouring, and [the] mountain-dwelling [philosophers] use (i.e., wear) hides of deer and have leather pouches, full of roots and drugs, claiming to practice medicine with sorcery, spells, and amulets.

The mountain-dwelling philosophers mentioned in this passage are clearly Brahmins, as shown by the fact that they wear hides of deer. Deer skins are exactly what, according to Megasthenes, Brahmins use. We may assume that our Greek authors here refer to the antelopeskin, which is a special feature of Vedic ascetics. ⁹⁹ The immediately following sentences, not quoted by Zysk, confirm that Brahmins are not excluded in this passage. Indeed, one gets the impression that specific features of certain groups are to some extent confused; some of these features, at any rate, are typically Brahmanical. We read, for example, in connection with the naked [philosophers]: ¹⁰⁰ “Women live in their society without sexual commerce.” This is typical for the Vedic vānaprastha, who withdraws with his wife into the forest. The Vedic vānaprastha needs a wife in order to fulfil his sacrificial obligations. ¹⁰¹ About the so-called ‘urban’ [philosophers] we read (15.1.71) that some live “out in the country, and go clad in the skins of fawns or antelopes”. ¹⁰² Again the antelope skin, a Brahmanical feature mentioned earlier. If, moreover, the statement to the effect “that they all wear long hair and long beards, and that they braid their hair and surround it with a head-band” ¹⁰³ is made with regard to the same ‘urban’ philosophers, we undoubtedly have here a reference to the matted hair (jatā) that characterizes Brahmins rather than a reference to the Śramanas, who are often described as bald (munda).

The healing of these Brahmins as described in the above passage, Zysk points out (p. 32), ¹⁰⁴ “is magico-religious, using sorcery (goêteia), spells (epōidaī), and amulets (periáptai), and reminiscent of the early Vedic medical tradition reflected in the Atharvaveda. This form of healing is, on the whole, contrary to the empirical and rational medicine of the early Buddhist and Āyurvedic literature, in which references to magical techniques are rare.” The second passage from Strabo’s Geography suggests, therefore, that also Brahmanical ascetics were known to offer their services as healers, but that they, contrary to the non-Vedic ascetics, practised a different kind of healing: the kind of healing namely which we also find in Vedic texts.

We may, in view of the above, agree with Zysk that some, perhaps many, ascetics in ancient India also worked as healers. To this we can add that Vedic ascetics practised Vedic healing, and that nonVedic ascetics practised non-Vedic healing. This, in its turn, can be explained by the fact that the social background of the healers concerned determined the type of healing they would practise. And this shows that there were two traditions of healing which existed side by side, originally belonging to two different cultures, even to different geographical areas.

How were these two traditions of medicine distinct from each other? Zysk characterizes the Vedic tradition of healing as “magicoreligious”, the non-Vedic tradition as “empirico-rational”. 104 “Vedic medicine,” he points out on p. 15, “was fundamentally a system of healing based on magic. Disease was believed to be produced by demonic or malevolent forces when they attacked and entered the bodies of their victims, causing the manifestation of morbid bodily conditions. These assaults were occasioned by the breach of certain taboos, by imprecations against the gods, or by witchcraft and sorcery.” ¹⁰⁵ With regard to the non-Vedic tradition of medicine Zysk has the following to say (p. 29-30): “Indian medical theoreticians placed paramount emphasis on direct observation as the proper means to know everything about mankind. […] Complete knowledge of humans and their relationship to their environment included an understanding of the causes of mankind’s ailments. Indian medicine’s inherent philosophical orientation led to theories about causes for mankind’s afflictions. Although its exact origin cannot be determined, the etiology particular to Indian medicine is the three-humour (tridosa) theory. Nearly all the maladies plaguing humans are explained by means of three ‘peccant’ humours, or dosas-wind, bile, and phlegm-either singly or in combination. The dosas are really specific waste products of digested food, occurring in quantities greater or lesser than need to maintain normal health. They act as vitiators by disrupting the normal balance of the bodily elements (dhātus), which in turn are modifications of the five basic elements (earth, air, fire, water, and ether) found in all of nature, and the resulting disequilibrium of the bodily elements produce disease. Their empirical orientation also led the medical theoreticians to include environmental factors, daily regimen, and external factors in their overall consideration of the causes of diseases.” The threehumour etiology is not known to the Vedic corpus, ¹⁰⁶ but it is known to the Pāli canon. Zysk refers in this connection to some passages in which the Buddha proclaims that the cause of mankind’s suffering is eightfold; among the eight items we find bile (pitta), phlegm (semha), wind (vāta) and their combination (sannipāta). ¹⁰⁷ Elsewhere in the Pāli canon, “a physician (tikicchaka) is known as one who administers purges and emetics for checking illnesses that arise from bile, phlegm, and wind.” ¹⁰⁸

These observations about the early history of Indian medicine confirm our thesis that there existed, during the late-Vedic period, (at least) two segments of society, or rather, two societies, which independently preserved radically different traditions and approaches to reality. What is more, we are in a position to identify these two societies: they are (the descendants of) Vedic society ¹⁰⁹ and the society of Greater Magadha, respectively. The approach to medicine in Vedic society was, in Zysk’s terminology, “magico-religious”, that in Greater Magadha “empirico-rational”. ¹¹⁰

Kapila

All the information that can be obtained about the culture of Greater Magadha has to be extracted from a variety of usually later sources. This procedure (the only one available) runs the risk of creating an incomplete and partially distorted picture of that culture. The features that have been discussed so far are all rather intellectual, even if one hesitates to borrow Zysk’s expression “empirico-rational”. Yet the way in which the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution was conceptualized and the methods invented to bring the cycle of rebirths to an end are straightforward and far removed from the kind of thought that finds expression in late-Vedic literature. This may in part be due to the fact that the intellectual ambiance of Greater Magadha and those who continued its traditions was very different from that found among Vedic Brahmins. More will be said about this in chapters III. 5 and Part IV. It is nevertheless difficult to believe that an important section of the population of Greater Magadha was exclusively interested in the issues identified so far, without exhibiting any more typically “religious” behaviour. Did the inhabitants of this region not know or recognize any gods? Did they not worship gods or other supernatural beings? How should we imagine the spiritual life to have been of those who did not become ascetics?

Most of these questions are likely to remain unanswered. It is probable that many beliefs and practices current in Greater Magadha have survived in one form or another in later Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism; unfortunately we have no certain criterion to identify these later beliefs and practices. However, a case can be made for the claim that the name and character of one god who was recognized as such by at least part of the population of Greater Magadha has survived. This god is Kapila. Let us consider the evidence.

Kapila is often presented as a representative of the asceticism we associate with Greater Magadha. Toward the end of the section we will examine a passage in which his type of asceticism is explicitly contrasted with another type of asceticism, viz., that of Vedic ascetics.

Kapila is mentioned in an intriguing passage of the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra. This Sūtra, like other early Dharma Sūtras, enumerates and then rejects the four āsramas. Immediately after doing so, the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra continues (2.11.28, in Bühler’s translation): “With reference to this matter they quote also (the following passage): ‘There was, forsooth, an Asura, Kapila by name, the son of Prahlāda. Striving with the gods, he made these divisions. A wise man should not take heed of them.” ¹¹¹ Two features of this passage attract attention: (i) the demonic nature of the sage Kapila; and (ii) the opposition here expressed between the Vedic tradition and that associated with Kapila.

(i) Kapila is, of course, primarily known as the sage who reputedly created the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. In the classical Sāṃkhya texts he is more than just a sage; he is an incarnation of God (tśvara). The Yuktidīpikā describes him as tśvaramaharsi ‘great seer who is [an incorporation of] God’ (Bronkhorst, 1983a: 153). The Mātharavṛtti speaks of “the great seer called Kapila, an incarnation of the exalted old Self, the son of Prajāpati Kardama” (id. p. 156). God is also “the light of Kapila” (id. p. 157). Yoga sūtras 1.24-25, moreover, describe God, who is a special kind of self, as possessing the germ of Kapila, here referred to as ‘the omniscient one’; in other words, God is the self of Kapila, and Kapila an incarnation of God. This interpretation is supported by the Yoga Bhāṣya (Bronkhorst, 1985a: 194 f.). The commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā which has only survived in Paramārtha’s Chinese translation tells us, under kārikā 1, that Kapila was ‘born from heaven’ and ‘endowed with self-existence’. ¹¹² According to the Yuktidīpikā, again, he-i.e., the paramarṣi-who gave names to things (ed. Pandeya p. 5 1. 9-10; ed. Wezler and Motegi p. 7 1. 23-24), is the first-born (viśvāgraja; ed. Pandeya p. 6 1. 1; ed. Wezler and Motegi p. 8 1. 19-20). Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattvavaiśāradī on Yoga sūtra 1.25, finally, calls Kapila an avatāra of Viṣnu, and adds that Kapila is identical with the self-existent Hiraṇyagarbha, and with God (tśvara). Kapila’s divine nature may therefore be taken as established for classical Sāṃkhya.

An inspection of the earlier texts shows that Kapila was already considered divine in the pre-classical period. Consider, to begin with, Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita 12.20-21. Verse 20 introduces the ‘field- knower’ (ksetrajña) and states (20cd): “Those who think about the self call the self ksetrajña”. Verse 21 then continues:

saśisyah kapilaś ceha pratibuddha ¹¹³ iti smṛtih |
saputro ‘pratibuddhas tu prajāpatir ihocyate ||

This must mean:

[This ksetrajña] when having students and being Kapila is remembered in this world as the enlightened one. But when having sons and not being enlightened it is in this world called Prajāpati.

Clearly Kapila is, if anything, more elevated than Prajāpati. ¹¹⁴

The Mahābhārata contains numerous references to Kapila, the supreme seer (paramarsi). He is identified with Prajāpati (12.211.9) and with Vāsudeva (3.106.2); he is one of the mind-born sons of Brahman (12.327.64); or he is called deva ‘god’, identical with Śakradhanu, son of the sun (5.107.17). Both Nārāyana and Kṛ̣̣na say of themselves that the Sāṃkhya masters call them “Kapila, possessor of wisdom, residing in the sun, eternal” (12.326.64; 330.30; see also 12.43.12). Śiva is Sanatkumāra for the Yogins, Kapila for the Sāṃkhyas (13.14.159). As propounder of Sāṃkhya, Kapila is mentioned beside Hiraṇyagarbha, who propounded Yoga (Mhbh 12.337.60; 326.64.65; 330.30-31).

Perhaps the earliest reference to ‘the seer Kapila’ occurs in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 5.2. Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation ‘tawny, red’ to ‘Kapila’, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiraṇyagarbha and linked to Rudra. ¹¹⁵ This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.

The passage of the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra under consideration calls Kapila an Asura, i.e., a demon. Recall that Asuras are not in principle subordinated to the gods; they are, on the contrary, often engaged in battles with the gods, battles which, it is true, the gods normally win. The fact that Kapila appears here as an Asura is revealing. It suggests that the author of our passage of the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra knew Kapila as a divine being, but one who was not, in his opinion, connected with orthodox Vedism. We have seen in an earlier chapter that the inhabitants of Greater Magadha were referred to as demonic people, followers of Asuras, in a Vedic text.

Kapila’s characterization as ‘son of Prahlāda’ (prāhlādi) is also interesting. Prahlāda is, in the earliest texts (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, Purāṇapañcalakṣaṇa, Mahābhārata) the king of the Asuras (Hacker, 1959: 14 f.). This characterization, though unknown elsewhere in connection with Kapila, confirms that the latter is here indeed looked upon as an Asura. But Prahlāda is also, in a number of passages of the Mahābhārata, a teacher of wisdom, who possesses omniscience (Hacker, p. 18 f.). This suggests that his link with Kapila may have more than superficial significance. For Kapila, too, is described as possessor of wisdom, of omniscience, as we have seen.

Kapila is nowhere else, to my knowledge, explicitly described as a demon. ¹¹⁶ Yet some features of early literature are suggestive in this connection. Consider first the role of Kapila in the story of Sagara and his sons (Mhbh 3.104-106), ¹¹⁷ as retold by Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty (1980: 220 f.):

King Sagara had two wives. In order to obtain sons, he performed asceticism […]; then, by the favor of Śiva he obtained sixty thousand sons from one wife and one son […] from the other. After some time, the king performed a horse sacrifice; as the horse wandered over the earth, protected by the king’s sons, it reached the ocean, and there it disappeared. The king sent his sixty thousand sons to search for the horse; they dug with spades in the earth, destroying many living creatures, digging out the ocean that is the abode of sea demons. They reached down into Hell, and there they saw the horse wandering about, and they saw the sage Kapila haloed in flames, blazing with ascetic power. The sons were angry and behaved disrespectfully to Kapila; infuriated, he released a flame from his eye and burnt all the sons to ashes. Then [Sagara’s grandson] Aṃśuman came and propitiated Kapila […]

One might wonder why Kapila practises his asceticism in Hell of all places. Even more telling may be that many elements of the above myth, as Doniger O’Flaherty points out, recur in the story of Dhundhu (Mhbh 3.193-195) who, though playing a role similar to that of Kapila, is an Asura. I quote again from Doniger O’Flaherty (1980: 222; with modifications):

King Bṛhadaśva had a son called Kuvalāśva, who in his turn had 21,000 sons. When the old king handed over his throne to Kuvalāśva and entered the forest, he met the sage Uttanka, who told him that a demon named Dhundhu was performing asceticism there by his hermitage, in the sands of the ocean, burning like the doomsday fire, with flames issuing from his mouth, causing the waters to flow about him in a whirlpool. Bṛhadaśva asked Kuvalāśva to subdue the demon; his sons dug down into the sand, but Dhundhu appeared from the ocean, breathing fire, and he burnt them all with his power of asceticism. Then Kuvalāśva drank up the watery flood, quenched the fire with water, and killed the demon Dhundhu, burning him up.

The parallelism between Dhundhu and Kapila is emphasized by the Mahābhārata itself: “Dhundhu burnt the sons of Bṛhadaśva with the fire from his mouth, just as Kapila had burnt the sons of Sagara.” ¹¹⁸

In conclusion it may be observed that Kapila’s frequent association with Āsuri, often presented as his pupil, might be significant: Āsuri means ‘son of an Asura’.

(ii) The opposition between Kapila and the Vedic tradition finds expression in an interesting passage of the Mahābhārata (12.260262) which records a discussion between Kapila and the seer (ṛṣi) Syūmaraśmi. The passage is meant to show that both the life of a householder and that of the renouncer (tyāga) result in great fruit and are both authoritative (260.2-4). ¹¹⁹ Syūmaraśmi sings the glory of the Vedic way of life, with heavy emphasis on the sacrifice. He criticizes the “cessation of effort called pravrajyā” of the lazy (alasa) sages who are without faith and wisdom, devoid of subtle vision (261.10). He rejects the possibility of liberation (mokṣa), pointing out that mortal beings should rather pay off their debts towards the manes, the gods, and the twice-born (261.15). He reminds Kapila of the central position of the Brahmin; the Brahmin is the cause of the three worlds, their eternal and stable boundary (12.261.11).

Kapila, in his turn, stresses his respect for the Vedas (12.260.12: nāham vedān vinindāmi; 262.1: na vedāh prṣthatahkrtāh), but points out that the Vedas contain the two contradictory messages that one must act and that one must abstain from action (260.15). A little later he pronounces several verses which tell us what a true Brahmin is like: he guards the gates of his body-i.e., his sexual organ, stomach, arms and speech-without which there is no use of tapas, sacrificing and knowing the self; the true Brahmin’s requirements are very limited, he likes to be alone where all others like to live in couples, he knows the original form (prakrti) and the modified forms (vikrti) of all this, he knows and inspires no fear, and is the soul of all living beings. ¹²⁰ Kapila then gives a description of the people of yore, who had direct knowledge of Dharma (pratyakṣadharma; 12.262.8) and led in general exemplary lives. They all followed one Dharma which, however, has four legs: “Those virtuous bull-like men had recourse to the four-legged Dharma; having reached it in accordance with the law, they [all] obtain the highest destiny, leaving the house, others by resorting to the forest, by becoming householders, others again as brahmacärins.” ¹²¹ Kapila also mentions the ‘fourth Upaniṣadic Dharma’ (caturtha aupanisado dharmah; 12.262.27) to be attained by accomplished, self-restrained Brahmins (28). We learn from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (2.23.1) that this fourth Dharma belongs to the man ‘who resides in Brahman’ (brahmasamstha), and the following verses of Mahābhārata 12.262 confirm this. ¹²² The fourth Upanişadic Dharma is rooted in contentment, consists in renunciation, and in the search of knowledge. ¹²³ The two following verses then speak of liberation (apavarga) as the eternal duty of the ascetic (yatidharma), and of the desire for Brahman’s abode, as a result of which one is freed from the cycle of rebirths (30cd: brahmanah padam anvicchan samssārān mucyate śucib). In conclusion Kapila points out that (sacrificial) acts are a purification of the body (sarīrapakti; 36), whereas knowledge is the highest path. But this does not prevent him from saying (v. 41): “Those who know the Veda know all; all is rooted in the Veda, for in the Veda is the foundation of all that exists and does not exist.”

Kapila, according to Mhbh 12.327.64-66, represents-along with certain other sages-the nivrtta dharma, he is a knower of Yoga (yogavid) and master in the science of liberation (mokṣaśāstre ācārya). The group of sages to which Kapila belongs is contrasted with another group, consisting of knowers of the Veda (vedavid), whose dharma is pravrtti (12.327.61-63). In Mhbh 12.312.4 the science of Yoga (yogaśāstra) which leads to liberation (3, 6, etc.) is called kāpila ‘belonging to Kapila’.

We turn once again to Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita. This text describes, among other things, how the future Buddha acquainted himself with various forms of religious life, before he found his own way to nirvāna. Most noteworthy are his visit to the penance grove described in Sarga 7, and the instruction he receives from Arāḍa Kālāma in Sarga 12. Arāḍa Kālāma teaches a form of Sāṃkhya and mentions in this context Kapila (see above). His aim is to reach liberation from saṃsāra (yathā […] saṃsāro […] nivartate; 12.16) through knowledge of the self. ¹²⁴ We recognize this as one of the ways originally belonging to Greater Magadha that lead to final liberation. At least as interesting are the Bodhisattva’s experiences in the penance grove (tapovana, āśrama). Its inhabitants divide their time, as appears from the description, between a variety of ascetic practices and Vedic sacrifices. Very important in the present context are the reasons for which these latter practices are undertaken: most prominently mentioned is the obtainment of heaven (7.10, 18, 20, 21, 24, 48). Strikingly, the main reason given by the Bodhisattva for leaving the äśrama is that he does not want heaven, but the end of rebirth. It is in this context (7.48) that he remarks that the nivrttidharma is different from pravrtti. Pravrtti here designates the asceticism practised in the äśrama. The teaching of Arāḍa, on the other hand, aims at final liberation (7.52-54) and belongs to the category nivrttidharma. Here, then, Kapila’s way is explicitly contrasted with the ascetic practices

Note further that Kapila’s link with renunciation is also evident from Baudhāyana Gṛhyaśeṣa Sūtra 4.16, which terms the rules of becoming a samnyāsin ‘Kapilasamnyāsavidhi’. ¹²⁵ P. V. Kane (HistDh II p. 953) draws attention to a line of royal kings called nrpati-parivrājaka ‘kingly ascetics’, attested in Gupta inscriptions, whose founder is said to have been (an incarnation of) Kapila. ¹²⁶ The Jaina text Uttarādhyayana chapter 8, which describes the virtues of asceticism, is also ascribed to Kapila. The commentary on the Paṇnavanā describes the wandering beggars called Carakas as descendants of Kapila. ¹²⁷

Recall in this context that Kapila in the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra is the son of Prahlāda. Prahlāda, king of the Asuras, is frequently engaged in battles with Indra, king of the gods (Hacker, 1959: 1617). But Indra is also antagonistic to the practice of asceticism, with which he interferes in various ways; Minoru Hara (1975) enumerates dissuasion, seduction by celestial nymphs, and straightforward violence, and illustrates these with passages from the Mahābhārata and from the Pāli Jātakas. Again one is tempted to interpret these stories as giving expression to an opposition which was felt to exist between orthodox Vedic religion and the tradition of wisdom and asceticism linked to the names of Prahlāda and, more in particular, Kapila.

This tradition of wisdom and asceticism might, of course, very well be the one which we have come to associate with Greater Magadha. Kapila is most often associated with that manifestation of this culture which looks for liberation from the cycle of rebirths through insight into the true nature of the self. It is not necessary to recall that the Sāṃkhya philosophy, in its various forms, is precisely the school of thought that stresses the fundamentally non-active nature of the soul, which is profoundly different from the material and mental world. ¹²⁸

Cyclic time

A presupposition of both early Buddhism and early Jainism is the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. This implies that all living beings, with the exception of those rare individuals who escape from it, are subjected to an ongoing cycle of rebirths. Ājīvikism, as we have seen, subscribed to the same idea, with this important difference that it believed the cycle of rebirths to be finite for all, with a beginning and an end for each individual. In Buddhism and Jainism there is no such beginning, and there is an end only for those who manage to escape. But even in Ājīvikism the beginning is relative, i.e., specific for each individual, not common to all. So it is plausible that the Ājīvikas accepted that there were always earlier individuals, with the result that the process as a whole is beginningless, here too.

The spectre of a beginningless cycle of rebirths, or a beginningless succession of cycles of rebirths, does not, of itself, impose a cyclic structure on time. However, the information we possess about these three religions from Greater Magadha suggests that they all, each of them, believed that beginningless time was carved up into units. ¹²⁹ A Buddhist sermon states: ¹³⁰ “Inconceivable is any beginning to the cycle of this samsāra; an earliest point is not discerned of beings who, obstructed by spiritual ignorance and fettered by craving, run and wander on.” Here nothing is said about units. These appear in some of the accounts of the Buddha’s enlightenment. During this event the Buddha acquired three knowledges, the first one being knowledge of his earlier existences. Of these, the texts tell us, the Buddha remembered up to a hundred thousand, followed by several kalpas. ¹³¹ A kalpa is obviously a “eon” of great length. In this account the Buddha remembers several of them, elsewhere he is said to have remembered up to ninety-one. ¹³² As to the length of a kalpa, the following comparison should help our failing imagination: “if there were a seven-mile high mountain of solid granite, and once a century it was stroked with a piece of fine cloth, it would be worn away before a great eon would pass. Nevertheless, more eons have passed than there are grains of sand on the banks of the river Ganges.” ¹³³ These texts do not tell us what happens at the end of a kalpa or at its beginning. The following passage from the Brahmajāla Sutta provides some information: ¹³⁴

There comes a time, monks, sooner or later after a long period, when this world contracts. At a time of contraction, beings are mostly reborn in the Ābhassara Brahmā world. And there they dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, gloriousand they stay like that for a very long time. But the time comes, sooner or later after a long period, when this world begins to expand. In this expanding world an empty palace of Brahmā appears. And then one being, from exhaustion of his life-span or of his merits, falls from the Ābhassara world and arises in the empty Brahmā-palace. […]

This passage does not use the term kalpa (Pāli kappa; it uses addha(n) instead), yet it most probably refers to the changes that separate one eon from another. In general, it appears that the eons that divide up time each start with a renewed creation of the world.

Similar ideas were current in Jainism. Schubring (1962/2000: 18), basing himself on canonical texts, speaks of “the assumption of the world having neither beginning nor end, i.e. being everlasting. Incessantly, though only within a small part of the universe, the wheel of time revolves with its spokes […], the gradations ranging from the paradisiacal to the catastrophical period […] and back to the former, ceaselessly passing through the point denoting the present.”

Among the very few things we know about Ājīvikism, one is that each living being has to pass through 8,400,000 great kalpas. No details have survived, yet this piece of information allows us to conclude that this religion, too, had a notion of cyclic time.

A cyclic notion of time, in which kalpas, yugas and other time units play a role, is a common feature of classical Hinduism from a certain date onward. It is not known to the Vedic texts. Among the earliest texts in this tradition that show familiarity with the concept we must count the Mahābhārata. A recent study on these eons in the Mahābhārata - The Mahābhārata and the Yugas by Luis GonzálezReimann (2002)—now comes to the conclusion “that the yuga theory is a relatively late addition to the poem” (p. 202). We will see in chapter IIA. 2 that there are good reasons to think that the core of the Mahābhārata of the critical edition was composed and written down at some time during the two centuries preceding the Common Era. Parts were subsequently added until approximately the time of the Guptas, when the archetype of our critical text was established. It follows that it is certainly possible that the cyclic vision of time was not yet known to the first written version of the Mahābhārata, and became part of it in passages that were subsequently added. If, therefore, González-Reimann’s hypothesis is correct-and he argues his case convincingly-we may have to see in the cyclic vision of time an element that entered into the Brahmanical tradition from the culture of Greater Magadha at a time when the core of the Mahābhārata (its first written version) was already in existence.

CHAPTER I.3 - CONCLUSIONS TO PART I

Part I has shown that Greater Magadha had a culture of its own, and that it is possible to say something about it in spite of the complete absence of direct sources. Chapter I. 2 has collected evidence to show that the inhabitants of this area also had other concerns than asceticism, such as dealing with their dead, healing their sick, and worshiping their gods. They did all these things (and no doubt many others) in a way which distinguished them profoundly from their Vedic neighbours (and immigrants, we may assume). But they distinguished themselves most of all by this peculiar belief, which was to exert such a strong attraction on those who adhered to the Vedic tradition. They believed not just in repeated rebirths, but more specifically in repeated rebirths determined by one’s deeds, i.e. in rebirth and karmic retribution. The element “karmic retribution”-if one can separate it at all from the element “rebirth”-was the element which determined a number of fundamental aspects of their religious life, among them the questions: (i) how do we free ourselves from (the effects of) our earlier deeds, and (ii) how do we stop acting now, i.e., stop laying the basis for karmic consequences?

Many of the features of this culture did not disappear with the confrontation with Vedic culture. They survived, sometimes in modified form, sometimes, it seems, without important changes. The most important of these features, i.e. the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, survived the confrontation very well, as far as we can tell. Asceticism that focuses on the immobilization of the body, so typical of early Jainism, finds expression in the Mahābhārata and other Brahmanical texts, as we have seen. Also the notion of an immutable self whose knowledge is a prerequisite for liberation from the effects of one’s deeds is widely present in Brahmanical literature.

PART II - BRAHMANISM VIS-À-VIS REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION

Of the cultural features of Greater Magadha enumerated in Part I, the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution is by far the most important, in the sense that we are best informed about it. This belief is at the basis of the religions that are known to have arisen in Greater Magadha and is, in a certain way, their very reason of existence. It is also a belief that turned out to be extremely fertile and that succeeded, in the course of time, to spread well beyond its original geographical area, and beyond the religions that were born there. Because of the ultimate success of this belief and the richness of sources that inform us about its vicissitudes, we can study its impact on Brahmanical culture. A critical analysis of the relevant sources shows that the new belief was hesitantly welcomed by some Brahmanical texts, ignored by others, and rejected by yet others.

PART IIA - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION HESITANTLY ACCEPTED

In Part I we used material from the Buddhist and Jaina canons-the two movements that had their roots in Greater Magadha - and also from Brahmanical texts. The justification for doing so was, and had to be, that the culture of Greater Magadha, or at least certain aspects of it, came to exercise an influence on the Brahmanical tradition and in this way found expression in its texts. Part I took all of this more or less for granted. Part IIA will look in some detail at the process in which this happened, considering a few specific cases. These few cases certainly constitute no more than the tip of the iceberg of wide-spread absorption of cultural elements from Greater Magadha into Brahmanical culture.

CHAPTER IIA.1 - A DHARMA SŪTRA

An example of the absorption of elements from the culture of Greater Magadha into Vedic culture is provided by a passage of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra. This text presents two forms of asceticism whose origin lay in Greater Magadha, beside one that is of Vedic character. In order to understand the passage concerned, it will be necessary to make some introductory remarks about Vedic asceticism and show that Vedic culture did, at that time, have its own ascetics and an accompanying ascetic life-style. These Vedic ascetics had different aims and customs from the ones we have considered so far, and for quite a while the two traditions of asceticism remained recognizably different, even at the time when they started to mix geographically.

Vedic asceticism

Information about Vedic asceticism can be obtained from various sources. Following Sprockhoff (1979: 416 f.), we first consider the kinds of householder that are called Śālīnas, Yāyāvaras, and Cakracaras, and that are described in the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra (3.1.1f.). ¹ These householders leave their home in order to settle in a hut or cottage at the end of the village (BaudhDhS 3.1.17). There they serve the fires and offer certain sacrifices (19). They neither teach nor sacrifice for others (21). BaudhDhS 3.2 enumerates the various ways of subsistence from which these householders can choose. The ninth of these (3.2.16 f.) - called siddhecchā (or siddhoñchā)-is most interesting in the present context. It is reserved for someone who has become tired of the (other) modes of subsistence on account of old age or disease (dhätuksaya). The person who adopts this mode of subsistence must interiorize (the fires; ātmasamäropana) and behave like a samnyāsin (samnyāsivad upacārah), ² except for using a strainer and wearing a reddish-brown garment. This description shows that the way of life of these householders is not preparatory to that of the vänaprastha, as it has been claimed: ³ the siddhecchā presents itself as the mode of subsistence for those who are old and sick, and therefore likely to die as householders. There is no indication in the text that the ascetic way of life was only, or predominantly, chosen by old men: the fact that one of the sub-choices is especially recommended for the aged suggests rather that the other alternatives were preferred by younger candidates.

The Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra is not the only early text that prescribes ascetic practices for the householder. Sprockhoff (1984: 25) has rightly drawn attention to the fact that gleaning corns (śiloñcha)-which constitutes one of the possible ways of subsistence of the ‘ascetic’ householders of the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra-is enumerated among the proper occupations (svakarman) of a Brahmin in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra (2.10.4). Also the Mānava Dharma Śāstra mentions this activity as an option for the householder (Manu 4.5,10). The best householder, moreover, makes no provisions for the morrow (asvastanika; Manu 4.7-8); almost the same term is used in connection with the householder in the Mahābhārata (12.235.3), which also mentions the mode of life in imitation of pigeons (käpotī vrtti), another form of asceticism also found in the enumeration of the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra.

These texts clearly prescribe an ascetic life-style as an option for the Vedic householder. This life-style often emphasizes and enlarges certain elements which were not unknown to the observant Vedic Brahmin. The ascetic element, in particular, is not foreign to the Vedic sacrificial tradition. The execution of a sacrifice demands from the sacrificer (yajamāna) various restrictions. ⁴ G. U. Thite (1975: 193 f.) enumerates and illustrates, on the basis of Brāhmaṇa passages, restrictions concerning food-according to some a complete fast may be required-sexual abstinence, limitations of speech-e.g., complete silence until sunset - restricted movements, and various other rules. Similar restrictions are mentioned in the Śrauta Sūtras. The Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra takes a rather extreme position in the following passage: ⁵ “When the consecrated sacrificer (dīksita) has become thin, he is pure for the sacrifice. When nothing is left in him, he is pure for the sacrifice. When his skin and bones touch each other, he is pure for the sacrifice. When the black disappears from his eyes, he is pure for the sacrifice. He begins the dīksā being fat, he sacrifices being thin.”

This link with the Vedic dīkṣā remains visible in some of the later texts. The Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, for example, speaks of the dīksās of the forest dwellers. ⁶ Certainly not by coincidence these dīksās include the restriction of food to roots and fruit (kandamūlaphalabhaka; 3.3.3), to what comes by chance (pravyttāsin; 9, 11), to water (toyāhāra; 13) and to wind (vāyubhaksa; 14), restraints which characterize the life of the vānaprastha in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra. Also the Mahābhārata (e.g., 5.118.7; 12.236.14) and the Mānava Dharma Śāstra (6.29) use the term dīksā in connection with forest-dwellers. One passage of the Mahābhārata (12.66.7) goes to the extent of calling the stage of life of the forest-dweller dīksāsrama, which confirms our impression that this way of life constitutes one permanent dīksā .⁷ The observation in the Mahābhārata (12.185.1.1) to the effect that forest-dwellers pursue the Dharma of Rṣis is also suggestive in this connection. ⁸

We find further evidence for Vedic asceticism in the Vedic texts. Take for example Ṛgveda 1.179, which contains a discussion between Agastya and his wife Lopāmudrā. Thieme (1963) has drawn attention to the fact that Agastya and Lopāmudrā live a life of celibacy, and that this was apparently not uncommon among Vedic seers ‘who served truth’ (ytasāp). ⁹ Another example is Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.13 (33.1), which has a corresponding passage in Śāñkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra 188-89 (15-17). We find here the following stanzas:

By means of a son have fathers always crossed over the deep darkness, since he was born as [their] self from [their] self. He is a [ship] provided with food, that carries over [to the other shore]. What is the use of dirt, what of an antelope-skin? What is the use of a beard, what of asceticism (tapas)? Wish for a son, O Brahmins […]

The mention of an antelope-skin (ajina) confirms that the ascetics here criticized are Vedic ascetics: the dīksita is also associated with an antelope-skin. ¹⁰ Similar criticism is expressed in a śloka cited in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa: ¹¹ “Durch das Wissen steigen sie dort hinauf, wo die Begierden überwunden sind. Dorthin gelangen weder Opferlöhne noch unwissende Asketen (tapaswin).”

The fact that the Vedic ascetics are here criticized suggests that, within the Vedic tradition itself, there existed a certain opposition between practising ascetics and those who felt that asceticism should not be pushed too far. This impression is confirmed by several passages from the Mahābhārata.

Consider the story of Jaratkāru, which the Mahābhārata presents in two versions. ¹² The part of the story that is important for us is as follows: Jaratkāru is an ascetic who abstains from sexuality, and who therefore has no son. During his wanderings he comes across his ancestors, who find themselves in an extremely disagreeable position: they are suspended in a hole, heads down, attached to a rope which a rat is about to gnaw through. The reason, it turns out, is the fact that their lineage is soon to die out, this because Jaratkāru has no son. Jaratkāru learns his lesson and begets a son in the remainder of the story, which is of no further interest for our purposes. In both versions of the story Jaratkāru and his ancestors are Yāyāvaras, ¹³ i.e., a type of Vedic householders who, as we have seen, live ascetic lives. Indeed, he is said to “observe dīkṣā ¹⁴ to be a “scholar of the Vedas and their branches”, ¹⁵ the “greatest of Vedic scholars”. ¹⁶ The longer version makes clear that Jaratkāru is an agnihotrin, one who never fails to perform the agnihotra sacrifice. ¹⁷ Even more interesting is the self-professed aim of Jaratkāru’s ascetic life-style: he wishes to carry his body whole to the world hereafter. ¹⁸ Shee (1986: 48, with note 83) rightly draws attention to the fact that this aim is known to accompany the Vedic sacrifice.

It is clear from this story-as it was from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa passage discussed above, and from other Mahābhārata passages still to follow - that the ascetic life-style which evolved within the Vedic tradition was not accepted by all. ¹⁹ Or rather, it appears that the aspect of complete sexual abstinence met with opposition from the side of those who saw the possession of a son as the sole guarantee for future well-being. This same element recurs in connection with Agastya, an ascetic about whom a variety of stories are told in the Mahābhārata. ²⁰ His connection with Vedic ritual is evident. He is the son of Mitra and Varuṇa, or simply of Varuṇa. ²¹ He takes an active part in the struggle between gods and demons. ²² Most significantly perhaps, he is described as performing a great sacrifice, and as undertaking a dīkṣā of twelve years in this connection. ²³ This Agastya meets his ancestors in the same disagreeable situation as had Jaratkāru, and he too decides to beget a son. ²⁴

The critical attitude toward asceticism that exists within the Vedic tradition manifests itself differently in the story of Yavakrī/ Yavakrīta. ²⁵ Yavakrī’s connection with the Vedic tradition is beyond all doubt. His father performs the agnihotra. ²⁶ He himself practises asceticism in order to obtain knowledge of the Vedas. ²⁷ The form of asceticism he practises is close to the Vedic sacrifice: he heats his body by placing it near a well-lit fire. ²⁸ He even threatens to cut off his limbs one by one and sacrifice them in the fire. ²⁹ Ritual purity is of such importance to him that his final fall will be caused by impurity. ³⁰ For the story of Yavakrī, too, constitutes an example of misdirected asceticism. ³¹

It will be clear from the above that there was such a thing as Vedic asceticism during the late-Vedic and early post-Vedic period, and perhaps already before these two. This asceticism pursued different aims from the asceticism practised in Greater Magadha, and has to be distinguished from the latter. The two were clearly distinguished from each other during the period that interests us, as is clear from a passage from the pen of the grammarian Patañjali, the same one who informed us that Greater Magadha was still not considered Brahmanical territory in the second century BCE. His Mahābhāṣya (I p. 476 1. 9; on P. 2.4.12 vt. 2) explains that the words Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa can be compounded so as to form the neuter singular śramanabrāhmaṇam “Śramaṇas and Brahmins”, this because, it states, there is eternal conflict (virodha) between them. Śramaṇa, it may be recalled, is the expression commonly used for the ascetics belonging to Buddhism, Jainism and Ājīvikism, and others. Patañjali saw the two-Brahmins on the one hand, all those covered by the term Śramaṇa on the other - as two groups of people who were at loggerheads. This is of course precisely what we would expect, given the cultural division of northern India at his time. (It is interesting that the grammatical tradition after Patañjali “forgot” this example, which is not cited in grammatical literature until it shows up again in the eleventh century. ³² This may be taken as an indication that the opposition between (undoubtedly non-Buddhist and non-Jaina) Śramanas and Brahmins no longer existed because ascetics had been integrated in an overall Brahmanical vision of society.)

The question whether the two forms of asceticism-Vedic and the one belonging to Greater Magadha - had had, at some earlier time, a common ancestor cannot be addressed here. The question whether and to what extent the two influenced each other during the early Vedic period cannot be dealt with either because no evidence known to me would help us answer it. They did, however, come to interact, and the passage from the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra to be considered in what follows will present an example of this interaction. The conclusion that is of interest at present is that during the late-Vedic and early post-Vedic period there was a form of asceticism which can safely be called Vedic asceticism because it remained close to the Vedic sacrifice in its aims and practices. Moreover, this Vedic asceticism was clearly distinct from the asceticism which we have come to know in connection with Greater Magadha.

The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra

There is, then, such a thing as Vedic asceticism, ³³ different from the forms of asceticism related to the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha. A passage from the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra shows that at least certain Brahmins made an effort to integrate the two, and dress them all up in a more or less Brahmanical garb. The presentation of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra does not succeed very well in this, thus allowing us to see through the attempts to cover up an earlier historical situation and recognize the different elements that are here being joined.

Patrick Olivelle, following earlier authors, ³⁴ observed in 1974 that a number of old Dharma Sūtras - the oldest, by common consentpresent the four äśramas not as four stages in the life of a high-caste Hindu, but as four alternatives, four options regarding how to spend one’s life after an initial period in the family of a teacher. It would not be correct to take this to mean that these Dharma Sūtras allow one to skip one or more intervening äśramas; the very idea of succession is absent. Among these texts the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra is of special interest. ³⁵ It deals with brahmacärins (“religious students”), parivrājas (“wanderers”), vānaprasthas (“forest dwellers”) and grhasthas (“householders”), in this order. This remarkable sequence-which deviates from the later temporal sequence brahmacärin, grhastha, vānaprastha, parivrāja (or saṃnyāsin “renouncer”)-is explained by the fact, already referred to, that no chronological sequence in the life of an individual is intended.

The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra prefers the choice of the state of householder (grhastha) to the three other ones, and even rejects the other ways of life in which, it states, the Vedic injunctions are not obeyed (2.23.10); the way of life of the wanderer (parivrāja) is explicitly stated to be against the scriptures (2.21.15). Nevertheless, the text presents a clear and interesting description of these ways of life.

Sūtras 2.21.7-16 deal with the parivrāja “wanderer”. We learn that the wanderer is chaste (8), without (sacrificial) fire, without house, without shelter, without protection, he is a muni who utters words only during recitation, who obtains support of life in a village, moving about without interest in this world or in the next (10); ³⁶ he uses only relinquished clothes (11) or, according to some, no clothes at all (12); he leaves behind truth and falsehood, pleasure and pain, the Vedas, this world and the next, searching his self (13).

In this enumeration no painful mortifications are included. The life of the parivrāja is no doubt simple, extremely simple, but the only remaining thing that interests him is not the capacity to endure hardship, but rather to find his self. This suggests that the parivrāja of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra is engaged in one of the ways of escape from the never ending cycle of birth and rebirth determined by one’s actions that originated in Greater Magadha, and which we discussed in Part I. And indeed, the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution is not unknown to the text. Sūtra 1.5.5, for example, states that “some become Rṣis on account of their knowledge of the scriptures (śrutarṣi) in a new birth, due to a residue of the fruits of their [former] actions”. ³⁷ Recall that this way of escape may imply that, once the true nature of the self has been realized, the aim has been reached. The remainder of the description of the wandering ascetic confirms that the author of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra was aware of this possible implication. Sūtra 2.21.14 states: “In an enlightened one there is obtainment of peace” (buddhe kṣemaprāpanam). The next two sūtras then turn against all this. Sūtra 15 begins: “That is opposed to the scriptures” (tac chāstrair vipratisiddham). No. 16 continues: “If there were obtainment of peace in an enlightened person, he would not experience pain even in this world” (buddhe cet kṣemaprāpanam ihaiva na duhkham upalabheta). These sūtras confirm again that the wandering ascetic is concerned with liberation through enlightenment; they also show that the author of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra rejects this as impossible.

The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra contains another section (the eighth Paṭala of the first Praśna) which appears to be in contradiction with the above rejection of the parivrāja. It sings the praise of what it calls ‘the obtainment of the self’. Indeed, “there is no higher [aim] than the obtainment of the self” (1.22.2). A number of ślokas are then quoted, possibly from a no longer existing Upaniṣad, ³⁸ which elaborate this theme (1.22.4-23.3) and specify that the self meant is “free from stain” (vikalmasa), “immovable but residing in the movable” (acalam calaniketan). This section does not only concern the parivrāja. Its concluding lines (1.23.6) enumerate the virtues that have to be cultivated in all the äśramas, and which, presumably, bring about identification with the universal soul. ³⁹ The puzzling bit is the quoted stanza 1.23.3, which seems to say that the aim of the religious life (ksema) is reached in this life: “But the destruction of faults results from the yoga here in this existence. Having eliminated [the faults] which destroy the creatures, the learned one arrives at peace (ksema).” ⁴⁰ It appears, therefore, that the author of this portion of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra accepts what another portion of the text rejects as impossible. Do we have to conclude that the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra had more than one author? ⁴¹

We turn to the next question: The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra deals explicitly with the way of insight, practised by the parivrāja. Does this mean that it knows the alternative way of inaction, the asceticism in which immobilization of body and mind is central? Yes it does, and it speaks about it in connection with the forest-dweller (vānaprastha). The forest-dweller, like the wandering ascetic, is chaste (2.21.19), without house, without shelter, without protection, he is a muni who utters words only during recitation (21). The description so far is identical with the one of the wandering ascetic, ⁴² except for the qualification that the forest-dweller has a single fire (ekāgnir). This qualification is surprising in that the following lines do not as much as mention the libations without which the fire would not survive; moreover, such a fire is virtually excluded by the absence of house, shelter or protection. Sūtra 2.22 .21 states explicitly, but in a different context, to be considered below, that a shelter is required for a fire (agnyartham śaranam). One has the impression that this qualification has been added to give a Vedic flavour to a way of life that in reality was without it. ⁴³

We learn from the sūtras that follow that the forest-dweller, unlike the wandering ascetic, wears clothes made from products of the jungle (2.22.1), he supports his life with roots, fruits, leaves and grass (2); in the end only things that come by chance support him (3); subsequently he depends successively on water, air, and ether alone (4). ⁴⁴ It is clear that the forest-dweller reduces progressively his intake of outside matter. Eating is reduced, then stopped, only water being taken in. Subsequently this too stops, while breathing remains. Then this too comes to an end, expressed by the words that the forest-dweller now depends on ether alone. We may conclude from this that the forest-dweller is involved in a fast to death which culminates in the interruption of breathing itself. This, of course, corresponds to the fast to death of Jaina and other ascetics which we have considered earlier.

The only connection with the Veda of the parivrāja and of the vānaprastha as described so far in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, is their recitation of Vedic mantras (svādhyāya; so sūtras 2.21 .10 and 21); the vānaprastha, moreover, has a dubious fire which he does not use and cannot maintain. These ascetics have nothing to do with Vedic rites, neither in their real, external form, nor in an interiorized form. In any case, our text does not say a word about it. Rather, by introducing another type of forest-dweller, i.e. one who does sacrifice and who must take a wife and kindle the sacred fires in order to do so, it confirms that these ascetics cannot perform Vedic sacrifices. This other type of forest-dweller is described in sūtras that represent the opinion of ‘some’ (eke), which may indicate that this description derives from a different source altogether. This other forest-dweller finishes his study of the Veda, takes a wife, kindles the sacrificial fires and performs the rites prescribed in the Veda (2.22.7); he builds a house outside the village, where he lives with his wife and children, and with his sacrificial fires (8). ⁴⁵ This alternative way of life of the forest-dweller is also characterized by an increasing number of mortifications (sūtras 2.22.9-23.2).

It will be clear that the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra describes, under the two headings of forest-dweller and wandering ascetic, not two, but three different forms of religious practice: 1) the way of insight into the true nature of the self; 2) the way of inaction: in this case, of fasting to death; and 3) a way of life that combines ritual activity and asceticism. ⁴⁶ Only one of these three ways of life has any obvious connection with Vedic ritual. In the case of the other two, some external features (svādhyāya, possession of a sacrificial fire) have been added on to ways of life which in themselves are without such connection. We may never know whether the author of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra was aware of the fact that two of his three ascetic life-styles were originally non-Vedic, but it is a safe bet that they were. In this way the text presents us with two superficially brahmanized versions of ascetic ways of life which we can identify as the main methods practised to reach liberation from rebirth and karmic retribution in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha and in circles that were influenced by it. To these two the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra adds a third which is more properly Vedic in character. The practices of the Vedic ascetics, unlike those of the other two kinds of ascetics, are linked to the Vedic sacrifice. The other two are involved in superficially brahmanized versions of activities that still bear the traces of their original context, where they were directed toward liberation from rebirth.

We have already noted that the author of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra was not favourably inclined toward asceticism in any of its forms. The same is undoubtedly also true for the aim which many ascetics pursued, viz., liberation from rebirth. It is therefore interesting to cite the defiant statement with which he describes what a frequent sacrificer can look forward to: “Thereafter, the Vedas declare, they obtain an eternal reward (phala) designated by the term ‘heaven’ (svargasabda)”. ⁴⁷ One has the impression that the Vedic heaven is presented here in a form that is meant to compete with the liberation aimed at by others.

Let us, by way of conclusion, pay attention to the terms vānaprastha and parivrāja that are used in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra. Vānaprastha is used to denote two types of ascetics, those of Vedic and those of Greater Magadhan extraction. It is therefore difficult to determine to which of these cultural domains this term originally belonged. The term parivrāja in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, on the other hand, is connected with non-Vedic ascetics only. This agrees with the use of the corresponding term paribhājaka in the Pāli Buddhist canon, which refers throughout to non-Vedic ascetics. No term corresponding to vānaprastha is found in these texts. ⁴⁸ The situation is different in the Jaina canon in Ardha-Māgadhī, and this may be due to the fact that most of its parts are much later than the Brahmanical and Buddhist texts considered above. Here the word vānaprastha (vāna(p)pattha) occurs a few times, always in connection with Brahmanical ascetics. We read here about vānaprastha ascetics (vānapatthā tāvasā) who are, among other things, hottiyaā, which corresponds to Sanskrit agnihotrikāh according to the commentator. ⁴⁹ According to one ms reading, these ascetics are also sottiya, which might correspond to Sanskrit śrotiya. ⁵⁰ Interestingly, the Jaina canon also uses the term parivrājaka (Ardha-Māgadhī parivvāyaga/-ya) to refer to Brahmins on some occasions. The parivrājaka Khanda(g)a, for example, knows the four Vedas with their aigas and upā̄igas, and many other Brahmanical and parivrājaka texts (Viy 2.1.12). Essentially the same description is repeated for the parivrājaka Moggala (or Poggala) (Viy 11.12.16) and for the Brahmins Gobahula and Bahula (Viy 15.16, 36). ⁵¹ It is clear that this confused terminology dates from a time when earlier distinctions had become blurred.

Confirmation in Greek sources

Consider next the three types of ascetics distinguished by Megasthenes (sent as ambassador to the court of Candragupta Maurya at Pātaliputra by the first Seleucus, around 300 BCE): ⁵²

Megasthenês makes a […] division of the philosophers, saying that they are of two kinds-one of which he calls the Brachmanes, and the other the Sarmanes.

The Brachmanes […] have their abode in a grove in front of the city within a moderate-sized enclosure. They live in a simple style, and lie on beds of rushes or (deer) skins. ⁵³ They abstain from animal food and sexual pleasures […] Death is with them a very frequent subject of discourse. They regard this life as, so to speak, the time when the child within the womb becomes mature, and death as a birth into a real and happy life for the votaries of philosophy. On this account they undergo much discipline as a preparation for death. […] on many points their opinions coincide with those of the Greeks, for like them they say that the world had a beginning […]

Of ⁵⁴ the Sarmanes he tells us that those he held in most honour are called the Hylobioi. They live in the woods, where they subsist on leaves of trees and wild fruits, and wear garments made from the bark of trees. They abstain from sexual intercourse and from wine. […] Next in honour to the Hylobioi are the physicians, since they are engaged in the study of the nature of man. They are simple in their habits, but do not live in the fields. Their food consists of rice and barley-meal, which they can always get for the mere asking, or receive from those who entertain them as guests in their houses. […] This class and the other class practise fortitude, both by undergoing active toil, and by the endurance of pain, so that they remain for a whole day motionless in one fixed attitude.

One type of Brahmin ascetic is here described, besides two kinds of Śramanas. Megasthenes’ remark about the views of the Brahmin ascetics, concerning the embryonic nature of this life, and death as birth into another, better existence, is of particular interest. The Vedic texts look upon the consecrated sacrificer (diksita) as an embryo preparing to be reborn into another kind of existence. ⁵⁵ Vedic asceticism, as we have seen, was in many respects a permanent form of dīksā.

Megasthenes’ remarks about the two kinds of Śramaṇas are even more telling, for they correspond almost exactly to the two kinds of non-Vedic ascetic of the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, and therefore to the two kinds of ascetics which we have come to distinguish within the religious movements that derived from the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha. ⁵⁶ One of these stays in the forest, and survives on what he finds there. The other one begs for his food and, very significantly, is “engaged in the study of the nature of man” (peri tòn ánthrōpon philosophous); we may safely interpret: this ascetic is in search of the true nature of the self. ⁵⁷ Both Śramaṇas are described as remaining motionless for long periods of time. This agrees with what we have discovered in an earlier chapter.

Megasthenes’ testimony constitutes a striking confirmation of the conclusions which we were able to draw from the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra. Both sources confirm that there were two main types of ascetics in ancient India: Vedic ascetics and those whose original inspiration came from Greater Magadha. Both describe only one type of Vedic ascetic and two of the other kind. We cannot but believe that we are confronted here with fairly reliable descriptions of the actual situation, rather than with mere Brahmanic rationalizations.

CHAPTER IIA.2 - A PORTION FROM THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

The chronological position of the Mahābhārata

Dating the Mahābhārata has been particularly difficult for Indological scholarship, and has so far led to few definite results. One of the difficulties is that the Mahābhārata is an enormous text which may have been created over a period of time. The expression “date of the Mahābhārata” is, therefore, far from clear. If the Mahābhārata contains parts composed in widely different periods, each of these parts might have a date of its own, and the question of determining which is the date of the Mahābhārata would lose much of its meaning. Moreover, it is likely that parts of this epic existed for a long time in oral form - either before those parts were written down, or alongside written versions - and depended for their survival on the memories of numerous bards, each of whom may have introduced minor or major changes, inadvertently or on purpose. Given that background, questions about the date and original form of the text as a whole, or even of any particular portion of it, are of dubious significance.

The text of the Mahābhārtata has reached us in many manuscripts, and therefore in a variety of more or less divergent written versions. Its criticial edition, undertaken by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, has not succeeded in establishing the one original written version from which all surviving written versions supposedly derive. It has, however, provided reasons for thinking that there may have been such a written archetype. This in its turn gives rise to questions such as, “was this written archetype identical with the first written version of the Mahābhārata, or was it rather a more or less remote descendant of it?” and “why did people bother to write down this enormous text?”

There is a growing consensus among scholars with regard to the second of these two questions. The Mahābhārata, as it has reached us, is clearly a Brahmanical text, which misses few occasions to preach a Brahmanical vision of the world. The role and the duties of kings, in particular, receive ample attention. This is hardly surprising in a text whose main narrative tells the story of a war between kings who disputed each others’ claims to kingship. The present version of the text, which may be a Brahmanical reworking of earlier material, appears to have had as one of its main purposes to teach kings how to behave in accordance with Brahmanical expectations. The need for such an ideological statement, scholars point out, was strongly felt during the aftermath of the Mauryan empire, whose rulers, as we have seen, did not observe the rules of Brahmanical society. The first Brahmanical reworking of earlier material, and the first writing down of the Mahābhārata, may therefore have taken place during the period in which the memory of the Mauryan empire was still strong. ¹ Some scholars go one step further and point out that the Mahābhārata emphasizes that kings should be Kṣatriyas. This emphasis might find its explanation in the fact that the Suingas, who were the successors of the Mauryan empire, were Brahmins: the Mahābhārata might implicitly criticize kings who are Brahmins. ² Either way the first written version of the Mahābhārata belongs to the final centuries preceding the Common Era. ³

The first of the two questions formulated above is important, too: “was the written archetype of the surviving manuscripts identical with the first written version of the Mahābhārata, or was it, rather, a more or less remote descendant of it?” One might argue that the two have to be identical, for the simple reason that a written text, once it has spread geographically and is being copied in different regions, can only become more diverse and is unlikely to converge again to one single text that might then be the common archetype of all later versions. This is correct, but overlooks an important point. It is true that manuscript traditions do not normally converge. However, one manuscript, or a small number of them, may attain a position of prestige which causes it (or them) to overshadow all others. Something like this can happen when the first or most important commentary is written. The commentator may use just one version of the text, perhaps the only one he is acquainted with, or the one he likes best. If the commentary becomes well-known, subsequent readers and copyists may prefer that version of the text to all others. This is one way in which one version of a text may replace all others, and become the archetype of all the manuscripts available many centuries later. This may not however be the only way how this can happen. Manuscripts preserved in major libraries or centres of learning may be copied more often than others, and for this reason become authoritative. Whatever the exact reason in each case, it is important to note that it can and does happen that the manuscript tradition of a text passes through a bottleneck, not necessarily in the sense that there is only one manuscript left at that time, but rather that just one manuscript becomes the ancestor of all those that survive at a given later point in time. The result is that a manuscript that is far removed in time from the original may become the archetype of all those that survive later on. This is what happened, according to Witzel (1986), to the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya, which appear to go back to an archetype that existed around the year 1000 CE. It seems likely that this archetype is the manuscript used by the commentator Kaiyata, and that it became the archetype of the surviving manuscripts for this very reason. ⁴ The manuscripts of the Vedic Paippalāda Saṃhitā, both in Kashmir and in Orissa, are descendents from a written archetype that existed at some time during the period 800-1000 CE, in Gujarat. ⁵ Something similar appears to have happened to the Mahābhārata, for the text constituted in its critical edition contains contradictions which reveal its lack of homogeneity. ⁶

The assumption of an archetype that is different from the first written version is attractive in the case of the Mahābhārata. This text contains many portions-e.g. the Bhagavadgītā, the Anugītā, the Anušāsanaparvan, etc.-which are most easily understood as later additions to an older text. And indeed, Dieter Schlingloff has argued, on the basis of the old Spitzer manuscript, that during the Kuṣāṇa period “the vast doctrinal passages of the Śāntiparvan were already incorporated in the epos”, but that this had probably not yet happened to the Anušāsanaparvan. ⁷

We are, of course, most interested in the first written version of the Mahābhārata. For the reasons given above, it is likely to belong to the final centuries preceding the Common Era. This is close to the period between Patañjali and Manu during which, as suggested in the Introduction, Greater Magadha became Brahmanical territory. Put differently, the first written version of the Mahābhārata dates from the time when Brahmanism was trying to reach out toward the east into regions that had had an altogether different culture until that time. Moreover, it was concerned with the imposition of Brahmanical culture on kings and kingdoms that had not adhered to it so far. We may assume that the Mahābhārata was an instrument in this Brahmanical effort to spread into the territories of Greater Magadha. We may hope and expect that some parts of this epic will preserve traces of the way in which Brahmins tried to deal with some of the spiritual challenges that faced them in this confrontation with the east, most particularly the ideas that were current there about rebirth and karmic retribution.

The Rājadharmaparvan

The portion of the Mahābhārata that is likely to be most interesting in this connection is the initial narrative of the Rājadharmaparvan, itself a sub-parvan of the Śāntiparvan. This portion narrates the persuasion of Yudhiṣthira to accept kingship after he has won the central battle of the epic. This narrative introduces the instruction which Bhīṣma subsequently imparts from his deathbed about all manner of issues, most of them relevant to kings. This instruction is long, and there can be no doubt that this is at least in part due to the fact that later users of the text could not resist the temptation to add material. Part of this instruction is indeed contained in the Anušāsanaparvan, which we saw may be a later addition. The introductory narrative, on the other hand, may be thought of as the kernel of the first written version of the epic, ⁸ for it is here that we find, in their most outspoken form, issues that were close to the hearts of its creators: Yudhiṣthira must resist the temptations linked to an escape from the world and accept the duties which the Brahmanical world view imputes to kings. To cite Fitzgerald (2004: 128-29): “The narrative argument depicting the ethically ambivalent Yudhisthira, having him lead a purge of the kṣatra, and then making him a proper brāhmanya king is central to the entire [Mahābhārata] as it now stands.” The enumeration of Yudhiṣthira’s temptations gave the author of this part of the text an occasion to show what he knew and understood of the religious ideology of Greater Magadha. If we are entitled to interpret the criticism directed against Yudhisthira’s intention to leave the world as being, at least in part, a criticism of the new ideology with which the Brahmins were confronted, an analysis of this opening portion may shed light on the question how much the Brahmanical authors of this part of the text had understood of that other ideology, and how they wished to present it. ⁹

In order to be able to evaluate the Brahmins’ understanding of the alternative ideology that was predominant in Greater Magadha, we will have to draw upon our understanding of it, as developed in Part I. Based on this, I propose to discuss some passages from the Rājadharmaparvan which more or less faithfully reflect views that can be identified as having their home, so to say, in the different religious currents that existed in that area.

Consider first the following passage, in which Yudhisṭhira formulates his intention to the seer Vyāsa who has been trying to win him back for royal life: ¹⁰

I am a wicked sinner responsible for ruining the earth. Sitting right here just like this, I will dry this body up. Realize that I, the one responsible for killing our elders, am now sitting in a fast to the death, so that I will not be a destroyer of the family in other births as well. I will not eat or drink anything at all. I will stay right here and dry up the dear breath of life, O ascetic.

This passage not only informs us about Yudhisṭhira’s intention, but also about his beliefs. He believes, to begin with, in rebirth. He also believes that he can stop rebirth. Abstention from eating and drinking while remaining seated in one place is, according to Yudhisṭhira’s words, a way to bring this about, perhaps the only way.

The passage does not tell us why this particular behavior should stop rebirth, but it is easy to recognize something closely similar in Jainism. There, too, death by immobilization - which implies abstention from all food and drink, and much else-was the one chosen by practitioners close to final liberation. In Jainism this made a lot of sense, because here immobilization was considered to be the way not only to avoid performing deeds which would then have karmic consequences, but also to destroy traces of deeds carried out before, perhaps in earlier lives. Destroying the traces of earlier deeds might take a long period of asceticism, and Jainas would certainly have found Yudhisṭhira’s belief that a mere fast to death would do the job on the optimistic side. This does not change the fact that Yudhisṭhira’s remarks clearly reflect an understanding of karmic retribution and of a way to stop it that we also find in early Jainism.

Another passage betrays a similar understanding of the principles involved. It occurs in the story of the conversation between the Progenitor Manu and some Siddhas which Vyāsa reports to Yudhisṭhira. The Siddhas question the Progenitor about Law, and part of Manu’s answer is as follows: ¹¹

They must understand that what is Lawful and what is Unlawful are both twofold: There is inactivity and activity; the twofold nature pertains to ordinary life and the Veda. Immortality results from inactivity; mortality is the result of activity. One should understand that bad things are the result of bad actions, and good things are the result of good actions. And the good or bad results of these two would come about on account of the goodness or badness of the actions, whether those results be heaven or something leading to heaven, or life or death.

Contrary to Fitzgerald (2004: 250), I find in this passage a fundamental opposition between inactivity and activity. Activity will bring about results: good things, bad things, heaven, something leading to heaven, life, or even death. All these results fall under the general heading of mortality. Inactivity, on the other hand, leads to immortality. Nothing more is said about this immortality, but in view of what we know about Jainism in particular I do not hesitate to identify this immortality with liberation from rebirth and karmic retribution. It is a fundamental tenet of early Jainism that karmic retribution can only be countered by inactivity, and the present passage gives expression to the same idea, concisely.

Acquaintance with Jainism or something similar to it is shown by a passage in chapter 15. The speaker is Arjuna, who criticizes the ascetic life style. The passage reads: ¹²

Not even ascetics - those dummies who have taken to the forest, having removed anger and joy-can keep life going without killing. There are many living creatures in water, in earth, and in fruits, and no one does not kill them. What can one do but make life go? Some beings have such subtle forms that they are known only through inferences, and their bodies can be destroyed (skandhaparyayah) by merely batting the eyelashes. ¹³

Jainas would agree with this, and some of their ascetics to this day go to extraordinary extents to reduce the damage as much as possible.

Elsewhere in the introductory portion of the Rājadharmaparvan Yudhisthira considers an altogether different path. His words are here addressed to his brother Arjuna. They are as follows: ¹⁴

Great scholars, unwavering in their desire to see what is durable and what is not, have gone through the learned teachings, thinking “It might be here”, or “Maybe it’s here”. They have searched outside the statements of the Veda and the forest treatises, and, like those who split open the trunk of a banana tree, they do not see anything durable. Subsequently (atha), by an absolutely radical analysis, on the basis of indirect clues, they proclaimed [the existence of] a self (ātman) within the body of five elements, [a soul] which is connected with desire and aversion. Invisible to the eye and inexpressible in words, it operates in beings, accompanied by the motive force of past deeds. After making the sensory field auspicious, after suppressing craving in the mind, and after getting rid of the continuum of past deeds, one is free and happy. When there is this path which must be traversed with great delicacy, and which is used by the pious, how is it, Arjuna, that you praise something that luxuriates in evil?

This passage is interesting for various reasons. Here, too, there is talk of “getting rid of the continuum of past deeds” (karmasaṃtatim utsrjya), and therefore of a method for obtaining liberation. But clearly this method is altogether different from the one we discussed earlier. There is no question here of fasting to death while remaining seated. On the contrary, this method clearly has something to do with a self (ātman) which has been found “by an absolutely radical analysis” (ekāntayyudāsena). In the light of what we know about the spiritual ideology current in Greater Magadha, it is easy to understand what is meant. The absolutely radical “analysis”, or “exclusion”, of all that acts, reveals the core of one’s being: a self (ātman) which by its nature never acts. Once this has become clear, one knows that the core of one’s being has never acted, and is not therefore liable to karmic retribution. The knowledge of one’s true self may in this way stop the process of rebirth.

To Vedāntins who wrote many centuries after the composition of the Rājadharmaparvan, the knowledge of the true self and its liberating effect belong to the most essential message of the Veda. And indeed, the theme is not unknown to some passages in the oldest Upaniṣads, and becomes quite frequent in later Upaniṣads. For this reason it is all the more intriguing that Yudhisthira does not invoke the Veda in this context. Quite on the contrary, the “great scholars” (kavi) whom he refers to did not hesitate to search outside the statements of the Veda (vedavādān atikramya) before they found the way, in the form of knowledge of their self, by the analysis which we discussed. This passage suggests that, at its time, the path through knowledge of the self was not yet associated with the Vedic heritage.

The Brahmanical tradition took a long time to fully accept and absorb the new ideas of rebirth and karmic retribution, as will become clear in Part IIB. Here it is important to emphasize that Yudhisthira’s statement refers to the path to liberation through knowledge of the self, not by basing itself on some tradition but rather by invoking the intelligence of some kavis “great scholars”.

I have translated the above passage on the assumption that it gives expression to one point of view. Fitzgerald (2004: 205) has proceeded differently. The part which I have translated “Subsequently (atha), by an absolutely radical analysis, on the basis of indirect clues, they proclaimed [the existence of] a self (ätman) within the body of five elements, [a soul] which is connected with desire and aversion”, he renders “But then, by an absolutely radical analysis, […] some others say […]”. In other words, in his interpretation the theme of the self is limited to the second half of the passage. It is true that there is no word in the Sanskrit corresponding to “some others”. It is yet possible that adding these words might here be justified. If so, the beginning of the passage deals with a different point of view, the one of those who, “having split open the trunk of a banana tree, do not see anything durable”. Fitzgerald is no doubt right in considering the phrase about a banana tree as a metaphor-and it is an interesting metaphor. It is interesting because the same metaphor is well known from Buddhist literature. There, too, the same terms-kadallskandha (Pāli kadalikkhandha “trunk of a banana tree”), and sāra (“something durable”)-are sometimes used in a context which suggests that there is nothing durable in the human being, and therefore, some would say, no self. An example is the discourse on foam in the Samyutta Nikāya (SN III p. 140 ff .), where this metaphor is used beside others to show that nothing durable is found in the five constituents of the human being, i.e., in the five skandhas. This can be easily understood to mean that there is nothing durable in the human being, as Yudhisṭhira says. It is therefore possible, and even likely, that there is a more or less covert reference to Buddhism in these words.

Personally I feel doubtful about the mention of two different positions in this one passage, the first one corresponding to the Buddhist position, the second to that of those who believe that knowledge of the true nature of the self leads to liberation. It just does not make sense to enumerate two ways, if in the end Yudhisṭhira is going to refer back to only one “path which must be traversed with great delicacy, and which is used by the pious”. I would rather feel inclined to see in this short passage elements belonging to two different paths that have somehow been muddled up and put together. If that is correct, the understanding which the author of this passage had of what was going on in the non-Brahmanical religious currents of the middle Ganges valley was less than complete and indeed somewhat confused.

Whatever we think of the allusion to a Buddhist point of view in the first half of the above passage, the second half seems to refer to knowledge of the self as a way to attain liberation. This is not explicitly stated, so it is not completely clear whether the author of this passage had understood how and why knowledge of the self should achieve this goal. It seems clear however that he thought it did. Knowledge of the self as a means to attain liberation is elsewhere in the epic sometimes called Sāṃkhya. ¹⁵ Note that the present passage does not use that expression. As a matter of fact, the term Sāṃkhya, is never used to designate any kind of knowledge in the introductory forty-five chapters of the Rājadharmaparvan. The term is used once, in chapter 39, to designate a person, the person called Cārvāka, “a Rāksasa disguised as a Brahmin, […] dressed like a mendicant, a Sāṃkhya, wearing a topknot and carrying a triple staff”. ¹⁶

Interestingly, some other elements sometimes connected with Sāṃkhya do figure in the introductory chapters of the Rājadharmaparvan. I am referring to the three gunas called sattva, rajas and tamas. They occur in a context which it is worth reproducing. In the middle of Bhīmasena’s attempt to tempt Yudhiṣthira back to his duties as king, we find the following exposition: ¹⁷

Two kinds of disease develop, the bodily and the mental. The occurrence of either of them is dependent upon the other; one is never found without the other. Mental disease arises from bodily, there is no doubt, and likewise it is a certainty that bodily disease arises from mental. […]

Cold, warmth, and wind are the three attributes of bodies. They say the definition of health is the equal balance of these attributes. When the level of any one of these rises too high, a medical prescription is indicated. Cold is checked by warmth, and warmth by cold.

Lightness (sattva), Energy (rajas), and Darkness (tamas) would be the three mental attributes. Sorrow is checked by joy, joy by sorrow.

This passage has several striking and potentially significant features. Most remarkable perhaps is the fact that sattva, rajas and tamas are introduced here as mental attributes (mānasa guṇa), not as the ultimate constituents of both material and mental reality. Bodies, i.e. the material dimension of human beings, also have three attributes, but they are different from sattva, rajas and tamas. Our passage calls them Cold (sita), Warmth (uṣna), and Wind (vāyu). It is impossible not to be reminded of the three humours (tridoṣa) of classical Āyurveda, which are already mentioned in the early Buddhist canon: bile (pitta), phlegm (kapha or śleṣman, Pāli semha), wind (vāyu, vāta). Their mention in the early Buddhist texts, and their absence as a group in the Vedic corpus, is, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, one good reason (beside others) to think that classical Āyurveda had its roots in the culture from which Buddhism arose, and therefore in Greater Magadha.

It is tempting, though for the time being purely speculative, to think that this passage presents us with the three gunas sattva, rajas and tamas in their original role and context. ¹⁸ Classical Sāṃkhya was confronted with major difficulties in its attempt to uphold these three, not only as attributes of the mental world, but as constituents of the material world. The present passage is confronted with none of these difficulties; it can moreover use the word guṇa in its ordinary meaning “attribute”. The interaction between these three mental attributes is in all respects parallel to the interaction of the three bodily attributes, and can therefore be seen as an extension, or simply as an application to a specific realm, of the kind of thinking that characterizes Āyurveda.

Having identified several fairly reliable expressions of the spiritual ideology underlying different religious currents of Greater Magadha, primarily of the asceticism which we know from Jainism and of the way to liberation through insight into the true nature of the self (along with a less precise hint at Buddhism), we are entitled to ask whether anything resembling Ājīvikism can be found in our portion of the Śāntiparvan. Ājīvikism shared a number of convictions with Jainism, with one major difference: Where the Jainas believed that the suffering engendered by a radical immobilization of body and mind would destroy the traces of deeds carried out earlier, the Ājivikas did not accept this as a possibility. For them there was no shortcut to liberation; the full karmic burden of past deeds had to exhaust itself by bringing about results, and this gave rise to a long series of innumerable lives, at the end of which the person would reach liberation. For an almost endless number of lives the Ājivikas would be the victims of a strictly determined succession of embodied existences. This fatalism, in the case of the Ājivikas, would yet be the expression of karmic retribution.

One form of fatalism of this kind is known to the Mahābhārata. In the secondary literature it is called Kālavāda. ¹⁹ It finds expression in several passages of the chapters of the Mahābhārata which we are considering. Vyāsa’s instruction in chapters 26,27 and 28 is the most important. Vyāsa’s opening remark creates the impression that this Kālavāda is altogether different from the doctrine of karmic retribution. He states: ²⁰ “One does not get anything through his deeds”. This, at first sight, suggests that the fatalism of the Kālavāda is different from that of the Ājivikas. However, this first impression may be mistaken. The Kālavāda is again mentioned in chapter 34, where the words of the seer Dvaipāyana are recorded. Dvaipāyana says, among other things: ²¹ “Realize that Time has deeds for its bodily form (karmamūtyātmaka) - it is witness to deeds good and bad, and it yields its fruit later in Time, giving rise to pleasant and unpleasant things.” And again: ²² “The universe is driven by action that is yoked to Time (kälayukta).” Do we have to conclude from this that Dvaipāyana’s Kālavāda was different from Vyāsa’s? I do not think so. Whether ultimately caused by deeds or otherwise, Kāla determines one’s fate in a way that is inescapable. The Ājivikas used the term Niyati to emphasize the fatalistic aspect of their doctrine. The existence of Niyati does not deny the role of deeds; quite on the contrary, it describes how karmic retribution works according to the adherents of this school of thought. Kāla plays a similar role in the Mahābhārata: it may simply sum up the workings of deeds in the opinion of those who think that karmic retribution follows a fixed pattern from which there is no escape for the individual.

Something is however missing in the Kālavāda of the Mahābhārata, or at any rate of the introductory portions of the Rājadharmaparvan. To my knowledge it does not mention that this pre-determined succession of births in the end leads to liberation. The little we know about the Ājivikas shows the importance which this final destination of the long cycle of rebirths had for them. Why is it not mentioned in the Kālavāda passages we have? Ājīvika liberation was not something one could try to attain; it would come of its own, but after a very, very long time. The soteriological side of Ājīvika teaching contains therefore very little to inspire one’s behavior. However, its non-soteriological side can be used to teach acceptance and this is precisely what the Kālavāda is used for in the passages of the introductory parts of the Rājadharmaparvan. Yudhiṣthira is told to accept his fate, which he cannot change. We know that Ājivikism survived for a long time after the days of its founder Maskarin Gośāla, but we know very little about what it meant to its practitioners. An important effect of this religion on the behavior of most of these practiti-ners-those who did not consider themselves sages about to reach liberation-was undoubtedly acceptance. This is how the Kālavāda is put to use in the discussions with Yudhisthira. I see therefore no reason to doubt that Kālavāda and Ājīvikism belonged to the same subsection of the ideology that originated in Greater Magadha.

Having seen that different passages of the portion of the Mahābhārata we are considering show awareness of the various manifestations of the rebirth ideology of Greater Magadha, it is interesting to observe that one passage contrasts the kind of asceticism considered above with another one, this one of a decidedly Vedic type. Consider the following expression of Yudhisṭhira’s intentions: ²³

Abandoning the way of life and the comforts of society, enduring tremendous ascetic observances, I shall live in the forest with the animals, eating only fruits and roots, pouring offerings onto the fire at the right times, bathing both times every day, wearing hides and rags, and piling my hair up on my head; and with my food intake limited I shall be lean. Enduring cold, wind, and heat, tolerating hunger, thirst, and fatigue, I shall dry my body up with the heat of the ascetic practices that are prescribed. […] Living all alone, reflecting upon matters, living on ripe and unripe foods, satisfying the ancestors and the gods with offering of forest fare, water, and formulas from the Vedas, and thus observing the most fiercely intense set of norms in the rule books for forest life, I will await the dissolution of this body.

The accent in this way of life is clearly on the performance of Vedic rituals and related issues. It is further interesting that this kind of ascetic “piles his hair up on his head”, which translates jatādhara: this ascetic has matted hair. He further wears hides (carman), another sign that distinguishes a Vedic ascetic from those whose practices derived from the movements of Greater Magadha.

We have seen in the preceding chapter that there is such a thing as Vedic asceticism, and that this form of asceticism has to be distinguished from the forms that found their origin in Greater Magadha. Yudhisṭhira is clearly aware of this distinction, because he immediately presents an alternative, viz., that of the sage with a shaven head (12.9.12: munir mundah) who lives upon alms. The culmination of this path is worth citing: ²⁴

I will not act at all like someone who wants to live or like one who wants to die; I will take no pleasure in life or death, nor will I despise them. And if there are two men, one cutting off one of my arms with a hatchet and the other sprinkling my other arm with sandal perfume, I will not think the one bad and the other good.

Having abandoned all those activities the living can do to improve things for themselves, I shall be restricted to just the actions of blinking my eyes and so on, and I shall never be attached to any of these. Having forsaken the operations of all my senses, and then having forsaken all ambitions, and then having thoroughly scrubbed away all blemishes from my Mind; having thus escaped from all attachments and passed beyond all the snares, being in the control of nothing at all-just like Mātariśvan-moving about with passions all gone, I will attain everlasting satisfaction.

I have given this passage in the translation of Fitzgerald, which is very good, yet a rereading in terms our reflections so far will prove fruitful. Let us first consider the phrase “Having abandoned all those activities the living can do to improve things for themselves”; the Sanskrit contains the compound abhyudayakriyaā. The translation “activities to improve things for themselves” does not reflect the fact that abhyudaya, lit. “elevation”, often refers to the elevation which is the result of religious activity. Elsewhere in the Śāntiparvan, in a discussion which contrasts inactivity (nivtti) with activity (pravrtti), activity is associated with deeds that are abhyudayokta. The whole verse reads (Mhbh 12.327.5):

ime sabrahmakā lokāh sasurāsuramānavāh |
kriyāsv abhyudayoktāsu saktā drīyanti sarvasah ||
It can be seen that these worlds, along with Brahman, together with gods, demons and humans, are completely attached to deeds, said to [lead to] elevation (abhyudaya).

And the following chapter contains a verse that opposes the rule (dharma) of inactivity (nivttilaksana) to that which is ābhyudayika, “leading to elevation (abhyudaya)”. ²⁵

If, then, we understand abhyudaya in this manner in Yudhisthira’s statement, we see that in his second alternative Yudhisthira proposes to abandon all religious activities, no doubt including the ones that played a central role in his first proposed form of renunciation. But he wants to go further, for he says: “I shall be restricted to just the actions of blinking my eyes and so on” (nimesādivyavasthita). This recalls the form of asceticism discussed earlier, in which all activity is reduced to an absolute minimum, sometimes right up to the point of death through immobilization. That this is indeed intended is confirmed by the compounds “having forsaken the operations of all my senses” (tyaktasarvendriyakriya) and suparityaktasamkalpa. Fitzgerald translates his last compound “having forsaken all ambitions”, but samkalpa is also “volition, desire”. If we take all these adjectives at their face value, we do not arrive at the picture of an ascetic who moves around, but rather at that of one who is about to leave this world. Fitzgerald’s translation “moving about with passions all gone” (vītarāgaś caran) may therefore have to be replaced with something like “being without passions”, and the sentence which follows, “I will attain everlasting satisfaction” (tustim prāpsyāmi śāśvatīm), must refer to the ascetic’s impending, and self-induced, death.

It follows that Yudhisṭhira speaks about the same path toward liberation which he also mentions elsewhere in these chapters, viz., in a passage which we have studied above. But here, in the ninth chapter, he contrasts it with an ascetic path which is quite different, and which has no connection with the methods developed in Greater Magadha. This other path is a path of Vedic asceticism which involves tending the Vedic fire and occupying oneself with ritual duties all alone in the forest.

Yudhisṭhira’s critics, who criticize the appropriateness of renunciation in his case, have a number of things to say about what they think renunciation amounts to. Some of their remarks show little respect for renouncers. Arjuna, for example, speaks in this connection of “the most wicked way of life, the ‘way of the skull’” (Mhbh 12.8.7: kāpā̄̄̄m […] pāpisṭhāṃ vrttim), and asks: ²⁶ “Why do you want to go about begging like a bum, ceasing to make any effort for yourself?” Bhīma’s remarks are even more interesting, because he denies the Vedic roots of the kind of renunciation Yudhisṭhira aspires to: ²⁷

“Renunciation should be made at a time of great distress, by one who is overcome by old age, or by one who has been cheated by his enemies”; so it is decreed. Thus those who are sophisticated do not recognize renunciation here, and those of subtle insight judge it to be a transgression of Law. How is it then that you have come to hold it as your ideal? That you have taken refuge in it? You ought to continue despising that; otherwise you are placing your trust in others. Your understanding of what the Vedas say is a falsehood that has the appearance of truth. It was initiated by unbelieving Naysayers who were impoverished because the Goddess Royal Splendor utterly abandoned them. If one resorts to this baldness, this sham-Law, and supports only himself, it is possible for him to subsist, but not to live.

Note that it is baldness (maundya) in particular that is called a shamLaw (dharmacchadman), initiated by unbelieving Naysayers (nāstika) contrary to the real contents of the Veda. This is interesting, because historically speaking Bhīma appears to be right. The fact that he says all of this may indicate that, when this passage was composed, this historical truth had not yet been completely forgotten. Part III, below, will show that the awareness of the “true” content of the Veda would take many centuries to completely disappear.

Arjuna, too, speaks about the non-Vedic nature of the ascetics who shave their heads in chapter 18: ²⁸

The bald ones in their ochre robes are bound by many kinds of fetters - they travel about in order to receive gifts, piling up idle enjoyments. Lacking understanding, they abandon the three Vedas and their livelihoods, and then they abandon their children and take up the triple staff and the robe.

But the sceptical attitude towards renunciation of these speakers is not matched by disbelief concerning rebirth. Most passages appear to take this for granted, and most speakers appear to be more interested in a good rebirth, in heaven or in this world, than in liberation from it. An example is the following verse, pronounced once again by Arjuna: ²⁹

Tradition teaches that asceticism and renunciation are the rule for gaining Merit for the next life for Brahmins, while death in battle is enjoined for Kṣatriyas.

One might think that Arjuna overlooks the fact that his brother does not wish to gain merit for his next life; instead he wishes to be liberated from rebirth. However, the distinction is not always clearly made in the portion of the Mahābhārata we are dealing with. We have already seen that at one point Yudhisthira declares his wish to become a hermit in the forest, spending his time performing Vedic rituals (Mhbh 12.9.4-6 & 10-11, discussed above). The passage concerned does not specify what aim Yudhisṭhira hopes to attain this way, but it is likely to be heaven rather than liberation. This may be concluded from the fact that a similar contrast between two forms of renunciation is found in the first book of the Mahābhārata where it tells the story of Pāṇụu. No longer able to live a normal family life with his wives, Pāṇụu initially decides to become a sage with a shaven head (1.110.7: munir mundah) and strive for liberation (1.110.6: mokṣam eva vyavasyāmi). He is then induced to change his mind, and decides to perform great austerities, live in the forest, eat fruits and roots, make offerings in the fire, wear matted hair, etc. (1.110.29-35); in brief, Pāṇụu accepts the same life-style which Yudhiṣṭhira initially evokes. But unlike Yudhiṣṭhira, Pāṇụu goes ahead with it, and “he soon won the road to heaven by his own power” (1.111.2: svargam gantum parākrāntah scena vīryena; tr. van Buitenen, 1973: 250).

This small collection of passages from the Rājadharmaparvan shows that most of the essential ideas concerning how to escape from this world that Brahmanism came to borrow from the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha are known to this text, though at times it may mix things up a bit. It is particularly interesting to see that some of these ideas and practices were still recognized as being non-Vedic in origin. Fatalism, for its part, if it is indeed derived from Ājīvikism, is known but not fully understood. Buddhism, too, appears to be known, but not understood.

CHAPTER IIA.3 - THE EARLY UPANIṢADS

The early Upaniṣads merit particular attention in our study of the way in which ideas from Greater Magadha came to be absorbed into the Brahmanical tradition. We will confine our attention to the early prose Upaniṣads, and try to understand the presence of rebirth and karmic retribution in them against the background of other aspects of Vedic thought.

The first occurrences of the new doctrine

The doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is, in the early prose Upaniṣads, associated with the names of Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya. The most important passages occur in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya and Kauṣitaki Upaniṣads. We will begin with the last one. ¹

A1 In KauṣUp 1 Uddālaka is instructed by someone called Citra Gāngyāyani or Gārgyāyaṇi. ² This teaching begins as follows: ³

When people depart from this world, it is to the moon that they all go. By means of their lifebreaths the moon swells up in the fortnight of waxing, and through the fortnight of waning it propels them to new birth. Now, the moon is the door to the heavenly world. It allows those who answer its question to pass. As to those who do not answer its question, after they have become rain, it rains them down here on earth, where they are born again in these various conditions-as a worm, an insect, a fish, a bird, a lion, a boar, a rhinoceros, a tiger, a man, or some other creature-each in accordance with his actions and his knowledge.

This paragraph teaches that those who do not possess a certain special knowledge-i.e., those who cannot answer the question asked by the moon-will be born again, “each in accordance with his actions and his knowledge”.

The Upaniṣad next explains in great detail what happens to those who can answer the question of the moon. We will have occasion to return to this part of the story below. Here we draw attention to some phrases which show what the special knowledge required consists in: “Freed from his good and bad deeds, this man, who has the knowledge of Brahman, goes on to Brahman”. ⁴ Later on in the story this man meets Brahman, who asks him: “Who are you?” He should reply, among other things: “You are the self of every being. I am who you are. […] you are this whole world.” (1.6). ⁵ Possession of this knowledge ensures that one is not born again in accordance with one’s actions and knowledge.

A2 Uddālaka is similarly instructed in ChānUp 5.3-10, this time by King Pravāhaṇa Jaivali. The king is initially hesitant to give this instruction for, as he puts it, “before you this knowledge has never reached Brahmins. In all the worlds, therefore, government has belonged exclusively to royalty.” ⁶ Here the order of presentation is reversed. The liberating knowledge is given first, followed by an account of those who do not possess it. The most relevant passages read (all in 5.10):

A2.1 Now, the people who know this, and the people here in the wilderness who venerate thus: ‘Austerity is faith’ - they pass into the flame, from the flame into the day, from the day into the fortnight of the waxing moon, from the fortnight of the waxing moon into the six months when the sun moves north, from these months into the year, from the year into the sun, from the sun into the moon, and from the moon into lightning. Then a person who is not human - he leads them to Brahman. This is the path leading to the gods. ⁷

The precise nature of the knowledge which entitles people to follow this path will be considered below. Note here that this path is the one trodden by those who will not be reborn. Those, on the other hand, who will be reborn are dealt with in the immediately following passage:

A2.2 The people here in villages, on the other hand, who venerate thus: ‘Gift-giving is offerings to gods and to priests’ - they pass into the smoke, from the smoke into the night, from the night into the fortnight of the waning moon, and from the fortnight of the waning moon into the six months when the sun moves south. These do not reach the year but from these months pass into the world of the fathers, and from the world of the fathers into space, and from space into the moon. This is King Soma, the food of the gods, and the gods eat it. They remain there as long as there is a residue, and then they return by the same path they went-first to space, and from space to the wind. After the wind has formed, it turns into smoke; after the smoke has formed, it turns into a thunder-cloud; after the thunder-cloud has formed, it turns into a rain-cloud; and after the rain-cloud has formed, it rains down. On earth they spring up as rice and barley, plants and trees, sesame and beans, from which it is extremely difficult to get out. When someone eats that food and deposits the semen, from him one comes into being again. ⁸

A2.3 Now, people here whose behaviour is pleasant can expect to enter a pleasant womb, like that of a woman of the Brahmin, the Kṣatriya, of the Vaiśya class. But people of foul behaviour can expect to enter a foul womb, like that of a dog, a pig, or an outcaste woman. ⁹

A2.4 Then there are those proceeding on neither of these two pathsthey become the tiny creatures that return many times. ‘Be born! Die!’ - that is a third state. ¹⁰

These passages from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad distinguish three kinds of living beings on the basis of the three different destinations that await them after death: (1) those who will reach liberation from rebirth, (2) those who will be reborn according to their actions, and (3) those tiny creatures that “return many times”, and appear to be confined to their lowly state of life.

A3 A variant of this last story occurs in BĀrUp(K) 6.2. Uddālaka is again instructed by King Jaivali Pravāhaṇa, who reminds him, once again, that “before now this knowledge has not resided in any Brahmin”. ¹¹ But the words used in this passage are not altogether identical. In the present context it is of interest to note that the journey of those who will not be reborn comes to an end in the worlds of Brahman and, the text adds, “They do not return.” The most important passages read:

A3.1 The people who know this, and the people there in the wilderness who venerate truth as faith - they pass into the flame, from the flame into the day, from the day into the fortnight of the waxing moon, from the fortnight of the waxing moon into the six months when the sun moves north, from these months into the world of the gods, from the world of the gods into the sun, and from the sun into the region of lightning. A person consisting of mind comes to the regions of lightning and leads him to the worlds of Brahman. The exalted people live in those worlds of Brahman for the longest time. They do not return. ¹²

A3.2 The people who win [heavenly] worlds, on the other hand, by offering sacrifices, by giving gifts, and by performing austerities-they pass into the smoke, from the smoke into the night, from the night into the fortnight of the waning moon, from the fortnight of the waning moon into the six months when the sun moves south, from these months into the world of the fathers, and from the world of the fathers into the moon. Reaching the moon they become food. There, the gods feed on them, as they tell King Soma, the moon: ‘Increase! Decrease!’ When that ends, they pass into this very sky, from the sky into the wind, from the wind into the rain, and from the rain into the earth. Reaching the earth, they become food. They * are again offered in the fire of man and then take birth in the fire of woman. Rising up once again to the [heavenly] worlds, they * circle around in the same way. ¹³

A3.3 Those who do not know these two paths, however, become worms, insects, or snakes. ¹⁴

As is clear from the above, those who do return make a journey that is not dissimilar to the one described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. ¹⁵ The difference is that here there is no reference to karmic retribution: to the idea that one’s future birth is determined by one’s earlier deeds. Moreover, the Mādhyandina version of A3.2, by leaving out the portion “They are again offered in the fire of man and then take birth in the fire of woman. Rising up once again to the [heavenly] worlds” (te punaḥ puruṣāgnau hūyante tato yoṣāgnau jāyante / lokān pratyutthāyinas; the portion is surrounded by asterisks [*] in the above translation), strictly speaking does not refer to rebirth in this world at all.

B1 Yājñavalkya’s ideas about rebirth and karmic retribution find expression in the two adhyāyas of the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad (3 and 4) which together are known by the name Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda. The first passage to be considered is part of a discussion that takes place at the court of King Janaka of Videha:

“Yājñavalkya”, Ārtabhāga said again, “tell me-when a man has died, and his speech disappears into fire, his breath into the wind, his sight into the sun, his mind into the moon, his hearing into the quarters, his physical body into the earth, his self (ātman) into space, the hair of his body into plants, the hair of his head into trees, and his blood and semen into water-what then happens to that person?” Yājñavalkya replied: “My friend, we cannot talk about this in public. Take my hand, Ārtabhāga; let’s go and discuss this in private.”

So they left and talked about it. And what did they talk about?they talked about nothing but action. And what did they praise?-they praised nothing but action. Yājñavalkya told him: “A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.”16

B2 The second passage from the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda that is relevant in the present context is part of the second instruction that Yājñavalkya imparts to King Janaka of Videha (4.4.3-5): ¹⁷

B2.1 It is like this. As a caterpillar, when it comes to the tip of a blade of grass, reaches out to a new foothold and draws itself onto it, so the self (ātman), after it has knocked down this body and rendered it unconscious, reaches out to a new foothold and draws itself onto it. ¹⁸

B2.2 It is like this. As a weaver, after she has removed the coloured yarn, weaves a different design that is newer and more attractive, so the self, after it has knocked down this body and rendered it unconscious, makes for himself a different figure that is newer and more attractive - the figure of a forefather, or of a Gandharva, or of a god, or of Prajāpati, or of Brahman, or else the figure of some other being. ¹⁹

[…]

B2.3 What a man turns out to be depends on how he acts and on how he conducts himself. If his actions are good, he will turn into something good. If his actions are bad, he will turn into something bad.

A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action. ²⁰

In the immediately following lines (4.4.5-7) Yājñavalkya explains in further detail the mechanism behind transmigration, and how one can put an end to it:

B2.4 And so people say: ‘A person here consists simply of desire.’ A man resolves in accordance with his desire, acts in accordance with his resolve, and turns out to be in accordance with his action. ²¹ On this point there is the following verse (śloka):

A man who’s attached goes with his action, to that very place to which
his mind and character cling.
Reaching the end of his action, of whatever he has done in this world -
From that world he returns
back to this world,
back to action. ²²

That is the course of a man who desires. ²³

B2.5 Now, a man who does not desire-who is without desire, who is freed from desires, whose desires are fulfilled, whose only desire is his self-his vital functions (prāna) do not depart. Brahman he is, and to Brahman he goes. On this point there is the following verse:

When they are all banished,
those desires lurking in one’s heart;
Then a mortal becomes immortal,
and attains Brahman in this world. ²⁴

B2.6 It’s like this. As a snake’s slough, lifeless and discarded, lies in an anthill, so lies this corpse. But this non-corporeal and immortal lifebreath (prāna) is nothing but Brahman, nothing but life. ²⁵

It is against the background of the idea of transmigration determined by one’s actions that we must understand the following passage, which is separated from the above by a number of quoted verses:

B2.7 This immense, unborn self is none other than the one consisting of perception here among the vital functions (prāna). There, in that space within the heart, he lies - the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all! He does not become more by good actions or in any way less by bad actions. […] It is he that Brahmins seek to know by means of Vedic recitation, sacrifice, gift-giving, austerity, and fasting. It is he, on knowing whom, a man becomes a sage. It is when they desire him as their world that wandering ascetics undertake the ascetic life of wandering. ²⁶

B2.8 It was when they knew this that men of old did not desire offspring, reasoning: ‘Ours is this self, and it is our world. What then is the use of offspring for us?’ So they gave up the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, and undertook the mendicant life. The desire for sons, after all, is the same as the desire for wealth, and the desire for wealth is the same as the desire for worlds - both are simply desires. ²⁷

B2.9 About this self (ātman), one can only say ‘not -, not -’. He is ungraspable, for he cannot be grasped. He is undecaying, for he is not subject to decay. He has nothing sticking to him, for nothing sticks to him. He is not bound; yet he neither trembles in fear nor suffers injury. ²⁸

B2.10 These two thoughts do not pass across this self at all: ‘Therefore, I did something bad’; and ‘Therefore, I did something good’. This self, on the other hand, passes across both those; he is not burnt by anything that he has done or left undone. ²⁹

In this instruction imparted by Yājnavalkya to King Janaka we find, in combination with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, the notion of a self that is not affected by actions. Knowledge of this self frees a person from the consequences of his actions, which are no longer his actions.

C It is remarkable that the various passages of the YājñavalkyaKāṇda give no specifications as to the kinds of rebirth a person can expect. From the instructions associated with the name of Uddālaka we know that one can be reborn as a worm, an insect, a fish, a bird, a lion, a boar, a rhinoceros, a tiger, a man, or some other creature, or again as a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya, a Vaiśya, a dog, a pig, or an outcaste; Yājñavalkya does not provide any information of the kind. The same is true of the teaching of Śāndịilya which occurs in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad:

Now, then, man is undoubtedly made of resolve. What a man becomes on departing from here after death is in accordance with his resolve in this world. ³⁰ […] “This self (ätman) of mine that lies deep within my heart - it contains all actions, all desires, all smells, and all tastes; it has captured this whole world; it neither speaks not pays any heed. It is Brahman. On departing from here after death, I will become that.” ³¹

This teaching is in fact too concise to be of much use in the present context. It is not clear whether it endorses rebirth, nor whether karmic retribution plays a role in it. Its resemblance to part of B2 above, on the other hand, cannot be denied, and it may indeed have inspired that passage (or vice-versa).

If we consider closely the passages where rebirth and karmic retribution are associated with the name of Uddālaka, we cannot fail to notice the critical attitude to traditional Vedic learning that is implicit in them (A1-3). ³² In all three of them Uddālaka’s son Śvetaketu, an accomplished Vedic scholar, is unable to answer questions asked by an outsider (in two of the three passages a king). Uddālaka subsequently becomes the pupil of that person, and learns things that no Brahmin had known before him (according to A2 and A3). The doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is a central part of this new knowledge. It is moreover a knowledge which Brahmins had to acquire from kings.

There are reasons to think that the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad was primarily composed to remove the stain of ignorance from the Vedic tradition; these reasons will be explained in detail in chapter III.4. Yājñavalkya is here presented as a Vedic Brahmin who possesses the knowledge of rebirth and karmic retribution without needing a king to acquire it. Quite on the contrary, Yājñavalkya teaches this knowledge to the highly respected legendary King Janaka of Videha. At the court of this king, moreover, he shames Uddālaka, who is nevertheless presented as his teacher in other parts of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The YājñavalkyaKāṇda, which is late, appears to have been composed so as to put some matters straight. Earlier legendary incidents connected with the name of Yājñavalkya are found here again, but modified so as to emphasize his superior knowledge of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution (of which there is no evidence whatsoever in all the other Vedic texts where he is mentioned).

Whether or not one accepts this understanding of the YājñavalkyaKāṇda, it can be stated that the presumably first references to the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in the prose Upaniṣads (and in Vedic literature as a whole) are those linked to the name of Uddālaka. These passages are explicit about the non-Brahmanical origin of this doctrine, as they are about the limits of traditional Vedic knowledge in general. If, on top of this, the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda must indeed be seen as a reaction to the stories centred on Uddālaka, it follows that the very earliest references to the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in the Veda-those that are connected with Uddālaka-are also the ones that state quite emphatically that this doctrine is a foreign intrusion into the Vedic tradition.

Rebirth and karmic retribution in relation to Vedic thought

The early Upaniṣads present the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in a Vedic garb. This indicates that the doctrine was “dressed up” so as to look Vedic. This Vedic presentation is no more than an external veneer, a clothing which does not really belong to it. A close reading of the passages concerned confirms this. ³³

Let us first concentrate on the “mechanism” by which rebirth is supposedly brought about. The account given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (A2) consists of two parts (A2.2 and A2.3) which could easily be separated from each other and which do not fit very well together. A2.3 simply points out that behaviour in the present existence determines the kind of life one can expect in the next. A2.2, on the other hand, presents the complicated voyage which a person makes after death in order to be reborn. This voyage passes through a stage “from which it is extremely difficult to get out”. ³⁴ This suggests that quite a number of travellers get stuck there, thus introducing an altogether different obstacle that has apparently nothing to do with the karmic retribution specified in A2.3. ³⁵

The parallel portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (A3) has nothing corresponding to A2.3, and therefore no explicit mention of karmic retribution. It does have something (A3.2) corresponding to A2.2, where it describes the complicated journey of those who are going to be reborn. This journey is not dissimilar to the one presented in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, but, unlike the latter, it does not appear to include any major obstacle.

It will be clear that in these two accounts the complicated journey that the person is supposed to make until his rebirth in this world on the one hand, and the doctrine of karmic retribution on the other, are strictly kept apart: the Chāndogya Upaniṣad does mention karmic retribution but in an altogether separate paragraph; ³⁶ the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad does not even have such a separate paragraph and as a result does not mention karmic retribution at all. Only the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad (A1) telescopes the two into one, so that we get a very condensed description of the journey after death to which, at the end, two adverbs are added: yathākarma yathāvidyam “each in accordance with his actions and his knowledge”.

We will see below that the journey which presumably links one existence to the next has parallels in earlier Vedic texts. The doctrine of karmic retribution, on the other hand, has none. The fact that the two have not yet been integrated in the texts under con-sideration-which are the earliest Vedic texts that mention this doctrine!-confirms that this doctrine has not arisen out of Vedic antecedents, but has rather been taken from elsewhere and added onto more or less adapted Vedic material. This means that the authors of the story of Uddālaka were right: these stories do contain something that had not been known to Brahmins.

It has already been pointed out that the instructions presumably given by Yājñavalkya and recorded in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad are of lesser importance in the present discussion. These instructions appear to have been invented at a later date, to some extent as a reaction to the events attributed to Uddālaka. It is therefore all the more remarkable that here, too, the references to karmic retribution are not properly integrated into their contexts. In Yājñavalkya’s discussion with Ārtabhāga (B1), to begin with, the doctrine of karmic retribution is added (in secret!) to an account of the vicissitudes of the dead person which is not obviously in need of this specific extension. In B2.1-3, karmic retribution sits very uncomfortably next to the comparison with a weaver who “weaves a different design that is newer and more attractive”. The self, it is added, “makes for himself a different figure that is newer and more attractive”. Karmic retribution, however, is far from merely making more attractive figures, given that “a man turns into something bad by bad action”; the next figure may hence be a lot less attractive. ³⁷ In B2.4, B2.7 and B2.10 there are veiled references to karmic retribution, but here the contexts do not provide any direct references to journeys which a person is supposed to make after death.

These reflections allow us to conclude that the notion of karmic retribution in the earliest relevant Upaniṣadic (i.e. Vedic) passages has been added to material that is devoid of it. If we now turn to the related question as to how, according to the same passages, karmic retribution can be avoided, we see that here the Upanişadic authors succeed decidedly better. Escape from karmic retribution could more easily be assimilated to Vedic concepts in various ways, and indeed it was. Paul Thieme, who subjected the part of the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad that deals with this issue (and that immediately follows the part reproduced in A1) to an in-depth analysis, had the following to say about it (1952: 35 [98]):

Ererbter Jenseitsglaube begegnet sich mit der neuen Wiedergeburtslehre; die naive Himmelsweltvorstellung altvedischer Zeit kommt zu Worte neben dem priesterlichen Weltbild, wie es die magische Spekulation der Opferwissenschaft entwickelt hat; der philosophischen Erkenntnis von einem einzigen Urgrund alles Seins tritt der mystische Glaube an eine Vereinigung mit einem höchsten persönlichen Gott zur Seite; neben der Hoffnung auf ein Jenseits, ausgestattet mit den Genüssen sinnlicher Seligkeit, erhebt sich die Sehnsucht nach dem Erlöschen der Individualität und schliesslich die Überzeugung des Asketen, dass es für den Weisen weder in dieser Welt Leiden, noch in jener Freuden gibt.

Clearly the Kauṣ̄taki Upaniṣad could use the new doctrine of karmic retribution as point of departure for the elaboration of an account of liberation which used a number of earlier Vedic ideas and materials. An earlier Vedic passage that was no doubt used is Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 1.18 (tr. Bodewitz, 1973: 54). Here, as in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad, the deceased person is made to answer the question “Who are you?”. It is likely that the author of the account in the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad found this portion of the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa all the more attractive in that it refers to good and bad deeds (the lifebreath announces to the gods: “So much good, so much evil has been done by him”). These deeds are not here connected with karmic retribution, a notion that is absent from this portion of the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa. It is nonetheless clear that a later author who looked for a peg on which to hang the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution found this reference to good and bad deeds useful. He maintained it in the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad, where it has an essential role to play, for clearly the person who seeks liberation from karmic retribution has to get rid of his good and bad deeds. This happens when the person concerned has crossed the heavenly river Vijarā: “There he shakes off his good and bad deeds, which fall upon his relatives - the good deeds upon the ones he likes and the bad deeds upon the ones he dislikes.” ³⁸

In the instruction of Uddālaka as we find it in the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads, liberation from karmic retribution is made to depend on the knowledge which is known by the name pañcāgnividyā “the knowledge of the five fires”. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad, which was explicit about karmic retribution, is equally explicit about the liberating effect of this knowledge: “A man who knows these five fires in this way […] is not tainted with evil […]”. ³⁹ In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad version the connection with karmic retribution is, once again, not made explicit.

The knowledge of the five fires has earlier Vedic roots, which have been traced by scholars. Schmithausen (1994), in particular, has argued that both the Upaniṣadic versions of the knowledge of the five fires ultimately depend on the one found in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (1.45), but that this earlier version has been modified under the influence of Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.6.2.6 ff. ⁴⁰ The knowledge of the five fires, even in its Upanisadic versions, has no intrinsic connection with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. One sees, once again, that earlier Vedic ideas and materials are hooked onto a doctrine with which they are essentially unconnected.

We may conclude, then, that the merger of Vedic ideas with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution has not succeeded all that well in the two versions of the instruction of Uddālaka by King Pravāhaṇa Jaivali that have been preserved in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads. The new doctrine remains a recognisably foreign element, and no attempt is even made to explain why precisely the knowledge of the five fires should be needed to escape from the results of one’s deeds. The parallel passage in the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad has succeeded somewhat better. The mention of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is not completely external to the instruction, as we have seen. What is more, the knowledge that frees the deceased from the consequences of his deeds is the awareness that he is identical with Brahman. It is not made clear why this particular knowledge should have that specific effect, and it is possible that the author(s) of this story were themselves not completely clear about it.

This changes with the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda. Here knowledge of the self comes to play an important role in the search for liberation. ⁴¹

On two occasions Yājñavalkya points out that Brahmins give up the desire for sons etc. and become mendicants when they know this self (BĀrUp(K) 3.5.1; 4.4.22). On four occasions he characterizes the self in the following words “He is ungraspable, for he cannot be grasped. He is undecaying, for he is not subject to decay. He has nothing sticking to him, for nothing sticks to him. He is not bound; yet he neither trembles in fear nor suffers injury.” (BĀrUp(K) 3.9.26; 4.2.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15). And in the second instruction of Janaka it is fully specified why knowledge of this self is so important in the context of karmic retribution: the self is here characterized as not being touched by good or bad actions (BĀrUp(K) 4.4.22 = B2.7-10). The realization that one’s self, and therefore the core of what one really is, is not touched by actions clearly frees a person from the effects of those actions, which are no longer his. This knowledge has taken its rightful place in Yājñavalkya’s teaching, but is completely absent from the story of Uddālaka’s instruction by a king in its Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣad versions, and remains ununderstood in the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad. ⁴²

A brief remark may be added about the teaching of Śāndilya recorded in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (C). This passage has to be marginal in our reflections, because its connection with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution remains doubtful and at best implicit. It is, in spite of this, of interest to draw attention to the research of Toshifumi Gotō (1996), who has studied the connection of this passage with the teaching of Śāndilya recorded in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (10.6.3). He sums up the outcome of this study in the following words (p. 83-84): “Aus den vorgelegten Betrachtungen dürfte klar hervorgehen, dass die im [Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa] belegte Lehre, die mit zusätzlichem innerem Ritual einen neuen Sinn in eine konkrete Ritualhandlung des Agnicayana hineinlegt, vom Verfasser der [Chāndogya Upaniṣad] in die Hand genommen und in eine Upaniṣad-Lehre über Ātman und Brahman umgestaltet wurde.” This suggests that here, too, we are confronted with an attempt to pour new wine-even though it is not clear whether this new wine has the form of the doctrine of rebirth, karmic retribution and liberation therefrom-in the old bottles of traditional Vedic material.

The self in the early Upanisads

The above analysis of the relevant Upaniṣadic passages strongly suggests that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, far from having arisen from preceding Vedic speculation, was added onto it. Initially this led to hardly more than a juxtaposition of views which obviously did not very well fit together. The Vedic authors apparently felt especially challenged in specifying what knowledge would free a person from the effects of his deeds. Since the Vedic tradition had always been proud of the special knowledge it preserved, they made major efforts to come up with the required knowledge. In so doing, unfortunately for them, they often missed the point of the new doctrine. Liberating knowledge concerned the fact that each person presumably has a core, his real self, which does not act and is not touched by deeds. Not until the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is this knowledge clearly formulated. The various stories of Uddālaka still come up with forms of knowledge that have no connection whatsoever with the new doctrine, but continue earlier Vedic ideas.

In a way this is surprising. Late Vedic literature, and the Upanisads in particular, have a great deal to say about the self, even though it is for reasons unconnected with rebirth and karmic retribution. What these texts say about the self is in most cases unconnected with this issue. But obviously, the two interests in the self might, and did, meet. The Upanisadic notion of the self evolved into the idea of a self that is not involved in the activity of its owner. This was often combined with a typically Upanisadic dimension, such as identity with Brahman. Let us look somewhat more closely at some of the passages that have not yet been contaminated.

In these passages the self often appears as representing the microcosm which corresponds to the macrocosm, usually the world as a whole. The frequent identification of the self with Brahman, the world-ground, is built on this correspondence. Many passages attest to this.

It is through the self (ātman), according to BĀrUp(K) 1.4.7, that one knows, or comes to know (veda), this entire world. This then gives rise to the following reflection: ⁴³

Now, the question is raised: “Since people think that they will become the Whole by knowing Brahman, what did Brahman know that enabled it to become the Whole?”

In the beginning this world was only Brahman, and it knew only itself (ātman), thinking: “I am Brahman.” As a result, it became the Whole. Among the gods, likewise, whosoever realized this, only they became the Whole. It was the same also among the seers and among humans. Upon seeing this very point, the seer Vāmadeva proclaimed: “I was Manu, and I was the sun.” This is true even now. If a man knows “I am Brahman” in this way, he becomes this whole world.

Nothing in this passage suggests that Brahman, or the self for that matter, is inactive. On the contrary, the immediately following passage explains that Brahman created a variety of entities, beginning with the ruling power (ksatra). The self (ātman), we further learn, is a world for all beings. For example, “when he makes offerings and sacrifices, he becomes thereby a world for the gods” (BĀrUp(K) 1.4.16). This self, moreover, being alone in the beginning, wished to have a wife so as to father offspring, plus wealth to perform rites BĀrUp(K) 1.4 .17 ). All this is quite the opposite of inactivity.

Consider now the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī as recounted in BĀrUp(K) 2, i.e., not in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda. The teaching on the self is here summed up in one sentence: “All these - the priestly power, the royal power, worlds, gods, beings, the Whole-all that is nothing but his self.” The self here described is deeply involved in the world - indeed, it is the world - and there is no hint that it does not participate in its activities. (The situation is different in the version of this dialogue that occurs in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda, for which see below, chapter III.4. ⁴⁴

The following passages further illustrate the idea that the self (ātman) is somehow identical or closely connected with the whole world: “This very self (ātman) is the lord and king of all beings. As all the spokes are fastened to the hub and the rim of a wheel, so to one’s self (ātman) are fastened all beings, all the gods, all the worlds, all the breaths, and all these bodies (ātman).” (BĀrUp(K) 2.5.15.) “The self, indeed, is below; the self is above; the self is in the west; the self is in the east; the self is in the south; and the self is in the north. Indeed, the self extends over this whole world. […] When, indeed, a man sees it this way, thinks about it this way, and perceives it this way-lifebreath springs from his self; hope springs from his self; memory springs from his self […] Indeed, this whole world springs from his self.” (ChānUp 7.25-26.) “From this very self (ātman) did space come into being; from space, air; from air, fire; from fire, the waters; from the waters, the earth; from the earth, plants; from plants, food; and from food, man.” (TaitUp 2.1.) “In the beginning this world was the self (ātman), one alone, and there was no other being at all that blinked an eye. He thought to himself: ‘Let me create the worlds.’ So he created these worlds […]” (AitUp 1.1.1.) “‘Who is this self?’ […] It is Brahman; it is Indra; it is Prajāpati; it is all the gods. It is these five immense beings - earth, wind, space, the waters, and the lights; it is these beings […]” (AitUp 3.)

Of special interest is a discussion in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (5.11-24) between on the one hand six Brahmins-among them Uddālaka Āruṇi-, and King Aśvapati Kaikeya on the other. ⁴⁵ The Brahmins are interested in the questions: “What is our self (ātman)? What is Brahman?” During the discussion it becomes clear that they have different opinions as to the nature of the self, thinking it to be the sky, the sun, the wind, space, the waters, and the earth respectively. The king improves upon all of them, stating: “Now, of this self here, the one common to all men-the brightly shining is the head; the dazzling is the eye; what follows diverse paths is the breath; the ample is the trunk; wealth is the bladder; the earth is the feet; the sacrificial enclosure is the stomach; the sacred grass is the body hair; the householder’s fire is the heart; the southern fire is the mind; and the offertorial fire is the mouth.”

Even the famous phrase tat tvam asi-famous because of its frequent use in later Vedānta-occurs in a context that shows that the correspondence between the self and the world, or even their identity, are at stake here, and not distantiation from the results of one’s deeds: ⁴⁶ “The finest essence here-that constitutes the self of this whole world; that is the truth; that is the self (ātman). And that’s how you are, Śvetaketu.”

The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda distinguishes itself from these other Upaniṣadic passages in that the correspondence of the self with the macrocosm plays no role in it. This was already observed by Reinvang, when he stated (2000: 152): “We should […] note that in the Yājñavalkya Section of [the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad], we find several verses defining ātman as something which can only be described in the negative. Whereas we, in what should probably be considered older levels of [the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad], have seen that the knowledge of ātman has been extolled as leading to autonomy and control over the world, we in [BĀrUp] 3.4.1, 3.7.22 and in the neti-neti formula, which is distributed freely across the Yājñavalkya Section (3.9.26/4.2.4/4.4.22/4.5.15), hear that ātman cannot be known. In these verses, ātman is the name of the basic reality which cannot be described in words and which is immutable. The macranthropic perspective is not really present, whereas the micranthropic is emphasized”. This changed conception of the self in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda is, of course, explained by the fact that the self has to play a different (and in Vedic terms: new) role in this portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

Note, to conclude, that not all early Upaniṣadic reflections about the self (with rare exceptions, such as those in the YājñavalkyaKāṇda) are variations on the theme of correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm. Some concern the subjective nature of the person. An example is ChānUp 8.7-12, which culminates in the following observation: “Now, when this sight here gazes into space, that is the seeing person, the faculty of sight enables one to see. The one who is aware: ‘Let me smell this’-that is the self; the faculty of smell enables him to smell. The one who is aware: ‘Let me say this’-that is the self; the faculty of speech enables him to speak. The one who is aware: ‘Let me listen to this’-that is the self; the faculty of hearing enables him to hear. The one who is aware:

‘Let me think about this’-that is the self; the mind is his divine faculty of sight. This very self rejoices as it perceives with his mind, with that divine sight, these objects of desire found in the world of Brahman. [^347] But here, too, there is no natural link with inactivity, which is confined to passages that have been influenced by the foreign ideas of rebirth and karmic retribution.

Vedic antecedents

The preceding pages have studied the earliest references to the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in Vedic literature. There are no earlier unambiguous references to it. We have seen that the Upaniṣadic references that are associated with the name of Uddālaka are explicit about the non-Brahmanical origin of this doctrine. The remaining references, which are associated with the name of Yājñavalkya, are all found in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda, a portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad which appears to have been composed in an attempt to counter the claim of its non-Brahmanical origin. The very fact that this attempt had to be made merely strengthens the suspicion that the stories around Uddālaka were right after all: the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution has a non-Vedic, non-Brahmanical origin.

We have also seen that in the early Upaniṣads the new doctrine was dressed up in a Vedic garb. Earlier occurrences in Vedic literature of this garb - or rather, these garbs - can be found, and we have drawn attention to some of these above. The question must now be raised where the garb ends and where the dressed-up doctrine begins. The Upanisadic passages themselves do not, of course, tell us exactly in what form the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution was presented by their “informants”, and which Vedic elements they themselves added on to it. It is not justified to assume more than the minimum with regard to these sources. By virtue of the fact that the adjunction of the new doctrine often remained external and superficial, the Upanisadic passages sometimes present it in a form that is free from any Vedic elements. Passage A2.3 (“Now, people here whose behaviour is pleasant can expect to enter a pleasant womb, like that of a woman of the Brahmin, the Kṣatriya, of the Vaiśya class. But people of foul behaviour can expect to enter a foul womb, like that of a dog, a pig, or an outcaste woman.”) is a clear example from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad; passages B1 (“A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action”) and B2.3 (“What a man turns out to be depends on how he acts and on how he conducts himself. If his actions are good, he will turn into something good. If his actions are bad, he will turn into something bad. A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.”) are good examples from the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda (and therefore from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad). If the early Upaniṣads borrowed the new doctrine from non-Vedic circles (as they themselves claim they did), it is not necessary to assume that they borrowed more than the basic ideas that find expression in these passages.

The passages which we have considered often combine the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution with notions about how one can escape from the cycle of rebirths thus determined by one’s deeds. A special kind of knowledge is required to attain that aim. It is understandable that the specifications of precisely what knowledge is needed are often heavily indebted to Vedic ideas. It could hardly be otherwise, for the Veda is, for the Vedic Brahmins, the repository of sacred knowledge. If we assume that the early Upaniṣads borrowed, along with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, also the notion that a certain kind of knowledge can set one free from the resulting cycle of rebirths, our chances of finding out what form that knowledge had in its original non-Vedic milieu look, at first sight, slim. And indeed, the story about Uddālaka’s instruction as told in the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads link it to a kind of knowledge (“the knowledge of the five fires”) which does have Vedic antecedents but no obvious connection with liberation from karmic retribution. However, we are luckier in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda. The instruction here attributed to Yājñavalkya introduces the notion of a self which is not touched by one’s deeds. This is even a recurring notion in this portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, as we have seen, and there can be no doubt that knowledge of this self is presented as a means of avoiding karmic retribution. In these passages the amount of Vedic traditional material is relatively small and easily discernible. If we remove it we arrive at a description of the liberating knowledge that undoubtedly accompanied the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in the milieu from which the authors of the early Upaniṣads took it: knowledge of a self which was conceived of as unchanging and completely unaffected by all one does. This makes sense, and this knowledge was certainly the liberating knowledge originally accompanying the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in its non-Vedic milieu. Some Upaniṣadic authors, notably the authors of the story of the instruction received by Uddālaka from a king, tried to put some kind of traditional Vedic knowledge in its place, but they did not succeed for long for the simple and good reason that this traditional Vedic knowledge had no obvious connection with the result it was supposed to bring about.

In view of the above it is hardly surprising that the efforts that have been made by scholars to identify the Vedic antecedents of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution have not yielded compelling results. Paul Horsch, in an article that in admirable fashion brings together almost all the research that had been done in this area until its date of appearance, still provides the following optimistic summary (1971: 155):

Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass die eigentliche Seelenwanderungslehre den älteren vedischen Texten von den Saṃhitās bis zu den Brāhmaṇas und Āraṇyakas unbekannt war […], dass in diesen Schriften jedoch alle wesentlichen Vorstufen des indischen Fundamentaldogmas zu finden sind. Daraus folgt der Schluss: die Lehre gründet ausschliesslich auf vedischen Prämissen, deren entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Ablauf sich in allen Phasen positiv erfassen lässt.

Twenty-five years later, Klaus Butzenberger (1996; 1998) takes the same position, but he obviously feels less certain for he covers his back in various ways: His “methodological positivism” (1996: 58), to begin with, is presented as a principle that presumably justifies leaving out of account possible non-Vedic antecedents. And the element “karmic retribution” is left out of consideration, ostensibly because “the earliest forms of [the doctrine] are still far away from the sophisticated precision and preciseness of the later theistic and philosophical systems” (1996: 59 n. 10 and 11). Herman W. Tull, in his book The Vedic Origins of Karma (1989), tries to get around the difficulty presented by karmic retribution by trying to trace it to Vedic ritual. Typically, Tull interprets Yājñavalkya’s statement “A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action” (BĀrUp(K) 3.2.13 = B1 above) as referring to ritual exactitude: good being equated with the correct performance of the rite, bad with the incorrect performance. He overlooks the fact that there is no such thing as bad ritual activity in the Veda; mistakes can be made but can then be corrected. ⁴⁸ Yet this oversight is at the basis of his argument: “It is this ritual substratum that scholars of an earlier generation failed, or were simply unwilling, to recognize in their examination of Upaniṣadic thought. Such lack of recognition, I believe, was at the base of these scholars’ inability to understand generally the origin of the karma doctrine” (p. 3). Not surprisingly, H. W. Bodewitz (1992; 1996) is convinced by neither of these two approaches, and comes to the conclusion that the new doctrine may not have arisen in ritualistic circles. Further, he makes the important observation that the assumption of a gradual development of the new doctrine within Vedic culture does not account any better for the Vedic evidence than the assumption of a gradual absorption from without.

It is unlikely that Vedic scholars will stop looking for “earlier forms” of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution in Vedic literature. There can be no objection to this, as long as they make no unjustified claims on the basis of this material. In practice they often come up with beliefs that are in some respects similar to the doctrine of rebirth without karmic retribution, and claim that these beliefs are the precursors of the doctrine of rebirth with karmic retribution that underlies religions like Buddhism and indeed the Upanisadic passages which we have studied. One example is a very short article “The earliest form of the idea of rebirth in India” by Michael Witzel (1984). It starts with the observation that “[i]t has frequently been denied that (traces of) the well-known theory of rebirth of the Upanisads and of Buddhism are to be found in early Indian texts such as the Ṛgveda”. This, the article claims, is not correct: “A number of stray remarks in various Vedic texts, however, reveal an early form of this idea”. As examples we find that “birds are regarded as being (magically) identical with the unborn children of the offering priest or householder (yajamāna)”, and other similar observations. “It is a small step,” the article continues, “to conceive the idea that the deceased take the form of unborn children and are reborn within their own family or elsewhere”. In spite of the claim that these beliefs are earlier forms of the beliefs that we find in the Upanisads and in Buddhism, the article concedes that ” [t]he concepts of a second death (punarmrtyu) and the connection of this simple form of the rebirth theory with the Karma theory are only to be met with in late Brāhmaṇa texts viz. the Upaniṣads” (my emphasis, JB). The karma theory is here, as in many other publications (cp. Butzenberger’s remarks cited above), treated as a minor and inconsequential addition to the “idea of rebirth”. By understanding it in this way the classical theory of rebirth and karmic retribution is deprived of what might be considered to be its most important part. Other scholars, among them Obeyesekere (1980), have observed that rebirth theories are very wide-spread in the world so that “[t]he Indian religious philosophers can be credited, not with the invention of the rebirth theory, but rather with transforming the ‘rebirth eschatology’ into the ‘karmic eschatology’” (p. 138). ⁴⁹ In spite of the omission of karmic retribution, Witzel’s article takes it for granted that these Vedic ideas are the precursors ⁵⁰ of the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, so that it reaches the following conclusion: “The Vedic texts thus provide several ‘stepping stones’ allowing to follow up the development of the ‘classical’ rebirth theory: an (also) Indo-European belief in birds as the souls of the departed ancestors and of unborn children, the fear of the second death (punarmrtyu), and the ahimsā and karma idea, the combination of which resulted at an unknown time (ca. the late Brāhmaṇa / early Upaniṣad period) in the creation of the ‘classical’ Indian theory of rebirth”. ⁵¹ One of the problems with this conclusion is that the Vedic stepping stones do not provide us with a clue as to how and why the idea of rebirth came to be connected with the theory of karmic retribution, a theory which in any case is still rather loosely connected with it in the earliest Upanisads. This problem is, of course, avoided if we assume that the “karma idea” co-existed with a belief in rebirth, not in the Vedic milieu to be sure, but in the culture of Greater Magadha from which it was borrowed by the Upaniṣadic sages.

By way of conclusion of this chapter a few remarks may be added. The first one concerns the so-called Vedānta system of philosophy. This system claims to be based on the Upaniṣads, and presents, in the name of those Upaniṣads, a vision of the world in which rebirth and karmic retribution play a major role. The antiquity of this system is far less great than has often been maintained. This is shown in Appendix I.

The second remark concerns Buddhism. Modern scholarship has been very keen to find traces of Buddhist influence in Brahmanical texts. ⁵² It may not have been looking for quite the right object. The passages considered in this chapter suggest that the influence of the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha is clear and undeniable in texts as varied as the Mahābhārata, the Dharma Sūtras and the Upaniṣads. The influence of Buddhism on these texts-if the passages considered can be looked upon as even approximately representatives of their kind-ranges from weak to non-existent. ⁵³ This fact, if it is one, calls for an explanation, which will not be attempted here.

PART IIB - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION IGNORED OR REJECTED

The fact that certain features of what was originally the culture of Greater Magadha, most notably the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, came to be adopted and indeed absorbed into the Brahmanical tradition raises some serious questions. Must we assume that the Brahmanical tradition accepted these foreign elements without any form of criticism? Was there no resistance against this infiltration which was to change Brahmanical culture almost beyond recognition?

These questions are important, and in urgent need of answers. It is however a priori clear that such answers may not be easy to find. We must never forget that the literary evidence we possess about early India is virtually limited to texts that have been preserved - i.e. copied and recopied generation after generation, century after cen-tury-by and for people who attached importance to them. This process of repeated copying worked as a kind of filter, which only let through what had the approval, or at least held the interest, of later generations. Texts representing points of view that had no followers in subsequent centuries are likely to have disappeared by the simple fact of no longer being copied. For this reason, our understanding of the intellectual and spiritual culture of early India has to be based on - i.e. constructed with the help of-a biased corpus of texts: biased in the direction of what subsequent generations considered correct or worth preserving.

About the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution we know that it became a common and generally accepted feature of Brahmanism in its more recent phases. If ever there were Brahmanical texts critical of this doctrine, we must expect that they have not survived in their original form. Moreover, it is but natural to expect that the later Brahmanical understanding of its past would leave no place for such critics.

The present Part IIB will study these issues. Chapter IIB.1, which is short, will draw renewed attention to some areas of Brahmanical concern that ignored the new belief and went on, perhaps until the end of the first millennium CE , as if nothing had happened. Chapter IIB. 2 will collect the textual evidence that shows that there was Brahmanical opposition to the new ideas that arrived from the culture of Greater Magadha. This opposition, too, stayed alive approximately until the end of the first millennium CE.

CHAPTER IIB.1 - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION IGNORED

We have seen that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution finds expression in some passages of the early Upaniṣads. This has often been interpreted to mean that this doctrine was being adopted by Vedic Brahmins at the time of those Upanisads, to remain part of their tradition for ever after. A closer look at the evidence soon reveals that the situation is not quite as simple as that. Far from being won over once and for all, the Vedic tradition - at least in some of its manifestations-turns out to have ignored these new ideas for a long time. A number of texts from the Brahmanical tradition that are considered later than the early Upaniṣads nevertheless show no signs of acquaintance with the new doctrine. An example sometimes cited is that of the Gṛhya Sūtras. Bodewitz, for example, makes the following observation (2002: 5): “Clear indications of the existence of a theory of transmigration and release are missing [in the second chapter of the Kausītaki Upaniṣad]. In itself this does not prove that this chapter cannot be late, since its contents belong to the sphere of the Gṛhya Sūtras which are late and nevertheless are silent on the modern developments which introduce classical Hinduism.” The Śrauta Sūtras present a similar situation. ¹ The Kaṭha Upaniṣad, which is believed to be later than the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads, records a discussion between Naciketas and Death in which the former states: ² “There is this doubt about a man who is dead. ‘He exists,’ say some, others, ‘He exists not.”’ Far from reminding Naciketas that the answer to this question is well-known, Death responds: ³ “As to this even the gods of old had doubts, for it’s hard to understand, it’s a subtle doctrine.” In its narrative portions the Mahābhārata presents a mixture of the two world views; to cite Brockington (1998: 246): “there occur at various points in the narrative both the older religious patterns based on sacrificial ritual, leading to svarga, and the newer patterns of worship, such as visiting tirthas, which are usually seen as leading to moksa and which are more prominent in the didactic parts […]” Peter Hill, in a study that concentrates on karma and related beliefs in the Mahābhārata, comes to the following conclusion (2001: 42): “What we see in the Mahābhārata is the coming together and working out of at least two separate traditions concerning human action and the afterlife. The first is the post-Vedic and pre-Hindu theory [of karma], the origins of which would seem to lie substantially outside of the orthodox Brahmanical tradition. The second is an earlier and fundamentally quite different Vedic tradition.”

The cases cited so far should not cause surprise after the discussions in preceding chapters. The meeting of the two cultures, we saw there, was a long drawn-out process, which perhaps was not completed even at the beginning of the Common Era. Some of the texts mentioned above may have been composed by authors who had barely, or not yet, come in contact with the new ideas. Far from ignoring those new ideas, they may not have known them.

A more interesting case, therefore, is that of the Mīmāṃsā, a school of Vedic interpretation that can reasonably be claimed to be the most orthodox embodiment of Brahmanism during the centuries following the close of the Vedic period. The fundamental text of this tradition is the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, and its oldest surviving commentary the massive Bhāṣya by Śabara. The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra appears to be old and may go back in its core to the late-Vedic period. Śabara’s Bhāṣya is much more recent, and may belong to the middle of the first millennium of the Common Era. In spite of its recent date, Śabara’s Bhāṣya, as has been observed by several scholars, ⁴ does not show any awareness of the notions of rebirth and karmic retribution. Indeed, while Śabara’s commentator Prabhākara still has no place for liberation in the seventh century CE, ⁵ meanwhile his other commentator Kumārila opens up to this idea at around the same time. The Jaina commentator Śīlānka, at the end of the ninth century, still maintains that the Mīmāṃsakas hold that there is no such thing as liberation. ⁶

All this fits in with the general picture developed above, according to which the belief in rebirth and liberation did not originate within Vedic Brahmanism but was borrowed from the culture of Greater Magadha. Vedic Brahmanism, far from being the source of these ideas, ignored them for perhaps as long as a thousand years after their first appearance in the Upaniṣads, at least in some of its manifestations. Seen in this way, the positions of Śabara and Prabhākara constitute additional evidence for the originally non-Vedic character of the belief in rebirth and liberation.

This simple and elegant way of understanding the spread in time of the belief in rebirth and liberation in India is jeopardized by certain ideas about the early history of the Vedānta philosophy. It is well known that the Vedānta philosophy - which is to be distinguished from the Upaniṣads upon which it claims to be based - played no role in the philosophical debates of the early centuries of the Common Era. This might be interpreted as evidence for its relatively late appearance. ⁷ In spite of this, a number of scholars are of the opinion that Vedānta as a system of philosophy was there right from the beginning, that is to say, right from the period immediately following the early Upaniṣads. This opinion is not justified by the available evidence. A detailed discussion of this evidence is to be found in Appendix I.

CHAPTER IIB.2 - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION REJECTED

The doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, then, far from being immediately accepted by all within the Brahmanic fold, took a long time to gain general acceptance. The most orthodox representatives of Vedic religion ignored it for some thousand years, counting from the moment these ideas found their way into the oldest Upaniṣads.

Did no one among the Brahmins protest against the introduction of these new ideas? The case of Mīmāṃsā is peculiar for, instead of voicing their disagreement with the new doctrine, its adherents ignored it for a long time. In the main Brahmanical philosophies different from Mīmāṃsā, on the other hand, this doctrine appears to be at the basis of their conceptual structure, so that we must assume that they had accepted this doctrine, probably right from the beginning. The question remains whether philosophically inclined Brahmins really had no choice but to submit to the new doctrine or to do as if it did not exist. Did no one protest, or criticize these ideas?

It is a priori unlikely, as has been emphasized above, that we will find many surviving copies of texts that are critical of rebirth and karmic retribution, even if they existed. This doctrine won the competition long ago, and texts that were critical of it stood no chance of being copied and preserved until today. The best we can hope for are passages in surviving texts that respond to such criticism, either by justifying the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution or by criticising its critics. The need to justify the doctrine may have been felt among adherents of non-Brahmanical religions, such as Buddhism and Jainism and among those segments of the philosophically inclined Brahmins who upheld it. The present chapter will show that such justifications, as well as criticism of critics, do indeed occur in the literature from an early date onward.

Criticism of rebirth and karmic retribution in anonymous literature Buddhism and Jainism present themselves as methods that deal with perceived difficulties that result from the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution: their practitioners did not want to continue the cycle of renewed births and deaths. Buddhism and Jainism provided radical (yet very different) solutions to the problem. It goes without saying that the belief underlying the problem - the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution - is not normally questioned in the texts of these two religions: those for whom this belief was not beyond all reasonable doubt would hardly give up all their possessions and leave their families in the hope of gaining liberation.

In spite of this, some of the early texts of Buddhism contain passages which clearly indicate that the truth of this doctrine was a concern for the authors of the canon. The Buddha himself, during the night of his enlightenment, is reported to have gained three knowledges, two of which consist of a complete experiential confirmation of the truth of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. This report occurs three times in the Majjhima Nikāya of the Pāli canon, and with minor variants in three texts belonging to different schools preserved in Chinese translation (Bareau, 1963: 75-91). The following is a translation of the Pāli: ¹

When my concentrated mind was thus purified, bright, unblemished, rid of imperfection, malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability, I directed it to knowledge of the recollection of past lives. I recollected my manifold past lives, that is, one birth, two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, twenty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, a hundred births, a thousand births, a hundred thousand births, many aeons of world-contraction, many aeons of world-expansion, many aeons of world-contraction and expansion: “There I was so named, of such a clan, with such an appearance, such was my nutriment, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my life-term; and passing away from there, I reappeared elsewhere; and there to I was so named, of such a clan, with such an appearance, such was my nutriment, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my life-term; and passing away from there, I reappeared here.” Thus with their aspects and particulars I recollected my manifold past lives.

This was the first true knowledge attained by me in the first watch of the night. Ignorance was banished and true knowledge arose, darkness was banished and light arose, as happens in one who abides diligent, ardent, and resolute

When my concentrated mind was thus purified, bright, unblemished, rid of imperfection, malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability, I directed it to knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings. With the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, I saw beings passing away and reappearing, inferior and superior, fair and ugly, fortunate an unfortunate. I understood how beings pass on according to their actions thus: “These worthy beings who were ill-conducted in body, speech, and mind, revilers of noble ones, wrong in their views, giving effect to wrong view in their actions, on the dissolution of the body, after death, have reappeared in a state of deprivation, in a bad destination, in perdition, even in hell; but these worthy beings who were well-conducted in body, speech, and mind, not revilers of noble ones, right in their views, giving effect tot right view in their actions, on the dissolution of the body, after death, have reappeared in a good destination, even in the heavenly world.” Thus with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, I saw beings passing away and reappearing, inferior and superior, fair and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate, and I understood how beings pass on according to their actions.

This was the second true knowledge attained by me in the second watch of the night. Ignorance was banished and true knowledge arose, darkness was banished and light arose, as happens in one who abides diligent, ardent, and resolute.

These two knowledges are followed by a third one, the knowledge of the destruction of the taints (āsava / āsrava), after which liberation is attained. The connection between this third knowledge and liberation is clear: in a way the Buddhist path to liberation is the path leading to the destruction of the taints. The first and second knowledge, on the other hand, have no obvious and intrinsic connection with liberation. Their presence here appears to serve a different purpose altogether. It attributes to the Buddha, at the moment of his deepest insights, a confirmation that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is true, and provides this doctrine with the highest seal of approval imaginable for a believing Buddhist. The fact that there was a need for such approval suggests that the early Buddhists were confronted with people who did not accept it. Our texts do not tell us who these people were.

Elsewhere in the canon, however, critical views of the kind countered by the first two knowledges are associated with concrete personalities, most notably Ajita Kesakambalī in the Pāli canon. ²

Consider the following passage from the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya: ³

Ajita Kesakambalī said: “Your Majesty, there is nothing given, bestowed, offered in sacrifice, there is no fruit or result of good or bad deeds, there is not this world or the next, there is no mother or father, there are no spontaneously arisen beings, there are in the world no ascetics or Brahmins who have attained, who have perfectly practised, who proclaim this world and the next, having realized them by their own super-knowledge. This human being is composed of the four great elements, and when one dies the earth part reverts to earth, the water part to water, the fire part to fire, the air part to air, and the faculties pass away into space. They accompany the dead man with four bearers and the bier as fifth, their footsteps are heard as far as the cremation-ground. There the bones whiten, the sacrifice ends in ashes. It is the idea of a fool to give this gift: the talk of those who preach a doctrine of survival is vain and false. Fools and wise, at the breaking-up of the body, are destroyed and perish, they do not exist after death.”

This passage looks rather confused, and we may assume that the authors or redactors of the Buddhist canon did not hesitate to exaggerate the opinions attributed here to Ajita Kesakambalī, so much so that it is difficult to believe that anyone ever held them in this form. Having said that, there are a number of elements in this passage that are clearly meant to be critical of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, among them the following: “there is no fruit or result of good or bad deeds”, “there is no next world”, “there are in the world no ascetics or Brahmins who […] proclaim […] the next [world], having realized [it] by their own super-knowledge”, “the talk of those who preach a doctrine of survival is vain and false”, “fools and wise, at the breaking-up of the body, are destroyed and perish, they do not exist after death”. It is not clear why to this denial of a next world a denial of “this world”, and of mother and father etc., is added. ⁴ This last denial seems to be contradicted by the observation that the “human being is composed of the four great elements” and that these elements each revert to their own domain. It is not our aim at present to analyse the opinions attributed to Ajita Kesakambalī in detail, but we are entitled to conclude that they include a fundamental rejection of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, combined with the idea that the human being consists of the four great elements and apparently nothing else.

Elsewhere in the canon a “wise man” is said to reflect in the following manner, focusing entirely on the existence of “another world”: ⁵

If there is no other world, then on the dissolution of the body this good person will have made himself safe enough. But if there is another world, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and Brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no other world: still this good person is here and now censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong views who holds the doctrine of nihilism (natthikavāda).

Note in passing that the position according to which no other world exists is here called natthikavāda, Skt. nāstikavāda.

A clear indication that critics of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution were known to the early Jainas can be found in the very first chapter of the Sūyagaḍa (or Sūyagaḍaṃga, Skt. Sūtraķrtānga), one of the oldest texts of the (Śvetāmbara) Jaina canon. Since this same chapter refers to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, it cannot be dated before the middle of the second century before the Common Era, and is perhaps more recent than that. ⁶ At the time of its composition there were people who rejected the notion of rebirth. The passage concerned reads, in Bollée’s translation: ⁷

Es gibt in dieser Welt nach der Lehre Einiger fünf grosse Elemente: Erde, Wasser, Feuer, Wind und als fünftes die Luft.

Das sind die fünf grossen Elemente. Daraus (geht) der Eine (hervor). In dieser Weise lehrt man sie. Wenn sie sich aber auflösen, geht das Individuum zugrunde.

It is clear from this passage that from the five gross elements one thing arises; the text does not specify what that one thing is. Jacobi (1895: 236) thought it is the ātman, the self, but this is not clear from the text. Bollée comments (p. 60): “Anders als Jac[obi], der bei ego an eine Allseele denkt, sieht Schrader (Philosophie [1902], S. 53) hierin das eine Bewustsein, das dem aus vielen Teilen bestehenden Körper gegenübergestellt wird. Sch[rader] ergänzt nur ‘Geist’. Meinen ego und dehin nicht dasselbe?” There is however a further possibility which no commentator so far has mentioned. The relationship between the whole and its parts has interested many thinkers in classical India. Some of these, most notably the Vaiśesikas, maintained that the whole (e.g., a jar) is a different entity from its constituent parts, and therefore single. Various texts in the Jaina canon show that they, too, accept the existence of wholes or aggregates as single entities. ⁸ According to this logic, the body is one (eka, ega) even though it is constituted of numerous parts. If this is the thought underlying the above passage, it merely states that a single body comes forth out of the five gross elements, but ceases to exist when those elements dissolve.

A few lines further on the same text has another passage that is of interest in the present context: ⁹

Jede Seele ist in sich (oder: individuell) vollständig. (Alle Menschen), ob Toren oder Weise, existieren nach ihrem Tode nicht (mehr). Es gibt keine zur Wiederverkörperung fähigen Wesen.

Es besteht weder Verdienst noch Böses, es besteht kein Jenseits. Durch die Auflösung des Körpers findet (gleichzeitig) die Auflösung des Individuums statt.

The similarity between this passage and some of the words attributed to Ajita Keśakambalin is clear, and there can be no doubt that the passages are not independent of each other.

It is hard to derive much detailed knowledge from this last passage of the Sūyagaḍa. One thing is however sure: at the time when the Sūyagaḍa was composed or before, there were people who held that living beings cease to exist at death. They believed this because a living being is no more than, or arises out of, the five gross elements, which dissolve at death.

A later chapter of the same text records the views of others who come to the same conclusion but in a slightly different way. They do not deny the existence of the soul but they do deny that the soul is different from the body. Jacobi (1895: 339-340) translates: ¹⁰

Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin’s surface is (what is called) Soul (jāva), or what is the same, the Ātman. The whole soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul), speak the truth. Those who maintain that the soul is something different from the body, cannot tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or circular or triangular or square or sexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft of heavy or light or cold or hot or smooth or rough. Those, therefore, who believe that there is and exists no soul, speak the truth. […]

A further indication that shows that some people were critical of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is a story that has been preserved in two different versions, one by the Buddhists and the other one by the Jainas. It is the story of King Pāyāsi (Buddhist) or Paesi (Jaina). It has been studied in great detail by Ernst Leumann in 1885, and by Willem Bollée in 2002, ¹¹ so a short reminder of the points relevant for us will do. The Buddhist version occurs in the Pāyāsi Sutta (no. 23) of the Dīgha Nikāya (DN II p. 316-358), which presents the contents of Pāyāsi’s thought in the following sentence: ¹²

“There is no other world, there are no spontaneously born beings, there is no fruit or result of good or evil deeds.” The Jaina version occurs in the Rāyapaseniya (Skt. Rājapraśnīya), which is one of the twelve Upāngas of the Śvetāmbara canon. King Paesi’s position is equally negative: confronted with a Jaina teacher who maintains that the soul and the body are different and not identical, he believes the opposite, viz., that the soul and the body are identical. ¹³ It is also clear that the king does not believe in existence after death. ¹⁴ In both versions the king engages in a long discussion in which all manner of situations are imagined or recalled that might prove the existence of a next world, or of the soul, but do not. The king concludes from these that the next world and the soul do not exist, ¹⁵ while his interlocutor has an explanation for each and every one of them. A later version of the story occurs in the Mahāvastu. ¹⁶

There is no need to enumerate all early passages that question the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. Only a few more can be mentioned here. The Carakasaṃhitā has a passage concerned with proving the existence of “another world” (paraloka). ¹⁷ The position criticized is formulated in the following manner: ¹⁸ “For there are some, attaching importance to perception, who claim that renewed existence (punarbhava) does not exist, because it cannot be perceived.” Echoes of the position that the Pāli canon ascribes to Ajita Keśakambalin are found in the Mahābhārata and in the Viṣnudharmottara Purāṇa; ¹⁹ in this last text this position is attributed to a lokāyatika king called Vena. ²⁰ The Rāmāyaṇa knows a Brahmin called Jābāli who denies the existence of another world (Rām 2.100.16: nāsti param). Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita (9.55) states: “And some say there is rebirth (punarbhava), others confidently assert that there is not.” The laukāyatikas mentioned in the Kāma Sūtra are made to say: ²¹ “People should not perform religious acts, for their results are in the world to come and that is doubtful.” In Āryaśūra’s Jātakamālā ch. 29 it is King Añgadinna of Videha who believes that there is no “other world”. In a passage from the Lañkāvatāra Sūtra the king of the Nāgas presents himself to the Buddha in the form of a Brahmin who states that there is no other world. ²² The Nyāya Sūtra provides arguments in support of former existences in sūtras 3.1 .18-26. ²³

None of these passages allow us to determine who exactly the critics of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution were. Kings figure rather frequently in these stories; this suggests that the royal court may in a number of cases have been the scene where confrontations with these critics took place. This is not very surprising, because we can be sure that representatives of different groups and convictions would all try to win the favour of the king, so that they were almost bound to meet each other at or around the court. Further details as to the background and allegiance of the critics of rebirth and karmic retribution are hard to extract from these sources. Fortunately the situation is clearer in the case of the Cārvākas mentioned in classical literature, to whom we now turn.

The Cārvākas

Classical and medieval sources indicate that criticism of rebirth and karmic retribution had taken shape in a school of thought whose followers are variously referred to as Cārvākas, Lokāyatas, Lokāyatikas, Laukāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas. ²⁴ This school of thought apparently had its own Sūtra text, attributed to Bṛhaspati, parts of which can be recovered from texts that criticize it. ²⁵ The original Bārhaspatya Sūtra was commented upon several times, sometimes by thinkers who developed the thought of the school into new directions. Practically all of the texts have been lost, and we depend on fragments cited by opponents and further characterizations also given by opponents. ²⁶

There is no need here to give a presentation of Cārvāka thought and its development. For our present purposes it is particularly interesting to note that an analysis of some of the testimonies that have come down to us allow us to draw certain conclusions as to who these Cārvākas were.

Note to begin with that the Cārvākas upheld a form of materialism, but not only that. Among their other positions the rejection of what is called “another world” is especially prominent; in practice this primarily concerns the rejection of rebirth and karmic retribution. The most often cited sūtra in this connection is: paralokino ‘bhāvāt paralokābhāvah “There is no other-world because of the absence of any other-worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self).” ²⁷ It shows that the rejection of the self was an element in the rejection of “another world”. And the rejection of the self was based on the view that the normal characteristics of the self, most notably consciousness, derive directly from the elements, so that there is no need for a self. ²⁸ Seen in this way, the materialist construction served the ultimate aim of rejecting rebirth and karmic retribution, rather than a love of materialism per se. ²⁹ This puts the Cārvākas in an altogether different perspective: their aim might primarily be negative and the point of view they were concerned to reject would be the belief in “another world”.

This way of looking at the school finds support elsewhere, too. The Buddhists were concerned with the intellectual threat coming from the Cārvākas, not because they denied the soul, but because they denied “another world”. They reacted by writing against this position, sometimes in independent treatises called Paralokasiddhi “Proof of another world / rebirth”, or in sections of larger treatises. ³⁰ Various Brahmanical authors admit that their concern to prove the eternality of the soul has as ultimate aim to show that there is life after death. ³¹

There is also an intriguing verse at the beginning of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika which reads: ³²

For the most part Mīmāṃsā has, in this world, been turned into Lokāyata. This effort of mine is made to take it to the path of the āstikas.

Ganga Nath Jha (1900: 2) translates this verse differently, saying that Mīmāṃsā “has been made Atheis[t]ic”; Kumārila’s effort is “to turn it to the theistic path”. ³³ This cannot however be correct. The Lokāyatas are here, too, those who deny “another world”, and the āstikas are those who accept it. ³⁴ This is confirmed by Pārthasārathi’s comments on this verse: ³⁵

Mīmāṃsā, though not being Lokāyata, has been turned into Lokāyata by Bhartṛmitra and others by accepting the incorrect position according to which there is no fruit, desired or not desired, of obligatory and forbidden [deeds] and many others.

Theism and atheism are clearly not envisaged here.

Who, then, were these Cārvākas? Our texts rarely express themselves on this question, and concentrate all the more on the arguments for and against their positions. However, there are some exceptions, to which we now turn. One passage to be considered is from Sīlānka’s Sūtrakṛtāngavṛtti, a commentary written towards the end of the ninth century ³⁶ on the Jaina canonical text Sūyagaḍa (Sūyagaḍaṃga; Skt. Sūtrakṛtāṅga). Sīlānka on Sūy 1.1.1.6 explains the words ege samanamāhanā (“Certain Śramaṇas and Brahmins”) as follows (p. 9): ³⁷

Certain Śramanas, viz. Buddhists etc., and Brahmins who are followers of the opinions of the Bārhaspatya.

The Bārhaspatya is the Bārhaspatya Sūtra, the classical text of the Cārvākas. Sīlānka indicates here that there are all kinds of Brahmins, some of whom are Cārvākas. The implicit suggestion is that the Cārvākas are all, or most of them, Brahmins.

If this suggestion looks at first surprising, a number of other factors support it. Jayarāśi, the author of the only surviving work (Tattvopaplavasiṃha) of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school that has come down to us, calls himself in the concluding verses bhaṭtasiī̄ayarāśidevaguru “guru Bhaṭṭa Śrī Jayarāśi Deva”. ³⁸ Another teacher of the school is known as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa. The honorific Bhaṭṭa indicates that these two were Brahmins, ³⁹ presumably Brahmin householders. ⁴⁰ To this can be added that two other Cārvāka thinkers, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, and perhaps also Udbhaṭa, appear to have written Nyāya works as well. ⁴¹ Udbhaṭa, moreover, was a grammarian in the Pāṇinian tradition besides being a Cārvāka, and perhaps also an Ālañkārika. ⁴² All these teachers had therefore strong links to Brahmanical traditions.

Śīlānka’s commentary has a further surprise in store. Under the immediately following verses of the Sūyagaḍa it discusses at length the positions of the Cārvākas. Most surprising is that under verse 11 it cites, in support of their position, a Vedic passage, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.12, which it calls “their scriptural authority” (tadāgama): ⁴³ “For this is their scriptural authority: ‘A single mass of perception, having arisen out of these elements, disappears after them: there is no awareness after death’”.

Śīlānka was not the only, nor indeed the first one, to connect the Cārvākas with this particular Vedic passage. ⁴⁴ The Āvaśyakaniryukti v. 600 speaks, in connection with the denial of the soul (jiva), of Vedic words that have been misunderstood (veyapayāna ya attham na yānasī, Skt. vedapadānām cārthaṃ na jānāsī). Its commentator Haribhadra (eighth century) cites the same Upaniṣadic passage in this connection (p. 161-62) and discusses it. Before him, in the sixth or seventh century, Jinabhadra does so in his Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. He refers to this passage in his verse 2043, and cites it in full in his own commentary (p. 354). The commentator Koṭyārya, comment- ing one or two centuries later ⁴⁵ on Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya verses 2404-06, cites this passage to show that the Veda sometimes agrees that “the other world” does not exist. ⁴⁶ Kumārila (seventh century) mentions in his Ślokavārttika someone “who concludes on the basis of the Veda that there is no self”. ⁴⁷ His commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra (eleventh century) cites here the same Upaniṣadic passage. ⁴⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭ̣a, who like Śīlānka wrote towards the end of the ninth century, cites the passage in the context of a Lokāyatika opponent who thinks that one should stop wasting one’s time talking about “another world”. ⁴⁹ Elsewhere in the same work Jayanta expresses concern that this Upaniṣadic passage might support the Lokāyata position. ⁵⁰ At the end of the seventh Āhnika he returns once again to this Upanişadic passage, connecting it with the pūrvapakṣa, then refers to other passages from the same Upanişad according to which the self does not perish, and comments that that is the siddhānta. ⁵¹ Malayagiri, in his Āvaśyakaniryuktivivaraṇa of the twelfth century, and the author of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha ⁵² in the fourteenth, still connect the Cārvākas with this passage. ⁵³

Let us remember at this point that according to Kumārila and Pārthasārathi the Mīmāṃsakas Bhartṛmitra and others had turned Mīmāṃsā into Lokāyata by accepting that there is no other world. This was presumably not very difficult. Śabara’s Bhāṣya discusses the meaning of “heaven” (svarga) under sūtras 6.1.1-2 and comes to the conclusion that heaven is “happiness” (prīti), not “a thing characterized by happiness” (prītiviśsṭa dravya). The popular notion according to which heaven is a very agreeable place where one goes after death is discarded. Put differently, in Śabara’s Mīmāṃsā the belief in “another world” is not at all obvious. Śabara’s Mīmāṃsā ignores everything that concerns rebirth and liberation; even its conception of heaven is compatible with a denial of life after death. Bhartṛmitra’s explicit denial was therefore hardly a revolutionary move within Mīmāṃsa. We should not of course conclude from this that Cārvāka thought was identical with the Mīmāṃsā of Śabara, Bhartṛmitra and others, but nor should we lose sight of the fact that the two had points in common. The distinction between Cārvāka thought and the Mīmāṃsā of Śabara is emphasized by the fact that the latter’s Bhāṣya contains a discussion which criticizes the Cārvākas. ⁵⁴

At this point we have to deal with a wide-spread misconception about the Cārvākas. They are often depicted as the greatest critics of the Vedic tradition. They are said to be characterized by “fierce opposition to the religious Weltanschauung which had sacrifices at its center”. ⁵⁵ A number of verses in Sanskrit are indeed attributed to them which ridicule the ritual and everything that is connected with the Veda. At the same time it must be admitted that the Buddhists and Jainas do not justify their positions with the help of Vedic quotations, and even Brahmanical philosophers other than Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins do not often do so; why then should the Cārvākas, of all people, justify their position with a Vedic statement? And what does the partial similarity of Cārvāka thought and some forms of Mīmāṃsā signify?

It is in this context important to recall Ramkrishna Bhattacharya’s following judicious remarks (2002: 599):

A look at the Cārvāka fragments collected to date reveals the fact that most of them are found in works written between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE. Although Cārvāka studies really began after the publication of the editio princeps of [the Sarvadarśanasamgraha], it should be noted that this digest rarely quotes any Cārvāka aphorism that can be taken as genuine. It only purports to give, both in prose and verse, the essence of the Cārvāka philosophy, not in the words of any Cārvāka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century Vedāntin understood it. Nor does he mention the name of a single Cārvāka work, text or commentary (which he does profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems in the same work). So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka works had disappeared from India even before Sāyaṇa-mādhava’s time.

This makes sense where the collection of fragments is concerned, but also in the reconstruction of the philosophy and, last but not least, in finding out what others thought of the Cārvākas. Authors after, say, the twelfth century had no direct knowledge of the Cārvākas and their ideas any more. They felt free to attribute to them all manner of positions which they disapproved of. An inspection of the Cārvāka fragments collected by Bhattacharya shows that criticism of the Veda and its associated practices are virtually confined to ślokas, most of which are only cited in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, a text which is no longer acquainted with the works and representatives of the school. Others are cited in other late works, or they are simply not connected with the Cārvākas, so that we have no grounds for assuming that Cārvākas in particular are meant. ⁵⁶ None of the thirty extracts from the commentaries in the collection of fragments says anything against Vedic texts and practices. Of the eighteen sūtras collected, two, according to Bhattacharya, deal with the rejection of Vedic authority. However, both these sūtras are only cited in Jayanta Bhațta’s Nyāyamañjarī, in a context which does not guarantee that these are sūtras at all. ⁵⁷

The anti-Vedic element appears to have been attributed to the Cārvākas later on, probably at the time when they were no longer around to show how inappropriate this was. It is hard to say with precision when this changed attitude towards the Cārvākas began. It was already there in the second half of the eleventh century, at the time of Kṛ̣̣na Miśra, the author of the allegorical drama called Prabodhacandrodaya. ⁵⁸ The Cārvāka in this drama cites several of the anti-Vedic ślokas ⁵⁹ which also the Sarvadarśanasamgraha associates with him. (It is noteworthy, however, that the Cārvāka in this play is a court philosopher and friend of the king, whereas the other heterodox doctrines appear in the form of ridiculous monks: a Jaina monk, a Buddhist monk, and a Kāpālika. ⁶⁰ ) Already before Kṛ̣ṇa Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra ⁶¹ did not hesitate to call the Cārvākas inferior to animals (because more stupid than them), but this may not tell us much about their position in society according to this author.

It is clear from the above that a prime concern of the Cārvāka philosophy was the denial of “another world”, without anti-Vedic overtones. ⁶² We have even seen that Mīmāmsā in one of its forms had been very close to this school of thought. We may conclude that the Cārvāka philosophy constitutes the Brahmanical reaction, still in classical times, against the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution that was slowly but certainly gaining ground. Indeed, the fact that there were Cārvāka philosophers right into the second half of the first millennium shows that the Brahmanical resistance stayed alive for a remarkably long time. It is of course a cruel joke of history that those who continued the Brahmanical resistance against outside forces came to be looked upon as the worst opponents of the Vedic tradition. This certainly happened long after their disappearance, and illustrates how complete had been the victory of those outside forces.

The probably earliest literary evidence for the existence of Cārvāka thought is found in a passage of the Mahābhārata. Since this passage is difficult and corrupt, its discussion has been relegated to Appendix II.

PART IIC - URBAN BRAHMINS

The preceding chapters have drawn attention to three different reactions to the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution within the Vedic tradition. To begin with, there are the passages in the early Upaniṣads, in the Dharma Sūtras and in the Mahābhārata which accept this new doctrine and present it as part of Brahmanical thinking. More recent texts continue this trend. Then there is the sacrificial tradition, most clearly embodied in the texts of the Mīmāṃsā school of Vedic hermeneutics, which ignores the new doctrine for some thousand years. And finally there is the Cārvāka school of Brahmanical thought, which vigorously criticizes and attacks the new doctrine.

These three positions, as we have seen, do not present themselves in complete isolation. The presentations of the new doctrine which are probably the earliest in the Upanisads occur in the different versions of the story of Uddālaka. They are parts of passages that are decidedly critical of the sacrificial tradition. Certain more recent Upaniṣads continue this critical current. The Mīmāṃsā school of hermeneutics, which is not by its nature critical of sacrifices, had to face-at some point in its history-the rival claims of the new Vedānta school of thought which presented itself as a better kind of Mīmāṃsā. To put it more precisely, according to these rivals Vedānta thought is the natural complement of traditional Mīmāṃsā, practised by sufficiently advanced individuals alongside, or instead of, Vedic sacrifices. The claims of Vedānta have misled many, including modern scholars, into thinking that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution had been accepted, right from the beginning, even by those most committed to continuing the sacrificial tradition. The Cārvākas, finally, have been treated worst by history. They ended up being depicted as the arch-enemies of the Vedic tradition, where in reality-historically speaking - they were the ones who made the greatest efforts to keep the tradition free from non-Vedic beliefs.

How do we explain these three altogether different reactions to the new doctrine? One can imagine the old sacrificial Vedic tradition succumbing to the lure of the new doctrine. Given the pre-eminent position in society which the Brahmins claimed for themselves, one can even imagine that the new doctrine provided them with a justification for this claim which they had not previously possessed: the Brahmins had earned their position in society through the good deed they had carried out in earlier existences. One can further imagine that members of the most traditional portion of Brahmanical society, those who were most committed to their traditions, were the last to succumb. But why this distinction between ritual Mīmāṃsakas on the one hand, and Cārvākas and their predecessors on the other?

As we have seen, we do not know how wide the gap was between ritual Mīmāṃsakas and Cārvākas. Kumārila complained in the beginning of his Ślokavārttika that Mīmāṃsā had largely been “turned into Lokāyata”. We do not know how exactly to interpret this remark, but it does suggest that the two schools were less distant from each other than we might be tempted to think in the light of the critical attacks on the Cārvākas in more recent literature. Yet the two are clearly not the same, and the question remains why the Brahmanical reaction to the invading doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution took these two different shapes.

The material at our disposal may not allow us to answer this question with certainty. It is however likely that the difference between ritual Mīmāṃsakas and explicit critics of the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is to be connected with the opposition between rural life and city life. We will see in chapter III. 5 that traditional Brahmanism detested urban life. The most ardent adherents of the Vedic sacrificial tradition no doubt lived in the countryside, far from the cities. Ritual Mīmāṃsā had its roots there. However, not all Brahmins lived in the countryside. From around 500 BCE onward, kings began to rule their kingdoms from courts and capitals, and these courts and capitals attracted Brahmins, i.e., certain Brahmins, as well as others. ¹ The present chapter will give a brief sketch of those urban Brahmins.

This second urbanization (to be distinguished from the first one, connected with the earlier Indus civilization) flourished from 200 BCE onward. The Brahmins of the cities aspired to positions such as that of purohita or councillor to the king or engaged in other activities. These were the Brahmins who wrote, and read, the Artha Śāstra, the Kāma Sūtra, the courtly literature which has been preserved, and no doubt much beside. Information about these urban Brahmins, and about the privileges they felt entitled too, can be obtained from the Artha Śāstra. Kangle (1965: 144 f.) sums it up in the following words:

[S]pecial privileges are intended for [the Brahmin], particularly for a Śrotriya, that is, a Brahmin learned in the Vedas. It is recommended, for example, that land free from taxes and fines should be granted to a Śrotriya, just as such lands are to be granted to the priests and preceptors of the ruler (2.1.7). It is also laid down that the property of a Śrotriya, even when he dies without an heir, cannot escheat to the state like the property of other citizens (3.5.28). Brahmins in general are, it seems, to be exempted from payment at ferries and pickets (3.20.14). In many cases, punishment for offences is made dependent on the varna of the offender. In cases of abuse, defamation, assault etc., an ascending scale of fines is prescribed in accordance with the offender’s varna (Chapters 3.18 and 3.19). […] Discrimination on the basis of varna is referred to in connection with the oath to be administered to witnesses (3.11.34-37), in the matter of inheritance by sons born of wives belonging to different varnas (3.6.17-20) and so on. Again, the varnas are to occupy different residential areas in the city, the Brahmins in the north, the Ksatriyas in the east and so on (2.4.915). It is also laid down that in social matters seniority shall be fixed from the Brahmin downwards. And the Brahmin is declared to be free to refuse contributions to common festivals and yet entitled to take full part in them (3.10.43-44). There can be no doubt about the high status enjoyed by the Brahmin as such, or about the privileges and concessions reserved for him.

It is more than likely that the Artha Śāstra paints far too attractive a picture of the privileges of the Brahmins, but this is undoubtedly due to the fact that Brahmins were involved in trying to influence public life at and around the royal court; they had to convince the king that it was his task to install and maintain “the law laid down in the Vedic lore which is beneficial, as it prescribes the respective duties of the four varnas and the four āśramas”. ² They may or may not have obtained all the privileges they wanted, but the fact that is important for us is that they were there, at the courts and in the cities. These were urban Brahmins, and we may be well advised not to confuse them with those other Brahmins who stayed as far as possible from urban centres, in the countryside where they stuck to their Vedic traditions.

In this connection it is interesting to consider the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana. This is clearly a Brahmanical text, which traces its ancestry to the Brahmanical god Prajāpati and the Upaniṣadic seer Auddālaki Śvetaketu (1.1.5-9). ³ It grants certain privileges to Brahmins who know the Veda (śrotriya), such as its rule that the wife of such a Brahmin cannot be taken as lover by someone else. ⁴ Successful courtesans are presented as offering thousands of cows to Brahmins. ⁵ One of its chapters is called Catuḥsaṣti “sixty-four”; the Kāma Sūtra points out that some see a link with the Ṛgveda here: the Ṛgveda, too, is called Catuḥsaṣti. ⁶ It is also a text which deals with urban dwellers: the man-about-town (nāgaraka; tr. Doniger and Kakar) plays a central role in it (and provokes the envy of village dwellers ⁷ ).

The text begins with “a bow to dharma, artha and kāma” (1.1.1: dharmārthakāmebhyo namah). These are the three traditional “aims of man” (puruṣārtha), to which a fourth, liberation (moksa), is sometimes added, ⁸ though not in the Kāma Sūtra. The Kāma Sūtra appears to have no place for liberation, for the first sūtra of its second adhyāya states that a man should cultivate the trivarga, i.e. the three aims called dharma, artha and kāma, during different periods of his life. ⁹ The sūtras that follow immediately specify what is meant: Arthas in the form of acquisition of knowledge etc. are cultivated in childhood; ¹⁰ pleasure (käma) is pursued in youth. ¹¹ The next sūtra 1.2.4, which we will consider below, assigns, as expected, the cultivation of dharma to old age. The remainder of the adhyāya-sūtras 1.2.7-41deals at length with these three aims of life, which are defined and whose relative importance vis-à-vis each other is discussed. There is here clearly no place for moksa.

The trivarga consisting of artha, dharma and kāma plays a role also elsewhere in the Kāma Sūtra. Sūtra 1.1.5 mentions a work composed by Prajāpati after he had created the creatures that deals with these three aims. Sūtras 6.6 .5 ff . refer back to these three and then enter upon a discussion of their opposites, anartha, adharma, and dvesa. Once again one has the impression that there is no place for moksa in this text.

With all this in mind we consider sūtra 1.2.4. We noted already that this sūtra, as expected, assigns the cultivation of dharma to old age. However, it does more: it assigns the cultivation of dharma and moksa to old age. ¹² This is surprising, and, in view of the above, it seems likely that moksa is an intruder in this sūtra. Three items had been announced - viz. the trivarga consisting of artha, kāma and dharma - and four are delivered. That the fourth one is moksa provides serious grounds for suspecting that this item has been added to a text which originally was without it. If this is correct, the original reading of sūtra 1.2.4 was sthāvire dharmam; adding moksaṃ ca was easy and reassuring in a later age when moksa had gained a solid foothold in the list of human aims. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the notion of liberation from rebirth does not come up anywhere else in the Kāma Sūtra. ¹³

And yet, the author of the Kāma Sūtra must have known that there were people who accepted the aim of liberation from rebirth for he mentions people for whom this was the ultimate goal. Sūtra 4.1.9, for example, presents an enumeration that contains the terms śramaṇa “female śramaṇa” and kṣapaṇa “Buddhist or Jaina nun”; a good wife should not consort with them. Sūtra 5.4.43 mentions a ksapaṇikā “Buddhist or Jaina nun” and a tāpas̄̄ “female ascetic”. ¹⁴ Sūtra 1.5.23 mentions the pravrajitā “female wandering ascetic” as a possible sexual partner according to Suvarnanābha; sūtra 1.5.29 mentions this same pravrajitā as agamyā “not eligible to be a lover”. ¹⁵ According to sūtra 5.5.8, the pravrajitā is an easy prey for a headman called sūtrādhyaksa. ¹⁶ The Buddhist or Jaina nun, at any rate, belonged to a religious movement in which liberation from rebirth stood central. The same may, but does not have to be true of the movements to which the śramanā and the pravrajitā belonged. Interestingly, the Kāma Sūtra enumerates a number of males practising religious restraints, sexual restraint among them, as potential targets for a courtesan. Most notably, these include the śrotrya, the brahmacārin, the dīksita, the vratin, and the lingin. ¹⁷ None of these terms necessarily refers to a man belonging to a movement in which liberation played a role.

What does the Kāma Sūtra have to say about the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution? To the best of my knowledge there are no direct references to this belief in the text, and certainly no passages that compel us to accept that its author accepted it. In this connection it is interesting to see what the text says about dharma, because accumulating dharma is often thought of as the way to secure a good rebirth. The Kāma Sūtra defines dharma in the following manner: ¹⁸ “Dharma consists in engaging, as the texts decree, in sacrifice and other such actions that are disengaged from material life, because they are not of this world and their results are invisible; and in refraining, as the texts decree, from eating meat and other such actions that are engaged in material life, because they are of this world and their results are visible. A man learns about it from sacred scripture and from associating with people who know about dharma.” This conception of dharma is close to the one current in Mīmāṃsā (recall that the very first Mīmāṃsā sūtra reads athāto dharmajijñāsā̄); we have seen that Mīmāṃsā had no place for mokṣa and rebirth until a date long after the composition of the Kāma Sūtra. ¹⁹ It is tempting to conclude that the Kāma Sūtra had no place for rebirth either.

A later sūtra in the same sub-chapter (1.2.25) explains why dharmas (the plural is here used) should be performed: ²⁰ “Vātsyāyana says: People should perform dharmas, because the text cannot be doubted; because, sometimes, black magic and curses are seen to bear fruit; because the constellations, moon, sun, stars, and the circle of planets are seen to act for the sake of the world as if they thought about it first; because social life is marked by the stability of the system of the varnas and äśramas; and because people are seen to cast away a seed in their hand for the sake of a crop in the future.” This sūtra clearly gives reasons to reassure those who are worried about the fact that the results of dharma are invisible, as pointed out in the earlier sūtra. The mention of äśramas in this sūtra is interesting. If the four äśramas are meant, one might be tempted to conclude from this that, at least theoretically, liberation played a role in the world view of Vātsyāyana: the fourth āśrama is often associated with this notion. However, we will see below that the Artha Śāstra, in spite of explicitly enumerating the four äśramas, shows no interest whatsoever in liberation, and accepts those who do not accept it. The mention of äśramas in the Kāma Sūtra is therefore no proof that its author accepted the notions of rebirth, karmic retribution and liberation.

Some further passages in the Kāma Sūtra have been interpreted as indicating that Vātsyāyana accepted the belief in rebirth. In reality they do no such thing. Doniger & Kakar (2002: 140), for example, translate sūtra 6.2.54 in the following manner: “On the occasion of making funeral offerings for reincarnation in other bodies she says, ‘And let him alone be mine!’”. This translation suggests that belief in reincarnation in other bodies is taken for granted. The Sanskrit is more ambiguous. The whole phrase “on the occasion of making funeral offerings for reincarnation in other bodies” translates the single Sanskrit word aurdhvadehikeṣu. The commentator Yaśodhara sees here indeed a reference to a future life (janmāntare), but this interpretation is far from certain, and can easily be explained by the fact that Yaśodhara lived almost a thousand years later, at a time when the belief in reincarnation had become generally accepted. Dictionaries give for aurdhvadehika the meanings “funeral ceremony”, and for ürdhvadeha (from which it is derived by P. 4.3.60 vt. 1) “a body gone above or into heaven, a deceased one” (Monier-Williams) and “a funeral ceremony” (Apte). In the sūtra (sa eva ca me syād ity aurdhvadehikeṣu vacanam) the translation “funeral offerings” is no doubt correct, but there is no obvious reference to reincarnation in other bodies. ²¹

Sūtra 6.2.72 is translated in the following manner by Doniger & Kakar (p. 141): “To a man who is attached to her she says that she will follow him even beyond death.” A note on p. 207 explains: “To follow him beyond death means to die a natural death after his death and wait to be joined with him in heaven or in the next rebirth”. The original Sanskrit is a lot less specific: saktasya cānumaranaṃ brūyāt. The term anumarana does not necessarily mean here “mounting his funeral pyre alive to burn to death with his corpse”, as Doniger & Kakar rightly point out. Schmidt’s (1897: 406) translation, once again, manages to render the original without introducing possibly foreign notions into the text; it reads: “Dem Hingegebenen gelobe sie Treue bis in den Tod”. Here, too, there is no obvious reference to a next rebirth. Mylius (1987: 139) translates, similarly: “Hängt er (ganz an ihr, ver)spreche sie (ihm) ein Folgen in den Tod.”

Doniger & Kakar (2002: xiv, 208) think there is intended irony in the use of the word moksa in sūtras 6.3.44-45 to designate the release of a man from a courtesan’s thrall. This is far from obvious. This word is not used exclusively to refer to a person’s spiritual release from the world of transmigration, as Doniger & Kakar suggest, not even in the Kāma Sūtra. Sūtra 3.4.46 uses the word in a compound which means “freeing from the state of childhood” (bäla-bhāva-moksa), i.e., defloration. Sūtra 6.2.38 has deśa-mokṣa in the sense of “leaving the country”. If one is to suspect irony in one of these cases, one must suspect it in all. There is no real reason to think that there is irony in any of them.

We must conclude that it remains an open question whether the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution was accepted by the author of the Kāma Sūtra. Even if we accept, against all contextual evidence, that the words moksaṃ ca in sūtra 1.2.4 are original and no later insertion into the text, it is clear that liberation played, at best, a totally marginal role in the religious vision of Vātsyāyana. The objection that liberation has no link with the subject-matter of the Kāma Sūtra, which is pleasure, could with the same force be made with regard to the other human goals, artha and dharma; these two yet receive much more attention than moksa, and the fact that the trivarga-which includes artha, kāma and dharma, but not moksa-is a frequently recurring theme in the Kāma Sūtra, confirms that moksa was not a necessary part of the religious convictions of its intended readership. The text stops short of rejecting the validity of moksa, to be sure. But even lip-service appears to have been more than Vātsyāyana was willing to pay to this notion.

At this point it will be interesting to return to the Artha Śāstra, like the Kāma Sūtra a Brahmanical text which we can safely assign to the urban milieu. This text, too, envisages a society in which the rules of the four varnas and äśramas prevail. ²² The four äśramas are enumerated and described in 1.3.9-12, from which it is clear that they do not constitute consecutive stages but choices. ²³ Artha Śāstra 1.3.14 specifies what the special duties (svadharma) of the four varnas and äśramas are good for: ²⁴ “[Observance of] one’s own special duty leads to heaven and endlessness.” The expression endlessness (änantya) is strange in this context. Kangle (1972: 8) explains it as follows: “änantya: this is mentioned over and above svarga ‘heaven’, and hence obviously indicates the ‘endless’ bliss of moksa.” Kangle may or may not be right in this. If he is, we are struck by the unusual and ambiguous manner in which liberation is referred to in a context which would demand more clarity. What is more, the passage that presents the parivräjaka, who embodies the fourth äśrama, does so in a manner which does not answer the question why he makes the effort: ²⁵ “[The special duties] of the parivräjaka are: having full control over the senses, refraining from activity, being without any possessions, giving up all attachments, keeping the vow of begging alms, residing in various places and in the forest, and observing external and internal cleanliness.” The concerns of the parivräjaka are clearly far removed from those of the author of the Artha Sāstra, so much so that even lip-service to the goal of liberation is too much effort, even in a context where religious seekers are presented who spend their life trying to attain this goal. Once again, this negligence cannot be explained by the fact that liberation is not the subject-matter of the Artha Sāstra. Dharma and kāma are not its subject-matter either, yet they figure repeatedly in the text, and are joined up with artha in the trivarga (1.7 .4 ; 9.7.60).

The Artha Sāstra mentions the parivrā̄aka again in a passage which explicitly enumerates the other three goals of man, but omits, once again, liberation. It reads: ²⁶ “For the Rod (daṇda), used after full consideration, endows the subjects with dharma, artha and kāma. Used unjustly, whether in passion or anger, or in contempt, it enrages even vänaprasthas and parivrājakas, how much more then the householders?” It would have been thoughtful in this passage to include moksa, in view of the fact that at least some parivrājakas were not, or not primarily, interested in dharma, artha and kāma. This strange omission reminds us, once again, that the author of (this part of) the Artha Śāstra was apparently not interested in moksa, and indeed, may not have believed in it.

Let us remember at this point that for the Artha Śāstra, as Kangle (1965: 119) rightly points out, “the Vedic religion is to be the state religion” and ” [t]he preservation of the Vedic social order is […] a duty laid on the ruler”. This Vedic religion, as we have seen above, was in some of its manifestations not much interested in the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, and some of its representatives were plainly against it. It is the sceptical, or at best distant, attitude of many Brahmins that finds expression in both the Artha Śāstra and the Kāma Sūtra. Their ideal order of society might tolerate seekers of moksa as a goal but their texts do not yet accept, even in theory, this goal as one to which everything else has to be subordinated.

This observation is supported by the way in which the Artha Śāstra presents the Lokāyata. Lokāyata is here one of the three disciplines that together make up ānvīkṣikī, “investigative science” in the interpretation of Paul Hacker. ²⁷ Ānvīkṣikī is the first of four “sciences” (vidyā), viz., “investigative science” (ānvīkṣikī), “science of the three Vedas” (trayī), “science of material welfare” (8), and “science of government and politics” (dandanīti). ²⁸ The three disciplines that make up ānvīkṣikī are Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. ²⁹ Yoga, as is common in early texts, may refer to Nyāya. ³⁰ It follows that Sāṃkhya, Lokāyata and probably Nyāya are presented here as investigative sciences (ānvikssikī). No more is said about Lokāyata, but the very fact that it is presented along with Sāṃkhya and presumably Nyāya allows us to conclude that it was a more or less systematized form of thought, in all likelihood the same system of thought (or its predecessor) which we studied in the preceding chapter. There is, moreover, a reason to think that already at the time of (this portion of) the Artha Śāstra, Lokāyata rejected the existence of the soul and of rebirth, as it does in the more recent manifestations which we have studied.

This reason is as follows. The Nyāya Bhāṣya under sūtra 1.1.1 refers to “these four sciences”-presumably ānvīkṣikī, trayī, vārttā, and daṇḍanīti-and adds the claim that the fourth (!), ānvīkṣikī, is identical with Nyāya. We noticed above that Nyāya may already have had a place under ānvīkṣikī in the Artha Śāstra, besides Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata. In the Nyāya Bhāṣya these competitors are removed, so that only Nyāya remains. But the Nyāya Bhāṣya does more. It emphasizes in the very next sentence that Nyāya is a form of adhyātmavidyā “science of the self”. ³¹ This makes sense if there is an implied contrast with something that claimed to be ānvīksikī, viz. Lokāyata, but which rejected the existence of the self.

For our present purposes it is of interest to note that Lokāyata is here presented besides Sāṃkhya and (presumably) Nyāya as an equivalent partner. Yet Sāṃkhya and Nyāya are “sciences of the self” and as such involved in the quest for liberation. ³² The author of the Artha Śāstra chose no position against Lokāyata. This would imply that he had no fundamental objections against those who rejected the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, and may conceivably even have agreed with them. He did in any case not take side in the intra-Brahmanical debate that opposed proponents and opponents of this specific belief. This may be taken to support the view that its was the urban milieu which was the most fruitful soil for the Cārvāka philosophy, i.e., for those Brahmins who had left the rural milieu favoured by their tradition, but who were yet not willing to adopt the new ideology that had come from the east.

PART III - CHRONOLOGY

CHAPTER III.0 - INTRODUCTION

The preceding Parts I and II have systematically avoided questions of late-Vedic chronology. These questions are nevertheless relevant to some of the issues discussed. Part III will fill this lacuna. By way of introduction I present here, in an admittedly oversimplified and somewhat dated form, the ideas about Vedic chronology which have found wide-spread acceptance so far and which are still widely held. These ideas will then be subjected to a critical evaluation, which will show that they are based on weak foundations. An indepth analysis of the situation will subsequently be provided in the following chapters.

The “classical” position can be presented in the following schematic manner. ¹ Two historical personalities play key-roles: the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, on the one hand, and Pānini, the great grammarian, on the other. Vedic literature is assumed to be older than both of them. ² The conclusion often drawn is that the old Upaniṣads belong more or less to the seventh century BCE, the Vedic Brāhmaṇas to a time around 800 BCE, the Saṃhitās to around 1000 BCE, and the Ṛgveda to around 1200 BCE. This is one of the more modest calculations of Vedic dates that one finds in the secondary literature. All dates are approximate.

The arguments which are supposed to justify these approximate dates do not stand up to criticism, as will be clear from the following analysis.

The following two arguments centre on the Buddha:

Already the oldest Buddhist texts presuppose the Veda. The Buddha must have lived around the year 500 BCE. The Veda must therefore be older than that.
Buddhism presupposes the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. Indeed, Buddhism teaches a way to escape from rebirth. Vedic literature, on the other hand, does not know this doctrine except in its most recent parts, the early Upaniṣads. These Upaniṣads must therefore be older than the Buddha, and have to be dated in or around the seventh century BCE; the other Vedic texts have to be even older.

Unfortunately:

(i) It is not true that the oldest Buddhist texts presuppose the whole of Vedic literature. ³ (ii) It is far from certain that the Buddhist texts in the form in which they have reached us date back to the time of the Buddha. They were not written down until the first century BCE, or even later. (iii) The precise date of the Buddha is not known. Recent research suggests for his death a date nearer 400 BCE than 500 BCE. ⁴
Preceding chapters have shown that Buddhism has not borrowed the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution from the early Upanisads. Rather, each has borrowed these notions from the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha which preceded both in time.

There are also two arguments that centre on Pānini:

The language described in the grammar of Pānini is more “modern” than Vedic, the language of the Veda. Pānini must have lived around or before the year 500 BCE. The texts composed in the Vedic language must be older than that.
Pānini knows the name of Śākalya, the person believed to have been responsible for the definitive (i.e., present) orthoepic form of the Ṛgveda. However, certain other Vedic texts know the Ṛgveda-or parts of it - in a form which is older than that. These other texts must therefore be older than Pānini.

These arguments lose their force for the following reasons:

(i) It is true that the language primarily (but not exclusively) described by Pānini is more modern than early Vedic. However, several indications suggest that, in India as elsewhere in the world, an archaic dialect continued to be used in sacred and liturgical contexts. A close comparison of the language of several Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads with Pānini’s grammar shows that this language is extremely close to the one described by him. ⁵ (ii) Recent research has shown that Pānini must be dated in or after the middle of the fourth century BCE. ⁶
It is true that Pānini knew Śākalya, but Śākalya was not responsible for the present form of the Ṛgveda. This final form did not yet exist at the time of Pānini and, it appears, did not yet exist even at the time of Patañjali, in the middle of the second century BCE. ⁷

Some of the “classical” views about aspects of late-Vedic chronology have been corrected by recent research (date of the Buddha, date of Pānini, idea of rebirth and karmic retribution wrongly believed to have been borrowed by Buddhism from early Upaniṣads). In the chapters that follow we will not come back to this discussion. We will rather explore issues that may shed new light on the chronology of this period.

CHAPTER III.1 - LINGUISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

The grammarian Pāṇini, as was pointed out above, has always played (and has to play) a central role in questions about late-Vedic chronology. His grammar describes a language, but which language? If it is a language that is less old than the one used in certain Vedic texts, the grammar is likely to be less old than those Vedic texts. Considerations like these gave Bruno Liebich (1891: 22-37) the idea to take one thousand finite verbs from each of the following texts: (i) Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, (ii) Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, (iii) Āśvalāyana and Pāraskara Gṛhya Sūtra, (iv) Bhagavadgītā. He compared these verb forms with Pāṇini’s grammar, in order to find out which of these texts comes closest to the language described in the Aṣtādhyāyī. This led him to the conclusion that the two Gṛhya Sūtras are closest to Pāṇini, that the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad preceded him, and that the Bhagavadgītā came later.

Liebich’s conclusions can easily be contested, for they crucially depend on the assumption that forms accounted for by Vedic rules cannot have belonged to Pāṇini’s time. In other words, the fundamental assumption behind this research is that all texts that contain forms that Pāṇini considered Vedic are for that reason older than Pāṇini. It goes without saying that research based on this assumption will lead to conclusions that confirm it.

This assumption is far from self-evident. It is well known that archaic forms of language are often preserved in religious or liturgical contexts all over the world. There is no reason whatsoever to think that Brahmanical India at the time of Pāṇini was any different. ¹ Indeed, it has been shown (Bronkhorst, 1981) that it is not correct to ascribe an awareness of linguistic development to the ancient Indian grammarians, so that Vedic and classical Sanskrit were not looked upon as belonging to earlier resp. later periods of time. This implies that Vedic was looked upon as the language proper for a certain kind of literature, even if that literature was still being, or had not yet been, composed. In this connection it is important to recall, as Thieme pointed out long ago, that “the language of the sacred texts […] was not only known from old manuscripts, but, as we are apt to forget, was actually used during the sacrificial rites (yajñakarmaṇi, in [P.] 1.2.34) and in the daily recitations (anvadhyāyam, in Nir 1.4 opposed to bhāṣāyām)” (Thieme, 1935: 67).

If, then, we drop Liebich’s fundamental assumption, the results of his own investigation lead to conclusions that are quite different from the ones he drew. In that case, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa retains 9 (out of 1000) forms which cannot be accounted for by Pānini’s grammar, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 31, the two Gṛhya Sūtras 42, the Bhagavadgītā 37 (Liebich, 1891: 34). If we further follow Liebich in excluding certain other forms from consideration (for various reasons), these numbers become respectively 6, 27, 41, 37. This means that, by simply removing an unjustified fundamental assumption from Liebich’s arguments, his own research leads us to think that the language of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa is closest to that of Pānini.

In earlier publications Liebich (1886a; 1886b) had exposed the far-reaching agreement between the use of cases in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and Pānini. Here, too, Liebich (1886b: 278, 309) argues for an early date of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa from the fact that some of its constructions are expressly designated as Vedic in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. This, as we have seen, is an invalid argument. The close agreement between the use of the aorist in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and the Aṣṭādhyāyī has been pointed out by Bhandarkar (1868: 416-19; 1885: 160-61), and speaks for itself. ²

Otto Wecker’s (1906) investigation purporting to show that the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad are older than Pānini is of poor quality. His arguments are circular: whenever he finds a deviation from Pānini in these Upaniṣads, he draws the conclusion that the deviations concerned are pre-Pāninian. This happens even where the evidence suggests another conclusion, as in the following statement (Wecker, 1906: 18): “Vielleicht ist diese Zusammenstellung: A[kkusativ] im Veda-I[nstrumental] in einzigen Upaniṣads-A[kkusativ] bei Pānini, ein Indizium, dass die betreffenden Upaniṣads zwischen Veda und Pānini anzusetzen sind.” And on p. 59 we read: “jaghanena wird Chānd. Up. II, 24, 3 mit G[enitiv] gebraucht […] anal. 24, 7.11—Nach der Kāśikā […] ist bei den Adverbien auf -ena A[kkusativ] und G[enitiv] erlaubt. Wäre der G[enitiv] erst späteres Sprachgut, so wäre auf Grund dieser Stelle Chānd. Up. sowohl unter Bṛh. Ār. Up. wie unter Pānini zu setzen. Allein auch hier glaube ich, dass die Angabe der Kāśikā nicht eine verfeinerte Weiterentwicklung bezeichnet, sondern dass sie einen von Pānini nich mehr anerkannten Sprachgebrauch ergänzend vermerkt.” Wecker’s manifest attempts to impose his own vision on recalcitrant data need no comments.

There are, unfortunately, no other studies known to me which systematically compare the language of specific Vedic texts with the usage prescribed by Pānini. There are, however, many intuitive remarks to the effect that the language of the Vedic texts clearly indicates that those texts must be earlier than Pānini. As an example we may consider the following: ³

Whatever the precise date in absolute terms [of the Buddha], we feel more certain of the relative chronology. We know that the Buddha lived at about the end of what is called the Vedic period of Indian history. … ‘Vedic’ is in the first instance the generic term for the literature which survives from that period - though of course it was not written down till many centuries later. The language of this literature, an early form of Sanskrit, is also known as Vedic (or Vedic Sanskrit). Classical Sanskrit follows the rules codified by Pānini, who probably lived in the fifth century BCE - he may have been a contemporary of the Buddha.

Statements like this divide the history of early Indian religious and cultural history into a small number of clearly separable periods, which may explain their appeal to a wider audience. They are misleading in that they do not make clear which texts they are talking about, nor indeed how exactly Pāṇini’s Classical Sanskrit deviates from the language of those texts. Simplified schemes are, unfortunately, not always of much use in solving the complexities of history. The few detailed studies that have been dedicated to the problem have not as yet shown that the texts of late-Vedic literature have to be older than Pāṇini, i.e. older than about 350 BCE.

CHAPTER III.2 - THE VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO THE EARLY SANSKRIT GRAMMARIANS

If we wish to determine which Vedic texts preceded Pānini and other early grammarians, our first task is to find out which Vedic texts these grammarians knew, and in what form. The present chapter will briefly present the result of an exploration, whose technical parts have been relegated to Appendices.

Pānini and the Veda: introduction

The relationship between Pānini and the Veda has been much debated. ¹ The presupposition often underlying this debate has been that much or even most of Vedic literature existed in its present form prior to Pānini. As we have seen, this presupposition is in need of reconsideration.

A fundamental question is whether Pānini knew the Vedic texts, i.e., the ones with which we are familiar, in the same form as we do. Were the Vedic texts that Pānini knew identical in all details with the editions we have now? It appears that the answer to this question must be negative.

It is not always possible to decide that a text has not reached us in its original form. In the case of metrical texts this may be possible, however, and to some extent we may be in a position to determine what the original text was like. This is true in the case of the Ṛgveda. In a later section (The Ṛgveda at the time of Pānini) it will be shown that certain rules of sandhi of the Aṣtādhyāyī fit an earlier stage of the text of the Ṛgveda than the one we now have. This suggests that Pānini was acquainted with a form of the Ṛgveda different from the one known today, at least in its phonetic details. Lack of agreement between Pānini’s phonetic rules and the present form of the Ṛgveda should not therefore be made the basis for rash conclusions.

This itself has important consequences. The Ṛgveda has been handed down with great care, with greater care perhaps than any other Vedic text. Yet even here Pānini’s rules of sandhi do not fully agree with the present text, although we know that at least some of them once did. How much less can we expect full agreement between Pānini’s rules of sandhi and all other Vedic texts! A comparison of Pānini’s rules of sandhi and the Vedic evidence, if it is to be made at all, must therefore be made with the greatest care. A straight confrontation of Pānini’s rules with the Vedic facts cannot be expected to yield more than partial agreement, and says little about the state of affairs in Pānini’s day. ²

A development in tone patterns, too, must have taken place after Pānini. Kiparsky (1982: 73) sums up the results of an investigation into this matter: “[T]he tone pattern described by Pānini represents an older stage than that described for the Vedic samhitās by the Prātiśākhyas. […] [W]e may assume that [the samhitās] were accented in Pānini’s time with the tone pattern described in the Aṣtādhyāyī, and that their present tone pattern, as well as the Prātiśākhyas that codify it, are post-Pāṇinian revisions.” It is true that Kiparsky derives the different tone patterns from accent properties belonging to morphemes that are stable in time. Yet it is at least conceivable that these accent properties, too, changed in the time before the tone patterns reached their final form. ³ This means that little can be concluded from such deviations from Pānini in the accentuation of Vedic words ⁴ as occur in arya (Thieme, 1938: 91 f.; Balasubrahmanyam, 1964; 1969), hāyana (Balasubrahmanyam, 1966), jyestha and kanistha (Devasthali, 1967: 7-8), ⁵ arpita and justa (Balasubrah- manyam, 1974), ⁶ śrìyase (Balasubrahmanyam, 1969; 1972), vodhave (Balasubrahmanyam, 1983), and vrṣti, bhūti, and vitti (Keith, 1936: 736). ⁷

These considerations show that any comparison between the linguistic data in Pānini and those in the Veda must be extremely careful in the fields of sandhi and accentuation. They also suggest that in other respects the Vedic texts known to Pānini may have undergone modification since Pānini’s time.

As an example of a feature that may have changed since Pānini, consider the word rātri/rātrī in the mantras of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā. According to P. 4.1.31 (rātreś cājasau), rātrī occurs in ritual literature (chandasi, see below) before all endings except the nominative plural (cf. Bhat, 1968; Wackernagel, 1896-1930, 3: 185 f.). ⁸ Five times the mantras of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā contain the word in a form that allows us to determine whether rātri or rātrī is used. Twice (TaitS 4.3.11.3 and 5.7.2.1) it is rātrī, thrice rātri. However, it is not impossible that originally all five occurrences had a form of rātrī. TaitS 4.1.10.1 (rātrim rātrim aprayāvaṃ bharantah) recurs as rātrīm rātrīm in other Vedic texts (MaitS 2.7.7; 3.1.9; KāṭhS 16.7; 19.10; ŚPaBr 6.6.4.1). TaitS 4.4.1.1 (rātrim jinvośigasi) occurs as rātrīm jinvo° at KāṭhS 17.7. In these two cases the shortening of i to i was a minor change. More problematic, at first sight, is TaitS 7.4.18.1 (rātrir āsīt piśangilā), to which no parallels with longī correspond (Bloomfield, 1906: 823). Here a substitution of rātrī would lead to rātry āsīt, ⁹ which differs rather much from the mantra as we know it. However, the earlier form may have been *rātri āsīt, which results from rātrī āsīt if one applies P. 6.1.127 (iko ‘savarne śākalyasya hrasvas ca), a rule of sandhi that also held in the Ṛgveda, at least according to Śākalya (see The Ṛgveda at the time of Pānini, below). In other words, it is possible, though not strictly provable, that all the mantras of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā followed Pānini’s rule 4.1.31 in his time, and that the deviations from this rule found their way into the text after him.

The second introductory question we have to ask is whether or not Pānini’s Vedic rules were meant to be universally valid in the Vedic texts. Our observations on sandhi have made it clear that here, at least, there is nothing to contradict the supposition that Pānini’s rules were meant to be adhered to throughout. (This does not necessarily mean that the texts known to Pānini always had Pānini’s kind of sandhi.) It can be argued, and it will be argued below, that all the Vedic rules of the Astāathyāyī were meant to be strictly followed unless the opposite is explicitly stated.

This takes us to the main point. If Pānini’s Vedic rules were not meant to be strictly followed, this should have been indicated in the Astāathyāyī. Option is indeed indicated in a number of Vedic rules: P. 1.2.36, 6.2.164, and 7.4.44 (which all have vibhāṣa chandasi), P. 1.4.9 (sasthiyuktaś chandasi vā), P. 8.3.49 (chandasi vā ‘prāmreditayoh), P. 5.3.13 (vā ha ca chandasi), P. 3.4.88 and 6.1.106 (vā chandasi), P. 6.4.5 and 6.4.86 (chandasy ubhayathā), P. 6.4.162 (vibhāsarjos chandasi), P. 8.2.70 (amnarūdharavar ity ubhayathā chandasi), P. 8.3.104 (yajusy ekesām), P. 8.3.119 (nicyabhibhyo’d vyavāye vā chandasi), P. 8.3.8 (ubhayatharksu), and P. 6.4.9 (vā sapūrvasya nigame). The words bahulam chandasi ‘variously in ritual literature’ occur no less than seventeen times together, ¹⁰ not counting the rules wherein they may have to be continued. In P. 1.2.61 (chandasi punarvasvor ekavacanam) and 62 (visākhayoś ca [chandasi]), the word anyatarasyām is in force from P. 1.2.58, and is not cancelled until nityam in 1.2.63. In P. 6.1.52 (khideś chandasi) there is continuation of vibhāṣa from sūtra 51, cancelled by nityam in 6.1.57. P. 3.1.85 (vyatyayo bahulam) continues chandasi from 3.1.84 (chandasi śayaj api), which itself indicates optionality by means of the word api. Similar devices are used in P. 1.4.81 (chandasi pare ‘pi), and 82 (vyavahitāś ca); P. 3.3.130 (anyebhyo ‘pi drīyate [chandasi 129]); P. 5.3.14 (itarābhyo ‘pi drīyate [chandasi 13]); P. 6.3.137 (anyesām api drīyate [rci 133][?]); P. 6.4.73 and 7.1.76 (chandasy api drīyate); P. 7.1.38 (ktvāpi chandasi); P. 5.2.50 (that ca chandasi); P. 5.3.20 (tayor dārhilau ca chandasi); P. 5.3.33 (paśca paścā ca chandasi); P. 5.4.12 (amu ca chandasi); and P. 5.4.41 (vykajyesṭhābhyāṃ tiltātilau ca chandasi). P. 3.2.106 (liṭah kānaj vā is confined to ritual literature because only there lit is used ( P . 3.2.105 [chandasi lit]). P. 8.1.64 (vaivāveti ca chandasi) continues vibhāsā (63), cancelled by nityam in 8.1.66. P. 6.1.209 (justā̄tpite ca chandasi) continues vibhāṣā from 208, discontinued by 6.1.210 (nityam mantre). In P. 6.3.108 (pathi ca chandasi) the word ca continues vibhāṣā from 6.3.106 (cf. Kiparsky, 1979: 62). P. 8.3.105 (stutastomayoś chandasi) appears to continue ekeṣām from 8.3.104. P. 4.4.113 (srotaso vibhāsā dyaddyau) continues chandasi from 4.4.110.

Nityam in P. 4.1.29 (nityam samjñāachandasob), in 4.1.46 and 7.4.8 (nityam chandasi), and in 6.1.210 (nityam mantre), does not indicate that here, exceptionally, some Vedic rules are universally valid. Rather, it is meant to block the option that is valid in the preceding rules, as so often in the Aṣtādhyāyī. We have no alternative but to assume that, just as in his other rules, Pānini’s Vedic rules not indicated as being optional were meant to be generally valid. ¹¹

From this we must conclude that deviations from Pānini in the Vedic texts known to him either did not exist in his time or were not considered correct by him. ¹²

We now come to the question of what range of literature Pānini considered “Vedic” in one way or another. This is best approached by studying Pānini’s use of the word chandas, by which he most often refers to Vedic literature. It is clear that Pānini employs this word in a special way. The most common meaning of chandas is ‘meter’, and then ‘metrical text’. But this is not the only sense in which Pānini uses it. Thieme (1935: passim, esp. 67-69) showed that rules given under chandasi ‘in chandas’ are also valid for prose passages (brāhmaṇa and yajus). He therefore rendered chandasi as ‘in Sacred Literature’. Thieme rightly criticizes Liebich’s (1891: 26) translation ‘pre-classical language’, saying: “I do not think it an appropriate translation, since it appears to endow Pānini with an historical perspective he hardly could have possessed” (p. 67). This makes sense, but a major difficulty remains. Many of the forms taught under the heading chandasi occur in Sūtra texts. Instances are numerous and only a few will be given here. The name Punarvasu, used optionally in the singular in chandas according to P. 1.2.61 (chandasi punarvasvor ekavacanam [anyatarasyām]), is so found at Viṣnu-smṛti 78.12 and VārŚS 1.5.1.5, besides several places in the Black Yajurveda. The singular of visäkhā, only allowed chandasi by P. 1.2.62 (visäkhayoś ca), occurs similarly at VārŚS 2.2.2.14. The grammatical object of the root hu can have an instrumental ending in chandas, according to P. 2.3.3 (trtīyā ca hoś chandasi). One instance is MānŚS 1.6.1.23 (payasā juhoti dadhnā yavāgvājyena vā [cf. Thieme, 1935: 10]). Some forms are only attested in Sūtras. Khānya- (P. 3.1.123) only occurs in Lātśs 8.2.4 and 5; (pra-)stācya- (id.) in LātśS 6.1.20; unnīya (id.) in ŚānGS 4.14.4; and yaśobhagīna (P. 4.4.132) in HirŚS 2.5.43, 6.4.3.

We can conclude that Pānini’s term chandas covered more than just ‘Sacred Literature’. We may have to assume that certain works, primarily the ritual Sūtras, and among those first of all the Śrauta Sūtras, belonged to a fringe area wherein Vedic usage was sometimes considered appropriate. The effect of this assumption for our investigation is that, where a chandas word prescribed by Pānini is attested in one Vedic text and in one or more Sūtras, we are not entitled to conclude that Pānini certainly knew that Vedic text.

The final introductory question we have to consider is the following. Are Pānini’s Vedic rules descriptive or prescriptive? To some extent, to be sure, they describe the language that Pānini found in Vedic texts, and are therefore descriptive. But are they exclusively so? It may well be that Vedic texts were still being composed in Pānini’s day, and that he gives in his grammar guidelines regarding correct Vedic usage. This possibility will be discussed in a following section (Pānini and the Veda (2)). Here attention may be drawn to one reason to conclude that at least some of Pānini’s rules may have been meant to be prescriptive, besides, or rather than, being descriptive. They may have been composed with something like ūha in mind.

Ūha ¹³ is the term used to describe the adjustments Vedic mantras undergo to make them fit for other ritual contexts. An original mantra such as agnaye tvā justam nirvapāmi, directed to Agni, can become modified into süryāya tvā justam nirvapāmi, directed to Sūrya. ¹⁴ Devīr āpah śuddhā yūyam (MaitS 1.1.11; 1.2.16; 3.10.1; KāṭhS 3.6), directed to the waters, becomes deva ājya suddham tvam when directed to clarified butter (äjya). Sometimes only the number needs adjustment, as when āyur āśāste (MaitS 4.13.9; TaitS 2.6.9.7; TaitBr 3.5.10.4) becomes āyur āśāsāte or āyur āśāsate. Only the gender is modified when jūr asi dhṛtā manasā justāa visṇave tasyās te satyasavasah (MaitS 1.2.4; 3.7.5; KāṭhS 2.5; 24.3; TaitS 1.2.4.1; 6.1.7.2; VājS 4.17; ŚPaBr 3.2.4.11; ŚPaBrK 4.2.4.9) becomes jūr asi dhṛto manasā justo visṇave tasya te satyasavasah because a bull is under discussion.

The later Mīmāṃsā tradition appears to be unanimous in its opinion that modified mantras are not mantras themselves. MīmSū 2.1.34 and Śabara’s Bhāṣya thereon state explicitly that the result of ūha is not a mantra, and all later authorities in this field appear to follow their example. This opinion is found, perhaps for the first time, in ĀpŚS 24.1.35, which reads anāmnātās tv amantrā yathā pravarohanāmadheyagrahaṇānīti “Die nicht (im Mantra- oder Brāhmaṇa-teile) überlieferten Teile sind indessen nicht als Mantra zu betrachten, z.B. der Pravara, die ‘Verschiebung’ ( ūha ), die Nennung eines Namens” (tr. Caland, 1928a: 387). It is not surprising that modified mantras were not considered mantras in their own right from an early date onward. After all, the opposite opinion would leave almost unlimited scope for creating new mantras. At a time when efforts had been made to gather all mantras into Vedic collections this must have been undesirable.

Yet there are clear traces of evidence that modified mantras had not always been considered non-mantras. As late an author as Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE), ¹⁵ who includes a long discussion on ūha in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (Ms 2b9 f.; AL 5.18 f.; Sw 6.17 f.; CEd Āhn. 1, 5.1 f.) mentions “others” who think that modified mantras are themselves mantras. ¹⁶ And several Śrauta Sūtras make no mention of the non-mantric nature of modified mantras in contexts in which that would have been appropriate, for example, the Bhāradvāja Śrauta Sūtra (6.15), the Mānava Śrauta Sūtra (5.2.9), and the Śāñkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra (6.1). Moreover, the Hiraṇyakeśin Śrauta Sūtra (1.1.13 - 14) specifies that which is not a mantra without mentioning ūha ! Apparently, at one time, modified mantras were mantras.

This view is supported by the fact that modified mantras have actually been included in the Vedic collections as mantras. A particularly clear example is the long adhrigu passage that occurs, or is discussed, at MaitS 4.13.4, KāṭhS 16.21, TaitBr 3.6.6, AitBr 2.6-7 (6.6-7), KauṣBr 10.4, ĀśvŚS 3.3, and ŚāñŚS 5.17, with this difference: the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, and the Śāñkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra have the dual medhapatibhyām where the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā and the Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā have the singular medhapataye. Interestingly, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa explains the difference in the following words: ¹⁷

If the victim be for one deity, ‘for the lord of the sacrifice’ [medhapataye] he should say; if for two deities, ‘for the two lords of the sacrifice’ [medhapatibhyām]; if for many deities, ‘for the lords of the sacrifice’ [medhapatibhyah]. That is the rule.

This is a clear case of ūha. ¹⁸

TaitS 2.3.10.1-2 repeats one and the same sacrificial formula four times in a single passage, with differences in number, in order to adjust it to different numbers of gods:

aśvinoh prāno ‘si tasya te dattām yayoh prāno ‘si svāhā indrasya prāno ‘si tasya te dadātu yasya prāno ‘si svāhā mitrāvarunayoh prāno ‘si tasya te dattām yayoh prāno ‘si svāhā viśveṣām devānām prāno ‘si tasya te dadatu yesām prāno ‘si svāhā

To what extent were the Vedic rules of the Aṣtādhyāyī composed with this kind of ūha in mind? Obviously, it cannot be maintained that this was the only purpose of these Vedic rules, for some were undoubtedly intended to describe isolated Vedic facts. But this does not exclude the possibility that ūha was one of the purposes for which some of the Vedic rules of the Aṣtādhyāyī were formulated.

There is some reason to accept this last view. Some Śrauta Sūtras lay down rules pertaining to the modification of certain verbal forms. MānŚS 5.2.9.6, for example, lists the following acceptable modified forms: adat, adatām, adan, ghasat, ghastām, ghasan, aghasat, aghastām, aghasan, karat, karatām, karan, agrabhīt, agrabhīṣtām, agrabhīṣuh, and aksan. ĀśvŚS 3.4.15, similarly, lists ādat, ghasat, kavat, jusatām, aghat, agrabhīt and avivadhata. ŚānśS 6.1.5, finally, lists ādat, ādan, ghastu, ghasantu, aghasat, aghasan, or aghat, aksan, agrabhīt, agrabhīsuh, avivrdhanta, and others. This shows that there was concern in ritual circles regarding the correct use of certain verbal forms in modified mantras. Among the recurring forms are the aorists of the roots ghas, ad, ¹⁹ and kṛ. The shared concern of ĀśvŚS 3.4.15, ŚānśS 6.1.5, and MānŚS 5.2.9.6 is explained by the fact that most of the modifications are meant for virtually identical texts, the so-called Praisa sūktas, in particular RV Khila 5.7.2 (f and l) (in Scheftelowitz, 1906; cp. Minkowski, 1991: 205-06, 214), which correspond to MaitS 4.13.7 (p. 208, 1. 3-7) and 4.13.9 (p. 211, 1. 5-12). It is very probable that Pānini knew the Praiṣa sūktas in which these modifications were to take place, for Scheftelowitz (1919: 47 f.) has adduced reasons to believe that the Praisas are among the oldest Vedic texts in prose. This allows us to surmise that a Pāninian sūtra may have been composed partly to solve this same problem. This sūtra would then be P. 2.4.80 (mantre ghasahvaranaśavrdahādvyckrgamijanibhyo leh), which deals with the aorists of a number of roots, among them ghas and kṛ, in a mantra. It favours here such forms as (a)ghat, (a)ghastām, aksan and akah, and akran (not in all cases the same forms as those preferred by the above Śrauta Sūtras). If it can be accepted that P. 2.4.80 was composed to serve the purpose of ūha (besides other purposes), the same may be true of other rules of the Aṣtādhyāyī. This, in turn, would mean that these rules not only describe Vedic data but also prescribe the means for modifying Vedic mantras when necessary. This implies that we cannot always be sure that Pānini’s Vedic rules describe forms that occurred in Vedic texts known to Pānini. Unattested forms accounted for by rules in the Aṣtādhyāyī do not, then, in all cases have to have been part of texts that are now lost.

Pānini and the Veda (1)

After these preliminary reflections we can now seriously address the question which Vedic texts Pānini knew and which he did not. The above considerations make it clear that in this context Pānini’s rules on sandhi and accent will be of little help. More generally, none of the rules that concern the phonetic details of words, i.e., the orthoepic diaskeuasis of texts, can be relied upon to determine which texts Pānini knew, for the simple reason that these features may have changed, and in some cases certainly have changed, after him. Our enquiry must in the main rely on word-forms prescribed in the Aṣtādhyāyī.

Here another consideration arises. Pānini is to be taken seriously, but this does not necessarily imply that his grammar is complete. Nor does it exclude the possibility that he made occasional mistakes. It does, however, imply that, where Pānini clearly and explicitly excludes certain features from the Vedic language, we must regard with suspicion the Vedic texts that contain those features.

We will proceed in a twofold manner. On the one hand, we will collect forms prescribed by Pānini for Vedic and attested in only one Vedic text and nowhere else. If a sufficient number of such forms are found for a particular Vedic text and nothing else pleads against it, we may then assume that this Vedic text was known to Pānini. On the other hand, we shall look for Vedic texts that contain features excluded by Pānini. If the number of such features is sufficiently large in any single text, we may consider the possibility that Pānini did not know that text. This double approach will provide us with the material to be evaluated.

A detailed presentation of this investigation and of the resulting data can be found in Appendix III. Here we turn to the question what patterns arise from these data. Which Vedic texts did Pānini know, and which ones did he not know? We shall try to arrive at an opinion on the basis of the forms emphatically accepted or rejected by Pānini himself. ²⁰

Pānini records a number of forms that occur in the Ṛgveda and nowhere else. Among the forms he clearly rejects, not one occurs in the Ṛgveda. To this must be added that P. 1.1.16-18 refer to Śākalya’s Padapāṭha. The Padapāṭha was added to the collection of hymns as a whole (excepting six verses; see Kashikar, 1951: 44) and presupposes the latter. We may safely assume that Pānini knew the collected Ṛgveda, not just the individual hymns.

Note that this is in no way self-evident. Pānini knew Vedic stanzas (ṛc) and sacrificial formulas in prose (yajus) - both of these went by the term mantra-besides brāhmaṇa and kalpa. He nowhere says that he knew the mantras in collections. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the term that came to designate such collections (saṃhitā) did not yet have this meaning in Pānini’s grammar and in the Vedic texts. There it is throughout synonymous with sandhi. The samhitā-pātha, as opposed to the pada-pātha, is the version of the text with sandhi.

The question as to whether the Vedic collections, the Saṃhitās, existed in Pānini’s time as collections becomes pertinent when we turn to the Taittirīya Saṃhitā. Three forms prescribed by Pānini occur in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā and nowhere else. All these words occur in mantras. This means that it is possible that Pānini may not have known the brāhmaṇa portions of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā. This possibility is supported by the fact that these brāhmaṇa parts frequently contain a conspicuous non-Pāṇinian feature, viz., the ending -ai instead of -ās (see Caland, 1927a: 50; Keith, 1914, 1: cxlv f.). Note also that the brāhmaṇa portion of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā refers twice (6.1.9.2; 6.4.5.1) to Aruṇa Aupaveśi, whose grandson Śvetaketu Āruṇeya is characterized as modern in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra (1.5.5). All this suggests that the Taittirīya Saṃhitā was collected in its more or less final form at a late date, perhaps later than Pānini. This agrees with some facts regarding the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and Taittirīya Āraṇyaka to which we now turn.

Both the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka contain forms that are explicitly rejected by Pānini. The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa has idāvatsarīna, anuvatsarīna, itarad, akārsam, sabhya, and sārdūlucarman. The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka has akārsam, svatejas, and masculine śsisira. Presumably these works were not known to, or accepted by, Pānini. The Baudhāyana and Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtras “accord in recognizing the whole content both of the Brāhmaṇa and of the Āraṇyaka” (Keith 1914, 1: lxxviii). At the same time, “it would be impossible, so far as can be seen, to prove that to [these Sūtras] even the Sañhitā was yet a definite unit” (ibid., p. lxxix-lxxx). The Sūtras only distinguish between mantra and brāhmaṇa, which occur in each of the three, Taittirīya Saṃhitā, Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. ²¹ The interrelationship of mantras and brähmana portions of the three Taittirīya texts suggests that they, or parts of them, once existed as an undivided whole. We see, for example, that the brāhmaṇa portions of TaitS 2.5.7 and 8 comment on the mantras of TaitBr 3.5.1 and 2; TaitS 2.5.9 on TaitBr 3.5.3.1-4.1; TaitS 2.6.1 and 2 on TaitBr 3.5.5-7; TaitS 2.6.7 on TaitBr 3.5.8; TaitS 2.6.9 on TaitBr 3.5.10; and TaitS 2.6.10 on TaitBr 3.5.11 (Keith, 1914: 1: lxxxiv). TaitS 3.5.11 supplements TaitBr 3.6.1, giving the mantras for the hotr for the animal sacrifice (Keith 1914, 1: 286, n. 4). Keith (1914, 1: lxxix) comes to a similar conclusion on the basis of the Śrauta Sūtras: “So far as we can judge there is no trace of any distinction being felt by the Sūtrakāras between the nature of the texts before them. ”

It is not impossible that the creation of a Padapāṭha differentiated the Taittirīya Saṃhitā from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, just as the Ṛgveda may conceivably have been collected by the author of its Padapāṭha (Bronkhorst, 1982a: 187). The fact that Pānini derives the term taittirīya, in the sense ‘uttered by Tittiri’, in P. 4.3.102 does not, of course, prove that the Taittirīya texts were known to him in the form in which we now know them. Pānini probably knew the mantras that are now part of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, or a number of them, and he may indeed have considered them taittirīya ‘uttered by Tittiri’. Note also that the Taittirīya Saṃhitā appears to borrow from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 1-5, as argued by Keith (1914: 1: xcvii f.). ²² The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa itself, including its first five chapters, deviates in a number of points from Pānini (see below).

Some of the other Saṃhitās of the Yajurveda sin occasionally against Pānini:

The Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā has ātmanā, masculine śsśira, and one Tatpuruṣa compound in -an (vyāghraloman). It shares this with the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.

The Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā has sabhya, some Tatpuruṣa compounds in -as and -an, ātmanā. ²³ These deviations from Pāṇini in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā are surprising, because Pāṇini appears to have known both the mantra and brāhmaṇa portions of this text. This warns us once again that we cannot assume that the texts we now know existed in the same form in Pāṇini’s day.

Did Pāṇini know the Atharvaveda? Two forms prescribed by him are found only there, one in the Śaunakīya version and one in the Paippalāda version. However, opposed to these two forms are numerous other ones forbidden by Pāṇini. They include gamayām cakāra, gamayām cakartha, akārsam, aruksat, sabhya, some neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds ending in -an and -as and iṣ̄kādanta, ātmanā, and masculine śsisira.

One might raise the question whether the word-forms in the Atharvaveda may not have been Vedic in Pāṇini’s opinion, that is, whether, perhaps, they were covered by non-Vedic rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. This is suggested by Balasubrahmanyam’s following remark (1984: 23):

Among the seven khyan- derivatives taught by P[āṇini] in A[ṣṭādhyāyī] 3.2.56, subhagamkaran̄̄ and priyamkaranam are only attested in the Saṃhitā texts of the [Atharvaveda]- the former occurring at [AVŚ] 6.139.1 and AVP 7.12.5, ²⁴ and the latter at the Paippalāda Saṃhitā (3.28.5; 6). Neither in the other Vedic Saṃhitās nor in the Brāhmaṇa-Āraṇyaka texts, do we come across these derivatives.

Balasubrahmanyam’s observation is misleading in that subhagamkaran̄̄ is not taught in P. 3.2.56 nor anywhere else in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. This is so because a vārttika of the Saunāgas (Mahā-bh II p. 105 1. 8; on P. 3.2.56) is required to provide subhagamkarana with its feminine endingī, as shown by Balasubrahmanyam himself. Thus, P. 3.2.56 did not derive subhagamkaran̄̄ in the Atharvaveda. The fact that the Atharvaveda contains three more words of the same kind (ayaksmamkaran̄̄ (AVŚ 19.2.5, AVP 8.8.11), sarūpamkaran̄̄ (AVŚ 1.24.4, AVP 1.26.5) (Balasubrahmanyam, 1984: 25 f.) and āvataṃkaran̄̄ (AVP 1.100.2) (3b according to Griffiths, 2004: 373)) and that these words are not even partially ²⁵ derived in Pāṇini’s grammar, makes it less than likely that the priyamkaranam of AVP 3.28.6 was meant to be explained in P. 3.2.56.

Griffiths (2004: xxxvii), following Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (2001) and to a lesser extent Louis Renou (1957a), thinks that it seems likely that Pāṇini has made use of the Paippalāda Saṃhitā. He bases this conclusion on forms prescribed by Pāṇini in non-Vedic rules. ²⁶ This raises, once again, the question whether in Pāṇini’s opinion wordforms in the Atharvaveda were Vedic or not. The material at my disposal does not allow me to propose a definite answer. It should, however, be recalled that non-Vedic rules cannot but play a limited role (perhaps none at all) in determining which Vedic texts were known to Pāṇini.

A passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is interesting in that it might be read as confirming that the Atharvaveda did not exist as a collection until long after the other three Vedas were collected. Sections 3.1-5 make a number of comparisons, or rather identifications, of which one in particular is of special interest to us. Section 3.1 states that the bees are the ṛces, the flower is the Ṛgveda; in 3.2 the bees are the yajuses, the flower is the Yajurveda; and in 3.3 the bees are the sāmans, the flower is the Sāmaveda. The interesting observation comes in section 3.4, where the bees are the atharvāṅgirasaḥ and the flower is itihāsapurānam. In 3.5, finally, the bees are the hidden teachings (guhyā ādeśāḥ), which may be the Upaniṣads, and the flower is Brahman (n.). Since the atharvängirasah constitute the Atharvaveda as we know it, the logic of the situation would have required that the flower in 3.4 be identified with the Atharvaveda. The fact that it is not hardly allows an explanation other than that the author of this passage did not know such a definite collection of atharvans and aingirases. Itihāsa and purāna certainly do not designate the Atharvaveda, neither separately nor jointly (see Horsch, 1966: 13 f.).

Bloomfield (1899: 2 f.), too, came to the conclusion “that many hymns and prose pieces in the AV. date from a very late period of Vedic productivity.” Indeed, “there is nothing in the way of assuming that the composition of such texts as the [Aitareya Brāhmaṇa] and [Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa] preceded the redactions of the Atharvan Saṃhitās.”

Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya allows us to obtain an approximate idea as to the time before which the Atharvaveda was constituted into a collected whole. It cites in its opening passage the first lines of the four Vedas; these apparently existed as collections in those days (second century BCE). The first line is śam no devīr abhistaye, which begins the Paippalāda version of the Atharvaveda. Patañjali even informs us of the size of the Atharvaveda known to him, saying (Mahā-bh II p. 378 l. 11; on P. 5.2.37): viṃśino’igirasah. This fits the twenty books of the Atharvaveda in both its surviving versions. ²⁷ We may conclude that the Paippalāda Saṃhitā existed essentially in its present form in the second century BCE.

The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa transgresses Pāṇini’s rules in containing itarad, nominative āvām (3.1), and several neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an (3.2). It is also interesting that AitBr 7.17 has the periphrastic perfect āmantrayām āsa, as opposed to P. 3.1.40, which allows only kṛ in such formations (Keith, 1936: 747). We further find optatives in -(ay)īta instead of -(ay)eta (Renou, 1940: 11), and the ending -ai for both genitive and ablative -ās (Caland, 1927a: 50 ), not prescribed by Pāṇini.

The other Brāhmaṇas that are often considered early are the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa, Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, and Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Renou, 1957: 14). We can be brief about them.

The Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa has a number of forbidden words: saprabhṛti, sodarka, and itarad, besides some neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an and at least one in -as. Like the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, it has optatives in -(ay)īta and -ai for -ās.

The Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa, too, has saprabhṛti and sodarka, as well as nominative yuvām, and various neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an.

The Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa goes against Pāṇini’s grammar in having itarad, various neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an, ubhayatodanta and anyatodanta, and masculine śiśira.

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa deviates from Pānini’s grammar in the words itarad, nominative āvām, akārṣīh, sabhya, an accusative rather than a genitive for the object of presya, many neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an, ubhayatodanta, genitive plural -grāmanyām, and masculine śsisira.

The Kāṇva version of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, finally, deviates in fewer respects, containing a few neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds in -an and -as, ubhayatodanta and anyatodanta, an accusative rather than a genitive for the object of presya, and masculine śsisira.

The above considerations must be treated with caution. For one thing, it is not known in any detail what changes were made in the texts during the process we refer to as their “orthoepic diaskeuasis”. This implies that we cannot be altogether sure what features of those texts can be used to determine their relationship with Pānini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī. We do also not know how many serious deviations from Pānini’s explicit statements must be considered evidence that Pānini was ignorant of a particular text.

We should not be rash either in concluding that Vedic texts that repeatedly transgress the rules of Pānini were for that reason completely unknown to Pānini. The problem is that probably no Vedic text has a single author. All are collections of parts of more or less heterogeneous origin. This applies to the Saṃhitās as well as to the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas. The most we can conclude from the deviations between the majority of Vedic texts and Pānini’s grammar is that Pānini did not know much of Vedic literature in its present form, that is, in the collections known to us. Unless we assume that Pānini is no reliable guide (which we don’t), we can safely state that much of Vedic literature was still in a state of flux in his day, and had not yet reached the unalterable shape in which we know it.

These considerations are of value with regard to the texts that appear to have been unknown to Pānini on the basis of the evidence reviewed in this section. They are, however, of equal value with regard to the texts that appear to have been known to him. The Ṛgveda may be an exception; it was known to Pānini along with its Padapātha, which leaves little room for major changes other than sandhi. But we must be cautious with respect to such texts as the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā and Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā. It is true that they contain words prescribed by Pānini which occur nowhere else, but this proves no more than that Pānini was acquainted with certain portions of them, if it proves anything at all.

The regional origin and early spread of most of the Vedic texts may account for Pānini’s lack of acquaintance with some of them. Pānini is held to have lived in north-west India. Texts from other parts of the country may only have been known to him if they were generally accepted as Vedic in their region and beyond it.

Pānini and the Veda (2)

Further conclusions as to the parts of the Veda that were known to Pānini may be drawn by taking as point of departure Paul Kiparsky’s book Pānini as a Variationist (1979). The main aim of this book is to show that the words vā, vibhāsā and anyatarasyām in Pānini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī do not-as has always been supposed-all mean the same thing, viz. just ‘optionally’, but rather have three different meanings, viz. ‘preferably’ (vā), ‘preferably not’ (vibhāsā) and ‘either way’ (anyatarasyām). It can be said that Kiparsky has established this thesis beyond reasonable doubt.

Once accepted, it can be used for further investigations. Kiparsky is aware of this, and one of the possibilities which he points at is “that we can also use this more exact information to get a firmer idea of Pānini’s date” (p. 16). Kiparsky repeatedly recurs to this question in his book. Here however he has missed some essential points, due to the fact that he starts from the assumption, repeatedly expressed, that Pānini lived after the completion of Vedic literature. Without this assumption a different picture emerges.

Regarding the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Kiparsky rightly remarks that “we cannot use them as information on Pānini’s sandhi usage, since nothing guarantees the authenticity of the present text in that regard” (p. 19). With regard to sandhi in Classical Sanskrit Kiparsky is equally careful: “the external sandhi of Classical Sanskrit manuscripts obviously has no claim to represent the author’s original text, but has been modified freely by the copyists” (p. 79). But in comparing Pānini with the Vedic language, five out of Kiparsky’s nineteen cases (i.e., numbers 6,12,17,18,19 ) deal with sandhi, or better, with orthoepy in one form or another.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the fixed form which the Vedic texts acquired in the course of time is the outcome of a long process, during which their form, at least as regards details of sandhi etc., was not yet fixed. In the following section it will be shown that this process was not yet completed by Pānini’s time as far as the Ṛgveda is concerned. This allows us to assume that the other Vedic Saṃhitās had not yet reached their present shape either at his time, at any rate in as far as these details are concerned. This implies that Pānini’s rules on Vedic sandhi do not necessarily describe the sandhi which was actually used in the Vedic texts known to Pānini. Rather, they describe the sandhi as it ought to be according to Pānini. This is confirmed by the circumstance that Pānini sometimes gives the opinions of others besides his own, e.g., in P. 8.3.17-19. In the context of Vedic sandhi it is therefore not possible to compare Pānini’s optional rules with the Vedic evidence.

We have seen above that the language of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa is particularly close to the language described by Pānini. If we agree with Keith (1920: 46) that this Brāhmaṇa is one of the oldest of the Brāhmaṇas, it follows that Pānini may be close in time to the older surviving Brāhmaṇas, provided that we can believe that the Vedic which we find in these texts was indeed a language known and for certain purposes still actively used in Pānini’s time. Can we believe this?

Some support for this belief might be derived from P. 4.3.105, which speaks of “Brāhmaṇa and Kalpa works uttered by ancient [sages]” (purānaproktesu brāhmanakalpesu), thus suggesting that there also were Brāhmaṇa and Kalpa works uttered by not so ancient sages. ²⁸ But for more interesting and convincing evidence we return to Kiparsky’s book. Kiparsky assumes that for Vedic “like us, [Pānini] had to rely on what he found in the texts” (p. 8). Is this assumption supported by the evidence he produces?

Kiparsky broaches the topic in connection with P. 2.3.25 vibhāṣa guṇe ‘striyām (p. 95). He describes the meaning of this rule as follows: “A cause (hetu) which is a property (guna), i.e. expressed by an abstract noun, can marginally have the ablative endings, except in the feminine, e.g. vīyyāt (or preferably vīyena) muktaḥ ‘released by heroism’.” Regarding actual usage, Kiparsky tells us (p. 96): “In the older language, the ablative of cause never appears in abstract nouns.” “[It] does not occur before the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad. In the Āpastamba-Śrautasūtra it is frequent only in book 24, which is a later addition […]” “In later Sanskrit, the ablative of cause is […] extremely common.” Kiparsky concludes: “The present rule reflects a period after cause in abstract nouns began to be expressible by means of the ablative, but before this became favoured over the instrumental. Judging by the evidence of this rule, then, Pānini must be dated within a period delimited by the older Upaniṣads (in particular, the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad) and the older Śrautasūtras (in particular, the main body of the Āpastamba-Śrautasūtra).”

Is this argument compelling? Clearly not! Time and again Kiparsky’s own book shows that less favoured forms or expressions are often not attested in the literature. This means that the evidence of the present rule indicates as date for Pānini “a period delimited by the older Upaniṣads […] and the Śrauta Sūtras” (whatever that may precisely mean) or earlier.

A number of facts favour the second alternative, according to which Pānini’s date is earlier rather than later than the oldest Upanisads. I collect the following from Kiparsky’s book:

(i) On p. 87 Kiparsky observes that Pānini considers ubhaya preferably not (vibhāṣā) a pronoun before nom. pl. Jas, and therefore preferably a noun. However, ” [u]bhaya (almost always plural) is […] only declined as a pronoun in the Classical language”. Kiparsky is puzzled and speculates: “It is possible that Pānini forgot about the nominative plural here. However, I rather think that he intended nom. pl. ubhayāh to be derivable in his grammar. The form occurs in the Ṛgveda (seven times, of which six have the augmen[t] asUK, viz. ubhayāsah), along with ubhaye (6x). Thus, it may have still been current in Pānini’s time, although it is hard to believe that it was still the favoured form.” Kiparsky’s puzzlement would be resolved on the assumption that Pānini may not be so far removed in time from the earlier strata of Vedic literature as has often been supposed.

(ii) P. 3.3.62 prescribes preferably (vā) aP after has ‘laugh’ to express state or action (bhāve): hasa. The alternative form is hāsa, formed with GHaÑ. The form hasa occurs in Vedic only, hāsa is the form common in Classical Sanskrit. Kiparsky (p. 110) looks upon this case as a counter-instance to his hypothesis. We need not, if we date Pānini earlier in relation to Vedic literature.

(iii) P. 6.3.88 (vibhāsodare) prescribes marginally (vibhāsā) substitution of sa for samāna when compounded with udara, and followed by the suffix ya. Kiparsky observes (p. 134): “In fact, sodarya ‘couterine’ is by far the more common form beginning with the Sūtra literature. ²⁹ I could find samānodarya only in [AitBr] 3.3.7. Pānini’s preference here does not agree with Classical Sanskrit usage.” True! But it does agree with the assumption that Pānini lived at a time not far removed from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.

(iv) P. 6.4.43 (ye vibhāṣā) prescribes marginally, among other things, a passive khāyate of the root khan, besides khanyate. Kiparsky observes (p. 136-37): “The form khanyate is overwhelmingly favoured in Classical Sanskrit. The option khāyate is, in practice, restricted to Vedic ([TaitS] 6.2.11.1, [ŚPaBr] 3.5.4.1), though we must assume on the strength of Pānini’s rule that it had not quite died out in his time.” Perhaps the reason is that Pānini’s time was not all that far removed from those Vedic texts.

Against these four cases there are some which seem to point in the opposite direction:

(i) P. 5.4.130 allows for a marginal ürdhvajñu ‘with raised knees’, besides a preferred ürdhvajānu. Only ürdhvajñu occurs in the older literature (MaitS, AitĀr) and it still predominates in Sūtra works. ürdhvajānu, on the other hand, has gained the upper hand in Classical Sanskrit. Kiparsky remarks (p. 124): “It is noteworthy […] that the usage of the Sūtra literature represents in this respect an older standard than Pānini.” It is worth observing that this rule, which is embarrassing also to Kiparsky, is not commented upon, nor used, in the Mahābhāṣya (Lahiri, 1935: 68), and can be removed from its context without any difficulty. It might conceivably be one of the additions which are known to have been made to the Aṣṭādhyāyī after Patañjali (Bronkhorst, 1983, esp. §§ 2.4 - 2.5, 6.2).

(ii) In P. 5.4.144 (Kiparsky, p. 124) Pānini expresses preference for śyāvadanta over śyāvadat. “śyāvadanta […] is common in Classical Sanskrit, […] [ś]yāvadat seems to be mainly restricted to Vedic. Classical Sanskrit agrees with Pānini’s preference.”

In this connection it will be interesting to cite a short passage from a recent article by M. Deshpande (2001: 35-36) which reminds us that besides chronological differences also regional differences may at times have to be taken into consideration:

Consider […] P. 7.3.95 (tu-ru-stu-śamy-amah sārvadhātuke). An option term, vā, continues into this rule from the previous rule P. 7.3.94 (yaio vā). Thus, by P. 7.3.95, we optionally (or preferably, à la Kiparsky 1979) get the augmentī for the consonant-initial sārvadhātuka affixes after roots like stu, and we get the forms stauti/stavīti. If Kiparsky’s interpretation is correct, this rule says that the form stavīti was the preferred form in the language known to Pānini, and the form stauti was a marginal form. This rule does not say anything specific for the language of the Veda.

However, Pāninian commentators have preserved a rule of Āpiśali, a pre-Pāṇinian grammarian, which runs as: tu-ru-stu-śamy-amah sārvadhātukāsu cchandasi (cf. Y. Mimamsaka 1963: 1.46 [= Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: I: 140]). To the extent we understand this statement, it says that the augmentī occurs only in the domain of chandas, and by implication, does not occur in the colloquial language known to Āpiśali. This rule provides us several important clues. First, it is now beyond dispute that pre-Pāṇinian grammarians had already begun to deal with the language of the Veda. Secondly, the colloquial language known to Āpiśali was somewhat different from the colloquial language known to Pānini. Thirdly, the colloquial language known to Pānini was in some respects closer to the language of the Veda, at least in certain respects, as compared to the language known to Āpiśali.

Kiparsky repeatedly (pp. 88, 143, 146, 149) observes that “Pānini stands at the threshold of the Classical period” (p. 149). This conflicts in no way with the view that in his time Brāhmaṇa or other Vedic works were still being composed. For according to the view at present investigated, late Vedic and the earliest Classical Sanskrit (if I may call it thus) were for a while used side by side. The evidence presented so far nowhere contradicts, and to some extent supports, this view.

It is understandable that Kiparsky, and so many others with him, find it hard to think of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as contemporaneous with the Brāhmaṇas, those storehouses of magical thought. Pānini, they like to believe, had outgrown those archaic modes of thought, and attained to something very close to our modern scientific way of thinking. Kiparsky does not say this explicitly, but that this is his view is clear from his characterization of the Nirukta as an “archaic work […] which [is] definitely pre-Pāṇinian in content and approach, though [it] may not antedate Pānini in real time as well” (p. 213). The Nirukta, as is well-known, contains a collection of ‘fanciful etymologies’, in which also the Brāhmaṇas abound.

In later chapters (III. 5 and Part IV) we will pay attention to the divergent “ways of thinking” that differentiate the cultures of the Veda and of Greater Magadha. Here it must suffice to point out that this way of looking at the Aṣtādhyāyī is mistaken and anachronistic. I have long ago (Bronkhorst, 1981) argued that “the Nirukta and the Aṣtādhyāyī can be looked upon as rational elaborations of the same set (or closely similar sets) of presuppositions” (p. 12). There is no reason to reject the possibility that both the Aṣtādhyāyī and literature of the kind we find in the Brāhmaṇas originated in the same period, and among the same people.

The Ṛgveda at the time of Pānini

There can be no doubt that the Ṛgveda existed at the time of Pānini, and that Pānini knew it. This does not however answer the question what its exact form was at his time. This question is to be addressed in the present section.

The Ṛgveda is known to us in a form which is fixed down to the minutest details. It obtained this form as the result of a process which, in as far as it concerns details of sandhi, etc., is known by the name “orthoepic diaskeuasis”. ³⁰ We have some idea of the original form of the hymns of the Ṛgveda, since the present Ṛgveda often deviates from the correct metre in a way that can easily be restored by undoing the sandhi or other minor changes. ³¹ Near the end of the diaskeuastic process, which led from that original form to the form in which the hymns are known to us at present, stands the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, a text which describes the phonetic peculiarities of the Ṛgveda. This Prātiśākhya cites a number of earlier authorities. Since these earlier authorities participated in the process that led from the original to the present shape of the Rgvedic hymns, it is possible, even likely, that some of them knew the Ṛgveda in an older form and formulated rules that fit that older form better than the present one. An investigation of this possibility (presented in Appendix IV) justifies the conclusion that the orthoepic diaskeuasis of the Ṛgveda extended over a rather long period of time, and was not yet completed at Pānini’s time. This implies that the Aṣtādhyāyī is older than the Ṛgveda Prātisākhya, because the latter is to be situated near the completion of this process. It also implies that the lack of agreement that exists between the Aṣtādhyāyī and our Ṛgveda may have to be explained-especially where phonetic questions are concerned - by the fact that Pānini describes an earlier form of the Ṛgveda. Pānini may not deserve to be blamed for being lacunary, as he is, e.g., by Renou (1960: 27).

Patañjali and the Veda

Having dealt with various issues related to the Veda as known to Pānini, we now turn to the question what parts of the Veda were known to Patañjali, and in what form. An essential tool for this investigation is Wilhelm Rau’s book Die vedischen Zitate im Vyākarana-Mahābhāsya (1985). This book lists all the quotations in the Mahābhāṣya which Rau has identified as Vedic, together with their various locations in the Vedic texts. It will be the basis for the following reflections.

Rau’s book aims at identifying Vedic quotations. This sounds simpler than it is, because Vedic quotations are rarely indicated as such in the Mahābhāṣya. The danger is therefore always present that a phrase, or word, though identical with a Vedic phrase or word, is not a quotation. Rau is aware of this, but has chosen to include too much rather than risk being incomplete. “Der Vorwurf, mehr als das völlig Sichere gebucht zu haben, wird mir erträglicher sein als der Tadel, Lückenhaftes vorzulegen” (5). This attitude is responsible for a very satisfactory list of ‘quotations’, but is not without danger the moment we wish to draw conclusions from them. Rau does not draw many conclusions, but he does try to determine which Vedic texts were known to Patañjali with the help of hapax legomena presumably quoted in the Mahābhāṣya. The question is therefore inescapable: Are all the hapax legomena really quoted, or can their presence in the Mahābhāṣya be explained differently?

A detailed analysis of these cases can be found in Appendix V. It shows that a considerable number of these “hapax legomena” have to be interpreted differently, often as variants that Patañjali looked upon as acceptable. The inevitable conclusion of this analysis is that a considerable number of Vedic texts had not yet been completely fixed at Patañjali’s time.

Conclusions

The preceding observations have raised more questions than they could answer. Yet in spite of debatable details their cumulative outcome is that the Veda was no finished body of texts at the time of Pānini. The situation had changed at the time of Patañjali, but even at his time the Vedic texts had not yet reached the unchangeable form which came to characterize them. This conclusion is perhaps more important than any presumed list of texts that Pānini and Patañjali may have known. If, as we have found, even the Ṛgveda(-Saṃhitā), the oldest text in the Vedic corpus, was still being refined in their time, we are entitled to raise serious questions with regard to the texts of late-Vedic literature such as the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads: even if we grant, for argument’s sake, that they existed at that time, did they have anything like their present form and contents? The simple scheme of a Vedic period with texts which all precede the time of Pānini (and even Patañjali) finds no support in the detailed discussions presented above; rather they suggest the opposite: Vedic texts were still being modified, perhaps even produced, down to the time of Patañjali, and perhaps beyond.

CHAPTER III.3 - THE VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO THE EARLY BUDDHISTS

Questions pertaining to the relationship between the early grammarians and the Veda are relatively straightforward. We are in possession of texts which presumably have been composed by those early grammarians themselves. Most scholars agree that the Aṣtādhyāyī is, for the most part, the work composed by Pānini himself. They further agree that the Mahābhāṣya is the work composed by Patañjali, exactly or almost exactly in the form in which it has come down to us. With regard to the vārttikas, too, there is quasi-unanimity that all of the prose vārttikas, or almost all of them, have been composed by Kātyāyana. The extent of the acquaintance of these authors with the Veda can therefore be investigated on the basis of their own words.

It has been pointed out above that these three grammarians, and Pānini in particular, constitute one of the two main pillars on which late-Vedic chronology is traditionally based. The other one is the Buddha. The Buddha is often claimed to be more recent than certain portions of the Veda-primarily the oldest Upaniṣads-and the reason usually given for this is that Buddhist teaching continues, and is in a way based on, certain developments that made their first appearance in those portions of the Veda. The doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is fundamental to Buddhism; it was presumably new at the time of the early Upanisads. The conclusion is often drawn that Buddhism must be later than those Upanisads.

The unsound nature of this argument has been discussed in earlier chapters. The present chapter will address a different but related question: What parts of the Veda are known to the earliest Buddhist texts that have been preserved?

This question must be treated with the greatest care. The question is not: Which portions of the Veda were known to the Buddha? This latter question is of the greatest interest, and would deserve our full attention if only it were possible to answer it. ¹ It is however highly unlikely that a satisfactory answer to this question will ever be found. Unlike Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, we do not possess any work that has been composed by the Buddha himself; not even the Buddhist tradition makes any such claim. We do have a number of canonical texts which claim to preserve his words, but it is far from certain that this claim is reliable in all cases.

In view of the above we cannot but reformulate the question and give it the form indicated earlier: What parts of the Veda are known to the earliest Buddhist texts that have been preserved? This question, in this particular form, gives rise to various other questions, among which we must consider the following:

a. Which are the earliest Buddhist texts that have been preserved?

b. What conclusions can be drawn from an enumeration of Vedic texts that were known to those earliest Buddhist texts?

These two questions are of course interrelated, and connected with a third one: What does it mean that parts of the Veda were “known to” certain early Buddhist texts? Since texts themselves do not have “knowledge” in the strict sense, we will have to translate our findings into statements like “the original author of this particular Buddhist text knew (or had heard of) that particular portion of the Veda”. However, there can be no doubt that different texts (or portions of texts) of the Buddhist canon were “originally” composed, or formulated, by different authors. There was no single author for all of them, and therefore perhaps no single person who “knew” all these different parts of the Veda. And there is no guarantee that these different authors were each other’s contemporaries, nor that they were particularly close in time to the Buddha.

Few scholars nowadays would agree that the texts of the early Buddhist canon were all composed at one at the same time. The tradition according to which the sermons of the Buddha-all of them-were recited by the disciple Ānanda soon after the demise of his master does not find many followers in academic circles. Other portions of the ancient canon are widely considered to be even less old than this so-called Sūtra-Piṭaka. It is frequently pointed out that according to the Ceylonese tradition canonical texts were not written down until the first century BCE, which leaves several centuries between the first composition of at least some of these texts and their fixation in writing. During this long period they were preserved orally; the reliability of this oral tradition cannot be verified. It may be significant that the Assalāyana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN II p. 149) refers to the Greeks (yona), which suggests that the passage which contains this reference was composed after-perhaps long after - the conquests of Alexander the Great, and therefore perhaps a century or more after the death of the Buddha. ² Unfortunately the canonical texts in Pāli do not contain many indications like this one which might help us to determine the precise dates of some of their portions. ³ It is therefore far from evident at which points during the period between the death of the Buddha and the first writing down of (parts of) the Pāli canon references to Vedic texts found their way into this canon. This in its turn has radical consequences for the interpretation of the findings to be discussed in this chapter. If certain passages of the Pāli canon show acquaintance with a certain Vedic text, we cannot with certainty conclude from this that that Vedic text existed at the time of the Buddha; quite on the contrary, the only safe conclusion will be that those passages of the Pāli canon were composed after the completion of that particular Vedic text (more precisely: of a possibly earlier version of that particular Vedic text). This is the opposite of what scholars have usually concluded from such passages, and raises fundamental questions with regard to the methodology used by earlier workers in the field.

In what follows the references to parts of the Veda and related issues which occur in the Sūtra-Piṭaka (Sutta-Piṭaka) of the Pāli canon will be considered. ⁴ There are here very few explicit references to Vedic texts. ⁵ A learned Brahmin is often characterized as being a “master of the three Vedas” (tinnaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū), ⁶ without further specification as to what exactly these three Vedas encompass, nor indeed which Vedas are meant. A passage in the Dīgha Nikāya provides help by distinguishing the following kinds of Brahmins: addhariya a brāhmaṇā, tittiriyā brāhmaṇā, chandokā brāhmaṇā, bahvārijjhā brāhmaṇā. ⁷ The expression addhariya corresponds no doubt to Sanskrit ādhvarika⁸ which shows that the Brahmins concerned were somehow connected with the sacrifice, but does not tell us much more about them. The remaining three Brahmins cannot but be Taittirīya, Chāndogya and Bahvṛca Brahmins, who belong to the Black Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the Ṛgveda respectively. That is to say, these passages show that these three Vedas were known to the authors of these passages in one form or another. A passage in the Suttanipāta (927) which uses the word āthabbaṇa (Skt. ātharvaṇa) suggests that the Atharvaveda, too, was known in some form or other. Another passage of the Suttanipāta (289) speaks of the 48 years which Brahmins used to live as celibates, acquiring knowledge. Falk (1988: 228) is no doubt right in pointing out that this number 48 has to be read, in the light of Brahmanical sources, as four times twelve: twelve years for the memorization of each of the four Vedas. ⁹

If, then, the four Vedas-presumably the four Saṃhitās, or their predecessors - were known to the authors of these passages, it is not clear whether all the surviving Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads of these four Vedas were known to them also.

Beside the above references to Vedic texts and to Brahmins connected with them, there is the following enumeration of “ancient Brahmin seers (isi, Skt. ryi), the creators of the hymns (manta, Skt. mantra), the composers of the hymns, whose ancient hymns that were formerly chanted, uttered, and compiled the Brahmins nowadays still chant and repeat, repeating what was spoken, reciting what was recited”, viz. Aṭthaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Aṅgirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa, and Bhagu. ¹⁰ These sages are no doubt to be identified with Aṣtaka (Atṭhaka), Vāmadeva, Viśvāmitra (Vessāmitta), Jamadagni (Yamataggi), Aṅgiras (Aṅgirasa), Bhāradvāja, Vasiṣṭha (Vāseṭṭha), Kaśyapa (Kassapa), and Bhrgu (Bhagu), practically all of whom are recognized Vedic sages. ¹¹ Only Vāmaka resists identification in Vedic literature. But in spite of these identifications, this list does not tell us much about the texts known to the author of this particular passage in the Pāli canon. Most of these sages are mentioned in, or are otherwise associated with, the Rgyeda.

It is not clear what conclusions can be drawn from these data. Chronological conclusions, if any, only concern the passages or pericopes concerned, and these are few in number. Whatever Vedic texts were known to the authors of these passages - and we have seen that it is difficult to determine which ones they are - were not necessarily known to the authors of other passages of the canon; ¹² nothing whatsoever can be concluded from them as to the Vedic texts known to the Buddha or his contemporaries. It is only fair to conclude that the search for explicit references to Vedic texts in the early Buddhist canon provides us with no information as to the Vedic texts that existed at the time of the Buddha.

Does this mean that the early Buddhist canon provides us with no useful information about the question we are investigating in this chapter? A number of scholars think otherwise, basing themselves not on explicit references to Vedic literature, but on contents which, they claim, reflect acquaintance with views and tenets expressed in certain Vedic texts. Some go to the extent of concluding from this that much of the teaching of the Buddha was a reaction to Brahmanical doctrine. ¹³

As a first example we may consider the claim that Brahmins are born from the mouth of Brahmā. This claim is made in two different passage of the Pāli canon by Brahmins keen to convince the Buddha of the superiority of their caste. It is once made by the Brahmin Assalāyana in the Assalāyana Sutta (MN II p. 147 ff.), and once by the Brahmin Vāseṭṭha in the Aggañña Sutta (DN III p. 80 ff.). ¹⁴ The claim is subsequently rejected by the Buddha. Basing himself on these two passages, Richard Gombrich observed in 1988 (p. 77):

[The Buddha] poked fun at the Hymn of the Cosmic Man (whom the Brahmins of the day evidently identified with Brahmā): “Brahmins say that they are the children of Brahmā, born from his mouth; and yet Brahmin ladies, one notices, menstruate, get pregnant, give birth and give suck.”

Two years later he referred back to this and stated (1990: 14):

Some of the great modern scholars of Buddhism have said that the Buddha had no direct knowledge of Vedic texts, but that is certainly wrong. The joke about how Brahmins are born satirizes the Puruṣasūkta, the text in which Brahmins are said to originate from the mouth of the cosmic Man.

The Puruṣa-sūkta is the Hymn of the Cosmic Man, a well-known hymn from the Ṛgveda (10.90). ¹⁵ Gombrich claims, in the second quotation more clearly than in the first, that the Buddha had direct knowledge of this hymn. ¹⁶

Nothing is of course less certain than this. The hymn to Puruṣa is, in the words of Louis Renou (1965: 8), “the major source of cosmogonic thought in ancient India”; elsewhere he says (1956: 12): “Il n’y a guère de poème cosmologique de l’Atharvaveda où l’on ne retrouve quelque allusion voilée au mythe du Géant sacrifié et au schéma évolutif qui en résulte […] C’est encore le thème du Géant qui sous les traits de Prajāpati ‘le seigneur des Créatures’ ressurgit dans les Brāhmaṇa et en commande la plupart des avenues.” Jan Gonda (1968: 101) calls it “the foundation stone of Viṣnuite philosophy”. Especially the part concerning the creation of the four main divisions of society, the four varnas, has been taken over in numerous texts belonging both to the Vedic and to the classical period. We find it, for example, in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā (7.1.1.46), the Mahābhārata (3.187.13; 8.23.32; 12.73.4-5; 12.285.5-6), the Rāmāyaṇa (3.13.29-30), but also in the first chapter of the Mānava Dharma Śāstra. The Lord, we there read, created, “so that the worlds and people would prosper and increase, from his mouth the Brahmin, from his arms the Kṣatriya, from his thighs the Vaiśya, and from his feet the Śūdra.” ¹⁷ Elsewhere the same text refers to this myth as common background knowledge, used as an alternative way of speaking about the four varnas. ¹⁸ The Puruṣa-sūkta remains important in later literature and practice. ¹⁹ In other words, the theme of the Brahmin supposedly born from the mouth of the creator God is among the most widely known themes of Indian mythology. The fact that we find it in the Pāli canon is not at all surprising. To this must be added that in the Puruṣa-sūkta the Brahmin is not born from the mouth of Brahmā, but from the mouth of the Puruṣa, the primordial giant. The fact that the two Pāli texts put Brahmā in his place shows that the authors of these passages did not know the Hymn of the Cosmic Man. It is finally of some interest to recall that the Assalāyana Sutta is precisely the one sutta, mentioned above, which refers to the Greeks, and which may therefore be suspected of being late. This reference to the Greeks is structural and not due to a later addition, because the Buddha’s reply to the Brahmin begins with this reference to the Greeks, bringing to Assalāyana’s notice that the varna system does not prevail among them. ²⁰

Gombrich further claims that the Buddha knew the Brāhmaṇa texts, or at least some of them. This is ostensibly shown by a passage from the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN III p. 144). Here “the Buddha holds up before some monks a pellet of cow dung. […] He has just said - as so often - that nothing in the five groups of components of a person (khandha) is permanent, stable, and exempt from change. Showing the dung pellet, he says that one does not acquire a self even of this size which is permanent, etc.; if one did, one would not live this holy life to destroy suffering. He goes on to talk of a former life in which he was an emperor; but now that glory has all passed away.” (Gombrich, 1996: 41). Why should this unexciting passage show the Buddha’s familiarity with the Brāhmaṇa texts of the Veda? Gombrich (p. 40) draws attention to some instructions for building a fire altar that occur in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā (5.3.5.2). Here, Gombrich explains, the sacrificer is told to lay in the middle a brick which is smeared with dung, “for truly, dung is the middle of the self. It is with his self that he lays the fire. He who knows this comes to be in the other world with his self”. Gombrich admits that the word he has translated “self” is ātman, which in this context clearly refers to the physical body. He does not say that the words he translates “dung” in the two passages are not the same: in the Pāli passage it is gomaya “cow dung”, in the Taittirīya passage purīsa “dust, excrement”. ²¹ The two passages therefore use the same word ätman in two clearly distinct meanings, and the two words which Gombrich both translates “dung” refer respectively to cow dung (gomaya) and to human excrement (or quite simply dust, soil: purīsa), two clearly distinct things. ²² Even listeners who knew this passage from the Taittirīya Saṃhitā are unlikely to have made the mental connection between the Buddha’s words and that passage (unless, of course, these listeners had the extraordinary sense of humour which Gombrich attributes to the Buddha, about which more below). Here we can safely conclude that there is no compelling, nor indeed suggestive evidence to think that the Buddha was familiar with Vedic Brāhmaṇas.

More interesting than the presumed acquaintance of the early Buddhists with older Vedic texts is their relationship to the Upaniṣads and the developments within Vedic thought that find expression in them. Literal quotations of Upaniṣadic passages are not to be found in the early Buddhist texts, nor indeed familiarity with the name Upaniṣad for a literary genre. ²³ There are, however, some claimed similarities in thought, which have led some researchers to conclude that the Buddha knew the earliest Upaniṣads and reacted to their teachings.

Before we study these similarities, it is important to consider the following. We are at present investigating the relative chronology of certain Brahmanical and Buddhist texts, and we are not therefore taking the chronological priority of any of them for granted. In this situation similarities of thought and expression (if there are any) will not, without further questioning, be interpreted as proof of the dependence of one on the other. Other possibilities will be considered, such as the fact that both groups of texts were produced in the same broad geographical area, where similar issues were discussed by adherents of different religious movements. The claim that adherents of different religious movements discussed the issues of rebirth and karmic retribution is not in need of proof, for we have seen that these ideas “spilled over” from Greater Magadha into the early Vedic Upaniṣads. This means that we cannot a priori exclude the possibility of similarities of thought and diction between the early Upaniṣads and the early Buddhist texts, even if we were to come to the conclusion that the early Upaniṣads were not known to the Buddhist authors. It is imperative to avoid hasty conclusions.

With this in mind, we turn to the Alagaddūpama Sutta which is, according to Gombrich (1996: 39), “probably the most important of all texts” on the topic of Buddhism as a reaction to Brahmanical doctrine. This Sutta rejects a point of view in which K. R. Norman (1981) finds Upaniṣadic echoes. ²⁴ One of these echoes is the notion of a soul or self (attā) which is, Norman observes, “by definition nicca and sukha” (p. 202); we may add that this self is believed to be unchanging, immutable. Since we have dealt with this conception of the soul in an earlier chapter, and have shown that it is a conception which the Upanisads themselves must have borrowed from the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, we can discard this specific “Upaniṣadic echo” as proof of Upaniṣadic influence on this part of the Alagaddūpama Sutta and turn to the other echo suggested by Norman. It is the notion of a self that is identical with the world. It finds expression in the following words (MN I p. 136): so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṃ tath’ eva thassāmi, “The world and the attā are the same; having passed away I shall be eternal, fixed, everlasting, of an unchangeable nature; I shall remain for ever exactly so” (tr. Norman). Norman comments (1981: 201).

The idea that the world and the ātman (= brahman) are the same is found in the Upanisads, and it is possible to find actual verbal echoes of the Upaniṣads in this passage, e.g. eṣa ma ātmā ([Chāndoga Upaniṣad] III.14.3-4), and yathākratur asmiṃl loke puruṣo bhavati tathetah pretya bhavati sa kratuṃ kurvīta […] etam itah pretyābhisambhavitāsmīti (ibid. III.14.1 and 4).

The Upanisadic passage which Norman refers to is the one we have studied in part in chapter IIA. 3 above (passage C), and gives expression to the teaching of Śāndilya.

Two differences between the two passages deserve our attention. There is, to begin with, no mention of brahman in the position criticized in the Alagaddūpama Sutta. This notion is, on the other hand, central in the passage of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Second, the position criticized by the Buddhists has clear links to the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution: only in that context does the notion of a self which is “eternal, fixed, everlasting, of an unchangeable nature” make sense. The Upaniṣadic passage does not refer to this aspect of the self. Quite on the contrary it is said to “contain all actions, all desires” (sarvakarmā sarvakāmah), etc. We have seen that the notion of the immutability of the self is largely absent from the early Upaniṣads, with the notable exception of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BĀrUp 3 and 4).

What can we conclude from the above? There is no need to deny that there are parallel elements in the teaching of Śāndilya and the teaching criticized in the Alagaddūpama Sutta. Both preach the identity between the self and the world (loka), called “this all” (sarvam idam) in the Upaniṣad. But the teaching of Śāndilya is a brahmanized teaching, whereas the teaching criticized in the Alagaddūpama Sutta has no Brahmanical features and is clearly aimed at liberation from rebirth and karmic retribution; the teaching of Śāndilya is not, or not clearly aimed at this. The teaching criticized in the Alagaddūpama Sutta is at home in Greater Magadha, where it may indeed have had adherents who did not need the Upaniṣads to work out this particular variant of thought. The Upanisadic teaching of Śāndilya is not so easily categorized: it is neither fish nor flesh. It is probably safest to understand it as a brahmanized version of an idea that originally belonged to the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, but there is no need to insist on this. If borrowing has to be assumed, however, then it has taken place from the non-Vedic idea of an immutable self, to the teaching of Śāndilya. This, if correct, does not imply that Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14 is later than the Alagaddūpama Sutta. It would merely imply that the Alagaddūpama Sutta shows awareness of a position which, at some time-maybe centuries earlier, maybe much later-influenced that part of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Chronological conclusions cannot be drawn from parallels like these.

After the Alagaddūpama Sutta, we turn to the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya which, according to Gombrich (1990: 14), contains a satirical allusion to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad:

[It] is the anecdote about Brahmā’s delusion that he created other beings. It occurs in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya ²⁵ to explain why some people think that the world and the soul are partly eternal and partly not; […] Brahmā is reborn (in Rhys Davids’ words) “either because his span of years has passed or his merit is exhausted”; he then gets lonely and upset and longs for company. Then, “either because their span of years had passed or their merit was exhausted”, other beings are reborn alongside him. Post hoc, propter hoc, thinks silly old Brahmā, and gets the idea that the other beings are his creation. [T]his is just a satirical retelling of the creation myth in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad [BĀrUp 1.4.1-3], in which Brahmā is lonely and afraid and so begets for company […]

It is hard to see how this parallel could prove acquaintance with a specific passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The Brahmajāla Sutta certainly knows the idea of Brahmā as creator god, who creates because he is lonely, but one cannot seriously maintain that this belief was the exclusive property of one passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Moreover, if the author of the Buddhist passage had wished to ridicule that specific passage from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we might have expected some similarity in wording. There is none. This is no obstacle if we ascribe a strongly developed sense of humour to the Buddha or his early disciples, for a favourite definition of joking-as Sigmund Freud pointed out more than a century ago (1905: 41) -has long been the ability to find similarity between dissimilar things. The scholar who ascribes a strong sense of humour to the Buddha permits himself to find similarities where others find none, or to exaggerate the importance of superficial similarities. Ascribing an exaggerated sense of humour to the Buddha (or to any other historical personality for that matter) is therefore very dubious methodology. Rather than resorting to this stratagem, I propose to state the obvious: there is no compelling reason to believe that the Buddha, or the author of this passage of the Brahmajāla Sutta, knew the portion concerned of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

There is no need to deny that the early Buddhist texts contain features which suggest a society in which certain Brahmanical ideas were known. Certain expressions and concepts (e.g., brahmabhūta, brahmasahavyatā) leave little doubt in this regard. One may hope that their detailed study will one day clarify their relationship with the Brahmanical ideas which we find in late-Vedic literature. This task will not be undertaken in this book. Here we try to answer the question whether the early Upaniṣads were known to the authors of the early Buddhist texts. The answer we are obliged to accept is that no evidence has been presented so far that they were.

CHAPTER III.4 - SOME INDICATIONS IN LATE-VEDIC LITERATURE

The relationship between late-Vedic literature and the two chronological beacons of ancient India-Pāṇini and the early Sanskrit grammarians on the one hand; the Buddha and his early followers on the other - has to be at the centre of each investigation into late-Vedic chronology. The preceding chapters have shown that the study of this relationship provides little to uphold traditional notions. The present chapter will study two indications provided by late-Vedic literature which may bring further clarity.

The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad ¹ contains three lineages: lists of teachers who passed on the text or a portion of it to their respective pupils, who passed it on to theirs, etc. These lineages occur at the end of the second, fourth and sixth adhyāyas respectively. The lineage at the end of the sixth adhyāya also completes the Upaniṣad as a whole.

These three lineages suggest that the text of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad consists of (at least) three originally independent portions: portion I (adhyāyas 1 & 2), portion II (adhyāyas 3 & 4), and portion III (adhyāyas 5 & 6). These portion are traditionally known by the names Madhu-Kāṇ̣a or Honey Section (= portion I), YājñavalkyaKāṇ̣a or Yājñavalkya Section (= portion II), and Khila-Kāṇ̣a or Supplementary Section (= portion III). The division into these three portions is not of course compelling. It is conceivable that lineages were originally added to smaller portions of the Upaniṣad, not to the whole of what we call portions I, II and III. It is also imaginable that the lineage at the end of the Upaniṣad did not just terminate portion III but the Upaniṣad as a whole. ² In this case we must assume that this last lineage was added to a collection of originally independent portions which already contained the first two lineages.

An inspection of the lineages as they occur in the Kāṇva version of the Upaniṣad reveals that the first two-those which conclude adhyāas 2 and 4 respectively-are very similar to each other. Of the 58 generations enumerated at BĀrUp(K) 2.6, only eleven (numbers 10 to 20 , counting from the present) have nothing corresponding to them at BĀrUp(K) 4.6. The other way round, BĀrUp(K) 4.6 enumerates 59 generations, of which twelve (numbers 10 to 21) have no corresponding items at BĀrUp(K) 2.6. It is tempting to conclude from this that portions I and II had indeed been joined eight generations before the most recent end of the lineages, presumably by someone called Āgniveśya, and that before that date they had been preserved separately by different lineages of individuals. ³ The fact that the oldest thirty-eight generations in the two lineages are identical may merely mean that later generations liked to think of both texts as having ultimately been derived from one and the same source, viz. Brahman. These oldest steps constitute the mythological origin of the lineage (with a number of identifiable mythological figures in it), and it is clear that, even if we assume that the lineages represent some historical reality, the same may not be true of their mythological origin.

Table 1.

BĀrUp(K) 2.6 (Kānva I)	BĀrUp(K) 4.6 (Kānva II)
Pautimāşya	Pautimāşya
Gaupavana	Gaupavana
Pautimāşya	Pautimāşya
Gaupavana	Kauśika
Kauṇdinya	Kauṇdinya
Sāndilya	Sāndilya
Kauśika&Gautama	Kauśika&Gautama
Agniveśya	Agniveśya
Sāndilya&Ānabhimlāta	Gārgya
Ānabhimlāta	Gārgya
Ānabhimlāta	Gautama
Gautama	Saitava
Saitava&Prācīnayogya	Pārāśaryāyaṇa
Pārāśarya	Gārgyāyaṇa
Bhāradvāja	Uddālakāyana
Bhāradvāja&Gautama	Jābālāyana
Bhāradvāja	Mādhyandināyana
Pārāśarya	Saukarāyaṇa
Vaijavāpāyana	Kāṣāyaṇa
	Sāyakāyana
Kauśikāyani	Kauśikāyani
Ghṛtakauśika	Ghṛtakauśika
Pārāśaryāyaṇa	Pārāśaryāyaṇa
Pārāśarya	Pārāśarya
Jātūkariyya	Jātūkariyya
Asurāyaṇa&Yāska	Asurāyaṇa&Yāska
Traivaṇi	Traivaṇi
Aupajandhani	Aupajandhani
Asuri	Asuri
Bhāradvāja	Bhāradvāja
Atreya	Atreya
Māṇ̣̣i	Māṇ̣̣i
Gautama	Gautama
Gautama	Gautama
Vātsya	Vātsya
Sāndilya	Sāndilya
Kaiśorya Kāpya	Kaiśorya Kāpya
Kumārahārita	Kumārahārita
Gālava	Gālava
Vidarbhīkauṇdinya	Vidarbhīkauṇdinya
Vatsanapāt Bābhrava	Vatsanapāt Bābhrava
Pathin Saubhara	Pathin Saubhara
Ayāsya Āngirasa	Ayāsya Āngirasa
Abhūti Tvāṣtra	Abhūti Tvāṣtra
Viśvarūpa Tvāṣṛa	Viśvarūpa Tvāṣṛa
the two Aśvins	the two Aśvins
Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa	Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa
Atharvan Daiva	Atharvan Daiva
Mṛtyu Prādhvaṃsana	Mṛtyu Prādhvaṃsana
Pradhvaṃsana	Pradhvaṃsana
Eka Ṛ̣̣i	Eka Ṛ̣̣i
Vipracitti	Vipracitti
Vyaṣti	Vyaṣti
Sanāru	Sanāru
Sanātana	Sanātana
Sanaga	Sanaga
Parameṣthin	Parameṣthin
Brahman	Brahman

The third lineage, at BĀrUp(K) 6.5, is different. Its generations are shown in table 2 .

Table 2.

	BārUp(K) 6.5 (Kānva III)
	Pautimāṣīputra
	Kātyāyanīputra
	Gautamīputra
	Bhāradvājīputra
	Pārāáarīputra
	Aupasvastīputra
	Pārāáarīputra
	Kātyāyanīputra
	Kauáikīputra
	Ālambīputra&Vaiyāghrapadīputra
	Kāṇvīputra&Kāpīputra
	Ātreyīputra
	Gautamīputra
	Bhāradvājīputra
	Pārāáarīputra
	Vātsīputra
	Pārāáarīputra
	Vārkāruṇīputra
	Vārkāruṇīputra
	Ārtabhāgīputra
	Śauṅgīputra
	Sāṃkṛtīputra
	Ālambāyanīputra
	Ālambīputra
	Jāyantīputra
	Māṇḍūkāyanīputra
	Māṇḍūkīputra
	Śāṇḍalīputra
	Rāthītarīputra
	Bhālukīputra
	two Krauñcikīputras
	Vaidabhṛtīputra
	Kāráakeyīputra
	Prācīnayogīputra
	Sāṃjīvīputra
Prāśnīputra Āsurivāsin		Māṇḍūkāyani
Āsurāyaṇa		Māṇ·avya
Āsuri		Kautsa
Yājñavalkya		Māhitthi
Uddālaka		Vāmakakṣāyaṇa
Aruṇa		Śāṇḍilya
Upaveái		Vātsya
Kuári		Kuári
Vājaáravas Yajñavacas		Rājastambāyana
Jihvāvat Bādhyoga Tura		Kāvaṣeya
Asita Vārṣagaṇa		Prajāpati
Harita Kaáyapa		Brahman
“ilpa Kaáyapa
Kaáyapa Naidhruvi
Vāc
Ambhiṇī
Āditya

It deviates in various respects from the other two. Most striking perhaps is that in its more recent portion the men concerned are not identified by their own names but by those of their mothers (“son of …”). ⁴ It is only towards the mythological origin that individuals are referred to by their own names. In spite of this difference, an altogether different sequence of individuals appears to be enumerated here from the ones we find in the other two lineages. ⁵ Pautimāsīputra, however, the most recent figure in the third lineage, is likely to be the same as Pautimāṣya, who is the most recent one in the other two. ⁶ This is possible if we interpret Pautimāṣīputra to mean “son of Pautimāṣī”, ⁷ and derive Pautimāṣī from Pautimāṣya in the sense “name of a wife because of the connection with her husband” by the grammatical rule P. 4.1.47 (punyyogād ākhyāyām) with P. 6.4.150 (halas taddhitasya). The son of the wife of Pautimāṣya, also being a gotra-descendant of Pūtimāṣa, is likewise called Pautimāṣya.

The assumed identity between Pautimāsīputra and Pautimāsya suggests that portion III did not join portions I and II (which had joined each other some eight generations earlier) until Pautimāsya, who is therefore presented as the person who brought all the different portions of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad together. This conclusion answers the question raised above, viz., does the lineage at the very end of the Upaniṣad merely terminate portion III or the Upaniṣad as a whole? The answer suggested by the lineages is: the third lineage belongs only to portion III, for Pautimāsya, who brought the three portions together, received portion III from the son of Kātyāyanī, and portions I and II from Gaupavana. ⁸ Even if we may feel sceptical about the exact names enumerated in the various lineages and about the number of generations indicated, the resulting picture in which portions I and II were combined ⁹ before the two were joined with portion III is as plausible as any other, and indeed more so: it has the great advantage over any other that it is supported by textual evidence in the form of the lineages, and by the fact that the traditional designation of portion III is Khila-Kāṇda “Supplementary Section”. We will adopt this picture as working hypothesis. ¹⁰

The third lineage, then, belongs to portion III only. This information is useful for an understanding of some of its peculiarities. Note to begin with that the lineage is given in two versions. Below the “son of Sāṃjīvī” (sāṃj̄vīputra) there are two options: the one printed on the left, and the one on the right. In fact, the Upaniṣad first gives the whole lineage including the left-hand version. It then adds (6.5.4) samānam ā sāṃj̄vīputrāt “The same up to the son of Sāñjīvī” followed by the list of teachers which is given on the right-hand side in the above scheme. The Upaniṣad gives no explanation for this peculiar procedure. Still, various indications allow us to think of a plausible explanation.

Note that the two versions of the lineage do not recognize one and the same ultimate source for the teaching contained in portion III. The one version presents Āditya as its ultimate source, the other Brahman. Brahman is also the ultimate source of portions I and II according to their lineages. It is therefore conceivable that the person who brought the three portions together-presumably Pautimāṣya-was not very happy with Āditya as the ultimate source for portion III, and considered it his task to indicate that Brahman might after all be the source of this portion as well. This explanation presupposes that the left-hand version of the third lineage is original, and the right-hand version an editorial modification. This agrees with the fact that the right-hand version is indeed added to the left-hand one, and also with the observation that the Mādhyandina version of the Upaniṣad does not have this addition.

By coincidence we know where “Pautimāṣya” got his alternative beginning of the lineage from, for exactly the same passage-beginning with samānamā sāṃ̃̃vīputrāt which is then followed by the genealogy reproduced on the right hand side of table 2 aboveoccurs elsewhere in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, at ŚPaBr 10.6.5.9, i.e. at the end of books 6-10 (both Mādhyandina and Kāṇva). There this passage occurs all on its own, and is not accompanied by the lineage that occurs at the end of the Upanişad. Renou (1948: 76 [886]) concludes from the implicit reference here to the end of the Upanişad that books 6-10 were made, or at least completed, after the books of Yājñavalkya (i.e., ŚPaBr 1-5 and 11-14). This may be so, but the fact that the final and partial lineage of the end of book 10 has been added to the lineage at the end of the Upaniṣad (in its Kāṇva recension) suggests that the situation may be more complex than that. It suggests, for example, that the author of the (partial) lineage at the end of book 10 of the Brāhmaṇa looked upon the lineage at the end of the Upaniṣad as belonging to much more than only portion III of the Upaniṣad; probably, as Renou proposes, as belonging to the whole Brāhmaṇa, including the Upaniṣad but excluding books 6-10. ¹¹

The supposition that this alternative version of part of the lineage has been added afterwards finds support in other circumstances. The presumably original third lineage presented Yājñavalkya as one of the ancient sages who had received this teaching from his teacher Uddālaka; Uddālaka had received it from Aruṇa, and Aruṇa from Upaveśi. Both Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka are well-known Vedic teachers, and we know from other sources that Uddālaka was the son of Aruṇa, and Aruṇa the son of Upaveśi. The teacher-pupil sequence Upaveśi - Aruṇa - Uddālaka - Yājñavalkya therefore makes sense, and we must conclude that the Vedic Brahmins who originally preserved portion III were of the opinion that Yājñavalkya had been Uddālaka’s pupil. This conclusion is confirmed by a passage which occurs elsewhere in portion III and states: “After telling this same thing to his pupil Vājasaneya Yājñavalkya, Uddālaka Āruṇi said […]” (BĀrUp(K) 6.3.7-8). Yājñavalkya is nowhere else mentioned in portion III, and if we had no other information than this we would look upon Yājñavalkya as a student of Uddālaka and no more.

However, portion II sings an altogether different tune. This whole portion is dedicated to the figure of Yājñavalkya, who appears here as invariably successful in his endeavours. One of his feats is a debate (BĀrUp(K) 3) which supposedly took place at the court of King Janaka and in which Yājñavalkya put various learned Brahmins to shame; the consequences are worst for one of them, Śākalya, whose head shatters apart. ¹² Most of this does not necessarily contradict the information about Yājñavalkya which we derive from portion III, but some passages do. One of his unfortunate opponents during this debate is none else than Uddālaka, and even though Uddālaka physically survives this ordeal, he comes out of it a big loser. It did not help that he had started the discussion with a threat directed at Yājñavalkya (BĀrUp(K) 3.7.1: “if you drive away the cows meant for the Brahmins, Yājñavalkya, without knowing what that string is and who that inner controller is, your head will shatter apart”), for in the end Uddālaka is silenced by Yājñavalkya’s superior knowledge. There is no hint in this part of the Upaniṣad that Yājñavalkya was, or had ever been, Uddālaka’s pupil, and indeed this information would no doubt have turned Yājñavalkya from a supremely wise debater into an impertinent and ungrateful rascal in the eyes of his later admirers. ¹³

This confrontation between Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka easily explains why the person who collected the different portions of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (was it Pautimāṣya?) felt uncomfortable with a lineage in which Yājñavalkya was clearly presented as the pupil of Uddālaka. ¹⁴ He thus had a second reason for proposing a corrected version of the lineage. We can only be grateful that, in spite of his misgivings, he also left us the older lineage.

The limited information found in portion III with regard to Yājñavalkya does not contain the slightest hint that there might have been friction between these two men. If the composers of this portion had been aware of the shameful treatment Uddālaka underwent in portion II, they might have been tempted to put matters straight (e.g., by dropping Yājñavalkya’s name or disowning him in some other way). The fact that they did not do so suggests that they did not know the contents of portion II.

The reverse is less certain. Various features of portion II can easily be understood in the light of the assumption that its composers knew portion III, or at least some of its contents. Beside the debate at the court of King Janaka mentioned above, portion II also contains some discussions between Yājñavalkya and the king (BĀrUp(K) 4.1-4). There are two episodes, BĀrUp(K) 4.1-2 and 4.3-4; at the end of each of these the king capitulates before the overwhelming instruction he has received from Yājñavalkya and offers himself and his subjects as servants (BĀrUp(K) 4.2.4: “These people of Videha and I myself-here we are at your service”; 4.4.23: “Here, sir, I’ll give you the people of Videha together with myself to be your slaves”). ¹⁵ The teaching which Yājñavalkya imparts to the king concerns Brahman and the immutable nature of the self, and in the second episode rebirth and karmic retribution as well.

These discussions between Yājñavalkya and King Janaka should surprise us. Elsewhere in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa (11.6.2) another discussion between the two is recorded in which it is Janaka whose knowledge is superior to that of Yājñavalkya; as a result, Yājñavalkya is given instruction by the king. In the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (1.22-25; cf. Bodewitz, 1973: 72 ff.) Yājñavalkya, along with Uddālaka and three other Brahmins, approaches King Janaka and is instructed by him. ¹⁶ Here in portion II of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, however, Yājñavalkya’s knowledge is so much superior to that of the king that the king offers himself and his subjects to the sage. This is surprising in that late-Vedic literature as a rule has a strictly linear conception of sacred knowledge. Either one has more of it, and in that case one is a greater sage, or one has less, and then one should become the other’s pupil. ¹⁷ One is not normally more knowledgeable in one area of sacred knowledge and less knowledgeable in another. Between Yājñavalkya and Janaka the situation appears to be different: Yājñavalkya is more pre-eminent in one field of knowledge, Janaka in another.

The topic that had been discussed in ŚPaBr 11.6.2 is the sacrifice called Agnihotra. Interestingly, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka refers to that earlier discussion, in the following words: “But once, when the two were engaged in a discussion about the daily fire sacrifice (= Agnihotra), Yājñavalkya had granted Janaka of Videha a wish. The wish he chose was the freedom to ask any question at will, and Yājñavalkya had granted it to him.” (BĀrUp(K) 4.3.1) Clearly, the authors of this passage also knew that Janaka had taught Yājñavalkya on that earlier occasion. How could they allow the tables to be turned so completely?

The answer to this question, I think, is twofold. To begin with, it is clear that the authors of portion II had the intention to sing the glory of Yājñavalkya, a glory unsullied by any hint of imperfection. In this portion Yājñavalkya is wiser, and stronger, than any of the people with whom he interacts, and he does not hesitate to shame them. Old scores are settled with various other persons; we have already mentioned Śākalya and Uddālaka, and we can now add Janaka himself. Yājñavalkya is superior to all of them, and as a result the others either die (Śākalya), are put to shame (Uddālaka), or offer themselves as his slaves (Janaka). ¹⁸

But there is more, and here Uddālaka re-enters the picture. Uddālaka was known to have admitted that he had received some crucial knowledge about the afterlife from a king; it had even been claimed that this very important knowledge had not so far been known to Brahmins. Portion II puts matters straight by showing that even the most illustrious King Janaka, who was admired for his knowledge, had not possessed this particular knowledge. He received it from a Brahmin, i.e., from Yājñavalkya; the implication is no doubt that the same is true of all other, lesser, kings. In other words, it is not at all true that knowledge about rebirth, karmic retribution and the nature of the self had initially been unknown to Brahmins. ¹⁹ Quite on the contrary, it had been known to the best of Brahmins all along, and if certain kings possessed it, too, this because they had been instructed by Brahmins. ²⁰

Let us recall the main points of the passages (discussed in chapter IIA.3) which link Uddālaka to the claim of a non-Brahmanical origin for the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. Three Upaniṣads-the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (6.2; this is our portion III), the Chāndogya (5.3-10) and the Kauṣ̄taki (1)—describe how, in spite of a completed traditional education, Uddālaka’s son Śvetaketu is not able to answer some important questions which he is asked by a king. ²¹ As a result his father, Uddālaka, then becomes a student of the king concerned (Pravāhaṇa Jaivali in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya, Citra Gāngyāyani in the Kauṣitaki), and learns the truth about rebirth and liberation; this truth, to be sure, is dressed up in a Vedic garb. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad, unlike the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, adds some remarks that deal with karmic retribution (ChānUp 5.10.7: “people here whose behaviour is pleasant can expect to enter a pleasant womb […] people of foul behaviour can expect to enter a foul womb”). The Kauṣitaki (1.2), too, shows awareness of karmic retribution: “they are born again […] each in accordance with his actions and his knowledge”. In both the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya Upaniṣads the king draws attention to the fact that “this knowledge has never before been in the possession of a Brahmin” (BĀrUp(K) 6.2.8), that “before you this knowledge had never reached the Brahmins” (ChānUp 5.3.6). The Chāndogya adds: “As a result in all the worlds government has belonged exclusively to royalty.” ²²

The instruction provided by Yājñavalkya to King Janaka has the unmistakable purpose of showing that Uddālaka and all those who put their trust in the stories that were told about him were mistaken. Yājñavalkya needed no king to be instructed in this doctrine, on the contrary: the great King Janaka had received this instruction from him and had been so impressed by it that he had offered himself and his kingdom to this sage. The circumstance that on an earlier occasion Yājñavalkya had received instruction from Janaka, as recorded at S̄PaBr 11.6.2, could now be turned into advantage. Yes, Yājñavalkya was ready, when necessary, to be taught by a king, but for the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution he did not need such instruction: this knowledge he possessed himself, and this knowledge did not come from non-Brahmanical milieus.

It is interesting to note, as has been pointed out by Brereton (1997: 4 f.), that the frame narrative of BārUp(K) 3 is taken from S̄PaBr 11.6.3. ²³ There, too, King Janaka offers a thousand cows to the most learned Brahmin, and there, too, Yājñavalkya claims the prize and then defeats Śākalya, who subsequently dies (there too). But the developed account at BārUp(K) 3 has several features that do not occur in the prototype. Among these the following are especially important in the present context. First, Uddālaka figures in the Upaniṣadic account, but not in the prototype. And second, Yājñavalkya’s instruction in the Upaniṣad concerns, in part, the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. When Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga asks him what happens to a man after he has died, Yājñavalkya explains to him (BĀrUp(K) 3.2.13 = B1 in chapter IIA.3, above): “A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.” The discussion between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī, too, needs our special attention. It occurs twice in the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, once in portion I (BĀrUp(K) 2.4), and once in portion II (BĀrUp(K) 4.5). This is surprising. Underlying portion II, as we have seen, there is the idea that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is Vedic and has not been borrowed from non-Brahmins. No such idea appears to underlie portion I. This, if true, makes us expect that the story of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī in portion II presents us once again with a Yājñavalkya who knew this doctrine, whereas portion I would not attribute this particular knowledge to him.

And indeed, it doesn’t. What is more, version II has been modified so as to introduce this knowledge. A detailed comparison of the two versions by Hanefeld (1976: 84 ff .) has revealed that the two are largely identical. There are however some small but significant differences. Hanefeld points out that version II is longer than version I on account of three added passages. (The reverse is not true: there are no added passages in version I.) One of these added passages is the following (BĀrUp 4.5 .15) :

About this self (ätman), one can only say ‘not —, not -’. He is ungraspable, for he cannot be grasped. He is undecaying, for he is not subject to decay. He has nothing sticking to him, for nothing sticks to him. He is not bound; yet he neither trembles in fear nor suffers injury. ²⁴

This passage introduces the notion of the immutability of the self. This same notion also occurs, in different words, somewhat earlier in portion II (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.14: avinās̄̄ vā are yam ātmā ‘nucchittidharmā “This self, you see, is imperishable; it has an indestructible nature”) in a passage which has, once again, no parallel in portion I. ²⁵

These modifications are far from innocent. Nothing in Yājñavalkya’s instruction as recorded in portion I suggests that the self has these qualifications. And yet these, and only these, are the qualifications which turn knowledge of the self into a means to escape from karmic retribution. Only the knowledge of a self that is completely unchangeable and is not at all involved in the activities of its owner can free a person from the consequences of his deeds. Yājñavalkya’s other thoughts about the self, and about what happens after death, are the idiosyncratic ideas of an undoubtedly original thinker, but one who had not yet been confronted with the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. ²⁶

Yājñavalkya’s instruction of his wife in portion I has a lot to say about the self (ātman) in which the whole world resides, but culminates in the teaching that “after death there is no awareness” (BĀrUp(K) 2.4.12: na pretya samjñāsti). ²⁷ Significantly, the instruction in portion II appears to play down this position. ²⁸ Where in portion I Maitreyī reacts by saying “Now you have totally confused me by saying ‘after death there is no awareness’” (BĀrUp(K) 2.4.13: atraiva mā bhagavān amūmuhan na pretya samjñāstiti), her reaction in portion II is: “Now, sir, you have utterly confused me! I cannot perceive this at all.” (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.14: atraiva mā bhagavān mohāntam āpīpipat / na vā aham imaṃ vijānāmīti /). Hanefeld (1976: 87) comments:

Die Schlussfolgerung, dass es nach dem Tode kein Objektbewusstsein gibt, lässt sich nur aus der Fassung A [= BĀrUp(K) 2.4] ziehen-in B [= BĀrUp(K) 4.5] findet sich statt des entsprechenden Bildes (Auflösung des Sabzes in Wasser) nur eine gänzlich funktionslose Beschreibung des Ātman (Einheitlichkeit des Ātman im Bild des einheitlichen Salzklumpens). Es ist daher nicht verwunderlich, dass der Satz na pretya samjñāstiti in B nicht einmal aufgenommen wird, ein Hinweis, dass sogar dem Redaktor aufgefallen sein mag, wie wenig diese Aussage in dem veränderten Zusammenhang von B passte.

Here and on the preceding page of his book (p. 86), Hanefeld draws attention to the major change which the comparison with salt has undergone from portion I to portion II. ²⁹ He calls it “[d]ie wichtigste Abweichung des ganzen Textes”. It will be worth our while to look at the two passages. They read:

BĀrUp(K) 2.4.12
It is like this. When a chunk of salt is thrown in water, it dissolves into that very water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way this Immense Being has no limit or boundary and is a single mass of perception. It arises out of and together with these beings and disappears after them ³⁰-so I say, after death there is no awareness.

BĀrUp(K) 4.5.13
It is like this. As a mass of salt has no distinctive core and surface; the whole thing is a single mass of flavour-so indeed, my dear, this self has no distinctive core and surface; the whole thing is a single mass of cognition. It arises out of and together with these beings and disappears after them - so I say, after death there is no awareness.

It is at first sight not clear why the comparison had to be so fundamentally changed. Hanefeld surmises that the doctrine as presented in portion I was no longer understood or no longer accepted in this form in portion II. That seems correct, and we have already seen that portion II was meant to serve an altogether different doctrinal position. But this may only be part of the correct explanation of the change. It may be important to remember that the Yājñavalkya of portion II is an opponent of Uddālaka, who defeats him in debate and rejects the notion, associated with the latter, of a non-Vedic origin of the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution. ³¹ Well, the comparison with salt, too, is associated with the name of Uddālaka. The relevant passage occurs in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad in a passage where Uddālaka teaches his son Śvetaketu: ³²

ChānUp 6.13.1-3
“Put this chunk of salt in a container of water and come back tomorrow.” The son did as he was told, and the father said to him: “The chunk of salt you put in the water last evening - bring it here.” He groped for it but could not find it, as it had dissolved completely.

“Now, take a sip from this corner”, said the father. “How does it taste?”

“Salty.”

“Take a sip from the centre.-How does it taste?”

“Salty.”

“Take a sip from that corner.-How does it taste?” “Salty.”

“Throw it out and come back later.” He did as he was told and found that the salt was always there. The father told him: “You, of course, did not see it there, son; yet it was always right there.

“The finest essence here-that constitutes the self of this whole world; that is the truth; that is the self (ātman). And that’s how you are, Śvetaketu.”

We find here exactly the same comparison as in BĀrUp(K) 2.4.12, only to illustrate a different position. Is it conceivable that the composers of portion II were determined to sever any connections that might link their hero Yājñavalkya to Uddālaka? It may not be possible to prove this, but it does fit the general tendency of portion II.

We are now in a position to arrive at a better understanding of the composition of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. All of the three portions which we must distinguish in this text know the figure of Yājñavalkya. In portion III he is no more than a pupil of Uddālaka. Portion I presents his idiosyncratic ideas about man’s fate after death, which show that the doctrine of rebirth, karmic retribution and liberation did not play a role in his thought. Portion II is completely different from the other two. ³³ This portion has obviously been composed to sing the glory of Yājñavalkya and to settle some scores. It is only in portion II that we find that Yājñavalkya is aware of rebirth, karmic retribution and liberation. Moreover, it is claimed here that Yājñavalkya somehow has discovered, or always known, all of this. Scores are settled with various people as well as with the belief that the doctrine of rebirth etc. had a non-Brahmanical origin. The main representative of this pernicious belief, Uddālaka, who may have been Yājñavalkya’s teacher in real life, is shamed and the Brahmanical origin of the new doctrine is firmly established. It follows that portion II, the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda, does not just contain some features which point to a beginning hagiography; on the contrary, portion II is hagiography from beginning to end. In some cases (discussion with Maitreyī) traditional elements are adapted to serve the aims of their authors, in other cases new stories are quite simply invented for the same reason.

If we combine the result of the above analysis with the information provided by the lineages, we can say that the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda, which is at present part of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, was for a while an independent text (probably preserved orally). It was subsequently joined with portion I, and the resulting longer text was finally joined with portion III so as to produce the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad more or less in the form in which we know it today.

Is there anything that can be said about the time until which the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda was known as an independent text? In order to find a possible answer it will be useful to recall some important facts:

The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a, like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa) as a whole, is divided into a number of subdivisions called brāhmaṇa. ³⁴ The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a contains 15 such brāhmanas: 9 in adhyāya 3 (of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad), plus 6 in adhyāya 4.
The brāhmanas of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a are the only ones in surviving Vedic literature which are exclusively dedicated to recording what Yājñavalkya is supposed to have said.
These statements, though attributed to an ancient sage, have in reality been composed much more recently, as has become clear from the above analysis.

These three facts fit some passages in Sanskrit grammatical literature like a glove. This can be seen as follows. Sūtra 4.3.105 of Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī reads: purānaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu [tena proktam 101, ṇini 103] “In the case of brāhmanas and kalpas uttered by ancient [sages, the taddhita suffix] NinI is [semantically equivalent to] tena proktam (‘uttered by him’).” Kātyāyana restricts the scope of this sūtra in his first and only vārttika on it (Mahā-bh II p. 326 l. 12-13): purānaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu yājñavalkyādibhyah pratisedhas tulyakālatvāt “A prohibition [of P. 4.3.105] purānaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu [must be stated] after yājñavalkya etc., because [they are] of the same time.” Patañjali explains (l. 14-16): purānaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣv ity atra yājñavalkyādibhyah pratisedho vaktavyah / yājñavalkāni brāhmanāni / saulabhānīti / kim kāraṇam / tulyakālatvāt / etāny api tulyakālānīti //. We learn from this that, according to Patañjali, the brāhmanas uttered by Yājñavalkya, rather than Yājñavalkya himself, are meant to be considered ‘of the same time’ in this vārttika. The sense requires (in spite of the commentator Kaiyaṭa) that the brāhmanas uttered by Yājñavalkya are of the same time as Pānini. ³⁵ We do not have to take such a remark by Kātyāyana very literally. It is, however, clear that Kātyāyana was still aware of the recent origin of the ‘brāhmaṇas uttered by Yājñavalkya’. But Kātyāyana must also have been aware that these brāhmanas were ascribed to an ancient sage, for otherwise this vārttika would serve no purpose in the context of P. 4.3.105 which is about ‘brāhmaṇas and kalpas uttered by ancient sages’. What Kātyāyana must have had in view was a number of brāhmanas recently composed and ascribed to Yājñavalkya, where in reality Yājñavalkya was an ancient sage who could not have composed them.

The only textual unit in the whole of surviving Vedic literature that fits this description is the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. ³⁶ We may conclude from this that Kātyāyana knew this text as an independent, recently composed work, as did Patañjali some time after him. ³⁷

I will resist the temptation to try to extract precise chronological data from the above. One might be tempted to assign to “Āgniveśya”, the person who-according to the lineages in the Kāṇva version of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad-brought portions I and II together, a date as recent as Patañjali (second half of the second century BCE). The creation of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as a whole, by “Pautimāṣya”, would then have taken place some ten generations later. Unfortunately such precise conclusions cannot be drawn from the evidence at our disposal. We are however entitled to conclude that composition of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a took place late: later than the date usually assigned to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as a whole. ³⁸ Moreover, the composition of the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣a took place a long time before the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad was created by bringing separately existing pieces together. This process, as we have seen, may have taken place in two steps. Judging by the way in which “Pautimāsya” treated the genealogy that did not suit him, we may conclude that the process of collecting pieces was done with great care and with a minimum of interference. If therefore the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda presents unreliable historical testimony, this is not the fault of later redactors, but of those who composed it to begin with.

³⁶ It is puzzling that Renou missed this point in the following passage (1948: 75 [885]): “Il est tout-à-fait improbable, malgré l’autorité de Weber (Ind. Lit. ² p. 129), que cette expression vise le Yājñavalkya-kāṇ̣̣a de la BĀU.: le sû. IV. 3, 105, auquel se réfère l’exception de Kātyāyana, concerne ‘les traités de Brāhmaṇa et de Kalpa’, non des chapitres d’Upaniṣad.” We have seen that the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇ̣̣a is a “traité de Brāhmaṇa”. ³⁷ It is interesting to make a comparison with the Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa which, like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, consists of three originally independent parts, the first two ending each with its own genealogical list of teachers. Fujii (1997: 96) points out that these three parts were still treated as independent texts at the times of Śaṅkara and Bhavatrāta (latter half of the first millennium CE). ³⁸ Cf. Renou (1948: 88 [898]) “le Yājñavalkakāṇ̣̣a de la BĀU. nous apparaît comme l’élément authentique et essentiel de l’oeuvre”. Gombrich (1990: 15) is struck by the parallelism between the following two passages: (i) MN L135: yampidaṃ diṭ̣ham sutaṃ mutaṃ viñhātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicavitaṃ manasā, tamṭi ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’ti samanupassati / yampidaṃ diṭhiṭ̣hānaṃ so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi: noco dhuvo sassato avipariñāmadhammo, sassatisamaṃ tatheva thassāmī’ti tamṭi ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’ti samanupassati / and (ii) BĀrUp(K) 4.5.6: ātmani khalv are dṛṣte śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam. If this parallelism is to be explained as a borrowing by the Buddhists from the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda (which is far from certain), we might have to conclude that the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda existed already at the time when this portion of the Buddhist canon was composed.

It is of some importance to recall that the above reflections are largely based on the Kāṇva recension of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Similar reflections might be based on its Mādhyandina recension, but some important elements would be missing. The Mādhyandina recension does not, for example, add a corrected genealogy to the original genealogy at the end of portion III-a correction that drew our attention to the relationship between Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka to begin with. One of the two added passages about the immutable nature of the self in Yājñavalkya’s instruction of his wife Maitreyī is not found in the Mādhyandina version either. And the genealogies at the end of the three portions, though showing by and large the same structure in their Mādhyandina and Kāṇva versions, do not always enumerate the same names, especially not at their more recent ends.

A complete study of the relationship between the Mādhyandina and Kāṇva recensions of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad cannot be undertaken at this point. There are however indications which suggest that the Kāṇva recension in at least some respects is the older one which was subsequently elaborated in the Mādhyandina recension. ³⁹ It is as if the Kāṇva recension has preserved the features which allowed us to carry out the above analysis, whereas those same features, though not absent, have become less prominent in the slightly more developed stage of preservation represented by the Mādhyandina recension.

A reference to the early grammarians in the Upaniṣads?

Since the preceding discussion has presented evidence which shows that parts of late-Vedic literature may very well have been composed at the time of Pāṇini, and perhaps even at the time of Patañjali, any indication that may reveal the precise relationship between these early grammarians and particular portions of late-Vedic literature is entitled to attention. The present section will study one particular feature of the early Upaniṣads which may, but does not have to be interpreted as an indication that the early grammarians were known to the author of a passage that has been preserved in those Upanisads.

The word anuvyākhyāna occurs four times in Vedic literature, three times in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (twice in the YājñavalkyaKāṇda), once in the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, and nowhere else. It always occurs in the following enumeration of literary works: ⁴⁰

rgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo ‘tharvāñgirasa itihāsah purānaṃ vidyā upaniṣadah ślokāh sūtrāny anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni

Paul Horsch discussed some of the terms of this enumeration in his Die vedische Gāthā- und Śloka-Literatur. The terms anuvyākhyāna and vyākhyāna, he argued (1966: 32), cannot but refer to texts that explain (vyākhyā-). They must be predecessors of the later commentatorial literature. With regard to anuvyākhyāna he expressed the opinion that this can only be an additional or extended vyākhyāna (p. 32). ⁴¹

This opinion is problematic. The position of anuvyākhyāna between sūtra and vyākhyāna suggests rather that, if anything, the vyākhyāna is secondary to the anuvyākhyāna, which in its turn might conceivably be some kind of commentary on the sūtra. The enumeration, moreover, seems to display a hierarchical structure, beginning as it does with the ‘five Vedas’ (itihāsa and purāna being occasionally referred to as ‘the fifth Veda’; see Bronkhorst, 1989b: 129 f.) which supports the idea that anuvyākhyāna is ‘higher’ than vyākhyāna and ‘lower’ than sūtra.

A search for occurrences of the term anuvyākhyāna in post-Vedic literature does not help to solve the problem. Śankara gives two different explanations for the words anuvyākhyāna and vyākhyāna while commenting on BĀrUp 2.4.10. ⁴² This shows that he was not at all certain about their meaning. According to him, anuvyākhyāna is either the explanation of a mantra (mantravivarana) or the explanation of a concise statement of (ultimate) reality (vastusanigrahavākyavivarana). In the latter case, vyākhyāna is the explanation of a mantra. In other words, the distinction between anuvyākhyāna and vyākhyāna is not clear to Śankara.

The term anuvyākhyāna occurs in some other contexts, too, but always, as far I am aware, in passages that are clearly indebted to the Upaniṣadic enumeration. Horsch (1966: 32) refers to the scholiast on Yājñavalkyasmṛti 3.189, who explains bhāsyāni with anuvyākhyānāni and vyākhyānāni. Since Yājñavalkyasmṛti 3.189 contains partly the same enumeration as the one we are studying, however, putting bhāsyāni where our passage has anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni, we can be sure that Horsch’s scholiast copied our passage here. The term is also used by Nīlakaṇṭha in his comments on Mahābhārata 1.1.50 (= Cr.Ed. 1.1.48). ⁴³ He refers here to TaitĀr 8.1.1 (8.2). ⁴⁴ Sāyaṇa on this last passage has some words to say about these terms. ⁴⁵ But he and Nīlakaṇṭha understand the terms vyākhyāna and anuvyākhyāna differently. ⁴⁶

How do we deal with the problem presented by anuvyākhyāna in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣads? Two observations are to be made here. The first one concerns the date of the enumeration in its present form, the second its correct shape.

First the date. The portion of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad that contains our enumeration is considered-by J. A. B. van Buitenen, who dedicated a study to this Upaniṣad (1962: 34)—an accretion to an accretion to an insertion into the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upanişad. This raises the question whether the enumeration containing anuvyākhyāna might not be late, and perhaps added or completed by a late redactor. With regard to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, we have seen that its final redaction may have taken place at a late date. Indeed, the preceding section has adduced evidence that suggests that one of the portions (the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda) that was going to be part of the Upaniṣad was still known as an independent text to the grammarian Patañjali.

Let us next look at the exact form of the term anuvyākhyāna. This term occurs only at the places indicated above of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣads, always in the same enumeration, and in passages that implicitly or explicitly refer to this enumeration, so far as I am aware. This may mean that one single editorial hand, or even one scribal error, may have been responsible for this word, and for its occurrence in this enumeration. And the possibility cannot be discarded that this single editorial hand ‘corrected’ some other word into anuvyākhyāna under the influence of the following vyākhyāna.

If we accept this last hypothesis, the most likely candidate for the original form underlying anuvyākhyāna is, no doubt, anvākhyāna. This word occurs a few times in Vedic literature, once, at GPaBr 1.2.10, in another enumeration of literary works. The fact that one ms. of the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa has sānvyākhyānāh instead of sānvākhyānāh confirms our impression that anvākhyāna could easily be ‘corrected’ into anuvyākhyāna.

We arrive, then, at the tentative conclusion that our list originally contained the three terms sūtrāny anvākhyānāni vyākhyānāni, in this order. Does this help us to reach some form of understanding?

Consider first the pair sūtra - anvākhyāna. This reminds us of the manuscripts of the Vādhūla Śrauta Sūtra, which contain both sūtra and anvākhyāna. Anvākhyāna is here the term used for the brāhmaṇaportion accompanying this Śrauta Sūtra. For, as Willem Caland (1926a: 5 (307)) observed, “[d]ie Texte der Vādhūlas […] haben […] dieses Merkwürdige, dass zu dem Sūtra ein eigenes Brāhmaṇa gehört, eine Art Anubrāhmaṇa, ein sekundäres Brāhmaṇa, das neben dem alten Brāhmaṇa der Taittirīyas (oder vielleicht richtiger: neben einem alten Brāhmaṇa, das mit dem der Taittirīyas aufs engste verwandt ist) steht: eine noch nie in einem vedischen Sūtra angetroffene Eigentümlichkeit.” This secondary Brāhmaṇa of the Vādhūla Śrauta Sūtra calls itself ‘Anvākhyāna’. ⁴⁷

It is, in view of the above, at least conceivable that the author of our enumeration had the Vādhūla Śrauta Sūtra in mind while adding anvākhyāna after sūtra (supposing that he actually did so).

Interestingly, there is another set of texts that appears to be referred to by the terms sūtra and anvākhyāna. More precisely, this set consists of three texts, which are, it has been argued, referred to by the terms sūtra, anvākhyāna and vyākhyāna respectively, i.e., by the very three terms that occur in this order in our enumeration. What is more, these texts were already referred to in this manner well before the beginning of our era. I am speaking about Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, a Sūtra-work on grammar commented upon in Kātyāyana’s vārttikas, which in their turn are discussed in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. The Mahābhāṣya is to be dated in the middle of the second century BCE.

Consider the following remarks by R. G. Bhandarkar, written more than a century ago (1876: 347):

[…] it seems that the verb anväcaṣte is used by Patañjali as characteristic of the work of Kātyāyana […] His own work Patañjali calls vyākhyāna, and frequently uses the verb vyākhyāsyāmah.

Since khyā replaces the root cakṣ beforeā ārdhadhātuka suffixes by P. 2.4.54 (cakṣiṅaḥ khyāñ), the noun corresponding to the verb anvācaṣte is anvākhyāna. If then Bhandarkar is correct, Kātyāyana’s vārttikas form an anvākhyāna, and Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya a vyākhyāna, also in Patañjali’s own terminology. It is clear that Patañjali’s choice of words deserves to be subjected to a closer examination.

(i) The word anvācaṣte in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya occurs most often in the expression ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā anvācaṣte, which appears to refer in all cases but one-where it refers to Pāṇini ⁴⁸-to Kātyāyana (see Bronkhorst, 1987: 6 f.).

In four of the five remaining cases ⁴⁹ it can reasonably be argued that anvācaṣte has Kātyāyana as (understood) subject, even though Kielhorn’s edition of the Mahābhāṣya contains no indication to this effect. They all occur in the following general context:

’ x ’ iti vartate | evaṃ tarhy anvācaṣte ’ x ’ iti vartate iti |

The first part ’ x ’ iti vartate is commented upon in the immediate sequel and can therefore be considered a vārttika. ⁵⁰ This is confirmed by the fact that on one occasion Patañjali explicitly claims that the next vārttika is meant to show the purpose of this anvākhyāna, ⁵¹ which makes no sense if the anvākhyāna does not derive from Kātyāyana. And on another occasion Patañjali ascribes the sentence under consideration to the ācārya, and repeats it in a slightly modified way, as he often does with vārttikas. ⁵²

In the one remaining case Patañjali uses the word anvācaṣte in order to describe the activity of the author of the preceding vārttika (P. 1.1.44 vt. 16), who, thinking that words are eternal, teaches (anvācaşe) the correctness of words actually in use. ⁵³

The terms anvākhyeya and anvākhyāna are sometimes used in immediate connection with anvācaşe. So at Mahā-bh II p. 83 1. 20 p. 841.1 (evaṃ tarhy anvācaşe ‘nupasarga iti vartate iti / naitad anvākhyeyam […]), III p. 27 1. 15 (the same with yani instead of anupasarga), III p. 349 1. 4-5 (same with upasargād), II p. 265 1. 12-13 (evaṃ tarhy anvācaşe pautraprabhṛtiti vartate iti / kim etasyānvākhyāne prayojanam /).

At Mahā-bh I p. 209 1. 1 and 4 anvākhyāna refers back to anvācaşe on p. 208 1. 16, which here however refers to Pāṇini.

In one passage on P. 2.1.1 the sense ‘additional communication’ suffices for anvākhyāna (Mahā-bh I p. 363 1. 12, 13 and 27). An additional communication regarding their meaning is given (in sūtras like P. 2.2.24 anekam anyapadārthe, P. 2.2.29 cārthe dvandvah, etc.) to words which are naturally endowed with those meanings, by way of condition of application. And later it is said that there is no use for an additional communication regarding the meaning of something whose meaning is known.

The sense of anvākhyāna and anvākhyāyaka in the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.62 vt. 1 (I p. 161 1. 17-18) is not relevant in the present investigation because the Bhāṣya follows here the use of anvākhyāna in the preceding vārttika.

We can conclude from the above that anvākhyāna and anvācaşe carry the meaning ‘additional communication’ wherever Patañjali uses these terms in his own right. This ‘additional communication’ is in the vast majority of cases embodied in the vārttikas of Kātyāyana. (ii) The word vyākhyāsyāmah occurs always, i.e. no fewer than 11 times, in connection with the Paribhāṣā vyākhyānato visesapratipattir na hi samdehād alakṣanam “The precise (meaning of an ambiguous term) is ascertained from interpretation, for (a rule), even though it contain an ambiguous term, must nevertheless teach (something definite).” (tr. Kielhorn, 1874: 2). In all these cases the vyākhyāna, i.e., ‘interpretation’ or ‘explanation’, is given by Patañjali himself. It can here be said that the Mahābhāṣya embodies the vyākhyānas.

But in Mahā-bh I p. 170 1. 17 vyākhyāyate is used to show how a sūtra is explained or interpreted in a vārttika, viz. in P. 1.1.65 vt. 5. And Mahā-bh I p. 11 1. 21-23 contains a brief discussion in which vyākhyāna is explained to be not just the separation of the words of sūtras, but to include, ‘example, counterexample, and words to be supplied’. Mahā-bh I p. 12 1. 23-27 again rejects this position and returns to the view that separation of words of sūtras is vyākhyāna. None of these characteristics apply to the Mahābhāṣya.

We must conclude that vyākhyāna for Patañjali means ‘interpretation’ or ‘explanation’ in general, and that he applies the word most often, but by no means always, to refer to his own Mahābhāṣya.

We see that Bhandarkar’s remark to the effect that Kātyāyana’s vārttikas were known by the designation anvākhyāna, and Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya by the name vyākhyāna, is justified, but only to a certain extent. It is therefore at least conceivable that the terms anvākhyāna and vyākhyāna in our Upaniṣadic passage (supposing that the first of these two actually belongs there) refer to two-layered commentaries on Sūtra works like the ones we find in the case of Pānini’s Astāāthyāyī.

Here it must be observed that it is unlikely that the word sūtra in our enumeration refers only to the Astāāthyāyī. There are many other Sūtra works connected with Vedic literature, and there may have been even more when our list was made. We can also not believe that no other commentaries were known to the author of the list. However, one can reasonably raise the question whether other twolayered commentaries were known to him. Suppose there weren’t. Suppose further that our author had such a two-layered commentary in mind when he enumerated the three items sūtra, anvākhyāna, vyākhyāna. In that case we cannot but conclude that he lived after Patañjali, i.e., after the middle of the second century BCE.

All this should not blind us to the fact that the present interpretation of the terms anuvyākhyāna (anvākhyāna) and vyākhyāna is no more than a conjecture. But even though a conjecture, it proposes an explanation for an otherwise obscure term. The chronological implications of this conjecture do not need further comments.

Conclusion

The two cases considered in this chapter may not be beyond criticism (the second decidedly less so than the first). Still, they point in the same direction as earlier chapters: some of the late-Vedic texts, and among them crucial passages from the early Upanișads, may have to be dated later than is commonly thought.

CHAPTER III.5 - URBAN VERSUS RURAL CULTURE

The preceding chapters have consistently strengthened the idea that late-Vedic literature may be less old than has generally been supposed. Two difficulties remain which stand in the way of simply accepting a more recent date for texts such as the early Upanișads. One of these is the mention of cities and towns in the early Buddhist texts where the late-Vedic texts do not give any signs of being aware of their existence. Some scholars conclude from this that there were no cities and towns in late-Vedic times. The second difficulty is linked to the fact that Vedic thought, as it expresses itself in late-Vedic literature, is very different from, and much more “primitive” than, the thought which we find in the early Buddhist texts. This has also been taken as an indication that the two genres of texts belong to altogether different periods.

We will discuss these two difficulties below. First of all it must be re-emphasized that these difficulties are associated with a comparison of two bodies of literature: the late-Vedic texts and the early Buddhist texts. The conclusions that have sometimes been drawn from these difficulties are not however about the chronological relationship of these two bodies of texts but about late-Vedic literature and the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism. We have seen in an earlier chapter that this confusion is not innocent, and should not be overlooked as minor. Indeed, the archaeologist George Erdosy expresses the following warning (1985: 83-84):

Most scholars have uncritically accepted the eloquent descriptions of cities to be found in the Epics, and in Buddhist literature, as proof of the existence of fully developed urban centres in the Buddha’s lifetime. Consequently, they overlook archaeological evidence, which suggests only the presence of a few fortified settlements, such as Kauśāmbī, none of which exhibits the magnificence attributed to them in the literature. Clearly, this apparent contradiction in our sources must be reconciled, and the appearance of cities accurately dated, if we are to explain the latter’s origins. The fact that none of the works mentioning cities predates, in its present form, the Maurya period is often overlooked, even though it should caution us against the literal acceptance of their contents. […] it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the eloquent descriptions of cities, which abound in the literature, were inspired by the urban centres of the Maurya and post-Maurya periods whose images were projected into an earlier age.

Even if we were, unjustifiably, to accept early Buddhist literature as evidence for the time of the Buddha, the analysis of the difficulties will show that they do not allow us to draw any chronological conclusions whatsoever.

The second urbanization

The South Asian subcontinent, after the first urbanization connected with the Indus valley civilization, remained without urban centres for more than a thousand years. The second urbanization began around the middle of the first millennium before the Common Era: most of its cities were situated in the eastern parts of the Ganges valley. ¹

Scholars have often drawn attention to the fact that the Buddhist texts describe a world with towns and cities. Indeed Buddhism has been claimed to owe its very existence to the rapid urbanization that was taking place at its time in the Ganges valley. The early Upaniṣads, on the other hand, breathe a different atmosphere. The sages here described live in villages, and towns and cities are not as much as mentioned. The conclusion has seemed obvious to many, though not to all, ² that the early Upaniṣads must have pre- ceded this period of urbanization. ³

Let us first consider the link between early Buddhism and urbanization. This link is not as clear as it is often made out to be. Greg Bailey and Ian Mabbett (2003: 15 f.) have surveyed the relevant secondary literature and classified the arguments relating the rise of Buddhism to urbanization and state formation under four headings, according as they bear upon the relevance of Buddhism

to the values of merchants,
to the nature of city life,
to political organization in the urban-based centralized state, and
to the shift from pastoral to agrarian culture which economically underpinned the rise of cities.

What they find is the following (p. 24): “In respect of each of the four identified aspects of urbanization, scholars have argued variously that Buddhism can be seen to have appealed because it was in tune with the changes associated with urbanization, being apt to legitimate or encode them, and that on the other hand Buddhism can be seen to have appealed because it was apt as a voice for those who suffered from the changes and sought an alternative world view.” They conclude (p. 24): “The arguments […] do not amount to a convincing case, on either side.” They subsequently (p. 34) point out how easily “the urbanization hypothesis […] might fall into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy”. This goes as follows: “During a certain period, the Gangetic plain witnessed the rise of cities. During a later but overlapping period, the dhamma became an important element in urban culture. The first is therefore used to explain the second.”

But even if the attempts to explain the rise of Buddhism in the light of growing urbanization have to be considered with a healthy dose of mistrust, it cannot be denied that cities are frequently mentioned in the early Buddhist canon, so often that it is highly unlikely that their names were later added to accounts that originally were without them. What is more, institutions that are typical of urban centres, such as the existence of rich merchants, prostitution, etc., are common in the Buddhist texts. In this case it appears justified to conclude that the Buddha did indeed visit many of the cities which he is recorded to have visited. This is all the more probable in view of the fact that archaeology confirms that there were cities in the area where the Buddha taught, at his time and already before him.

³ So e.g., Oldenberg, 1915/1991: 186 f.; Witzel, 2001: 6 (§ 3): “The early Upaniṣads precede the date of the Buddha, now considered to be around 400 BCE (…), of Mahāvīra, and of the re-emergence of cities around 450 BCE (…).”

With this in mind we may consider the early Upaniṣads. The situation here depicted is quite different. These texts do not mention cities at all. The human geography of these texts is totally different from the one of the early Buddhist texts, and it is tempting to conclude from this that these texts were composed at a time when there were no cities as yet in the Ganges plain.

This conclusion would overlook a crucial factor: when it came in contact with cities, Vedic civilization did not like them. ⁴ There are explicit statements to that effect, already in the early Dharma Sūtras. The Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, for example, states: ⁵ “A man who keeps himself well under control will attain final bliss even if he lives in a city with his body covered with the city dust and his eyes and face coated with it’ - now that is something impossible.” And the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra enjoins: ⁶ “He should also avoid visiting cities.” The impurity of city life finds expression in the Gautama Dharma Sūtra where it points out that “according to some, Vedic recitation is always suspended in a town”. ⁷ The same disapproving attitude also finds expression in some later texts that call themselves Upaniṣads. A pericope that occurs a few times in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads states: ⁸ “He shall avoid […] capital cities as he would the Kumbhīpāka hell”.

This distaste for city life may have characterized Brahmanism all along. One modern scholar affirms that, after several centuries of flourishing city life, it declined again from the 3rd century CE onward, this because the Brahmanical social and economic model regained the upper hand: ⁹

From the 3rd century onwards, the crisis of the trade economy became increasingly profound. The decline of the Indian cities began, which caused the de-urbanization of the country already in Gupta times (…). This was the moment in which the Brahmanic social and economic model, based on land, regained the upper hand. I would like to underline, in this regard, that I do not believe that the new social order that India was preparing depended on the general, changed state of the economic fundamentals (the rise of Islam demonstrates that the conditions of economic stalemate could be successfully overcome by relying on trade, to the point of transforming a very large number of regions very different from each other into a great urban and mercantile civilization). On the contrary, I think that Brahmanic ideology, which had always been hostile to anything that questioned the social equilibrium attained in the rural areas, exerted a fundamental function in determining the decline of the urban and mercantile economy of the subcontinent, the struggle against which coincided basically with the struggle against the Buddhists and Jains. The ‘Brahmanic model’ did not prevail because of objective and uncontrollable factors; on the contrary, it was actively pursued and constructed.

It is not possible, nor indeed necessary, to discuss at present this interesting position, which emphasizes once again the Brahmanical distaste for city life and the identification of Vedic life with the village and its surroundings. ¹⁰ A consequence of this distaste might be that the Vedic texts would largely ignore cities and towns, even if, and when, they were there. ¹¹ This, if true, makes it very difficult to conclude anything certain from the silence of these texts. Some may have been composed when there were no cities and towns, but others may not. In any case we would see no difference, for both kinds of texts would not mention cities and towns.

Interestingly, various scholars have drawn attention to the possibility that the silence of the late-Vedic texts about cities and towns may not be counted as evidence that they did not exist. One of these was Max Weber, who observed more than eighty-five years ago (1920: 218):

Oldenberg macht darauf aufmerksam, wie die ländliche Umgebung, Vieh und Weide für die altbrahmanischen Lehrer und Schulen mindestens der älteren Upanischadenzeit, die Stadt und das Stadtschloss mit seinem auf Elefanten reitenden König aber für die Buddha-Zeit charakteristisch sind und wie die Dialogform die hereingebrochene Stadtkultur widerspiegelt. […] Aus dem literarischen Charakter liesse sich hier offenbar ein Altersunterschied nicht leicht ableiten. (my emphasis, JB)

Frauwallner observed, similarly, more than fifty years ago (1953: 47):

Von den Kreisen, in denen die Upanișaden entstanden sind, geben uns die Texte selbst eine gute Vorstellung […] Es ist ein ausgesprochenes ländliches Leben, ein dörflicher Hintergrund, vor dem sich die Vorgänge abspielen. Rinder sind der wertvollste Besitz, und dem Gedeihen der Herden gilt das Hauptinteresse. Auch die Königshöfe, von denen die Rede ist, scheinen den äusseren Rahmen bescheidener Gaufürsten nicht zu überschreiten. Das steht in scharfem Gegensatz zur überwiegend städtischen Kultur, welche uns die Schriften des buddhistischen Kanons vor Augen führen. Aber es ist leicht möglich, dass in den Upanisaden gewohnheitsmässig die Verhältnisse einer älteren Zeit festgehalten wurden. Ähnliches lässt sich öfter beobachten. Örtliche Verschiedenheiten und ein rasches Fortschreiten der Entwicklung mögen hinzukommen und den Gegensatz schärfer erscheinen lassen, als er in Wirklichkeit war. (my emphasis, JB)

Recent scholarship has become conscious of the fact that the Vedic texts may have left out-intentionally sometimes-information which is important to us. A few citations from Michael Witzel’s “The development of the Vedic canon and its schools” (1997) testify to this. We read there, for example (p. 320 n. 333): “It may very well be the case that the Vedic texts intentionally did not mention the emerging kingdom of Magadha”. On p. 329 the same article speaks of “the political developments and the emergence of large eastern kingdoms with their increasing stratification of society and, not visible in the Brahmanical texts, the beginning of the second urbanization of India.” (emphasis mine, JB). ¹² It also tells us that the Vedic texts, already during an earlier period, failed to refer to commercial centres which archaeology however tells us did exist (p. 294: “At this time [i.e., the time of early Yajurveda prose and Brāhmaṇas], there were semi-permanent settlements only (grāma ‘trek, wagon train’). Archaeological evidence indicates that some centers existed, mostly as market places. These, however, are not mentioned in the texts […]”) The same scholar stated earlier (1989: 245) that the fact that the Vedic texts do not mention towns and writing “may [be] due to the cultural tendency of the Brahmins who have no use for writing, as they learnt all their-mostly secret-Vedic texts by heart and also could preserve their ritual purity better in a village than in a busy town”. ¹³

To the above observations another one may be added. Vedic texts may have remained silent about the new urban centres because this renewed urbanization was altogether independent of Vedic society. To cite Erdosy (1995a: 118): “[O]ne must […] entertain the possibility of political institutions developing altogether outside the sphere of Vedic society; […] it would be a mistake to assume that the evolution of the latter constitutes the sum total of South Asian history simply because it monopolizes literary accounts.” These newly developing political institutions include, or were linked to, the new urbanization, in which Vedic society may have had no part. Elsewhere Erdosy states (1988: 145): “The fact that the areas influenced by Buddhism - and Jainism - were coterminous in the 6th - 5th centuries B. C. with the limits of the tribal oligarchies indicates the close relationship of the two phenomena. That both have been attributed to the internal evolution of [Vedic] society reflects the biases of scholars who depend solely on the literary record to reconstruct the history of the Ganga Valley […]” Our reflections so far have shown that the fault does not lie with the literary record, whose in-depth analysis has shown that the internal evolution of Vedic society is not sufficient explanation for the appearance of Buddhism and Jainism. No, at fault are the biases of scholars, biases which are as old as modern Indology itself.

To return now to the chronological questions we are dealing with, it will be clear from the above that we may have to consider the possibility that at least some Vedic texts intentionally abstained from mentioning the developments that were taking place in the eastern Ganges valley: urbanization, the creation of the kingdom of Magadha, etc. This implies that the habit of earlier scholars to assign late-Vedic literature, and the early Upaniṣads in particular, to a period preceding the re-emergence of cities in the Ganges valley has to make place for a more careful assessment of the evidence. The fact that the early Upanisads do not mention cities can no longer be considered proof that no cities existed. This may be a negative conclusion, but it removes one of the traditional pillars of late-Vedic chronology.

Magical thought in the Veda

We have to turn to another feature which is sometime invoked to show that Vedic literature must precede developments such as Buddhism and Jainism. This feature is perhaps difficult to pin down exactly, but becomes clear to most readers who read a passage from a late-Vedic text and one, say, from a Buddhist sermon side by side. The way of thinking one is confronted with in the former is very different - more “primitive”-than that in the latter. Once again Hermann Oldenberg has given expression to this opposition (1915: 245-246):

Soviel stellt sich da nun mit unbedingter Sicherheit heraus, dass verglichen mit der älteren Schicht der Upanishaden auch die ersten Anfänge der Buddhistischen Literatur das Spätere, ja das erheblich spätere sind.

Dies zeigt sich in der […] sehr viel weiter fortgeschrittene Fähigkeit der Buddhisten, grössere Gedankenmassen lehrhaft zu entfalten, in der Behandlung des Dialogs. Es zeigt sich vor allem im ganzen Inhalt dieser Literaturen, im Bilde der Welt und des Lebens, insonderheit des geistlichen Lebens, das in ihnen zur Erscheinung kommt.

Oldenberg was not the last to draw attention to this obvious difference between what we call Vedic culture and the culture of Greater Magadha. In chapter I.2, above, we had occasion to discuss the different forms of medicine that were current in the two cultures; Zysk used in this connection the expressions “magico-religious” and “empirico-rational”. Whether or not these are the right terms to use, there can be no doubt that the conceptual worlds of these two groups of people were widely divergent. “Magical thought” in the Veda has been discussed by many scholars, ¹⁴ and indeed, the Vedic “identifications”, the “correspondences” between seemingly unrelated things, the “fanciful etymologies”, ¹⁵ the reification of ungraspable entities (such as the year), all these are features that are omnipresent in middle- and late-Vedic literature, but much less prominent in Buddhist and Jaina literature. Does this prove chronological precedence of the former to the latter?

We have to be careful before drawing any such conclusion. Late-Vedic religion attached importance to its identifications and correspondences. It adhered to what is sometimes called a correlative cosmology, parallels to which are known from China, Europe, and elsewhere. ¹⁶ Beliefs of this kind are not limited to early periods of history; traces are present in New Age religion today. ¹⁷ Considered in isolation, they cannot help us answer questions about chronology.

To this must be added that the “magical thought” which we find in the Veda and elsewhere is no proof that its adherents could not think in any other way. There is absolutely no reason to think that the grammarian Pānini, whose work has been characterized as “one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence” (L. Bloomfield, 1933: 11), rejected the world-view of the Vedic texts as “primitive”. Rather the opposite: this world-view may have inspired him to compose his grammar. We had occasion to point out in chapter III. 2 that both the Nirukta (which deals with “fanciful etymologies”) and the Aṣtādhyāyī are based on the same, or very similar presuppositions. Pānini belonged fully to Vedic culture, not to the culture of Greater Magadha. As we now know, he was in all probability a contemporary of the authors of certain late-Vedic texts. ¹⁸

CHAPTER III.6 - CONCLUSIONS TO PART III

It will be clear that, once one drops the requirements that the early Upaniṣads have to precede the beginnings of Buddhism and Jainism chronologically, and that the whole of Vedic literature has to precede Pānini, the traditional structure of late-Vedic chronology collapses. This is no disadvantage, as the present Part III has demonstrated. It opens the way to a fair assessment of all the evidence we have, which, as has now been shown, strongly favours more recent dates for late-Vedic literature and culture. The cumulative weight of a number of indications clearly brings much of late-Vedic literature down to a time considerably later than has generally been maintained. It is not impossible that some important Brāhmaṇa texts were still being composed at the time of Pānini, i.e. after 350 BCE. It is probable that parts of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad were being composed at a date close to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and that the Yājñavalkya-Kānda, now an inseparable part of that Upaniṣad, was still known to them as an independent text. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as a whole was put together much later, perhaps after Patañjali. It is indeed possible that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as we have it contains a line which betrays acquaintance with the three grammarians: Pānini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali.

If these dates are even approximately correct, it follows that at least some portions of the early Upaniṣads-perhaps precisely the portions that introduce the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution into the Veda-were composed more or less at the time of the Buddha, or later. This, if true, would not imply that these Upaniṣad had undergone Buddhist influence (even though this may not be altogether ruled out in the case of some passages, such as B2.4 ff., discussed in chapter IIA.3). ¹ The influence, as has been argued throughout, came from the culture of Greater Magadha, not just from the two currents (Buddhism and Jainism) which through historical coincidence have survived until today. The passages in the Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda that introduce the notion of an immutable self cannot owe this notion to Buddhist influence, for the modified understanding of rebirth and karmic retribution in Buddhism has no place for such a self.

The renewed uncertainty with regard to late-Vedic chronology will also give short shrift to summary statements of Brahmanical priority in the case of similarities between Brahmanical and Buddhist or Jaina texts. Certain ascetic rules which are found, in slightly different forms, in the texts of the three religions provide an example. In 1884 Hermann Jacobi drew attention to the close correspondence between rules accepted by the Buddhists and the Jainas and such as find expression in the Brahmanical Gautama and Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtras. ² He concluded from this that these rules originally concerned Brahmanical ascetics and were subsequently borrowed by Buddhists and Jainas. More recent scholars followed his example. Perhaps the most recent article in this line is from the hand of Thomas Oberlies (1997; with references to earlier secondary literature). ³ Strictly speaking Oberlies does not argue for the Vedic-Brahmanical origin of the ascetic rules concerned; he presents it as something that has been known for a long time, and blames other scholars for having ignored this supposedly well-known fact (p. 171). He only observes that chronological considerations make it extremely likely that these rules must have originated within Vedic-Brahmanical culture. ⁴ This general reference to “chronological considerations” is his only argument (if it is one). ⁵

The so-called Pārājika rules of the Buddhists necessarily play a central role in Oberlies’s article. It is therefore interesting to compare his position with what Oskar von Hinüber has to say about the question. Oberlies takes it for granted that the Buddhists and Jainas must have borrowed from the Brahmins. Hinüber, on the other hand, calls the chronology of the texts concerned “unclear”, and states that only “vague suspicions” can be held about the exact relationship between them. ⁶ It is far from certain whether, in this context or any other, all questions of late-Vedic chronology can be solved. The answer to these questions should not, however, be spoiled by prior assumptions. In addition, it should be clearly realized that besides the three kinds of sources to which we have access-Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jaina-there may have been others, from which these three were derived. This fourth kind of source, now lost, may conceivably have belonged to Greater Magadha. ⁷

The modern scholarly discussion about non-violence (ahimsaā ) is related to the question of asceticism in the three main traditions. Predictably several scholars (e.g. Schmidt, 1968; 1997; Tull, 1996) maintain that this idea has Vedic roots, ⁸ but there are others who are critical about this. In a recent article Bodewitz (1999: 33), referring to a paper in which it is once again claimed that the ascetic renouncers of the so-called śramaṇa tradition “seem to have adopted non-violence from Brāhmaṇic circles”, objects against this claim and complains about the fact “that even now such rather unfounded conclusions are uncritically repeated”. Hans-Peter Schmidt, whose earlier article on the subject (1968) was very influential, realizes in his more recent contribution (1997) that there are difficulties with his earlier position. ⁹ He mentions the opinion according to which the history of Jainism may go back to the tīrthankara Pārśva who presumably lived around the 9th-8th century BCE, ¹⁰ and refers to Jaini’s argument to the effect “that the Jainas have no memory of a time when they fell within the Vedic fold and could accordingly not have started as an ahimsā oriented sect with the Vedic tradition”. Schmidt responds (p. 219): “Even if one concedes the rather vague possibility that Buddhism and Jainism originated in a completely different milieu than Vedism, the question remains against which practices the ascetic movements were directed.” Since Schmidt does not explain his own words, we are left to wonder why we should assume that the ascetic movements must be thought of as being directed against any practices at all, and therefore as protest movements. ¹¹ We have seen that ascetic movements such as Jainism and Buddhism had more important things to worry about, viz., freedom from karmic retribution, yet the desire to see them as protest movements has been very persistent in modern scholarship, partly on account of the comparison of Buddhism with Protestantism in Christianity. ¹² Once we give up the idea that the ascetic movements were directed against certain practices, we are free to “concede the […] possibility that Buddhism and Jainism originated in a completely different milieu than Vedism”. ¹³

It appears that, in the case of ahimsā as in that of the shared ascetic rules, we are confronted with a situation where it may be very useful to recall that, besides the sources that have been preserved, there may have been other ones in Greater Magadha which have not.

PART IV - CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV.1 - DISCWORLD MEETS ROUNDWORLD

The preceding chapters have shown that there was indeed a culture of Greater Magadha which remained recognizably distinct from Vedic culture until the time of the grammarian Patañjali (ca. 150 BCE) and beyond. The most important feature of this culture - important because of the enormous influence it came to exert on the subsequent developments of Indian religious and philosophical history-was the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. There were other features, too, but these are not always easy to identify. Preceding chapters have proposed funerary practices that were very different from the Vedic ones, the notion of cyclic time, and medical practices that were distinct from those current in the Vedic milieu.

These findings raise new questions for future research that can only be alluded to here.

We have seen that the centuries preceding the Common Era saw two altogether different cultures that existed next to each other without profoundly influencing each other (initially). Both belonged to speakers of Indo-Aryan languages. The question that imposes itself is how such a situation might have come about. It is clear that the idea of a linear development of culture, with different temporal instalments succeeding each other, paralleled by a presumably linear linguistic development from Old Indo-Aryan to Middle Indo-Aryan, can no longer be maintained. Our study confronts us with speakers of Middle Indo-Aryan whose culture was not derived from Vedic culture, but existed next to it.

This observation is not altogether new. In recent years various scholars have warned against confusing linguistic and cultural denominations. ¹ Asko Parpola, for example, observed in 1988 that “we must distinguish between the modern use of the name ‘Aryan’ to denote a branch of the Indo-European language family, and the ancient tribal name used of themselves by many, but not necessarily all, peoples who have spoken those languages” (Parpola, 1988: 219). George Erdosy stated in 1995: “Until recently, archaeologists, and to a lesser extent linguists, had persistently confused ‘Aryans’ with ‘Indo-Aryans’” (Erdosy, 1995c: 3). In another publication of the same year he adopted the view that the āryas were indigenous to South Asia, noting that “the identification of āryas as racial or linguistic groups originating outside South Asia is questionable on the following grounds. First, while the Rigveda contains accounts of migrations and is replete with battles, it preserves no memory of a foreign ancestry; ārya tribes appear in the northwest of the subcontinent and from the beginning fight each other as well as non-āryas. Second, āryas see themselves as subscribers to a set of religious beliefs and social conventions […], and not as physiologically or linguistically distinct.” ² He then continues: “Coupled with the undeniable fact that āryas speak a language with striking structural similarities to languages outside South Asia, the following conclusions seem inescapable: (1) While Indo-European languages may well have spread to South Asia through migration, the āryas were not their carriers. (2) Aryas do not constitute a racial group; rather belonging to diverse ethnic groups, they are distinguished by a set of ideas and it is these-instead of the people holding them - which spread rapidly over the subcontinent.” (Erdosy, 1995b: 89-90). ³ A number of scholars, moreover, distinguish, on linguistic or other grounds, two or more waves of immigration of “Aryans” (i.e., Indo-Aryans); ⁴ this then raises the question as to which wave is responsible for the composition of the Veda: one of these, or all of them, each a different part? Parpola has a tendency to see contributions of different waves in Vedic religion. This does not prevent him from stating: “Māgadhī, the language of Magadha, is the easternmost Aryan dialect of which we have knowledge in Vedic times. Speakers of Proto-Māgadhī must have moved to the Gangetic Valley fairly early, before it was occupied by the Vedic Aryans. On their eastward advance from the GangesYamuna Doab, the Vedic Aryans encountered non-Vedic people worshipping ‘demons’ (asura), and the abominable language which they spoke resembles the later Māgadhī Prakrit.” (Parpola, 2002: 257). ⁵ Investigations along these lines, which are beyond the scope of this book, may one day account for the situation that prevailed in nothern India during the centuries preceding the Common Era. ⁶

Restraint must also be imposed on our discussion of later developments. There can be no doubt that classical Indian culture is to a large extent the result of the amalgamation of the two cultures discussed in this book. ⁷ This applies both to its Brahmanical aspect, in spite of its claim of being entirely based on the Veda, as well as to those more directly linked to the culture of Greater Magadha, as in Buddhism. The number of features which Brahmanical culture absorbed from its eastern neighbour is impressive, and we have come across several of them in the preceding pages. The belief in rebirth and karmic retribution becomes omnipresent in classical Hinduism, as does the concept of what we have called “cyclic time” with its succession of very long world periods. Āyurveda, the classical school of Hindu medicine, drew most of its inspiration from the culture of Greater Magadha. Most of the classical schools of Brahmanical philosophy are built around the concept of a self that does not participate in, and is not touched by, actions, a concept that found its origin in Greater Magadha; this is true of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and, of course, Vedānta, as well as those schools which adopted their ontologies. It may indeed be necessary to rewrite the early history of Indian philosophy in the light of the new perspective we have to adopt. In the case of Sāṃkhya, moreover, it seems likely that its mythical founder, Kapila, is a divine figure whose origins may have to be looked for in that same eastern part of the Ganges valley. There may be many more features of the culture of Greater Magadha that have survived in classical Hinduism, acquiring along the way the blessings of the Brahmanical tradition. One such is the peculiar habit in Hinduism to bury, rather than burn, the physical remains of certain renouncers (usually called sammyāsins). This custom, which survived until recent times (and may still exist) also has the sanction of some early para-Vedic texts. ⁸ A systematic study might reveal further features, but that, too, would go beyond the scope of this book.

In order to assess the contribution of Vedic-Brahmanical culture to the classical culture of India in its Brahmanical, Buddhist and other forms, one would need a fuller characterization of Vedic-Brahmanical culture than we possess, a task which cannot be undertaken here. However, there are some obvious features that have been exposed in the preceding discussions, and which I now briefly restate. While discussing the different forms of early medicine, we saw that one modern researcher described Vedic medicine as being “magico-religious, using sorcery, spells, and amulets”. The medicine originally practised in Greater Magadha, on the other hand, he characterized as “empirico-rational”. These terms may or may not accurately describe the main characteristics of the two cultures, but they do succeed in bringing to mind the significant difference that existed between them. We were again reminded of this difference when studying the concepts of the self in the two cultures. In the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha-or at least in those aspects of it which the limited amount of surviving evidence allowed us to study-the self was primarily thought of as the inactive core of the human being (and presumably other living beings) which, on account of its inactivity, offered a way out of the cycle of rebirth determined by karmic retribution. The early Upaniṣads, on the other hand, in those parts not influenced by this outside idea, present the self in a way which suits Vedic speculations about the homology of macrocosm and microcosm, an element that appears to be absent in the notions belonging to Greater Magadha. We also had occasion to draw attention to the “identifications”, the “correspondences” between seemingly unrelated things, and the “fanciful etymologies” which are an essential part of Vedic culture. We may add an almost obsessive preoccupation with ritual purity, a belief in the power of curses, and much else.

Seen against this background, the meeting of the two cultures of northern India calls to mind the meeting of Discworld and Roundworld well-known to readers of Terry Pratchett’s novels. Discworld is a world inhabited by wizards who unwittingly created Roundworld. The resulting meeting between the two worlds is of interest to us, for “Discworld runs on magic, Roundworld runs on rules”. ⁹ The comparison is necessarily incomplete and to some extent even misleading. Terry Pratchett’s Roundworld was created by the wizards of Discworld, whereas the culture of Greater Magadha was precisely not created by Vedic seers. Roundworld, moreover, is supposed to be our world, which should therefore include both Vedic culture and the culture of Greater Magadha, besides much else. It is true, as the Queen of elves points out, that many people in Roundworld think that their world is just like Discworld, ¹⁰ but I take it that my readers do not share that view. In spite of this, the comparison, though unsatisfactory, does help bring to mind the enormous divide that existed between Vedic culture and the culture of Greater Magadha. We have seen that orthodox and orthoprax Brahmins looked down upon the inhabitants of Magadha and its surroundings. ¹¹ We have also seen that the Śramanas described in Strabo’s Geography returned the compliment by deriding the Brahmins “as charlatans and fools”. The opposition between the two cultures must have been great, and their basic features, to at least some extent, reminiscent of Discworld and Roundworld.

Let me remove, once again, a frequent misunderstanding. The representatives of Brahmanical culture were not prisoners of their “magical” way of thinking and unable to think straight. We had occasion to point out (chapter III.5) that so-called correlative cosmologies are found in all periods of history, including the modern western world. They are not signs of impaired or underdeveloped intelligence. Representatives of Brahmanical culture could think out things as clearly as anyone else, in some cases more so. The grammarian Pānini has often been praised for his superior intelligence, yet his closeness to-better: participation in-late-Vedic thinking is beyond doubt. Some centuries later, Brahmins had no difficulty developing philosophical systems when the need arose to defend themselves against Buddhists and others. In some of their systems - esp. Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika - elements from the culture of Greater Magadha (liberation, inactive nature of the self, etc.) played a central role. The Cārvāka system, on the other hand, was developed to combat such elements, and Mīmāṃsā ignored them altogether. Brahmins could reason as well as anyone, but this does not change the fact that they adhered to a correlative cosmology which, they thought or pretended, gave them access to supernatural powers. Their ritual purity, their knowledge of mantras and other skills allowed them to use these supernatural powers for their own benefit, or for the benefit of those who gave them the treatment to which they felt entitled.

It would of course be one-sided to think that the culture of Greater Magadha was free from interest in “magical” spells and procedures, yet the available evidence suggests that they were decidedly less prominent there. Classical Āyurveda, which inherited its main ideas from Greater Magadha, sometimes makes use of mantras, but this may be due to the influence of Brahmanical culture. This is Zysk’s (1989) opinion. He maintains that these mantras have a subordinate, if not anomalous, place in the medical treatments concerned. Indeed, he points out that “the diseases treated by mantras are those that have either exact or very similar parallels in the Atharvaveda” (p. 133). Early Buddhist literature, too, is not free from “magic”. The use of spells (mantra, dhāran̄̄) occupies an increasingly important place in this religion, but once again, it can be argued that this place is weaker the farther one goes back in time. Schmithausen (1997), after an analysis of a limited number of texts, comes to the conclusion that the need for protection from potentially dangerous forms of nature (poisonous snakes, etc.) was first met by the cultivation of friendliness, which was subsequently supplemented or even replaced by other protective devices like commemoration of the Buddha or the Three Jewels, while magical formulas entered only progressively into the picture (p. 67). These and other questions require further study, but it seems safe to hold on to the Discworld-Roundworld divide as by and large appropriate.

The spread of Brahmanical culture implied, at least to some extent, the imposition of the Brahmins’ view of the world, combined with the belief that they had more access to supernatural powers than anyone else. The battle for the hearts and minds of people, and of their rulers in particular, was fought, as far as the Brahmins were concerned, on this level rather than on an intellectual, “philosophical”, level. ¹² When Brahmins offered their services to kings, they did not only offer their worldly expertise, or their learning, but also their access to occult powers. The Artha Śāstra, which may be looked upon as a manual for Brahmins who made a career in and around the royal court, confirms this abundantly. It is full of indications that magic and sorcery were accepted facts of life. ¹³ Moreover, a whole chap-ter-no. 14, called aupaniṣadika “concerning secret practices”-deals with preparations, medicines, occult practices and spells that can be used to harm or kill an enemy and his troops. ¹⁴ These are secret practices which a Brahmin adviser can suggest to, or carry out for, his king, because they are to be used “in order to protect the four classes (varna) against the unrighteous” (14.1.1). Indeed, at the end of this enumeration we find the verse, “Practices accompanied by mantras and medicines and those that are caused by illusion-with them he should destroy the enemies and protect his own people.” ¹⁵ But kings could expect even more from their Brahmin advisers. The most important Brahmin to be appointed at the court is the purohita “chaplain”, about whom the Artha Śāstra states: ¹⁶ “He should appoint a chaplain, who is very exalted in family and character, thoroughly trained in the Veda with its auxiliary sciences, in divine signs, in omens and in the science of politics and capable of counteracting divine and human calamities by means of Atharvan remedies.” ¹⁷

It is certainly no coincidence that, already in the early canon, ¹⁸ but also in Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita (1.31), the people able to read the signs (nemitta) of the new-born future Buddha, and who predict to his father that the baby will either become a world-ruler or a Buddha, are Brahmins. The seer Asita, also known as the “Buddhist Simeon”, who performs a similar service with regard to the most recent Buddha-to-be, is described as a Rṣi (Pāli isi) and as having completely mastered marks and mantras (lakkhaṇamantapāragū) in the Pāli, and similarly in parallel and later sources. ¹⁹ Indeed, the Atharvaveda already knows a mythical sage of this name who figures as a magician, ²⁰ and Varāhamihira’s Bṛhatsaṃhitā (11.1) refers back to him as an earlier authority. Often called Asita Devala, he is a well-known seer in the Mahābhārata. Reading signs remained a Brahmanical specialty, as can be seen from the Bṛhatsaṃhitā and other works. ²¹ The power of curses pronounced by Brahmins is too well known to need detailed documentation here. Characters like Śakuntalā and many others learnt the hard way that one commits even minor transgressions against Brahmins at one’s peril. And the Rākṣasa called Cārvāka, disguised as a Brahmin and dressed like a mendicant Sāṃkhya, who dared to give bad advise to Yudhiṣthira, was killed by the exalted Brahmins present. These Brahmins, who were learned in the Vedas and cleansed through their asceticism, did so by merely chanting hum (Mhbh 12.39.22-39).

It is interesting to note, in passing, that curses - as William Smith (1986; 1995) points out - do not fit easily in a world believed to be ruled by karmic retribution. If misfortunes are due to bad deeds performed in an earlier life, how can curses interfere with this? Smith shows how the two, which we now know came from altogether different cultural backgrounds, were and remained uneasy partners in literature.

Returning now to the contribution of Vedic-Brahmanical culture to the classical culture of India in its various forms, there can be no doubt that it has been massive and varied, and strongest, of course, in developments that looked upon the Veda and its traditions as authoritative. The features concerned will not be traced and enumerated in this concluding chapter. It may, on the other hand, be interesting to briefly mention two areas in which originally Brahmanical features may conceivably have found their way into Buddhism.

One concerns the worship of relics which Buddhism appears to have taken over from the culture of Greater Magadha. The Brahmanical concern with ritual purity frowned upon such practices.

Probably as a result of this, Indian Buddhism moved away ever farther from the direct worship of bodily relics, by shifting the object of worship to related but different things, and through the development of theoretical constructs that served a similar purpose. Since I have dealt with the issue elsewhere, ²² a brief summary of the results must here suffice. Investigators have been struck from the beginning by the fact that the stūpa, meant to contain bodily remains of the Buddha, became an object of worship in its own right. On a theoretical level, emphasis was put on some remarks by the Buddha to the effect that he was embodied in his teaching. This led to developments in which the body of teaching (dharmakāya) was juxtaposed to, and valued higher than, the physical body (rūpakāya) of the Buddha. Attempts were sometimes made to show that the stūpa itself corresponds to the teaching. Alternatively, written forms of the teaching (i.e., manuscripts) were made the object of worship, sometimes by putting them inside stūpas, beside or in the place of bodily relics. Images of the Buddha came to play a role as well, being ideal (because “pure”) replacements of bodily relics. It goes without saying that none of these developments were ever justified by a reference to the social pressure exerted by brahmanized surroundings against an “impure” practice. We may yet be justified in thinking that this pressure was an important motivating factor. ²³

It is equally tempting to suspect Discworld influence on a development that came to affect all the religions that interest us at present. Brahmanical culture’s concern with rituals, with magical powers and mantras, with “correspondences” between macrocosm and microcosm, with “fanciful etymologies”, etc., manifests itself, centuries later, in the development often referred to as Tantrism. Tantrism was strong enough to cross the boundary, giving rise to esoteric or Tantric Buddhism. ²⁴ Ronald M. Davidson, who has made an attempt to situate esoteric Buddhism in its social and political context, giving due attention to its preoccupation with political themes, emphasizes the extent to which Buddhism in its new form could provide rulers with some of the advantages which they had theretofore received from the Brahmanical tradition (including its continuation in Saivism in particular): ²⁵ “[T]he monarchs on the Indian borderlands understood that Buddhist institutions had provided them with exactly the right combination of political and religious authority. […] [T]hey and their representatives received from institutional esoterism some of its many virtues: […] elaborate ritual systems, […] spells of undoubted power and potency, […] and medicine.” Is it justified to state that the general attitude toward reality that we find in Vedic religion persists in Tantrism, including Tantric Buddhism, be it perhaps through various intermediaries? If so, we may assume that, in this particular respect, the confrontation of Vedic culture with the culture of Greater Magadha has shown the former to be the stronger one. ²⁶

This concluding chapter does not pretend to show in any detail how Vedic culture and the culture of Greater Magadha together contributed to the creation of classical Indian culture. It should however be clear that they did. This conclusion may open up a new field in the study of early Indian culture that is waiting to be explored.

PART V - APPENDICES

APPENDIX I - THE ANTIQUITY OF THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY

The Vedānta philosophy, as stated in Part II, played no role in the philosophical debates of the early centuries of the Common Era. For centuries debates took place, and were recorded, between Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeșikas and various schools of Buddhism, without any reference to the Vedānta philosophy. The first known mention of this school of thought by others occurs in the Madhyamakahrdaya, a text belonging to the sixth century whose author was a Buddhist called Bhavya.

The Vedānta philosophy is sometimes called Uttaramīmāṃsā. Certain scholars believe that in early days it was part of the original Mīmāṃsā, which covered both Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. It is believed that at the beginning they constituted but one single school of thought. Some extend this idea, and maintain that this single school of thought originally had one basic text, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. This original text had two parts: the former or first part of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, and the latter or second part of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra; in Sanskrit: Pūrva-Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Uttara-Mīmāṃsāsūtra. The later expressions Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā are explained as having (erroneously) evolved from these book-titles.

It is easy to see that the view which holds that in the beginning the Vedānta philosophy was inseparably linked to Pūrvamīmāṃsā contradicts the idea that Pūrvamīmāṃsā (an expression never used in the surviving writings of the school) was not interested in liberation and related concepts: the Vedānta philosophy must have been interested in liberation from its beginning. If the two schools of thought were originally one, we are virtually forced to conclude that the earliest ritualistic Mīmāṃsakas were also convinced Vedāntins. We are then also obliged to believe that Pūrvamīmāṃsā subsequently abandoned the ideal of liberation, and picked it up once again at the time of Kumārila.

It will be clear that the idea of an original unity of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā would raise serious questions. It is therefore justified to ask what evidence it is based on. Several arguments have been presented in the secondary literature. The present appendix will deal with them.

Were the Pūrva- and Uttaramīmāṃsā originally one system?

Hermann Jacobi remarked in 1911 that “at Śabarasvāmin’s time the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā still formed one philosophical system, while after Kumārila and Śańkara they were practically two mutually exclusive philosophies”. ¹ This remark, if true, has rather troubling consequences. It raises the general question what this supposedly single philosophical system may have been like at the time of Śabara and before him. In particular, it raises the specific question why Śabara shows no awareness of the notion of liberation in his commentary on the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. Presumably from its beginning, Uttara Mīmāṃsā has always been about liberation through knowledge of Brahma. Is Śabara’s silence in this regard to be explained by the presumed fact that he left this issue to the part of the single philosophical system that he adhered to but which he had no occasion to comment upon? Or does it show that he did not accept the notion of liberation, or even that he was not, or only barely, aware of it?

Jacobi’s remark is cited with approval by Asko Parpola (1981: 155) in an article which tries to establish not only that Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā were originally one system, but that the fundamental texts of the two (the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Uttara-Mīmāṃsāsūtra respectively) were originally the initial and final parts of one single text, the original Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. He supports this claim with the testimony of classical authors, to which he adds an argument based on what he calls the teacher quotations (but which are really only mentions of their names) in the two texts.

Reacting to Jacobi’s remark, A. B. Keith observed: “This, of course, would give the Pūrvamīmāṃsā a very different aspect, as merely a part of a philosophy, not the whole”. Keith himself considered Jacobi’s remark dubious, and believed that syncretism of the systems would rather be due to the commentators. ² It is indeed dif- ficult to believe that, far from being the pure Vedic ritualistic thinkers that the texts present us with, the earliest Mīmāṃsakas were in their heart of hearts early Vedāntins, and that non-Vedāntic, ‘pure’ Mīmāṃsakas did not exist until later. At first sight this would appear to turn the historical development on its head. ¹ The improbability of such a development does not, of course, in itself constitute proof that it may not have taken place. It does, however, force us to review the evidence with great care.

Jacobi based his opinion to the effect that “at Śabarasvāmin’s time the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā still formed one philosophical system” on the fact that Śabara is mentioned in an important passage in Śaṅkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya on sūtra 3.3.53. The passage needs to be studied in its context. This context is primarily provided by the sūtra 3.3.53 (eka ātmanah sarīre bhāvāt) which, in Śankara’s interpretation, establishes the existence of the self. In this context Śankara states: ²

[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda?

[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the Bhāṣya. But there (i.e., at the beginning of the Śāstra) there is no sūtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the author of the Sūtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, Ācārya Śabarasvāmin has described [the existence of the self] in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavarṣa in the first Tantra, when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented himself with saying: ‘We shall explain this in the Śārīraka’.

The passage contains a number of puzzling expressions. It is particularly important to find out whether the expression “at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda” (śāstrapramukha eva prathame pāde) is to be taken as referring to the same thing as “in the first Tantra” (prathame tantre), or not. Since “the first Tantra” is explicitly contrasted with and therefore differentiated from “the Śārīraka” - the Śārīraka being no doubt Upavarṣa’s planned (or executed) commentary on the Brahma Sūtra-we can conclude that “the first Tantra” is the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (or Upavarṣa’s commentary on it). ³ Many interpreters ⁴ identify “the very beginning of the Śāstra” with Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.5. But is this correct? Why should our short passage refer to one and the same discussion in three different ways: (i) “at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda”, (ii) “in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition” and (iii) “in the first Tantra”?

We have to investigate what Śankara meant by “the beginning of the Śāstra”. The question whether Śañara looked upon Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and Brahma Sūtra as together constituting one Śāstra or as two different Śāstras is related to this. Jacobi and Parpola, as we have seen, invoke the passage under discussion to prove that the two together were originally one Śāstra, but their proof is, at least in part, circular: The two disciplines were originally one because Śankara refers to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra as “the beginning of the Śāstra”, and “the beginning of the Śāstra” must refer to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra because the two disciplines were originally one. How do we get out of this circular argument?

There is another passage in Śaṅkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya which may clarify his understanding of his own Śāstra. It occurs under sūtra 1.1.4 and reads: ⁵

Such being the case, it is proper to begin a separate Śāstra with the words “Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma” (Brahma Sūtra 1.1.1) because it deals with that. For in case [this Śāstra] were to deal with injunctions that one has to know [Brahma], no separate Śāstra could be begun, because [the Śāstra of injunctions (viz. the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra)] has already begun with the words “Then therefore the enquiry into Dharma” (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.1). Something that has already begun would begin like this “Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining Dharma”, just like “Then therefore the enquiry into the purpose of the sacrifice and into the purpose of man” (which is a sūtra (4.1.1) that introduces a chapter of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra). But because knowledge of the identity of Brahma and ātman has not been stated (in the Mīmāṃsā), the beginning of a [new] Śāstra in the form “Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma” in order to convey that [knowledge] is appropriate.

As the translation shows, this passage easily lends itself to an interpretation in which the Brahma Sūtra belongs to a separate Śāstra (prthakāāstra), different from ritual Mīmāṃsā.

Moreover, according to Śaṅkara’s comments on Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53, which we studied above, “the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra has [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda”. The very first Pāda of Śabara’s Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra does indeed contain a long passage dealing with the existence of the self. ⁸ This self is stated to be different from the body, but the passage says nothing about its being “capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra”. The first Pāda of Śaṅkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, on the other hand, repeatedly deals with these issues. As a short example we can take the following statement from Śaṅkara’s comments on Brahma Sūtra 1.1.4: ⁹

From the denial of being affected by joy and sorrow expressed in the statement “Joy and sorrow do not affect the one without body” (ChānUp 8.12.1) we understand that the state of being without body, called liberation, is denied to be the effect of Dharma characterized as injunction.

The “one without body” is the self. The present passage tells us that this self, which is without body, is capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra, viz. liberation.

As an example of a short passage dealing with the existence of the self we can quote from Śañara’s comments on Brahma Sūtra 1.1 .1: ¹⁰

For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) self, and never thinks ‘I am not’. If the existence of the self were not known, every one would think ‘I am not’.

There are therefore good reasons to interpret the passage from Śañkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya on sūtra 3.3.53 cited above in the following manner:

[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruits of the Śāstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the [present] Śāstra, in the first Pāda [of the Brahma Sūtra and its Bhāṣya]?

[Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the [Brahma Sūtra-]Bhāṣya (i.e., by Śañara himself). ¹¹ But there (i.e., at the beginning of the Brahma Sūtra) there is no sūtra about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the author of the Sūtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, ācārya Śabarasvāmin has described [the existence of the self] in [the section of the Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya] dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavarṣa in the first Tantra (i.e. in his commentary on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra), when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented himself with saying: ‘We shall explain this in the Śārīraka’.

This way of understanding Śañara’s reference to the first Pāda agrees with the way in which he refers to the first, second and third adhyāyas. Wherever in his Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya he refers to adhyāyas, they are adhyāyas of his Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya (or of the Brahma Sūtra), numbered according to the position they have in his own work. Śañara refers to the “first adhyāya ” at the very beginning of the second adhyāya of his Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya. There can be no doubt that here it concerns the first adhyāya of the Brahma Sūtra (Bhāṣya), not of ritual Mīmāṃsā. Similarly, the “second adhyāya” referred to at the very beginning of the third adhyāya and under Brahma Sūtra 2.1.1 clearly refers to Śankara’s own second chapter (or to that chapter of the Brahma Sūtra). The same applies to the “third adhyāya” referred to at the beginning of chapter four and under Brahma Sūtra 3.1.1. ¹²

Let us now turn to Śabara. The above passage shows that, in Śankara’s opinion, Śabara took a topic, or a passage, which belonged under Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53 and placed it in his Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya. The passage does not say what exactly he took, nor does it state that he took it from his own commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.

Śankara’s testimony loses most of its value in the light of Erich Frauwallner’s (1968) analysis of Śabara’s Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.1-5. It is this portion of Śabara’s Bhāṣya that contains a discussion of the self in a section dealing with the means of valid cognition, as noted by Śankara. However, both the discussion of the self, as well as the section on means of valid cognition in which it finds itself, belong to the so-called Vrttikāra-grantha. That is to say, they belong to a portion which Śabara explicitly cites from another author whom he calls the Vrttikāra. No one, not even Śankara, claims that the Vrttikāra-grantha as a whole was taken from a commentary on Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53 and the fact that the Vrttikāra-grantha comments on several Mīmāṃsā sūtras excludes this as a possibility. Within the Vrttikāra-grantha the section on the existence of the self is an insertion (Frauwallner, 1968: 109-110). This implies that if someone has taken this section from a commentary on Brahma Sūtra 3.3.53, it was not Śabara, but the Vrttikāra. It is therefore excluded that Śankara still knew a commentary by Śabara on the Brahma Sūtra which presumably contained the passage which is now part of the Vrttikāra-grantha. Stated differently, it is open to question whether Śaṅkara knew more about Śabara than we do.

This may not be all that surprising. Even Kumārila, who is commonly regarded as having lived before Śańkara (Pande, 1994: 46-47) and who commented upon Śabara’s Bhāṣya, no longer knew the extent of the Vṛttikāra-grantha (Jacobi, 1911: 15 (573) f.). ¹³ Śañkara’s incorrect attribution of the discussion of the self to Sabara is therefore understandable. His claim to know where this passage came from, on the other hand, is no more reliable than this incorrect attribution.

Since Frauwallner’s analysis may not be generally known, I cite here the most relevant passage (1968: 109-110):

Der ganze Vṛttikāragranthaḥ ist, im grossen gesehen, folgendermassen aufgebaut. Nach der Besprechung der Erkenntnismittel ergreift ein Gegner das Wort und bringt eine Reihe von Gründen gegen die Glaubwürdigkeit des Veda vor. Die späteren Kommentatoren nennen diesen Abschnitt Citrākṣepavādaḥ, weil der Gegner von der vedischen Vorschrift “citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ” ausgeht. Die Antwort lautet zunächst im Anschluss an das Sütram 5, dass der Veda glaubwürdig ist wegen der Naturgegebenheit der Verknüpfung von Wort und Gegenstand. Das wird weit ausholend besprochen: Wesen des Wortes, Gegenstand des Wortes, Wesen der Verknüpfung und ihre Naturgegebenheit. Dann wird nochmal auf die Angriffe des Gegners im Citrākṣepah zurückgegriffen und sie werden der Reihe nach widerlegt. Damit ist die ganze Auseinandersetzung abgeschlossen.

In die abschliessende Zurückweisung des Citrākṣepah ist nun eine lange Erörterung über das Vorhandensein einer Seele eingefügt. Dass es sich dabei um einen sekundären Einschub handelt, zeigt schon das grobe Missverhältnis im Umfang dieses Einschubs gegenüber dem ganzen Abschnitt. Die ganze übrige Widerlegung des Citrākṣepah umfasst nur 16 Zeilen, der Einschub 133 Zeilen. Ebenso krass ist die Äusserlichkeit der Einfügung. Auf diese lange Abschweifung folgt plötzlich ganz unvermittelt noch eine kurze Erwiderung auf einen der Einwände im Citrākṣepah, so dass der Leser zunächst erstaunt fragt, wovon denn eigentlich die Rede ist.

This analysis clearly shows that the portion on the soul is an insertion into the Vṛttikāra-grantha, and not into Śabara’s commentary. Śańkara obviously was in error. ¹⁴

There is less reason to be sceptical with regard to Śankara’s statement about Upavarṣa. There is no reason to doubt that Śaṅkara knew a commentary by Upavarṣa on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra in which its author stated: “We shall explain [the existence of the self] in the Śārīraka”. What does this prove?

It indicates that Upavarṣa commented, or intended to comment, on both the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and the Brahma Sūtra. Does this mean that he “seems to have treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work” (Nakamura, 1983: 398 n. 4, referring to Belvalkar)? This is far from certain. We know that another author, Maṇdana Miśra, wrote treatises both on Mīmāṃsā and on Vedānta around the time of Śankara, and it cannot be maintained that he treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work. Not much later Vācaspati Miśra commented upon works belonging to a variety of schools of thought. The fact, therefore, that Upavarṣa commented (or wanted to comment) upon the classical texts of two schools of thought does not, in and of itself, prove that he looked upon these as fundamentally the same, or upon their classical texts as really being parts of one single text. Indeed, the very circumstance that he speaks in this connection of “the Śārīraka” suggests that he did not look upon that work as simply a later part of the same commentary. And the fact that Śankara speaks about Upavarṣa’s ‘first Tantra’ without further specification while referring to his commentary on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra may simply suggest that Śaṅkara knew only one work by Upavarṣa, and not his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra.

The analysis of Śankara’s statements does not, therefore, provide us with reliable evidence that would permit us to conclude that until Śankara, and more particularly at the time of Upavarṣa and Śabara, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and the Brahma Sūtra were looked upon as parts of one single work. ¹⁵ Even less do these statements prove that the two systems of thought that find expression in those texts were believed to be in reality just one system of thought.

Only one classical Sanskrit author appears to have made a statement suggesting that the two Sūtra texts were originally part of one undivided text. This author is Sureśvara.

Also the words of Jaimini which you present, they too are based on an incorrect understanding of his intention. For Jaimini did not intend to say that the whole Veda is for [ritual] activity. Indeed, had this been his intention, he would not have composed the sūtras of the venerable Śā̃̃raka, viz. athāto brahmajijñāsā, janmādy asya yatah (Brahma Sūtra 1.1.1-2) etc., whose aim is to elucidate the real nature of the essence of Brahma and nothing else, and which is an investigation into the meaning of the Upaniṣads as a whole accompanied by profound reasoning. But he has composed those sūtras. Therefore Jaimini’s intention is as follows: just as injunctive sentences are authoritative in their semantic space, in the same way too the sentences proclaiming the identity [of the self with Brahma], this because [both types of sentences] are equally limited to matters not known [from other sources].

It appears from this passage that Sureśvara believed that Jaimini the author of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra had also composed the Brahma Sūtra. ¹⁸ It is, of course, a small step from there to the position that both Sūtra texts had once been one single text. Sureśvara maintained this common authorship even in the face of Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1, which he proposed to reinterpret in the light of Jaimini’s “real” intentions.

No independent scholar could possibly accept Sureśvara’s argument as it is presented in this passage. ¹⁹ Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1 constitutes, as a matter of fact, a major argument against the original unity of Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. It is true that this sūtra-at any rate in Śabara’s interpretation - presents a pūrvapakṣa, i.e., an opinion that will subsequently be discarded. But what is going to be discarded (from sūtra 1.2.7 onward) is not the position that the whole Veda is for ritual activity, but the conclusion that passages that are not for ritual activity are for that reason without purpose. Sureśvara on the other hand claims that Jaimini did not intend to say that the whole Veda is for ritual activity, which is a position which is difficult to defend, even though he was not the only Vedāntin to hold it. Sureśvara’s reinterpretation of this sūtra-or more precisely: his rejection of the straightforward interpretation of this sūtra without offering something credible in its place ²⁰-may therefore be understood to indicate that he attempted to impose a vision on the two Mīmāṃsās which does not easily fit the texts.

It goes without saying that Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1 constituted a challenge for many Vedāntins. Śañara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, for example, cites Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1 in its introduction to Brahma Sūtra 1.1.4, and subsequently enters in great detail to show that the Upaniṣadic statements about Brahma do not prescribe activity and are not to be construed with other statements that do. In the end Śañara does not reject Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1, but he limits its range to such an extent that it cannot any longer do much harm: ²¹

That is why the mention of purposelessness (in Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1) is to be understood as concerning arthavādas in the form of stories and the like that do not serve a human purpose (purusārtha).

Padmapāda-like Sureśvara probably a pupil of Śañara (Hacker, 1951: 1929-30 (= (23)-(24); Ungemach, 1996) and therefore a contemporary of the former-disagrees with Sureśvara where the authorship of the Brahma Sūtra is concerned. ²² He does so in the following passage: ²³

And as to where or how the Vedic texts relating to the cognition of the existent entity (serve as a pramāna) is not explained by the revered Jaimini since in accordance with this resolve he set about investigating into the nature of Dharma only and since such knowledge (i.e., of ātman as distinguished from the body) is not to the purpose. But the revered Bādarāyaṇa on the other hand having resolved to inquire into a different topic altogether, has expounded (the subject of the separate existence of ātman) in the ‘samanvayādhikarana’-[Brahma Sūtra] I.1.1-4.

Padmapāda’s disagreement with Sureśvara in this respect does not change the fact that he, too, has to limit the range of applicability of Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.1. He does so in the following passage: ²⁴

[Objection:] Has it not been shown in [Śabara on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.1 (Frauwallner, 1968: 12 1. 12-13):] dṛ̣to hi tasyārthah karmāvabodhanam, [and in Mīmāṃsā sūtras 1.1.15:] tadbhūtānạ̣̄ kriyārthena samāmnāyah […] [and 1.2.1] āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād […] that all [Vedic statements] have actions that are to be performed as purpose?

[Reply:] True; because it begins with those [sūtras] (viz. athāto dharmaijjñāsā MīmSū 1.1.1, and codanālakṣaṇo ‘rtho dharmah MīmSū 1.1.2), the portion of the Veda that is related to those [notions] (i.e., dharma and codanā) is understood. [These notions] do not pertain to the whole [of the Veda].

Sureśvara himself, in his Sambandhavārttika on Śañkara’s Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisad Bhāṣya, ²⁵ points out that “in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra passage (1.2.1) ‘since scripture (āmnāya) has action as its subject’ the word ‘scripture’ refers only to the karmakānda, not to the Upaniṣads” (EIP III p. 428).

Returning now to Sureśvara’s remark about the authorship of the Brahma Sūtra, note that his passage stands alone, is not confirmed by others and is indeed contradicted by statements from other authors (among them Padmapāda). All this does not add to its credibility. It is therefore not possible to agree with Parpola (1981: 150) when he cites this passage-without translation and without discus-sion-as supporting evidence for the hypothesis that “the founder of the Mīmāṃsā [is to] be credited with the authorship of a treatise upon the Vedānta, which the [present Brahma Sūtra] would have replaced, not without thereby utilizing some of its elements”. Note that Parpola’s conclusion goes well beyond Sureśvara’s evidence. Sureśvara’s remark, if correct, would show that Jaimini was the author of the Brahma Sūtra, not-pace Kane, Belvalkar, and Par-pola-”of a treatise upon the Vedānta, which the [present Brahma Sūtra] would have replaced, not without thereby utilizing some of its elements”. This artificial interpretation of Sureśvara’s words by these modern scholars, including the postulated existence of an early Vedāntic work by Jaimini, finds its explanation in the fact that the extant Brahma Sūtra is obviously a far more recent work than the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and dates from many centuries after the lateVedic period; its references to other systems of thought which did not yet exist in the late-Vedic period leave little doubt in this regard (see Jacobi, 1911: 13 [571] f.). However, it is more reasonable to take Sureśvara’s remark at its face value and conclude that it is mistaken, rather than to take it as a justification to postulate the existence of an earlier composition for which no independent evidence exists.

Let us now consider some further passages that have a bearing on the relationship between ritual Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Rāmānuja introduces his Śrī Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra in the following manner: ²⁶

Earlier Ācāryas have condensed the extensive Brahma Sūtra Vṛtti composed by the venerable Bodhāyana. The sounds of the sūtras will be explained in accordance with their/his opinions.

It is not clear from this statement whether Rāmānuja still knew the long commentary of Bodhāyana or only the condensed versions prepared by the Ācāryas he mentions. ²⁷ Mesquita (1984: 179-180) surmises that he knew Bodhāyana’s commentary in fragmentary form; this would explain that there are only seven quotations from this Vṛtti, all from the first adhyāya, in the Śrī Bhāṣya. When, therefore, Rāmānuja cites a few pages later an unspecified Vṛtikāra, it is not fully clear whether the author cited is Bodhāyana (which seems probable), or someone else. The unspecified Vṛttikāra is cited in the following passage: ²⁸

The Vṛttikāra states this [in the following words]: “After the knowledge of karma which has been acquired, there is desire to know Brahma.” And he will state that Karmamīmāṃsā and Brahmamīmāṃsā are one Śāstra, in the words: “This Śārīraka has been joined with the sixteenfold [composition] of Jaimini, ²⁹ and that proves that the two Śāstras are one.”

Unlike Sureśvara, the Vṛttikāra cited by Rāmānuja does not appear to look upon the Brahma Sūtra as a composition of Jaimini. His words rather create the impression that, according to him, the unity of the two Śāstras came about later, after the composition of their classical texts. Note further that these passages from Rāmānuja’s Śrī Bhāṣya (unlike the Prapañcahṛdaya, to be considered below) do not state that either Bodhāyana or the Vṛttikāra (who may well have been one and the same person) commented upon both the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and the Brahma Sūtra.

Also the Prapañcahṛdaya, an anonymous work of unknown date, ³⁰ creates the impression that the two Śāstras were combined at some moment of time after the composition of their classical texts: ³¹

The Mīmāṃsā Śāstra reflects on the meanings of all sentences belonging to the Veda, Pūrvakāṇda and Uttarakāṇda combined, along with its Angas and Upāngas. It has been composed in twenty chapters. Among these, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstra composed in sixteen chapters, ³² by Jaimini, reflects upon the Dharma connected with the Pūrvakāṇda. Different from that is the Uttaramīmāṃsā Śāstra, four chapters composed by Vyāsa, ³³ which reflects upon Brahma of the Uttarakāṇda.

This same text adds that Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa commented upon the combined work: ³⁴

Bodhāyana wrote a commentary, called Krtakoti, on the [entire] Mīmāṃsā Śāstra composed in twenty chapters. Because the great bulk of [that] work was frightening, Upavarṣa abridged it by omitting some things. Considering even that to be difficult to understand for the dull-witted on account of its extent, Devasvāmin wrote a much abridged [commentary] pertaining only to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstra defined by the [first] 16 [chapters]. Bhavadāsa, too, wrote a commentary upon [this] work of Jaimini’s. Again, Ācārya Śabarasvāmin wrote, with much abbreviation, a commentary upon the first of the two kāṇdas of the Dharmamīmāṃsā Śāstra, Tantrakāṇda, omitting the second Saṅkarṣakāṇda.

It is hard to determine with certainty the extent to which the accounts of the Prapañcahṛdaya are trustworthy. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1987: Intr. p. 29-30) has pointed out that according to various early testimonies Krtakoṭi, far from being the name of a commentary, is another name for Upavarṣa. He further draws attention to the fact that the Prapañcahṛdaya, while mentioning Brahmadatta and Bhāskara as commentators on the Brahma Sūtra, ³⁵ does not mention Śankara. ³⁶ Christian Bouy (2000: 24 n. 96), moreover, reminds us that according to Vedāntadeśika, Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa appear to be one and the same person. ³⁷

However that may be, the Prapañcahṛdaya does not tell us that Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā were originally one system. It rather suggests that at some point in time efforts were made to combine the two fundamental texts - the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and the Brahma Sūtra-in order to create one single system. Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa (whether one or two persons) may have played a role in this attempt. Judging by later developments, this attempt did not meet with lasting success. Devasvāmin and other commentators returned to a separate treatment of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, the commentators mentioned by Rāmānuja and others apparently confined themselves to the Brahma Sūtra.

We must conclude from the evidence so far considered that the testimony from later authors does not support the hypothesis that the Pūrva- and the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā originally were one system, and even less that the Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra were originally part of one single work.

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Uttara-Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the teacher quotations

Asko Parpola, in some articles that have already been referred to, makes the suggestion that the terms Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā “seem to have come to being as a result of an erroneous analysis as PM-S and UM-S respectively of the names Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra (abbreviated PMS) and Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra (UMS).” (Parpola, 1981: 147-148). He continues: “I suspect that originally the terms PM and UM did not occur at all outside the book titles or rather headings PMS and UMS, but have evolved from these, and that the correct analysis of the latter is P-MS and U-MS. In other words, I suggest that the references of the words pūrea and uttara is not the two branches of Mīmāṃsā as a philosophical system, but the two portions of one single work called Mīmāṃsāsūtra. PMS would thus have originally meant ‘the former or first part of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra’, and UMS correspondingly ‘the latter or second part of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra’, not ‘the Sūtra of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā/UttaraMīmāṃsā’.” ³⁸

Parpola provides a number of arguments in defence of his thesis, some of which have already been dealt with above. He does not however address the question to what extent the textual evidence supports the priority of the expressions Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra and Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra to Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā respectively. And yet, this is an issue that cannot be ignored.

The Mīmāṃsākoṣa has no entries for (or beginning with) Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. This raises the question whether the two terms can be found in surviving Pūrvamīmāṃsā works. No such occurrences are known to me. ³⁹

The colophons to Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma Sūtra call his commentary Śārīrakamīmāṃsā Bhāṣya. This text never uses the terms Uttaramīmāṃsā or Uttaramīmāṃsā Sūtra according to the Word Index brought out under the general editorship of T. M. P. Mahadevan (1971, 1973). They do not occur in Śaṅkara’s Upadeśasāhasrī, according to the Index of Words in Mayeda’s (1973) edition, nor in his Gītā Bhāṣya, according to D’Sa’s Word-Index (1985). I have not found these terms in Padmapāda’s Pañcapādikā. ⁴⁰ Sureśvara, too, in the passage considered above, speaks of the Śārīraka which, in view of the context, must stand for Śārīraka Sūtra. Bhāskara, a commentator on the Brahma Sūtra who must be slightly later than Śaṅkara, does not appear to use the terms Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. The fact that he uses the term Mīmāṃsā to refer to ritual Mīmāṃsā (e.g. p. 6 l. 12-13: na ca brahmavisayo vicāro mīmāṃsāyām kvacid adhikaraṇe vartate […]; p. 15 l. 20-21: na ca niyogasya vākyārthatve mīmāṃsāyāṃ bhāṣyāksaraṃ sārīrake vā sūtrāksaraṃ sūcakam asti⁴¹ ) confirms this, in spite of the fact that his commentary calls itself Śārīrakamīmāṃsā Bhāṣya in the colophons.

An early attestation of Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā occurs in Yāmuna’s Ātmasiddhi, ⁴² where it is stated (p. 25 l. 12-13): ⁴³ prapañcitaś ca pūrvottaramīmāṃsābhāgayor nirālambanatvapratisedhah; yathār thakhyātisamarthanena ca śāstra iti na vyāvarnyate. Mesquita (1988: 62 n. 77) translates: “Und die Widerlegung der [von den Buddhisten gelehrten] Objektlosigkeit [der Erkenntnis] wurde [in den Werken] der beiden Teile[, nämlich der] Pūrva- und der Uttaramīmāṃsā, ausführlich vorgetragen, und [zuletzt auch] in [Nāthamunis] Lehrbuch [Nyāyatattva] zusammen mit der Rechtfertigung der [Irrtums-lehre] Yathārthakhyāti. Deshalb wird [sie hier] nicht dargelegt.” Rāmānuja’s Śrī Bhāṣya speaks of Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā in a passage which points out the difference between the two (p. 4 l. 9-10: […] pūrvottaramīmāṃsayoh bhedah). The Prapañcahṛdaya, as we have seen, speaks of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstra which it considers to reflect upon the Dharma connected with the Pūrvakāṇda, and of the Uttaramīmāṃsā Śāstra which reflects upon Brahma of the Uttarakāṇda. ⁴⁴

It will be clear that, so long as no earlier occurrences of the expressions Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā have been identified, Parpola’s proposal as to the original use of these expressions will not be based on any direct evidence.

However, a more plausible interpretation of these terms is possible. Consider first the four hypotheses presented and rejected as pūrvapakṣas by Parpola (1981: 145-146):

“the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā has come into being as a philosophical system earlier than the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā”;
“Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is so called because it deals with that part of the Vedic literature which was composed earlier, […] while the Uttara-mīmāṃsā is concerned with the later part of the Śruti”;
“Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā [are] ‘the discussion of the first and second (part of the Veda)’ respectively”;
“Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā [is] ‘the preliminary investigation’, […] establishing beyond doubt the authority and reliability of the Veda and elaborating methods of interpreting it. It thus provides the requirements needed for the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or ‘the final investigation’”.

Parpola is probably right in rejecting all four of these hypotheses, but, as we have seen, his reason for doing so, viz. that all these interpretations erroneously take the existence of the terms Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā for granted, does not appear to be valid. The fourth hypothesis may however be closest to the truth. This can be seen as follows.

For Śaṅkara Vedāntic thought (which he calls Śārīraka- or Brahma-Mīmāṃsā) can be studied instead of ritual Mīmāṃsā (which he does not call Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). The two are not therefore ordered in time for him. The situation is altogether different for other commentators of the Brahma Sūtra. Bhāskara states that reflection on Dharma has to precede reflection on Brahma (p. 2 1. 25-26: pūrvam tu dharmaijjñāsā kartavyā; p. 3 1. 25-26: tasmāt pūrvavṛttād dharmajñānād anantaram brahmajijñāseti yuktam). Reflection on Dharma is the business of ritual Mīmāṃsā, whose first sūtra begins with the words: athāto dharmaijjñāsā. Rāmānuja states the same in different words (Śrī Bhāṣya p. 4 1. 3-4: pūrvavṛttāt karmajñānād anantaram […] brahma jñātavyam). ⁴⁵ That is to say, for these thinkers Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā has to precede Uttara-Mīmāṃsā in the life of a man (even if Bhāskara does not appear to use these precise terms). The fact that we find these terms first in the writings of Rāmānuja and his predecessor Yāmuna suggests that the terms have to be interpreted quite simply as earlier and later Mīmāṃsā in the sense that the study of these two “sciences” were meant to occupy the attention of the thinkers concerned ‘earlier’ respectively ‘later’ in their lives. ⁴⁶ It appears that only later these terms came to be used by Advaitins, as in the passage from the Prapañcahṛdaya cited earlier in this appendix.

The new argument which Parpola adduces to show that originally the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra and the Brahma Sūtra ⁴⁷ were part of one single text is the fact that both quote the same teachers; indeed, teacher quotations figure in the subtitle of his articles. ⁴⁸ After our preceding considerations, it will be clear that this argument, if it is one, is the only one remaining. Let us therefore look at these quotations more closely.

Parpola (1981: 155-57) provides an “exhaustive tabulation” which shows “that both texts cite what is in practice an identical selection of named authorities”. The exceptions, Parpola continues, concern a few rarely occurring names only. It can easily be seen from this tabulation that the Brahma Sūtra never cites the name of a teacher that is not also cited in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra (along with the Sañkarṣakāṇda). There is only one exception: the name of Kāśakrtsna, which only occurs in the Brahma Sūtra (1.4.22), but not in the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra.

It must be admitted that this state of affairs is quite extraordinary. It becomes even more so if we take into consideration Renou’s (1962: 197 [623]) observation to the effect that these teachers never express a dissident view in the Brahma Sūtra. If taken at its face value, all this implies that the authorities responsible for the development of “Vedāntic” thought were the same as those who developed ritual thought. Parpola (1981: 158) concludes from this that “it is quite clear that both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, as well as the other authorities quoted, were well acquainted with both branches of the Mīmāṃsā, just like the earliest commentators of the unified Mīmāṃsāsūtra”. This conclusion seems reasonable enough. However, it raises the question which we formulated at the beginning of this appendix, but this time in a more extreme form: Must we really believe that all those early ritualists - this time not only Jaimini and his early commentators, but also the authorities he quotes - were in their heart of hearts Vedāntins? Moreover, how is it possible that only recognized ritual teachers contributed to Vedāntic thought?

What do we know about the early development of Vedāntic thought? Parpola paints the following picture. Having pointed out that there was a “twofold Mīmāṃsā” connected with Vedic ritual from the very beginning (1981: 158 ff .), he states with regard to its late-Vedic history (p. 162): “I have no doubt that this twofold Mīmāṃsā continued to be practised by the Vedic ritualists even after the Upaniṣadic period right down to the days of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, although the ceremonial and speculative (or practical and theoretical) sides of this early scholarly activity were henceforth recorded separately, in the Kalpasūtras and in the (later) Upaniṣads.” This picture gives rise to several questions.

First of all, at the time of and following the Vedic Upaniṣads, Vedāntic thought is not just the theoretical side of ritual activity. This is particularly clear from passages in the Upaniṣads that express themselves critically with regard to the Vedic ritual tradition. ⁴⁹ There is also the tendency, which manifests itself in late-Vedic texts, to ‘interiorize’ ritual practice, to ‘deritualize’ it. ⁵⁰ Then there are passages which distinguish those who reach the world of Brahma by reason of a special insight from those who sacrifice and are as a result reborn in this world. ⁵¹ Criticism of Vedic ritualism finds perhaps its culmination in the late-Vedic Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (still commented upon by Śañkara); the following passage illustrates this: ⁵²

Wallowing in ignorance time and again, the fools imagine, “We have reached our aim!” Because of their passion, they do not understand, these people who are given to rites. Therefore, they fall, wretched and forlorn, when their heavenly stay comes to a close.

Deeming sacrifices and gifts as the best, the imbeciles know nothing better. When they have enjoyed their good work, atop the firmament, they return again to this abject world.

But those in the wilderness, calm and wise, who live a life of penance and faith, as they beg their food; through the sun’s door they go, spotless, to where that immortal Person is, that immutable self.

Scepticism with regard to the Vedic sacrifice does not stop with the late-Vedic Upaniṣads. The Bhagavadgītā-in which the supreme Brahma plays an important role, and which refers to its chapters in the colophons as Upaniṣad (Schreiner, 1991: 234)—is a particularly prominent example of such continued criticism, as scholars have repeatedly observed (e.g. Sarup, 1921: 75; Lamotte, 1929: 105 (121); references to Bhag 2.42-46; 9.20-21; 11.48, 53). ⁵³ Critical gāthās and ślokas have been preserved, which have been studied by Paul Horsch (1966: esp. p. 468 ff.). All this shows that it is far from evident that the Upaniṣadic tradition is simply the theoretical part of the practical tradition which led from Vedic ritual to post-Vedic ritual thought (Mīmāṃsā).

Texts such as the Mahābhārata demonstrate that the Vedic ritualistic tradition did continue in post-Upaniṣadic times while remaining largely unaffected by ideas about rebirth and liberation. ⁵⁴ Indeed, Brockington (1998: 232) refers to the significance of Vedic sacrifice within the Mahābhārata, and observes: “this is clearly a feature which tends to align it more with the Brāhmaṇas than with classical Hinduism”. The concepts of karma and samsāra do occasionally appear in the narrative books, beside various other determinants of human destiny (ibid., p. 244 f.), but they do not play the important role which they should be expected to play if we assume that the Vedic tradition had accepted these concepts from the days of the early Upaniṣads onward. Hopkins, citing a passage from the Śāntiparvan, paraphrases (1901: 186): “The priest, orthodox, is recognized as still striving for heaven and likely to go to hell, in the old way.” ⁵⁵ There can be no doubt that the Brahmins made fun of in this passage are not Vedāntins in their heart of hearts.

Second, if it is true that the speculative (or theoretical) sides of the early scholarly activity which led to Uttaramīmāṃsā was recorded in the (later) Upaniṣads, one might expect to find the names of the authorities cited in the Brahma Sūtra in those Upaniṣads. However, none of these names occur in the surviving Upaniṣads, as we can learn from Vishva Bandhu’s Vedic Word-Concordance (VWC). Most of them do occur in the Kalpa Sūtras (as shown by Parpola). Do we have to assume that these names occurred in other Upaniṣads that are now lost? or in other pre-Brahma Sūtra “Vedāntic” texts that are now lost? The uncomfortable fact is that we have plenty of independent evidence pertaining to the ritualistic activity of the authorities cited in the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, but none whatsoever with regard to their Vedāntic interests. To be more precise, we know from independent sources that the authorities cited in the Brahma Sūtra were interested in ritual, but we do not have one bit of independent evidence that they were interested in Vedāntic thought and concerns.

The above reflections call for another way of looking at the teacher quotations in the Brahma Sūtra. One branch of later Vedāntic thinkers (Śaṅkara, Maṇ̣̣ana Miśra and others) took great pain to show that their discipline is really a form - the best form - of Mīmāṃsā, and that they applied the methods and techniques of Mīmāṃsā with even more rigour than the ritualist Mīmāṃsakas. ⁵⁶ The Brahma Sūtra belongs to this branch of Vedāntic thought. Therefore, it had to justify its teachings by invoking the same authorities as the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. ⁵⁷ That is to say, it did not wish to proclaim a different discipline based on the teachings of different authorities, because this would suggest, or even imply, that the Brahma Sūtra belonged to a different tradition, just as the teachings of Kapila (Sāṃkhya) and of Gautama (Nyāya) constitute different traditions. By basing itself on the same authorities as the ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and using the same exegetical principles, the Brahma Sūtra presents itself as teaching the same Mīmāṃsā, only better. Teaching Mīmāṃsā better means, of course, that in the Brahma Sūtra due attention is given to the statements about Brahma in the Upaniṣads. This in its turn, the Vedāntic Mīmāṃsakas claim, is a necessary consequence of the correct application of the rules of Mīmāṃsā.

This does not necessarily imply that all the references to authorities in the Brahma Sūtra are mere inventions by its author(s). It is certainly conceivable that early ‘Uttaramīmāṃsakas’ made major efforts to extend the views of ritual authorities so as to make them applicable to Vedāntic thought and procedures, i.e., to draw new conclusions out of their old positions. The unfortunate truth is that we have practically no evidence which would permit us to come to anything approaching certainty in this regard. The almost impossible style of the Brahma Sūtra ⁵⁸ itself-which, as Rüping (1977: 2) points out, may well have been cultivated on purpose ⁵⁹ —prevents us, in most cases, from being sure that this text itself ascribes Vedāntic positions to these ritual authorities.

And yet, a closer look at the positions ascribed to Jaimini in the Brahma Sūtra ⁶⁰ suggests that these ascribed views are often very close to positions known to be held by the ritual Mīmāṃsakas. This may indicate that the Brahma Sūtra occasionally mentions the name of Jaimini in order to present a ritual Mīmāṃsā view which it then rejects. The conclusion that Jaimini must have been a Vedāntin of sorts stands doubly refuted in this case.

Consider first Brahma Sūtra 1.3.31 which mentions the name of Jaimini. The sūtra reads: madhvādiss asambhavād anadhikāraṃ jaiminih; it stands out, in comparison with many other sūtras in the same text, by the relative clarity of its formulation. It is yet difficult to determine, on the basis of these words alone, what this sūtra means. If we assume that Śankara was aware of the intention of the sūtra, and that we are therefore entitled to invoke his help, we may then translate: “On account of the impossibility [on the part of the gods to be qualified to knowledge] with regard to honey etc., Jaimini [thinks that the gods] are not qualified [to knowledge of Brahma].” According to the editions of Śankara’s commentary, sūtra 1.3.31 is part of the Devatādhikaraṇa, which covers sūtras 1.3.26-33. None of these sūtras, to be sure, contains any indication that this sec- tion is concerned with gods or with the qualification to knowledge of Brahma, so it is probably impossible to confirm that Śańkara’s understanding of sūtra 1.3.31 is correct. Assuming nonetheless that it is, some interesting observations can be made. We know from Sabara’s Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.1.5 that gods are not qualified to perform Vedic rites. The statement from Sabara concerned, na devānām devatāntarābhāvāt, is even cited by Śañkara in the beginning of the Devatādhikaraṇa (on Brahma Sūtra 1.3.26). Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.1.5 itself, though rather obscure, can be understood to express the same position. ⁶¹ The position presumably attributed to Jaimini in Brahma Sūtra 1.3.31 may therefore very well be an extension of the view held by the “real” Jaimini, i.e., by the author of Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.1.5. It certainly is an extension of what Sabara-and perhaps others before him-believed was Jaimini’s view.

It is less obvious that the reason given in Brahma Sūtra 1.3.31 corresponds to anything Jaimini may have ever thought of. According to Śañkara, the words madhvādiṣv asaṃbhavād “On account of the impossibility [on the part of the gods to be qualified to knowledge] with regard to honey etc.” refer to Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.1.1 asau vā ādityo devamadhu “The honey of the gods, clearly, is the sun up there” (tr. Olivelle, 1998: 201). The interpretation which Jaimini, according to Śañkara, gives of this statement is that human beings should worship the sun by superimposing the idea of honey on it (manusyā ādityam madhvadhyāsenopāsīran). No such interpretation is found in Śañkara’s commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. And it is very surprising to find such an interpretation attributed to Jaimini. From the point of view of ritual Mīmāṃsā this is a simple arthavāda. And Śañkara himself, under the immediately following sūtra 1.3.32, presents Jaimini’s ideas about arthavädas as follows: arthavādā api vidhinaikavākyatvāt stutyarthāh santo na pārthagarthyena devādīnām vigrahādisadbhāve kāraṇabhāvam pratipadyante “Arthavādas, too, having as purpose to praise [an activity] on account of the fact that they are to be understood in connection with an injunction, are no independent (pārthagarthyena) grounds for [accepting] that the gods etc. have bodies and so on”. This is indeed the position of ritual Mīmāṃsā, and this same reasoning might be used to refuse drawing conclusions from the statement from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad on which Jaimini is yet supposed to base his conclusion that the gods are not qualified to knowledge.

Jaimini is again mentioned in Brahma Sūtra 3.2.40: dharmaṃ jaiminir ata eva. ⁶² Śankara interprets this to mean that in Jaimini’s opinion not God (tśvara) but Dharma, or Apūrva, links the sacrificial activity with its result. This agrees with what we know from Śabara’s Bhāṣya, and sūtra 3.2.40 may therefore correctly represent Jaimini’s opinion without obliging us to conclude that Jaimini was (also) a Vedāntin.

Jaimini’s mention in Brahma Sūtra 4.4.11 (bhāvaṃ jaiminir vikalpāmananāt ⁶³ is at first sight more problematic, for it concerns - at least in Śankara’s interpretation - the question whether a liberated soul still has a body and organs; according to Jaimini, it does. Far from concluding from this sūtra that Jaimini had ideas about the state of liberation, it seems prudent to read no more in it than an extension of the ritual Mīmāṃsā idea that sacrificers will remain in possession of body and organs in the state which they strive to attain above all, viz. heaven.

Jaimini defends the subordinate nature of knowledge of the self in Brahma Sūtra 3.4.2 ⁶⁴ (in Śankara’s interpretation) and the noninjunction of other stages of life (āśrama) in sūtra 3.4.18 ⁶⁵ (again according to Śankara), both times in opposition to Bādarāyaṇa, and both times in agreement with ritual Mīmāṃsā doctrine.

Let it be repeated once more that the obscure formulation of the Brahma Sūtra makes any study of its contents extremely difficult.

The observations about Jaimini presented above are, however, suggestive. They suggest that, far from being the name of an individual who had outspoken ideas about Vedānta, Jaimini in the Brahma Sūtra stands for a collection of views which agree more or less well with the ritual Mīmāṃsā position. Something similar may be true for the remaining teachers whose names are cited in the Brahma Sūtra. Unfortunately this will have to remain a hypothesis as long as the Brahma Sūtra remains almost completely unintelligible.

The view that the Brahma Sūtra made an effort to show itself to be a Mīmāṃsā text that does not in any essential aspect deviate from classical Mīmāṃsā can explain various other features as well. The Brahma Sūtra refers on some occasions to Mīmāṃsā rules, which it obviously accepts. Mīmāṃsaka (1987: Intr. p. 7) illustrates this with a number of examples, ⁶⁶ but points out that no borrowing of rules has taken place in the opposite direction, from Brahma Sūtra to ritual Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. He concludes from this that the names Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā are appropriate, undoubtedly in the meanings of earlier and later Mīmāṃsā respectively. Whatever one thinks of this interpretation (which differs widely from the one proposed by Parpola), it is clear that Uttaramīmāṃsā was influenced by and followed the example of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, but not vice-versa. This of course agrees with our suggestion that the thinkers of Uttaramīmāṃsā went out of their way to show their teaching to be an improved version of ritual Mīmāṃsā. The extensive use made by Śaṅkara of Mīmāṃsā principles (Devasthali, 1952; Moghe, 1984) points in the same direction.

Seen in the way proposed here, the Brahma Sūtra and its early commentaries are the embodiment of the attempt to lend the respectability of serious Vedic interpretation to the speculations about Brahma which had continued, perhaps without interruption, since Upaniṣadic times. Such respectability so far only belonged to the (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā. By basing all their doctrines on properly interpreted Upaniṣadic statements, the speculations about Brahma became a form of Mīmāṃsā, even a better form of Mīmāṃsā than the ritualistic one. Since examples of non-Mīmāṃsic Vedāntic thought (“Gauḍapāda”, Ādiśeṣa, the Vedāntavādins criticized by Bhavya, etc.) have survived, it is clear that Vedāntic philosophy had not always been a form of Mīmāṃsā.

Conclusions

It will be clear from the preceding reflections that Uttaramīmāṃsā, far from being part of original Mīmāṃsā, attached itself at some time to it in order to provide speculations about Brahma with the solid underpinnings of serious Vedic interpretation. Speculations about Brahma, more or less continuing the ideas found in the Vedic Upaniṣads, had been around probably without interruption since Upaniṣadic times. They had not always profited from the sophisticated instruments of Vedic interpretation that had been developed in Mīmāṃsā for the sake of Vedic ritual. Using these instruments to anchor Vedāntic ideas solidly into the eternal Veda was an aim that gave rise to a new - or perhaps better: supplementary - school of Vedic interpretation: the Uttaramīmāṃsā.

This way of looking at the historical origins of Uttaramīmāṃsā does away with the need to believe that the early ritual MīmāṃsakasŚabara, but also Jaimini, and even the authorities cited in the Sūtra-were really convinced Vedāntins, who believed in liberation from this world as a possibility above and beside the rewards offered for Vedic ritual practice. It is no longer necessary to think that Śabara, in spite of showing no awareness whatsoever of the notion of liberation in his massive commentary on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, was nevertheless familiar with it and may therefore himself have hoped to attain liberation one day. We can now stick to the far simpler and far more plausible position that Śabara-and Jaimini, and all those they cite-never mention liberation because they did not believe in it. They did not believe in it because there was no place for liberation in their vision of the world which was, in this respect, still rather close to and indeed a continuation of the Vedic ritualistic world view. This in its turn constitutes evidence that not all Vedic Brahmins from the time of the Upaniṣads onward had embraced the new ideas of karmic retribution and liberation. Some had, to be sure, and others may not have bothered to take sides. To these people we owe the composition and preservation of the Brahmanical texts in which these ideas are taken for granted. The most conservative among them, however, continued to ignore them for many centuries: from the time of the early Upaniṣads until that of Śabara and Prabhākara and beyond. We can now also understand how later ritual Mīmāṃsakas-prominent among them Kumārila Bhaṭ̣a - could no longer resist the lure of the notion of liberation and yielded to it without becoming Vedāntins. From the point of view of ritual Mīmāṃsā the two Mīmāṃsās were not fundamentally one, and never had been. Vedānta had attached itself to the older school of Vedic interpretation, claiming that it had always been part of it and that ritual Mīmāṃsā had never been complete without it. The ritual Mīmāṃsakas knew better, and historically speaking they were right.

APPENDIX II - A CĀRVĀKA IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

The Mahābhārata contains a passage which expresses opinions, attributed to a Brahmin, that are so close to the ones we know from classical Cārvāka doctrine that we may call it a Cārvāka passage. However, this passages poses major problems of interpretation, mainly because it appears to be very corrupt. It will therefore be discussed in this appendix, with more attention than usual for philological detail. It is known by the name Pañcaśikha-vākya.

Pañcaśikha is the name of a revered teacher in the classical traditions of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Before that time the name is not always associated with these traditions. It is used (as Pañcasikha) in the Pāli canon to refer to a celestial musician (gandhabba). ¹ Other early occurrences appear in a couple of passages of the Mokṣadharma Parvan of the Mahābhārata. One of these is the Pañcaśikha-vākya (Mhbh 12.211-212), which will be examined here. ²

In the Pañcaśikha-vākya King Janaka receives instruction from Pañcaśikha. This instruction is divided in two parts, one in chapter 211 and the other in 212 . Both have some surprises in store for us.

Pañcaśikha’s teaching in chapter 211, as will be argued below, has nothing whatsoever to do with Sāṃkhya as we know it from classical sources. ³ More specifically, it criticizes all belief in a world after death. This teaching is introduced with the following words (Mhbh 12.211.19cd-20):

abravīt paramaṃ mokṣaṃ yat tat sāṃkhyaṃ vidhīyate //
jākinirvedam uktvā hi karmanirvedam abravīt /
karmanirvedam uktvā ca sarvanirvedam abravīt //

Pañcaśikha spoke of the highest form of Freedom, the one prescribed as belonging to Sāṃkhya. Having spoken of the disaffection from birth, he then spoke of the disaffection from action; having spoken of the disaffection from action, he then spoke of the disaffection from everything.

The verses that follow present the teaching of Pañcaśikha in his own words. These words are difficult to understand, giving the impression sometimes that the text is too corrupt for a reliable interpretation to be possible. We will therefore first concentrate on the passages that are less problematic. As already pointed out, these passages appear to give expression to Pañcaśikha’s belief that there is no existence after death. Consider the following (Mhbh 12.211.21-22):

yadarthaṃ karmasaṃsargah karmaṇạ̣̄ ca phalodayah /
tad anāśvāsikaṃ moghaṃ vināśi calam adhruvam //
drśyamāne vināśe ca pratyakse lokasāksike /
āgamāt param astīti bruvann api parājitah //

That for the sake of which one engages in action and the arising of the fruits of actions, is unreliable, vain, destructible, movable and unfixed. With the destruction [of the body] being observed plainly with the eyes with all the world to see it, the one who says, on the basis of tradition, that there is a next world, is refuted.

The following three stanzas are difficult to interpret, and will therefore be skipped for the time being. It appears that Pañcaśikha has little confidence in means of knowledge other than perception. He expresses this in the following verse (Mhbh 12.211.26):

pratyaksaṃ hy etayor mūlaṃ krtāntaitihyayor api /
pratyakso hy āgamo bhinnah krtā̄to vā na kiṃcana //

Direct perception is the root of certain knowledge and traditional instruction both. Indeed tradition is directly perceptible, and certain knowledge is not different at all.

The first two pādas of stanza 27, which follows, are difficult to interpret. Pādas c and d can be understood, but their interpretation depends on our judgment as to whether Pañcaśikha considered himself to be an āstika or a nāstika. Few thinkers of ancient India present themselves as being nāstikas; Pañcaśikha, too, may have thought of himself as an āstika, in spite of the fact that he rejected the existence of a next world. If this is correct, the pādas concerned can be read and interpreted as follows (Mhbh 12.211.27cd):

anyo jīvah śarīrasya nāstikānāṃ mate smṛtah //

A soul different from the body is not taught in the opinion of the āstikas.

If, on the other hand, one considers that Pañcaśikha, by rejecting the existence of a next world, was a nāstika and may have thought of himself as one, one may read (Mhbh 12.211.27cd):

anyo jivah śarīrasya nāstikānām mate ‘smṛtah //

A soul different from the body is not taught in the opinion of the nāstikas.

Either way we can read this line to mean that Pañcaśikha did not accept the existence of a soul different from the body.

Verses 28 and 29 then enumerate a number of astonishing items which presumably were meant, by some unknown opponents, to prove the existence of a soul that is different from the body. Some of these items are obscure. Among the items that are less obscure the following may be mentioned: the germ that is in the seed of a fig tree, the memory of [earlier] births, magnets, the cessation of activity in a dead body. Pañcaśikha does not accept this evidence, and states (Mhbh 12.211.30):

na tv ete hetavah santi ye kecin mürtisamsthitāh /
amartyasya hi martyena sāmānyam nopapadyate //

But these are not reasons, as they are some arguments based on material substances. For it is not appropriate that the immortal has something in common with the mortal.

The verses considered support the view (or are at least compatible with it) that Pañcaśikha did indeed reject both the existence of “another world” after death and the existence of a soul that is different from the body. It is true that between the stanzas selected there are others which might conceivably oblige us to reconsider this position, if only we could be certain of their correct interpretation. However, all of these other stanzas are very obscure.

At this point Pañcaśikha dedicates three stanzas to a critique of his position, put in the mouth of “some”. They read (Mhbh 12.211.3133):

avidyākarmaceṣtānām kecid āhuh punarbhavam /
kāraṇam lobhamohau tu doṣānām ca niṣevanam //
avidyām kṣetram āhur hi karma bījam tathā krtam /
tṣnā samjananam sneha eṣa tẹ̄ām punarbhavah //
tasmin vyūdhe ca dagdhe ca citte maraṇadharmiṇi /
anyo ‘nyāj jāyate dehas tam āhuh sattvasamkṣayam //

Some teach renewed existence of ignorance, deeds and movements. Its causes are avarice, confusion, and the practice of sins. For they say that ignorance is the field, and deeds performed the seed; thirst is the growth, their moisture here is the renewed existence. When that mind characterized by death has been arrayed and burned, one body is born from another; they say that is the waning away of a being.

Note that each of these three stanzas contains the verb āhuh “they say”, whose subject cannot but be kecit “some” in the first of them. This shows that these three stanzas together constitute a unit, which critizes Pañcaśikha’s position.

Pañcaśikha does not accept the renewed existence presented here, and proceeds to point out the weaknesses of this belief (Mhbh 12.211.34):

yadā sa rūpataś cānyo jātitah śrutito ‘rthatah /
katham asmin sa ity eva sambandhah syād asamhitah //

When the [body] is different [from its predecessor] with regard to form, with regard to birth, with regard to learning, with regard to wealth, how could there be in it a connection of the form “it is him” (sa iti), given that it is not connected?

The idea behind this answer is easy to grasp. If one body dies, and another comes into being which is believed to be the continuation of the former, one must assume that the two are, in a certain sense, the same. However, the differences between the two can concern every conceivable aspect, including form, birth (jāti, no doubt caste is intended), learning and wealth, so that the idea of identity cannot be seriously maintained.

Pañcaśikha now continues (Mhbh 12.211.35):

evam sati ca kā prītir dānavidyātapobalaih /
yad anyācaritaṃ karma sarvam anyah prapadyate //

And if it is so, what is the pleasure in generous giving, knowledge, and ascetic practices? Someone else gets all the karma done by oneself.

Once again, the next reincarnation of a person is someone else who, according to the believers in reincarnation, profits from the good things accomplished by his predecessor. This, again, is of no use for the living person.

Stanza 36 is not fully clear, but stanza 37 continues (Mhbh 12.211.37):

tathā hi musalair hanyuh sarīram tat punar bhavet /
prthag jñānam yad anyac ca yenaitan nopalabhyate //

Should they slay a body with clubs, a separate knowledge, different, would come to be again, [a knowledge] by which this [slaying] is not perceived.

The absurdity brought to light here is that the murder of a person would presumably make him live on in another body without knowing what has happened to him.

Death, Pañcaśikha tells us, must be thought of as no different from the passing of the seasons and similar events, or the decay of a house (Mhbh 12.211.38-39):

rtuh samvatsaras tithyah sītosṇe ca priyāpriye /
yathā̄̄tāni paśyanti tādrśah sattvasamksayah //
jarayā hi parītasya mṛtyunā vā vināśinā /
durbalam durbalam pūrvam grhasyeva vinaśyate //

Seasons, years, the lunar days, winter and summer, pleasant and unpleasant, as they see these that have passed by-such is the waning away of a being. Of one possessed by old age or annihilating death, this weak element first and then that weak element vanish, as of a house.

The components of the body come to their end in a similar way (Mhbh 12.211.40):

indriyāni mano vāyuh śonitam māṃsam asthi ca /
ānupūryyā vinaśyanti svaṃ dhātum upayānti ca //

Sensory faculties, mind, wind, blood, flesh, and bones vanish in sequence, each returning to its own stratum/source.

What, then, is the purpose of the Veda and of worldly behaviour? Verse 41 proposes the following answer (Mhbh 12.211.41):

lokayātrāvidhānaṃ ca dānadharmaphalāgamah /
yadarthaṃ vedaśabdāś ca vyavahārāś ca laukikāh //

The rule for the functioning of the world, the return of fruit from the virtue of generous giving, this is what the words of the Veda are for, as well as the public affairs of the world.

Summing up (Mhbh 12.211.42):

iti samyañmanasy ete bahavah santi hetavah /
etad astīdam asīti na kiṃcit pratipadyate //

In this way there are many argument for someone whose mind is right [to determine] “this exists, and this here exists”; nothing at all goes against that.

The final stanzas of adhyāya 211 continue in a vein which reminds us of the disaffection (nirveda) which characterizes Pañcaśikha’s teachings according to the initial stanza (20) considered above (Mhbh 12.211.43-47):

teṣạ̣̄ vimrśatām evaṃ tat tat samabhidhāvatām /
kvacin nivisate buddhis tatra jīryati vṛkṣavat //
evam arthair anarthaśs ca duhkhitāh sarvajantavah /
āgamair apakṣ̣yante hastipair hastino yathā //
arthāms tathātyantasukhāvahāṃś ca; lipsanta ete bahavo viśulkāh /
mahattaram duhkham abhiprapannā; hitvāmiṣaṃ mṛtyuvaśam prayānti //
vināśino hy adhruvajīvitasya; kiṃ bandhubhir mitraparigrahaśś ca /
vihāya yo gacchati sarvam eva; kṣanena gatvā na nivartate ca //
bhūvyomatoyānalavāyavo hi; sadā śarīram paripālayanti /
itīdam ālaksya kuto ratir bhaved; vināśino hy asya na śarma vidyate //

Of those reasoning like this, running hither and thither, intellect enters in somewhere, and like a tree it decays there. So all people made miserable by goals and by non-goals are dragged down by traditions as are elephants by elephant drivers. These many paupers seeking to obtain riches that bring absolute happiness and arriving at greater misery abandon that prize and go forth to death’s grip. What good are relatives, friends, or possessions for one whose life is uncertain, who is subject to destruction? for one who abandons every last bit of it and goes, and who, having gone in an instance, does not return? “Earth, space, water, fire and wind, these always maintain the body”; having observed this where would be the delight? For there is no protection against this annihilation.

This disheartening depiction of human existence is clearly the end, and the summing up, of Pañcaśikha’s first sermon, for the final verse of the adhyāya reads (Mhbh 12.211.48):

idam anupadhi vākyam acchalaṃ paramanirāmayam ātmasāksikam /
narapatir abhivāksya vismitaḥ punar anuyoktum idaṃ pracakrame //

Having taken in this unequivocal, unyielding, supremely salubrious statement, witnessed by himself, the king was amazed and now he began again to question him.

This interpretation of chapter 211 is different from the one proposed by Shujun Motegi in an article dedicated to “the teachings of Pañcaśikha in the Mokṣadharma” (1999). ⁴ Basing himself largely on the same stanzas as those considered above, Motegi presents part of his interpretation of Pañcaśikha’s teaching in the following words (p. 515):

P[añcaśikha] preaches the highest emancipation which is prescribed by Sāṃkhya (211.19). He preaches “disgust” (nirveda) as the basic motivation for emancipation. He denies actions and characterizes them as perishing, etc. (211.21), and then presents arguments which refute both materialists (nāstika) and Buddhists. The materialists’ point is that the soul (ātman) is nothing but the physical body because it is only perceptible things that exist. They deny the validity of anumāna and āgama. P refutes this by maintaining that the soul is different from the body and that things having form are different from things formless.

Motegi’s remarks are in agreement with those made here in as far as the interpretation of verses 19 and 21 is concerned. However, the claim that Pañcaśikha “then presents arguments which refute both materialists (nāstika) and Buddhists” needs examination. What reason could there be to think that Pañcaśikha tries to refute materialists (nāstika)? Motegi does not cite any passages, nor does he refer to any verses in this context. He says that “the materialists’ point is that the soul is nothing but the physical body”. This must refer to verse 27 cd which, as we have seen, can be read in different ways. Motegi apparently takes this as a pūrvapakṣa (reading ‘smṛtah for smṛtah), but does not tell us why he does so. He further states that “they deny the validity of anumāna and āgama”, explaining in a note that these two terms replace krtānta and aitihya respectively. Once again he takes this to be part of the pūrvapakṣa, without clarifying why he thinks so. Pañcaśikha presumably “refutes this by maintaining that the soul is different from the body”. What this refers to is not clear to me, for the only passage that does mention a soul different from the body, verse 27 cd , presents the opinion of the nästikas according to Motegi. Pañcaśikha is further claimed to maintain “that things having form are different from things formless”. This cannot but be an unavowed reference to verse 30 cd , which in the critical edition has the form amartyasya hi martyena sāmānyam nopapadyate, but for which the variant reading amürtasya hi mürtena° is recorded in the critical apparatus.

It is difficult to escape from the impression that Motegi has rather lightly imposed an interpretation on the text, imputing pūrvapakṣa status to passages without any evidence to that effect where it suits his position, and choosing variant readings without any warning to his readers. Motegi’s procedure can be taken as an illustration of the difficulty of chapter 211, which tempts the interpreter to take steps that are sometimes drastic.

Motegi’s steps in interpreting the passages considered so far have been too drastic. In interpreting the then following stanzas, he comes up with some interesting observations (p. 515):

Then P proceeds to deny the Buddhist theory of rebirth (211.31-32). ⁵ Buddhists hold that human beings are subjected to multiple rebirths as a result of their ignorance and actions. The cause of rebirth, according to them, is greed and delusion. This is substantiated by the parable of field, seed and moisture, which is often seen in Buddhist literature.

In a note he gives references to a number of Buddhist texts which use the images of field, seed and moisture, often together. It is therefore conceivable that Buddhist notions which plead in favour of renewed existence appear in these stanzas.

Motegi admits having difficulties understanding verse 33, which contains, as he puts it, “the next argument of the Buddhists”. He sees therefore that verses 31-33 belong together, and he also sees that this “Buddhist” position is going to be refuted in the stanzas that follow. He sums up this refutation, saying (p. 516):

P refutes this point by reasoning that the two cannot be connected, as the mind of the new body has nothing to do with the mind of the previous body (211.34). He further argues that, if the Buddhists argument were true, no one would find pleasure in donation, knowledge, asceticism or power, because the result of an action done by one person would be obtained by another (211.35). He adds a third reason by stating that, if the Buddhist argument were true, another body would arise even if one destroyed a body by clubbing it to death (211.37).

This can be looked upon as a fair summary of the verses we also looked at above. However, Motegi is not ready to accept these verses as expressing Pañcaśikha’s own view. The reason for this is not clear, for not even Motegi can find in the then following verses evidence of what Pañcaśikha presumably thought himself (p. 516):

After refuting this Buddhist theory, P expresses his own standpoint on the theme of emancipation. It is difficult to extract his own views reliably, however, as the text would appear to be corrupt.

The verses which Motegi considers corrupt, are 38-44. Nevertheless, they have been interpreted without difficulty above. Indeed, they offer no resistance to interpretation once one is ready to accept that these verses continue the line of reasoning begun in verse 34, viz., that Pañcaśikha himself rejects renewed existence after death.

Motegi postulates a multiplicity of positions and counterpositions, where in reality most verses give expression to Pañcaśikha’s own nihilistic views.

All this may look plausible enough, but what about the verses that have been left out for being too obscure? They are verses 23-25, 27ab, 28-29, 36. Could their correct interpretation endanger the interpretation here given of Pañcaśikha’s position?

Let us begin with Mhbh 12.211.25:

asti nāstiti cāpy etat tasminn asati laksane /
kim adhisṭthāya tad brūyāl lokayātrāviniścayam //

This verse contains some elements which recur in verses 41-42. These two verses, as interpreted above, propose an answer which is Pañcaśikha’s answer to the question of how the functioning of the world is regulated. They tell us that the person who is in his right mind (as conceived of by Pañcaśikha) knows what is. Verse 25 arranges these elements differently, and ends up with a question: if the sign allowing one to know “this is, this is not” is absent, on what basis could one then determine how the world functions? Interpreted in this manner, verse 25 continues the criticism begun in verses 21-22 by asking a rhetorical question. In reality, according to Pañcaśikha, one can know what is (by direct perception, verse 26), and one can know what is reponsible for the functioning of the world, viz., the words of the Veda and the public affairs of the world (whatever this last item may exactly mean).

It should be clear, then, that verse 25 can be interpreted in a way which fits the overall interpretation of the teaching of Pañcaśikha in chapter 211 presented above. Once this has been admitted, it is necessary to look for an interpretation of verses 23-24 that fits this context as well. I propose the following (Mhbh 12.211.23-24):

anātmā hy ātmano mytyuh kleśo mytyur jarāmayah /
ātmānaṃ manyate mohāt tad asamyak paraṃ matam //
atha ced evam apy asti yal loke nopapadyate /
ajaro ‘yam amrtyuś ca rājāsau manyate tathā //

For death of oneself is (quite simply) the non-self (i.e., the non-existence of oneself); death is the distress that arises from old age ⁶ (and not a transition to another existence). The other opinion, [held by him who] think that there is a self [even after death] is based on confusion, and is incorrect. And if [one maintains that,] even so, there are things that do not fit in this world, then one [may] think that [anybody, e.g.] that king, is free from old age and free from death.

This interpretation is, of course, highly tentative. Verses 23-24 are particularly obscure, and the form in which they have been handed down (or rather, reconstructed in the critical edition) may be corrupt. Yet this interpretation is no worse than any other. We must remember at this point that it cannot be our task to find the “correct” interpretation of these verses, but rather to show that they can be interpreted in a way that does not conflict with the overall interpretation of the whole passage which was proposed earlier.

I cannot suggest an interpretation for verse 27ab. While verses 28-29 certainly offer difficulties of interpretation, these difficulties concern the meaning of individual items. The tenor of the two verses as a whole is, however, clear: they present reasons for accepting the existence of a soul different from the body, reasons which are rejected in verse 30 . This means that only verse 36 remains to be considered as a potential threat against the interpretation of chapter 211 proposed here. In fact, verse 36 constitutes no such threat. Its first half means something like “for if this [person] here were to be afflicted by other vile [deeds]”. ⁷ It is clear that the absurdity of one person’s suffering the consequences of sins committed by others (viz., their earlier incarnations) is being addressed, here too, as it is in the previous and subsequent verses. It follows that the interpretation of Pañcaśikha proposed here is not threatened by the obscure verses of chapter 211.

This gives rise to a different question. What kind of person was this Pañcaśikha, who denied everything that we have come to associate both with Brahmanism and with the “heretical” religions of that time including Buddhism and Jainism? The introductory story provides a number of details, from among which the following are of interest to us. Pañcaśikha is a great sage (mahāmuni; 211.6), one of the seers ( ṛṣīṇāṃ […] ekaṃ; 211.8), a supreme seer (paramarṣi; 211.9), one who has performed a Satra sacrifice of a thousand years (yah satram āste varsasahasrikam; 211.10). ⁸ At the court of King Janaka he is confronted with hundred teachers (ācārya) who teach various heresies (nānāpāṣandavādin; 211.4). Pañcaśikha throws these hundred teachers into confusion, after which they are fired by the king. All this presents Pañcaśikha as an orthodox and orthoprax Brahmin, who reestablishes Brahmanical doctrine at the court of Janaka after the latter had temporarily fallen under the influence of heretical teachers.

Regarding the teachings of the heretical teachers verses 3-5 tell us the following: ⁹

Janaka Janadeva, the king of Mithilā, reflected intently on the doctrines regarding what is beyond the body. There were always a hundred learned teachers living in his palace variously propounding their doctrines, teaching various heresies. Based on tradition for the most part, Janaka was not satisfied with their conclusions on existence after death, nor on birth after death, nor on the fundamental reality of the Self.

If we read these verses in the light of how we now understand the remainder of the chapter, it becomes clear that the beliefs in existence after death, in birth after death, and in the fundamental reality of the self, are taught by heretical teachers, and that Janaka, who based himself on (Brahmanical) tradition, did not approve of these beliefs. In other words, our chapter implicitly asserts that those who adhere to the Brahmanical tradition, do not believe in the doctrine of rebirth and in the fundamental reality of a transmigrating self. Janaka did not accept these ideas because he stuck to tradition, and Pañcaśikha, a sage or seer with strong links to the Vedic sacrifice, showed these ideas to be mistaken and even absurd. Only the heretical teachers accepted these ideas, and they were therefore dismissed by Janaka.

In view of our earlier reflections, this interpretation of chapter 211 should not surprise us. In fact, the most surprising aspect of the ideas taught here is the fact that they are attributed to Pañcaśikha, a person often associated with Sāṃkhya thought, primarily in more recent sources, but also in chapter 211 itself (verse 19; see above). We will return to this question below.

There is a further question to be considered. Pañcaśikha’s teaching does not end in chapter 211, it continues in chapter 212. It is true that the two chapters are seperated by remarks to the effect that Janaka asked Pañcaśikha some more questions about existence or non-existence after death. ¹⁰ If these two chapters-or at least the two instructions by Pañcaśikha in them - constituted a unit from the beginning, we must expect that chapter 212, too, will reject rebirth and the existence of a transmigrating self.

Unfortunately chapter 212, too, is difficult to interpret. It is by no means evident what message it tries to convey, and like chapter 211 a sustained philological effort is required to make any coherent sense of it. In the remainder of this appendix I will try to impose an overall interpretation on chapter 212, specifying right from the beginning that other interpretations may be possible.

I start from the assumption that there is some continuity between chapters 211 and 212, although this does not necessarily mean that in each of them Pañcaśikha gives expression to exactly the same point of view. It is equally possible that the author or editor who added chapter 212 had some idea of the contents of chapter 211, and wanted to add something that was more or less closely related to that. The teaching of Pañcaśikha in chapter 211, as we have seen, was close to the ideas presented in classical times, in more coherent fashion, by the Cārvākas. We know that the Cārvākas, at the time when they had not yet been reduced to a much despised memory without any living adherents left, justified their philosophy in various ways, among them through a Vedic quotation. The Vedic statement that the Cārvākas, as we have seen, invoked in support of their views, is Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.12, vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya samjñāstiti, a statement that the Upaniṣad puts in the mouth of Yājñavalkya talking to his wife Maitreyī. The end of this quotation, na pretya samjñāsti, can be understood to mean, “there is no consciousness after death”. It is not surprising that the Cārvākas liked this statement, which fitted their ideas well. What is surprising, is that the beginning of chapter 212, where Janaka formulates new questions, appears to sum up what has so far been said by using precisely these words (Mhbh 12.212.2-4):

bhagavan yadi na pretya samjñā bhavati kasyacit /
evaṃ sati kim aj̃̃ānaṃ jñānaṃ vā kiṃ kariş̦ati //
sarvaṃ ucchedanisṭham syāt paśya caitad dvijottama /
apramattah pramatto vā kim visesam kariş̦ati //
asamsargo hi bhūtesu samsargo vā vināśisu /
kasmai kriyeta kalpena niścayah ko ‘tra tattvatah //

Blessed one, if there is no consciousness after death for anyone, in that case, what will knowledge or ignorance do? Everything would have dissolution as basis-look at that, O highest of Brahmins-will it make a difference if one is attentive or inattentive? Commingling or not commingling among beings subject to annihilation is done by rule for what purpose? What is the determination of these matters according to fundamental principles?

This understanding of the passage makes sense and fits the preceding context, but there is a difficulty. The reading of verse 2ab accepted in the critical edition differs from the one presented here with regard to one syllable: instead of na it has dam. The critical edition therefore has bhagavan yad idaṃ pretya samjjñā bhavati kasyacit /. This is difficult to interpret.

We will have a closer look at the philological reasons for and against the reading here proposed (yadi na […]). First, however, it will be useful to note that the end of the part in anustubh meter of Pañcaśikha’s reply appears to refer back to this part of Janaka’s question (Mhbh 12.212.43ab):

evaṃ sati kutah samjñā pretyabhāve punar bhavet /

That being so, how could there again be consciousness in the state after death?

This looks very much like an answer to Janaka’s question as we have construed it. Clearly no hasty conclusions should be drawn without an understanding of the intervening verses (5-42), nevertheless we may hope to be on the right track, if only the reading yadi na in verse 2 can be justified. Let us consider this issue in detail.

According to the critical apparatus, the reading yadi na occurs in the manuscripts called K6, K7, V1, Bo, B6, B7, B8, B9, ¹¹ Da3, Da4, Dn1, Dn4, Ds1, Ds2, D2, D3, D5, D6, D8, and has been accepted by the commentators Nīlakaṇṭha, Paramānanda Bhaṭṭācārya, and Vidyāsāgara. All these mss belong, according to the editors of the critical text, to the Northern Recension: K6, K7 and V1 are three of the altogether seven mss belonging to the North-western Group used for this edition (Kashmir and Maithilī, Videha). Bo, B6, B7, B8, B9 are the totality of all the Bengali mss used; they belong to the Central Group. And Da3, Da4, Dn1, Dn4, Ds1, Ds2, D2, D3, D5, D6, D8 are eleven of the altogether fourteen Devanāgarī mss of the Central Group used. No mss of the Southern Recension are recorded to have yadi na. However, all the mss of the Southern Recension (plus one Devanāgarī ms) have yad idam proktam, which here replaces, and makes more sense than, yad idam pretya. As a matter of fact, this reading yad idam pretya, the one accepted in the critical edition, is a hybrid reading, which combines elements that hardly ever occur together. Assuming that the note in the critical edition can be relied upon for this kind of reconstruction, the reading yad idam pretya occurs in mss Ś1, K1, K2, K4, D7. With the exception of D7, these are all mss from Kashmir. This may be accounted for by the fact that the written signs for na and da are not very different in the Śāradā script. ¹² In other words, yadida and yadina are similar, and can easily be confused with each other. The anuswāra ṃ, being no more than a point, gives frequent rise to confusions; its presence or absence in a reading is therefore of relatively minor significance (no copyist would leave yad ida pretya without anuswāra).

These observations confront us with some serious questions about the way a critical edition should be constituted. In the case under consideration, there are essentially three readings. Practically all mss from the Northern Recension have yadi na pretya. All mss from the Southern Recension have yad idam proktam. A few mss from Kashmir have yadidam pretya which, in view of the script used, may be a misreading for yadi na pretya. Taking these factors into consideration, it is hard to understand how yad idam pretya could become the reading retained in the text. Indeed, if the critical notes had presented information about a slightly longer unit-about yad idam proktam / yadi na pretya rather than separately about yadidam / yadina and pretya / proktam, as they actually do-it seems unlikely that any editor would have chosen yad idam pretya.

It will be clear from the above that we are entitled to accept, at least provisionally, the reading yadi na pretya, to postulate a link with Yājñavalkya’s instruction of his wife Maitreyī, and to connect verse 2 with verse 43 , as suggested earlier. We may, then, suspect that chapter 212 has as one of its themes the presumed absence of consciousness after death. With this in mind, let us have a closer look at the text.

Much of chapter 212 is concerned with enumerations of elements that make up the person. These enumerations are interesting in themselves, but do not particularly concern us in our present investigation. ¹³ We are primarily interested in the general picture of Pañcaśikha’s thought, and as such our questions are similar to the ones asked by Janaka and translated above. We have found confirmation for the idea that, in Pañcaśikha’s opinion, their is no consciousness (samjnā ) after death. In order to understand this better, we will wish to know what happens at death. This issue had been addressed in chapter 211; the expression there used was sattvasamksaya “the waning away of a being” (12.211.33 and 38). Pañcaśikha’s view of death had found expression in verse 38-39, and was: “Seasons, years, the lunar days, winter and summer, pleasant and unpleasant, as they see these that have passed by - such is the waning away of a being. Of one possessed by old age or annihilating death, this weak element first and then that weak element vanish, as of a house.” Chapter 212 uses the same expression sattvasamksaya, and now puts the following explanation in the mouth of Pañcaśikha (Mhbh 12.212.42):

yathāṃavagatā nadyo vyaktīr jahati nāma ca /
na ca svatāṃ niyacchanti tādrśah sattvasamksayah //

As rivers that go into the ocean abandon their individual manifestations and no longer retain their own proper selfness-like that is the waning away of a being.

It is immediately after this verse that Pañcaśikha confirms that there can be no consciousness after death, as we saw earlier (Mhbh 12.212.43):

evaṃ sati kutah samjjñā pretyabhāve punar bhavet /
pratisaṃmiśrite jive grhyamāne ca madhyatah //

That being so, how could there again be consciousness in the state after death, given that the soul has been mixed together [with other souls] and is being taken in the midst [of them].

In these verses Pañcaśikha appears as someone who thinks that the part of the person which we might call “soul” (jīva) is mixed up with other souls at death in such a manner that no saṃjñā can possibly remain. This suggests that saṃjñā is understood here, not as consciousness in general, but rather as personal consciousness, i.e. the individual consciousness that distinguishes one person from another.

How do we have to conceive of this individual soul? It is obviously something individual and something which one person does not share with another. Pañcaśikha gives some specifications in verses 40-41, which also answer the king’s fear that “everything would have dissolution as basis” (sarvam ucchedanisṭham syāt; verse 3), saying (Mhbh 12.212.40-41):

evam āhuh samāhāram kṣetram adhyātmacintakāh /
sthito manasi yo bhāvah sa vai ksetrajña ucyate //
evam sati ka ucchedah śāsvato vā katham bhavet /
svabhāvād vartamānesu sarvabhūtesu hetutah //

So those who ponder over the self call this collectivity the Field. That being present in the mind they call the Knower of the Field. That being so, what dissolution might there be? and how could [the Knower of the Field] be everlasting? in all those beings that move by cause of their proper natures.

In Pañcaśikha’s opinion, the king has nothing to worry about. Everything will not terminate in dissolution. But nor is there an everlasting soul.

Pañcaśikha’s use of the word bhāva “being” is intriguing, and calls for further reflection. Consider the very first words he pronounces in chapter 212 (Mhbh 12.212.6ab):

ucchedanisṭhā nehāsti bhāvanisṭ̣hā na vidyate /

Here the same two topics-uccheda and bhāva-are mentioned. In view of the verses just studied, this line may be translated:

There is in this world no basis for destruction, nor a basis for an [everlasting] being.

It is not certain whether the other occurrences of bhāva as an independent word in chapter 212 throw further light on this notion. Verse 24 speaks of a “triple being” (trividho bhāvah), triple, it appears, because of its association with sattva, rajas, and tamas, which were known in later times as the three constituents (guna) of Sāṃkhya. In the verses that follow, only the sättvika bhāva is explicitly mentioned, but this seems to be a different way of saying sattva. This is suggested by the fact that the sentence in which it occurs has a close parallel nearby, which has just tamas, rather than tāmasa bhāva. ¹⁴ The “being” which, according to Pañcaśikha, is the Knower of the Field (ksetrajña), may therefore be made up of sattva, rajas and tamas, but this is not sure. This “being” does reside in the mind, and apparently it is neither everlasting nor momentary. It mixes together with other “beings” at death, in such a manner that no individual consciousness (saṃjñā) remains. Further information about it is hard to obtain from chapter 212.

This is not to suggest that chapter 212 has nothing more to say. Far from it. What remains deals for the most part with the constitution of the human being, the elements - whether physical, cognitive, or psychological - that constitute it. These parts present many difficulties of interpretation which do not however have a direct bearing on our investigation.

The interpretation of chapters 211 and 212 presented so far is challenged by a number of verses in tristubh meter that occur at the end of chapter 212. Whereas, up to this point, the two chapters had given expression to a point of view according to which there is no transmigration determined by one’s deeds, these tristubh verses present a different position altogether. Verse 44, in particular, speaks of someone who diligently seeks his self (ätmānam anvicchati […] apramattah) and who is not smeared with the undesirable fruits of his actions (na lipyate karmaphalair anistaib). Karmic retribution plays a role in the following verses, too, which seems to go against all we have met so far in these two chapters. This leads me to conjecture that these verses (44-49) were not originally part of Pañcaśikha’s teaching in chapter 212.

We have to return to the question of how to explain the anomaly, or confusion, which gives the name Sāṃkhya to a collection of ideas which are close to the Lokāyata system of thought known from later sources. Certainly classical Sāṃkhya does not deny individual existence after death!

There is a curious parallel in chapter 39 of the Rājadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. There the expression Sāṃkhya is used to designate a person who is described as being “a Rākṣasa called Cārvāka” (cārvāko nāma rākṣasaḥ, v. 33), and as “a Rākṣasa disguised as a Brahmin, […] dressed like a mendicant Sāṃkhya, wearing a topknot and carrying a triple staff”. ¹⁵ It is not clear how much can be deduced from the fact that someone called Cārvāka is said here to be a Sāṃkhya: the context does not justify any certain conclusions. Yet it is remarkable that the relevant section of the Mahābhārata, i.e. the adhyāyas in which Yudhiṣthira must be convinced not to leave the world and to accept kingship, does not use the expression Sāṃkhya anywhere else. Is it conceivable that the story of the “Rākṣasa called Cārvāka” contains an obscure reference to a time, or a place, where the expression Sāṃkhya was reserved for Cārvākas/Lokāyatikas?

A totally independent source, and one several centuries younger, creates exactly the same impression. According to the biography of the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang composed by his pupil Huili, Xuanzang once participated in a public debate with a Lokāyata. The beginning of the story leaves no room for doubt in this respect: ¹⁶

At that time a heretic of the Lokāyatika school came to seek a debate and wrote his argument in fourteen points, which he hung on the door of the monastery, while he announced, ‘If anybody is able to refute any one point of my argument, I shall cut off my head to apologize!’

What follows shows that the Lokāyatika concerned was a Brahmin. This does not surprise us after what we have learned so far. This Brahmin Lokāyatika is subsequently compelled to debate with Xuanzang, compelled because the reputation of the great Buddhist master deprives him of all desire, and even of the possibility, of speaking. The debate is therefore onesided. Xuanzang decides “to start a debate with him about the principles of his school and the theories founded by other heretical sects as well”. As a result, Xuanzang first gives an overview of a number of Brahmanical schools, both ascetic and philosophical. The overview of the the Brahmanical philosophical schools mentions the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas and briefly enumerates their main doctrines. Once the overview is finished, Xuanzang enters upon a detailed refutation of the Sāṃkhya position. Sāṃkhya is, indeed, the only school whose doctrines are refuted in this one-sided debate. At the end of this refutation “the Brahmin remained silent and said nothing” and had obviously lost the debate. Xuanzang, clearly not keen on having blood on his hands, grants him the favour of becoming his slave. This is the part of the story that interests us.

If we now reduce the story to the part that is of direct relevance to our present concerns, we see that a Lokāyatika Brahmin looses a debate because he has no answer to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya system put forth by Xuanzang. This only makes sense on the assumption that Huili believed that Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata were two names for one and the same system. This might be shrugged off as being mere confusion on the part of this Chinese pupil, were it not that exactly the same confusion occurs in the Pañcaśikha-vākya. It is at least possible to entertain the idea, not that classical Sāṃkhya and classical Lokāyata were identical, but rather that the Lokāyatas, or at least some among them, had borrowed elements from Sāṃkhya to “fill up” empty spaces in their newly created philosophy. Huili would still be mistaken in that case, but his confusion would be much more understandable and a lot less serious. The Pañcaśikhavākya presents us with a case where the straightforward rejection of individual existence after death is presented as a form of Sāṃkhya. Nothing prevents us from surmising that early Brahmanical critics of the theory of rebirth and karmic retribution tried to borrow not only elements of what was sometimes called Sāṃkhya, but its name as well.

If we now return to the Pañcaśikha-vākya, we have seen that chapter 212 enumerates many components of the person, a number of which have a distinctly Sāṃkhya flavour. We find there, for example, the triplet sattva, rajas and tamas, called here the triple bhāva (v. 24 ff .). The expression ksetrajña (v. 40), too, is typical for classical Sāṃkhya, as are the combination of buddhi and mahat (v. 13). Other terms and expressions are not exclusively Sāṃkhya, but are used there, too. Among these we may count the five faculties of knowledge (jñānendriya, v. 20) with the manas as sixth (manahsaṣtha, v. 20), followed by the five faculties of action (karmendriya, v. 20). No doubt significantly, there is here no mention of a purusa, an eternal and unchanging soul different from the “material” world in the widest possible interpretation. This purusa plays a vital role in the Sāṃkhya that aims at the liberation from karmic retribution, because this inactive kernel at the centre of one’s being allows the insight that one’s core has never acted to begin with. Pañcaśikha’s teaching in chapters 211 and 212 (with the exception of the tristubh verses 212.44-49) has no need and indeed no place for such a purusa, for freedom from karmic retribution in the usual sense is not part of it. ¹⁷

APPENDIX III - VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO PĀNINI

Many words prescribed by Pānini for Vedic are only found in the Ṛgveda. Some examples are vykati (P. 5.4.41) at RV 4.41.4; cicyuse (P. 6.1.36) at RV 4.30.22; yajadhvainam (P. 7.1.43) at RV 8.2.37; jagrbhma (P. 7.2.64) at RV 1.139.10 and 10.47.1; ¹ vrsanyati (P. 7.4.36) at RV 9.5.6; tetikte (P. 7.4.65) at RV 4.23.7; and svatavā̃̃̃ pāyuh (P. 8.3.11) at RV. 4.2.6.

Three words prescribed by Pānini for Vedic are only found in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā: khanya- (P. 3.1.123) at TaitS 7.4.13.1; the denominative kavya (P. 7.4.39) at TaitS 7.1.20.1; and ānyhuh (P. 6.1.36) at TaitS 3.2.8.3. Note that all three words occur in mantras. Thieme (1935: 64) was of the opinion that a fourth word, brahmavā̄dya (P. 3.1.123), is only found in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā. This word occurs in a brāhmaṇa portion (at TaitS 2.5.8.3) but not only there: it is also found at JUpBr 3.2.3.2; ĀpŚS 21.10.12; and VādhŚS (Caland, 1928: 176). Thus, no direct evidence remains that Pānini knew the brāhmaṇa portion of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā.

Leopold von Schroeder (1879: 194 f.; 1881-86: 1: x1 f., 2: viii f.) has argued that Pānini knew the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā. Not all of the evidence produced by him can stand scrutiny. Some cases are not derived from Pānini but from his commentators. Others correspond to rules of Pānini that are not confined to Vedic usage; these cases do not prove that Pānini knew the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā, or a part of it, for the simple reason that the words concerned were apparently also in use in other than ritual contexts. Finally, there are cases where Schroeder was mistaken in thinking that certain Vedic words prescribed by Pānini occurred only in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā and not in other texts. However, the following cases can be used to establish Pānini’s acquaintance with at least certain parts of the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā. P. 3.1.42 teaches the Vedic (chandasi, but amantre) verbal forms abhyutsādayām akah, prajanayām akah, and pāvayām kriyāt; they occur at MaitS 1.6.5, 1.6.10 and 1.8.5, and 2.1.3, respectively, and nowhere else. The Vedic (nigame) forms sādhyai and sādhvā (P. 6.3.113) are found nowhere except MaitS 1.6.3 and 3.8.5, respectively. Agrīya- (P. 4.4.117) is only attested at MaitS 2.7.13, 2.9.5, and in the colophon to 3.1.10. Noncompounded bhavisnu (P. 3.2.138) is found only at MaitS 1.8.1. Pranīya- (P. 3.1.123) is found at MaitS 3.9.1 and nowhere else; ucchisya- occurs only at MaitS 3.9.2. Purīyavāhana (P. 3.2.65) is found only at MaitS 2.7.4.

The following Vedic forms are attested only in the Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā (cf. Schroeder, 1880; 1895): ramayām akab (P. 3.1.42) at KāṭhS 7.7; upacāyyapṛ̣̣a (P. 3.1.123) at KāṭhS 11.1; and ksariti (P. 7.2.34) at KāṭhS 12.11. One word occurs only in the Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā and in the Kapiṣthala Saṃhitā. Since the latter “is practically a variant of the Kāṭhaka” (Gonda, 1975: 327), it is here included: jagatya- (P. 4.4.122) at KāṭhS 1.8 KapS 1.8, and at KāṭhS 31.7. Adhvarya in P. 3.1.123 may indicate acquaintance with KāṭhS 35.7= KapS 48.9 (Thieme, 1935: 23-24; Gotō, 1987: 191 n. 355).

A Vedic form found exclusively in a verse of the Atharvaveda (AVŚ 6.16.3, AVP 19.5.8) is ailayīt. Thieme (1935: 64) maintained that it is formed by P. 3.1.51, and concluded from it that Pānini knew that verse. Falk (1993a: 209-210), however, has drawn attention to complications which invalidate this conclusion. ² Śvatāti (P. 4.4.143) is only found at AVP 5.36.1-9. The word māmakī, formed by P. 4.1.30, occurs only AVP 6.6.8. ³

Two Vedic forms occur in the Lātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra of the Sāmaveda and nowhere else (except, of course, in the later Drāhyāyaṇa Śrauta Sūtra, which is often no more than a recast of the former): khānya- (P. 3.1.123) at LāṭŚS 8.2.4 and 5 (DrāŚS 22.2.5 and 6); and (pra-)stāyya- (id.) at LāṭŚS 6.1.20 (DrāŚS 16.1.22 and 18). Hvarita (P. 7.2.33) occurs only in a mantra in MānŚS 2.5.4.24d and 4.4.39. Sanim sasanivāṃsam (P. 7.2.69) occurs in mantras in MānŚS 1.3.4.2 and VārŚS 1.3.5.16 (cf. Hoffmann, 1974). Dādharti is only attested in JaimBr 2.37. ⁴ Yaśobhagina (P. 4.4.132) is only attested HirŚS 2.5.43 and 6.4.3.

We turn to forms excluded by Pāṇini.

P. 3.1.35 (kāspratyayādā ām amantre litī) forbids a periphrastic perfect to occur in a mantra, yet AVŚ 18.2.27 has gamayām cakāra (cf. Whitney, 1893: 249), AVP 18.65.10 gamayām cakartha (see Bhattacharya, 2001: 31).

P. 5.1.91 (vatsarāntāc chaś chandasi) prescribes -īya after words ending in -vatsara, resulting in forms like samvatsariya. The next rule, 5.1.92 (samparipūrvāt kha ca), adds -ina in the same position, provided that -vatsara- is preceded by sam- or pari-. This means that Pāṇini did not know, or approve of, forms wherein -vatsarina- is not preceded by sam- or pari-. Yet such forms occur: idāvatsarīna at TaitBr 1.4.10.2 and anuvatsarīna at TaitBr 1.4.10.3.

P. 5.4.158 (rtaś chandasi) forbids the addition of kaP after a Bahuvrīhi compound ending in -ṛ. An exception is brāhmaṇabhartyka (AitĀr 5.3.2).

P. 6.3.84 (samānasya chandasy amūrdhaprabhṛtyudarkesu) forbids substitution of sa- for samāna before mürdhan, prabhṛti, and udarka. Yet this substitution has taken place in saprabhṛti (PañBr 15.1.6 and KauṣBr 20.4, 21.4, etc.); sodarka (PañBr 13.7.9, 13.8.1, 13.8.4, and 13.8.5; and KauṣBr 20.4, 21.4, etc.).

P. 7.1.26 (netarāc chandasi) prohibits the use of neuter itarad in ritual literature. Yet it occurs at AitBr 6.15; KauṣBr 12.8; ŚPaBr 4.5.8.14 and 13.8.2.9; TaitBr 3.10.11.4; JaimBr 1.213, 2.75, and 2.249; and at ṢaḍBr 4.3.7, 4.4.10, and 4.5.8.

P. 7.2.88 (prathamāyāś ca dvivacane bhāṣāyām) prescribes the nominativesā v ām and yuvām with long penultimate ā for secular language, thus excluding these nominatives from the Vedic language. Yet they occur: āvām at AitBr 4.8; Śān̄̄r 5.7; ŚPaBr 4.1.5.16 and 14.1.1.23; BĀrUp[K] 3.2.13; ChānUp 8.8.1; and yuvām at PañBr 21.1.1.

We obtain further results by applying the rule that Pāṇini’s grammar is to be taken seriously more strictly. Grammatical sūtras that are not indicated as being optional must be accepted as intended to be of general validity. In incidental cases this may give rise to doubts, ⁵ but no such doubt attaches to the following cases.

P. 2.3.61 (presyabruvor haviso devatāsampradāne) is a rule valid for Brāhmaṇa literature (anuvrtti of brāhmaṇe from rule 60; see Joshi and Roodbergen, 1981: 101 n. 331), prescribing a genitive for the object of presya and brū, if it is an oblation in an offering to a deity. It thus excludes the use of the accusative in such cases. Yet the accusative is often used in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, most clearly in agnīṣomābhyām chāgasya vapām medah presya (ŚPaBr 3.8.2.27; ŚPaBrK 4.8.2.21), agnīṣomābhyām chāgasya havih presya (ŚPaBr 3.8.3.29; ŚPaBrK 4.8.3.18), indrāya somān prasthitān presya (ŚPaBr 4.2.1.23; ŚPaBrK 5.2.1.20), and chāgānām havih prasthitaṃ presya (ŚPaBr 5.1.3.14). ⁶

P. 3.1.59 (krmrdrruhibhyaś chandasi) is a nonoptional rule (cf. Kiparsky, 1979: 62) prescribing an as an aorist marker after the roots kṛ, mṛ, dṛ, and ruh in ritual literature. It excludes in this way the forms akārsīt, akārsīh, akārsam, aruksat and rukṣat from Vedic literature. Yet these forms occur, as follows: (a)kārsīt (GPaBr 1.3.4; ChānUp 6.16.1); akārsīh (ŚPaBr 10.5.5.3; GPaBr 1.3.11); akārsam (AVP 20.1.6; TaitBr 3.7.5.5; TaitĀr 10.24.1, 10.25.1; GPaBr 1.3.12); aruksat (AVŚ 12.3.42; AVP 16.90.3 & 6, 17.40.2); rukṣat (AVP 16.150.10).

P. 4.4.105 (sabhāyāh yah) prescribes the suffix ya after sabhā in the sense tatra sādhuh (4.4.98). The next rule, P. 4.4.106 (dhaś chandasi), makes an exception for ritual literature. The form sabhya derived by P. 4.4.105 should apparently not occur in Vedic literature. It does, though, at the following places: AVŚ 8.10.5, 19.55.6; AVP 16.133.3; MaitS 1.6.11; TaitBr 1.2.1.26, 3.7.4.6; and ŚPaBr 12.9.2.3.

P. 5.4.103 (anasantān napuṃsakāc chandasi) prescribes for ritual literature the addition of tac to neuter Tatpuruṣa compounds the last member of which ends in -an or -as. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya (2: 441) makes this rule optional, in order to account for words like brahmasāman and devacchandas, but this merely emphasizes the fact that Pānini’s rule is not optional. Yet there are numerous exceptions, some of which occur in the following texts: ⁷

AVŚ 19.7.2 (mygaśiras), 19.30.3 (devavarman).
MaitS 3.6.7 (dīksitavāsas), 3.11.9 (vyāghraloman).
VājSM 19.92 (vyāghraloman = MaitS 3.11.9).
VājSK 21.6.13 (vyāghraloman = MaitS 3.11.9 and VājSM 19.92).
AitBr 1.26 (devavarman), 4.19 (brahmasāman, agnistomasāman), 8.5 and 8.6 (vyāghracarman).
KauṣBr 2.1, 5.7, and 27.1 (devakarman), 5.7 (pitṛkarman), 8.7 (paśukarman), 27.1 (agniṣtomasāman), 30.11 (rātricchandas).
GPaBr 1.3.16 (sarvacchandas), 1.5.25 (svakarman), 2.6.6 (yajñaparvan).
TaitBr 1.7.8.1 (sārdūlacarman).
ŚPaBr 4.6.6.5 and 13.3.3.5 (brahmasāman), 5.3.5.3, 5.4.1.9, and 11 (sārdūlacarman), 6.6.1.4, 7.3.1.4, etc. (adhvarakarman, agnikarman), 13.3.3.4 (maitrāvarunasāman), 13.3.3.6 (acchāvākasāman), 13.5.1.1 and 13.5.3.10 (agniṣtomasāman), 14.3.1.35 (patnikarman).
ŚPaBrK 1.1.2.5-6 (mygaśiras), 7.2.4.3 and 7.3.1.9-10 (sārdūlacarman). JaimBr 1.149, etc. (rathantarasāman), 1.155, etc. (acchāvākasāman), 1.172, etc. agnistomasāman), 2.276 (ācāryakarman), etc.
PañBr 4.2.19, etc. (agniṣtomasāman), 4.3.1, etc. (brahmasāman), 8.10.1, etc. (acchāvākasāman), 9.2.7 and 15 (kṣatrasāman), 9.2.20, etc. (rātrisāman), 11.3.8 and 9 (somasāman), 13.9.22 and 23 (varunasāman).
Saḍ̣Br 4.2.12-14 (brahmasāman).
ĀrsBr 1.378 (varunasāman), etc.
JĀrBr 5.3, etc. (somasāman), etc.
SāmBr 1.5.15 (svakarman), 2.1.6 (setuṣāman), 2.3.3 (sarpasāman).
ŚātyBr, p. 72 (brahmasāman, acchāvākasāman).
ŚāñĀr 1.5 (devacchandas), 3.5 (brahmayasas, brahmatejas).
TaitĀr 1.15.1, etc. (svatejas).

P. 5.4.142 (chandasi ca) prescribes substitution of datR for danta final in a Bahuvrīhi compound in ritual literature. It excludes from the Vedic language Bahuvrīhi compounds ending in danta. Yet there are some: krsnadanta at AitĀr 3.2.4 and ŚāñĀr 11.4; isīkādanta at AVP 1.44.2; ubhayatodanta at AitĀr 2.3.1, ŚPaBr 1.6.3.30, ŚPaBrK 2.6.1.21, JaimBr 1.128, 2.84 and 2.114 and SāmBr 1.8.2; and anyatodanta at ŚPaBrK 2.6.1.21 and JaimBr 1.128, 2.84 and 2.114.

P. 7.1.56 (śrīgrāmanyoś chandasi) determines the form of the genitive plural of śrī and grāmanī as śrīnām and grāmanīnām, respectively. But genitive sūtagrāmanyām occurs at ŚPaBr 13.4.2.5 and 13.5.2.7.

P. 6.4.141 reads mantreṣs āñy āder ātmanah (lopah 134) “In mantras there is elision of the initial [sound ā] of ātman when [the instrumental singular ending] āṅ follows.” It is not easy to determine the precise meaning of this sūtra. It may not imply that ātman never loses its initial ā before other case endings, since for all we know Pānini may have looked upon tman as a separate vocable, but this sūtra clearly excludes the occurrence of ātmanā in mantras. This form is found, however, in mantras at the following places: AVŚ 8.2.8 AVP 16.3.9; AVŚ 9.5.31-36 AVP 16.99.8; AVŚ 18.2.7; AVŚ 19.33.5 AVP 12.5.5; AVP 3.28.1, 16.100.5-11, and 16.119.1-3; VājSM 32.11 VājSK 35.3.8; and MaitS 2.8.14.

To the above cases the following may be added:

P. 2.4.48 (hemantasisisirāv ahorātre ca chandasi) implies, as Thieme (1935: 13) rightly pointed out, that Pānini “must have known sisiraas a neuter.” However, sisira is masculine at SVK 3.4.2; SVJ 2.3.3; AVŚ 6.55.2 and 12.1.36; AVP 17.4.6 and 19.9.3; ŚPaBr 2.1.3.1, 2.6.1.2, 8.7.1.7 and 8, 13.6.1.10 and 11; ŚPaBrK 1.1.3.1 and 1.2.3.6; JaimBr 1.313, 2.51, 2.211, 2.356; and TaitĀr 1.6.1.

P. 3.1.118 (pratyapibhyām graheh [without chandasi; see Kielhorn, 1885: 192 (195); Thieme, 1935: 16]) prescribes pratigrhya- and apigrhya-. Kātyāyana’s vārttika on this sūtra confines it to Vedic literature (chandas) and Patañjali mentions the alternatives pratigrāhya- and apigrāhya-. The last two forms were apparently not known to Pānini, yet apratigrāhya- occurs at SāmBr 1.7.2.

APPENDIX IV - THE FORM OF THE ṚGVEDA KNOWN TO PĀNINI

The authorities mentioned in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya are: Ānyatareya ¹ (3.22(208)), Gārgya (1.15(16); 6.36(412); 11.17(629); 11.26(638); 13.31(739)), Pañcāla (2.33(137); 2.81(185)), Prācya (2.33(137); 2.81(185)); Mākṣavya (Intr. v. 2); Māṇ̂ūkeya (Intr. v. 2; 3.14(200)), Yāska (17.42(993)), Vedamitra (1.51(52)), Vyāḷi (3.23(209); 3.28(214); 6.43(419); 13.31(739); 13.37(745)), Śākaṭāyana (1.16(17); 13.39(747)), Śākala (1.64(65); 1.75(76); 6.14(390); 6.20(396); 6.24(400); 6.27(403); 11.19(631); 11.21(633); 11.61(673)), Śākalya (3.13(199); 3.22(208); 4.13(232); 13.31(739)), Śākalya (sthavira) (2.81(185)), Śākalya-pitr (4.4(223)), Śūravīra (Intr. v. 3), Śūravīra-suta (Intr. v. 3). None of the opinions ascribed to these authorities in the Prātiśākhya itself has an effect on the metre of the hymns. However, many of these authorities are mentioned elsewhere in ancient and classical literature, ² and opinions are ascribed to them which are not found in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. Many of these other opinions do not affect the metre either, but there are some which do in a way that deserves our attention:

(i) Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī contains the following rule: P. 6.1.127: iko ‘savame śākalyasya hrasvaś ca [saṃhitāyām (72), ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ (84), na (115), ³ aci (125)] “[In the opinion] of Śākalya, in connected speech (saṃhitā), no single [substitute] of what precedes and what follows [comes] in the place of [the vowels] i, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, ḷ, when a dissimilar vowel follows; and [if the earlier vowel is long,] a short [vowel comes in its place].” This interpretation may be improved upon by reading the word chandasi “in Sacred Literature” into this rule, from the preceding one. Both the mention of the name “Śākalya” and the unusual kind of sandhi described support this. We may assume that this rule was (also) valid for the Ṛgveda.

The Ṛgveda in its present form is not in agreement with Śākalya’s rule. The earlier form of the Ṛgveda, on the other hand, agrees with it in a most striking manner. E. Vernon Arnold (1905) makes the following statements about the original Ṛgveda. First: “Before dissimilar vowels final -i, -ī, -u, -ū are regularly used without hiatus” (p. 76). Second: “The vowels -ī, -ū are regularly shortened when followed by dissimilar vowels, but there are many exceptions” (p. 135). Third: “Final a, ā are regularly combined with an initial vowel or diphthong following; and final -i, -ī, -u, -ū are regularly combined with similar vowels, that is -i or -ī with either -i or -ī and -u or -ū with either -u or -ū ” (p. 72). These three statements are so close to the opinion ascribed to Śākalya in P. 6.1.127 as to be almost a translation of that rule.

(ii) Puruṣottamadeva’s Bhāṣāvrtti on P. 6.1.77 contains the following line (quoted in Mishra, 1972: 30n, 32n; Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: I: 26): ikām yanbhir vyavadhānam vyādigālavayor iti vaktavyam / dadhiyatra dadhy atra madhuvatra madhv atra / “It must be stated that [in the opinion] of Vyādi and Gālava there is separation of [the vowels] i, u, ṛ, ḷ by [the consonants] y, v, r, l [respectively. Examples are] dadhi-y-atra [for dadhi atra, where we normally find] dadhy atra, madhu-v-atra [for madhu atra, where we normally find] madhv atra.” The kind of sandhi here ascribed to Vyādi and Gālava is not found in our Ṛgveda. (It is found in a few places elsewhere in Vedic literature; see Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: I: 27 f.) It would, however, make good the metre of the hymns of the Ṛgveda in innumerable instances (Whitney, 1888: 39, § 113).

(iii) The third case rests upon a somewhat unorthodox interpretation of some rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, ⁴ an interpretation which, however, has rather strong arguments to support it. They will be discussed below.

Pāṇini’s grammar contains the following three rules:

P. 8.3.17: bhobhagoaghoapūrvasya yo ‘si [roh (16), rah (14)] “In the place of r of rU, which is preceded by bho, bhago, agho, -a or -ā, [comes] y, when a vowel or voiced consonant follows.”
P. 8.3.18: vyor laghuprayatnatarah śākaṭāyanasya [aśi (17)] “According to Śākaṭāyana, in the place of v and y [comes a substitute] of which the [articulatory] effort is lighter, when a vowel or voiced consonant follows.”
P. 8.3.19: lopah śākalyasya [vyoh (18), asi (17)] “According to Śākalya, there is elision of v and y when a vowel or voiced consonant follows.”

When these rules are applied to a word ending in -as that is followed by a-, this sandhi evolves: -as + a→ -a-rU + a- (8.2 .66) > -ay + a- (8.3 .17), or the same with lighter articulatory effort (8.3.17&18), or again -a + a- (8.3 .17 & 19). None of these three forms is ever found in our Ṛgveda, which invariably has -o - or -o + a-. However, the metre requires two distinct syllables, of which the first is metrically short, in the vast majority of cases (Wackernagel, 1896: 324, § 272b; Ghatage, 1948: 14). Oldenberg (1888: 458) has argued that the original reading was -a + a- ⁵ We note that this is the opinion of Śākalya expressed in P. 8.3.19 as interpreted here. Oldenberg (1888: 457-58) further shows that -ay for -as occurs in Vedic literature, and does not exclude the possibility that -ay + a- for -as + a- was the original form in the Ṛgveda. This would correspond to the opinions presumably attributed to Śākaṭāyana (P. 8.3.18) and Pāṇini (if P. 8.3.17 does indeed present Pāṇini’s opinion).

All these three passages require some further comments.

ad (i) There is no reason to doubt that the Śākalya mentioned in the Aṣṭādhyāyī is identical with the Śākalya mentioned in the Ṛgveda Prātisākhya. On one occasion we find an opinion ascribed to Śākalya in the Aṣṭādhyāyī which the Ṛgveda Prātisākhya ascribes to the followers of Śākalya (Bronkhorst, 1982). P. 1.1.16, moreover, appears to associate Śākalya with a Padapāṭha. We know from Nirukta 6.28 that the author of the Padapāṭha of the Ṛgveda was called thus. The connection of the Śākalya mentioned in the Aṣtādhyāyī with the Ṛgveda may therefore be considered as established.

ad (ii) Of the two, Vyādi (or Vyāḷi) and Gālava, only the first one is mentioned in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. It is unlikely that Purusottamadeva derived his knowledge directly or indirectly from the Samgraha, a work reputedly ⁶ written by someone called ‘Vyādi’. All we know about this work (see Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: I: 282-90) shows that the Samgraha dealt with philosophical questions, and was not just a grammar. We are therefore justified in neglecting the claim of the commentator Abhayanandin on the Jainendra grammar to the effect that this rule derives from the Samgraha and is there ascribed to “some” (Jainendra Mahāvṛtti 1.2.1: ikām yambhir vyavadhānam ekeṣām iti samgrahaḥ; quoted in Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: I: 26 n). We further do not have to decide whether the two Vyādis are one and the same or not.

ad (iii) The example -as + a- would yield -o - according to the orthodox interpretation of Pānini’s grammar, in the following manner: -as + a- > -a-rU + a- (8.2 .66) > -a-u +a- (6.1 .113) > -o + a- (6.1 .87) > -o- (6.1 .109). There can be no doubt that this form of sandhi was also accepted by Pānini, for his own grammar makes abundant use of it, e.g., in P. 8.3.17 (see above) which has yośi for yas+aśi. The question is if only this form was accepted. Some circumstances indicate that such is not the case.

The fact is that a strict application of the principles of Pānini’s grammar can not lead to -o- but only to -ay + a (with normal or lighter y ), and -a +a-! To understand why, we must recall that the substitute rU for s is introduced in P. 8.2.66, a rule which is part of the last three sections of the Aṣtādhyāyī, the so-called “Tripādī”, which has a linear rule ordering (Bronkhorst, 1980: 72 f.). Use of P. 8.2.66 can therefore only be followed by application of a rule which comes after P. 8.2.66, certainly not by application of P. 6.1.113, which would be necessary to obtain -o-

The location of P. 6.1.113 is the most flagrant violation of the principle of linear rule ordering of the Tripādī which there is in the Aṣṭādhyāyī (cf. Buiskool, 1939: 83, 99). P. 6.1.113 reads: ato ror aplutād aplicate [ati (109), ut (111)] “In the place of rU which follows a that is not prolated, [comes] u, when a non-prolated a follows.” This rule presupposes the presence of the substitute rU. But rU is not introduced except in the Tripādī. Strictly speaking P. 6.1.113 should never apply, and be superfluous. Why was P. 6.1.113 not located in the Tripādī, somewhere after P. 8.2.66 and before P. 8.3.17?

I think that there are two answers to this question and that they may be valid simultaneously. The first is that P. 6.1.113 has to “feed” P. 6.1.87 in the derivation of -o- out of -as+a- (see above). This answer alone is not fully satisfying, for if the linear ordering of the Tripādī was to be broken, then why not after the application of P. 6.1.113?7 The second answer is that if P. 6.1.113 were located in the Tripādī, it would make the derivation of -ay + a- / -aȳ + a- / -a + a- out of -as + a - impossible. That this second answer leads to a result which agrees so well with the original Ṛgveda only confirms that it is most probably correct.

The above shows that Śākalya was not the final redactor of the Ṛgveda, ⁸ as Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya seems to say he was (on P. 1.4.84, vol. I, p. 347, 1. 3: śākalena sukṭtāṃ saṃhitām anunisśamya devah prāavṣat). Patañjali’s mistaken opinion no doubt illustrates the process of apotheosis which Śākalya underwent, ⁹ as I have observed elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 1982).

I shall now show that other data we possess about Śākalya and his Padapāṭha agree, or at any rate do not disagree, with the view that Śākalya preceded the final redaction of the Ṛgveda.

Aitareya Āraṇyaka 3.2.6 lays down two rules: where there is doubt whether or not n is to be used, there n must indeed be used; ¹⁰ where there is a similar doubt regarding s, there s must be used (p. 139: sa yadi vicikitset sanakāraṃ bravāṇī̄̄̄̄ anakārā̄̄̄̄ iti sanakāram eva brū̄̄āt saṣakāraṃ bravāṇī̄̄̄ asakārā̄̄̄ iti sasakāram eva brū̄ā̄). The same chapter of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka (3.1.2) mentions the opinion of Śākalya regarding the mystical significance of union (saṃhitā). Doubts regarding the correct form of the Ṛgveda were apparently still alive in the time after Śākalya.

Six verses of the Ṛgveda have no Padapāṭha. They are RV 7.59.12; 10.20.1; 121.10; 190.1-2-3 (Kashikar, 1951: 44). This absence is most easily explained by the assumption that these verses were not considered part of the Ṛgveda by Śākalya. It further shows that the final redactors did not hesitate to deviate from the composer of the Padapāṭha in deciding what did, and what did not, belong to the Ṛgveda. (It is interesting to note that at least one hymn of the Ṛgveda (10.95) is known to have had fewer verses than at present at as late a date as that of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. See Oldenberg, 1912: 303.)

Oldenberg (1888: 384-85) points out that the Saṃhitā text contains several nom. sing. fem. words ending in -ā which are not joined with a following vowel. Oldenberg, following Lanman, explains this by assuming that the final redactors of the Ṛgveda considered these words as really ending in -āh. The Padapāṭha, on the other hand, presents all these forms as actually ending in -ā. This suggests that the maker of the Padapāṭha and the final redactors of the Saṃhitā were different persons. Since the final redactors did not consider the Padapāṭha authoritative (see above, further fn. 9), this fact does not conflict with Śākalya’s temporal priority to these redactors. ¹¹

In what phase of the development of the Ṛgveda does Pānini fit? There is no doubt that Pānini came after Śākalya, for he mentions him four times (P. 1.1.16; 6.1.127; 8.3.19; 4.51; see above). The question is: Had the Ṛgveda known to Pānini already obtained the form which it had at the time of the Ṛgveda Prātisākhya, and which was to remain virtually unchanged ever since? Three passages in the Aṣṭādhyāyī may indicate that this was not the case. ¹²

(i) P. 6.1.134: so’ci lope cet pādapūranam [sulopah (132)] “There is elision of [the nom. sing. case-affix] sU of sa ‘he’ before a vowel, if, in case of elision, there is completion of the Pāda.” This rule is obeyed in our Ṛgveda where sas is followed by a vowel different from a; e.g., in RV 1.32.15: sed u rājā kṣayati carṣanīnām for sah / it / etc., and in RV 8.43.9: sauṣadhīr anu rudhyase for sah / oṣadhīh / etc. (cf. Oldenberg, 1888: 464; Arnold, 1905: 74). Where, on the other hand, sas is followed by a - and the metre requires contraction, “ist in einer Reihe von Fällen sā - überliefert […], in einigen andern so a - oder so mit dem Abhinihita Sandhi” (Oldenberg, 1888: 464; cf. Arnold, 1897: 292). Oldenberg is of the opinion that all these cases originally had sā-.¹³ Apparently Pānini defends here quite generally an older reading which survived but in a number of cases. Moreover, Pānini’s concern for metre contrasts with the unconcern in this respect found in the Ṛgveda Prātisākhya; see Oldenberg, 1888: 372-73n; Müller, 1891: lxxix f.

(ii) P. 6.1.115: nāntahpādam avyapare ¹⁴ [saṃhitāyām (72), ekah pūrvaparayoh (84), pūrvah (107), eñah padāntād ati (109)] “In a Saṃhitā [text], when e or o which are final in a word precede, [and] when a which is not [itself] followed by v or y follows, [then] the preceding [sound is] not the single [substitute] of both the preceding and the following [sound], when [these sounds occur] in the interior of a Pāda.”

P. 6.1.116: avyādavadyādavakramuravratāyamavantvavasyusu ca [samhitäyām (72), ekah pūrvaparayoh (84), pūrvah (107), enah padāntād ati (109), näntahpädam (115)] “In a Saṃhitā [text], when e or o which are final in a word precede, [and] when a follows which is [the initial sound] in [one of the following words:] avyāt, avadyāt, avakramuh, avrata, ayam, avantu, avasyu, [then] the preceding [sound is] not the single [substitute] of both the preceding and the following [sound], when [these sounds occur] in the interior of a Pāda.”

P. 6.1.116 is not always in agreement with the facts of our Ṛgveda. There are at least two places where ayam has been joined with a preceding -e or -o, viz. RV 1.108.6 vṛnāno ‘yam and RV 5.30.3 vahate ‘yam. Nowhere does ayam behave in the prescribed manner. Avasyu is joined with a preceding -o in RV 8.21.1 bharanto ‘vasyavah. And avantu is always joined with a preceding -e or -o (RVePrā 2.40(144); Böhtlingk, 1887: 298). The precise prescription contained in P. 6.1.116 makes it very difficult to believe, with Thieme (1935: 51), that this rule does “not imply strict application”.

A glance at the metrically restored text of the Ṛgveda (van Nooten & Holland, 1994) shows that there is indeed no need to accept Thieme’s belief. We there find that P. 6.1.116 is in almost complete agreement with the original form of that text. We find there RV 1.108.6 vṛnāno ayam and RV 8.21.1 bharanto avasyavah, contrary to the preserved text. Avantu is here never joined with preceding -e or -o (RV 6.52.4: dhruvāso avantu; 4.33.3, 5.41.11, 10.15.1, 10.77.8: no avantu; 7.36.7: vājino avantu; 10.15.5: te avantu). The one occurrence of avadyāt after -e or -o is RV 4.4.15, which has mitramaho avadyāt, both in the preserved and in the metrically restored text; the one instance of avakramuh after -e or -o is RV 7.32.27 mäs̃ivāso avakramuh, again in both texts; avrata follows -e or -o at RV 6.14.3 (sīkṣanto avratam) and 9.73.5 (samdahanto avratān), both times without single substitute in both versions of the text. Avasyu never joins preceding -e or -o : To RV 8.21.1 we can now add RV 3.42.9 (kuśikāso avasyavah) and 7.32.17 (pārthivo avasyur). Acyyāt does not occur in the Ṛgveda; this is not problematic, for there is no reason to think that P. 6.1.116 applies only to that text. The only exception to P. 6.1.116 in the metrically restored text of the Ṛgveda appears to be RV 5.30.3 vahate ‘yam.

We will see below that there is reason to believe that sūtras 6.1.115 and 116 were forerunners of certain sūtras from the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. Like the latter, but presumably on a larger scale, they did imply strict application.

(iii) Pānini appears to consider the sandhi form -ay+a- for -as+acorrect, which agrees with the original Ṛgveda, but not with the Ṛgveda known to us. This has been explained above.

It must still be shown that the sūtras 6.1.134 and 6.1.115-116 really are about the Veda. In the case of P. 6.1.134 there can be no doubt. The preceding rule contains the word chandasi “in Sacred Literature”. The Kāśikā illustrates the rule with the help of the two examples from the Ṛgveda which were reproduced above (and adds that some think that the rule is not confined to Vedic verse alone: pādagrahanenātra ślokapādasyāpi grahanam kecit icchanti; this would justify a verse subsequently quoted in the Kāśikā). Indeed, wherever the word pāda is used in the Aṣtādhyāyī to specify a context (as it does in P. 6.1.134 and P. 6.1.115), it appears to refer to feet of Vedic verse. The remaining places are: P. 3.2.66 (havye ‘nantahpādam): here chandasi is understood from rule 63; P. 8.3.9 (dirghād aṭi samānapāde): rkṣu is understood from the preceding rule; P. 6.1.115 (nāntahpādam avyapare) and 8.3.103 (yusmattattataksuhsv antahpādam): here yajusi “in a sacrificial formula in prose” occurs in a following rule (P. 6.1.117 and 8.3.104 respectively), suggesting that the verse-feet (pāda) talked about in the earlier rules likewise belong to sacrificial formulas, and therefore to Vedic verse; P. 8.1.6 (prasamupodah pādapūraṇe), finally, deals with a phenomenon which is only found in Vedic verse (see the Kāśikā on this rule).

P. 8.3.17, which justifies the sandhi form -ay+a-for -as+a-, occurs in the company of P. 8.3.18 and 19, which mention Śākaṭāyana and Śākalya respectively (see above). These two authorities are mentioned in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, and their opinions may be considered to apply also to the Ṛgveda, if not primarily to that work. It is therefore safe to say the same of P. 8.3.17.

The above strongly suggests that Pānini worked with a version of the Ṛgveda which is earlier than the versions described in the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. A possible objection would be that Pānini’s version is not earlier, but quite simply different from the ones of the Prātiśākhya. And indeed, we have no guarantee that the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya describes all the versions of the Ṛgveda which existed in its time. The fact that we obtain opinions of the authorities mentioned in the Prātiśākhya from sources other than the Prātiśākhya shows that the information provided by the Prātiśākhya is in no way complete.

There is, nonetheless, reason to think that Pānini did not draw upon an altogether different version of the Ṛgveda. To begin with, Pānini mentions Śākalya on four occasions (see above) and also knows of the Śākalas, or so it seems (P. 4.3.128). Perhaps more important, his rules 6.1.115-116 (discussed above) appear to be an earlier version of some rules of the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. ¹⁵ This will now be shown. P. 6.1.115-116 specify the circumstances in which e and o retain their original form before a. The Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya adopts the opposite procedure: it specifies the circumstances when e and o merge with a. In spite of this difference, there is a remarkable similarity.

RVePrā 2.35(139) reads: antahpādam akārāc cet samhitäyām laghor laghu yakārādy aksaram param vakārādy api vā bhavet “In the interior of a Pāda, if, in the Saṃhitā [text], a light syllable beginning with y or even v follows a light vowel a, [this a becomes one with the preceding e or o ]”. This means the same as P. 6.1.115, and more. In addition it contains a restriction on that rule. According to P. 6.1.115, e and o merge with a following a, when that a is followed by v or y. According to RVePrā 2.35(139), e and o merge with a following a, when that a is followed by v or y, and is a light vowel, and when moreover the syllable beginning with v or y is light.

The advantage of the formulation in the Prātiśākhya is clear. Of the seven exceptions which Pānini had to enumerate in rule P. 6.1.116, six are excluded by the added restriction of the Prātiśākhya. But a price had to be paid. Twenty exceptions are enumerated in the immediately following sūtras of the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. ¹⁶ This means that the complicated qualification which we find in RVePrā 2.35(139) does not in any way simplify the description of the sub-ject-matter. The formulation of the Prātiśākhya can most easily be accounted for by taking it as an attempted (but in the end not very successful) improvement upon an earlier formulation, the one found in the Aṣṭādhyāyī or one closely similar to it.

I shall now enumerate a few more circumstances which fit the conclusion that Pānini preceded the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya and made use of an earlier version of the Ṛgveda.

Pānini’s grammar does not know the retroflex consonant ḻ. ¹⁷ Our Ṛgveda contains this sound, but we know that not all versions had it (Bronkhorst, 1982). The introduction of ḻ was “doubtless a dialectical anticipation of the more general identical process in MidIA” (Allen, 1962: 54) and may have taken place rather late. This is supported by the fact that ḻ occupies the place of ḍ where our Ṛgveda would otherwise have had ḍ between two vowels, not where the original Ṛgveda would otherwise have had ḍ between two vowels (Wackernagel, 1896: 25556). E.g., vidv-aiga was originally pronounced vidut-aiga, but contains nonetheless no ḻ. One way of explaining the absence of ḻ in the Aṣṭādhyāyī is that Pānini lived before this sound made its appearance in the Veda, and therefore before the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya. ¹⁸ (If Pānini lived after the sound ḻ had found entrance into the Śākala version of the Ṛgveda, it would be hard to account for the absence of ḻ from the Aṣṭādhyāyī by saying that this sound was not used in the language of the region where Pānini lived (Lüders, 1923: 30102). Pānini knew the Śākalas (see above) and therefore probably also the peculiarities of their version of the Ṛgveda. If these peculiarities included ḻ in Pānini’s time, this sound would, and should, have been mentioned in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, irrespective of the presence or absence of the sound in Pānini’s own dialect.)

¹⁷ Cardona’s (1999: 238-239) following remark is unintelligible to me: “Assuming that Pānini acknowledged Śākalya’s padapātha [with intervocalic ḻ, JB] and also knew of the Rgvedaprātiśākhya, the fact that he does not have a special rule providing for intervocalic -ḍ - and -ḍh - to be replaced by ḻ - and ḻh - is understandable […]” ¹⁸ That the Padapāṭha contains ḻ may be explained by the process of sākalization, which also affected the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya (Bronkhorst, 1982).

Vowels with the svarita accent are described as follows in the Aṣtādhyāyī:

P. 1.2.31: samāhārah svaritah [ac (27)] “A vowel which is a mixture [of an udätta and an anudätta vowel] is svarita.”

P. 1.2.32: tasyādita udāttam ardhahrasvam “Of that [svarita vowel] half [the length of] a short [vowel, starting] from the beginning, is udätta.”

There has been some discussion as to why this description is included in the Aṣtādhyāyī (Thieme, 1957; Cardona, 1968), but this does not concern us here. We note the difference from the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, ¹⁹ which has the following sūtras:

RVePrā 3.4(189-90): tasyodāttatarodāttād ardhamātrārdham eva vā “Of that [svarita accent ²⁰ ] half a mātrā or even half [of the svarita accent] is higher than the udätta [accent].”

RVePrā 3.5(191): anudāttaḥ parah śeṣah sa udāttasrutiḥ “The following remainder [of the svarita accent] is anudātta; it sounds like udātta.”

RVePrā 3.6(192) further specifies that this description is not valid when a syllable follows which has an udātta or svarita accent. The commentator Uvaṭa explains that in such cases the latter part of the svarita accent becomes really udātta (p. 114: yadi tūdāttam svaritam vā param syāt tadānudāttaḥ parah śeṣah syāt). The Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya clearly describes a circumflex accent that is more “developed” than the one described in the Aṣtādhyāyī. This “development” may be due to the tradition of recitation without understanding which has preserved Vedic texts from a certain time onward. The implication is, once again, that the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya is of later date than the Aṣtādhyāyī. ²¹

The argumentation in this appendix is cumulative: the separate arguments separately support the conclusions. The force of the arguments taken separately may vary, but this does not mean that the general conclusions would have to be given up if one or more of the arguments were to be shown to be invalid. Cardona (1999: 235 ff .) does not seem to have realized this, for his criticism of the arguments presented above concentrates almost exclusively on the “unorthodox interpretation of some rules of the Aṣtādhyāyī” presented in point (iii), above. In spite of this, he concludes that the “claims concerning the relative chronology of Pānini and the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya and about the Ṛgveda text known to Pānini remain unsubstantiated” (p. 239-240). It is difficult to understand this. There may be difference of appreciation of the strength of the particular argument he criticizes, but there are others: among them the remarkable similarities between a straight application of certain rules of Pānini and the original form of the Ṛgveda as reconstructed by modern scholars. These remain untouched in Cardona’s criticism, even though they might by themselves be considered sufficient to justify the conclusions reached.

APPENDIX V - VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO PATAÑJALI

Many ‘quotations’ in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya occur in pairs which resemble each other closely. Are both of them quotations? The impression is rather created that in many of these cases an unusual form is cited in a Vedic quotation, which is then followed by the same phrase containing the more usual form. While the first phrase can in most cases be found in the Veda, the second one cannot. The Bhāṣya under P. 5.4.30 vt. 5, for example, contains a long list of such pairs; the first half contains a word with a redundant (svārthe) suffix, the second half has the word without that suffix. One such pair is janyaṃ tābhih sajanyaṃ tābhih / janaṃ tābhih sajanaṃ tābhih /. The first half can be traced to JaimBr 2.182; the second half cannot be traced in the Veda. In the same way we can explain the pairs sva okye (RV 1.91.13 etc.) besides sva oke (not traced); niṣkevalyam (MaitS 2.8.9 etc.) besides niṣkevalam (untraced); stomam janayāmi navyam ¹ (RV 1.109.2 etc.) besides stomam janayāmi navam (untraced); pra no navyebhih (TaitBr 3.6.9.1) besides pra no navaih (untraced); sa pra pūryyah (RV 6.14.1 etc.) besides sa pra pūrvah (untraced); agnim vah pūryyam (RV 8.23.7 etc.) besides agnim vah pūrvam (untraced); tam jusasva yavisthya (RV 3.28.2) besides tam jusasva yavistha (untraced); hotravāham yaviṣthyam (RV 5.26.7 etc.) besides hotravāham yaviṣtham (untraced); samāvad vasati (MaitS 2.2.7 etc.) besides samam vasati (untraced); samāvad vīryāni karoti (TaitS 3.2.2.1) besides samāni vīryāni karoti (untraced). The position that in cases like these the second half of the pair is no more than an explanation of the first half finds especially strong support in the pair āmusyāyaṇasya (AVŚ 10.5.36 etc.) besides amusya putrasya. Also elsewhere in the Mahābhāṣya pairs occur which support this view. An example is saṃbhṛtyā eva saṃbhārāh (MaitS 1.7.2 etc.) besides saṃbhāryā eva saṃbhārāh (untraced) under P. 3.1.112 vt. 4; here the second phrase is a paraphrase of the first one using the other permitted form. The following case is similar: yo jāgāra tam rcah kāmayante (RV 5.44.14) besides yo jajāgāra tam rcah kāmayante (untraced), under P. 6.1.8 vt. 1. The passage where the second ‘quotations’ are most obviously meant as an explanation of a Vedic peculiarity in the first occurs twice over in the Mahābhāṣya, once under P. 6.1.9 vt. 4 and again under P. 8.2.25 vt. 3. The pairs here illustrate the irregular elision of individual sounds in the Veda. The examples include tubhyedam agne (RV 5.11.5 etc.) which would be tubhyam idam agne if the normal rules of grammar had been followed (iti prāpte); ämbānāṃ caruh (KāṭhS 15.5 etc.) which would be nāmbānāṃ caruh; āvyādhinīr uganā̄h (AVP 1.42.1 etc.) which would have been āvyādhinīh suganāh.

This last passage contains a further pair of examples which, this time, can both be traced to Vedic texts. The Mahābhāṣya reads (III p. 14 1. 8-9): iskartāram adhvarasya / niṣkartāram adhvarasyeti prāpte /. The first half occurs RV 10.140 .5 and elsewhere; the second half KāṭhS 16.14 and elsewhere (see Rau 22). Yet it is clear that here too the second half is Patañjali’s explanation of the first. Rau realizes this, for he does not list the second half as a Vedic quotation; he merely mentions it under the first half. We must conclude that it is only coincidence that niṣkartāram adhvarasya also occurs in the Veda, a coincidence that may find its explanation in the fact that the compilers of the Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā etc., like Patañjali, ‘corrected’ the text. In certain other cases, too, the second member of a pair of ‘quotations’ can be traced in Vedic literature; and here too this may have to be looked upon as coincidental. From among the list under P. 5.4 .30 vt .5 the following examples are of this type: apasyo vasānāh (MaitS 2.6.8 etc.) is followed by apo vasānāh (RV 1.164.47 etc.); kṣemyasyeśe (TaitS 5.2.1.7) by kṣemasyeśe (KāṭhS 19.12)2; ukthyam by uktham (both common in Vedic literature); pūrvyāsah (RV 1.35.11 etc.) by pūrvāsah (RV 9.77.3 etc.). P. 7.3.109 vt. 2, similarly, enumerates a number of Vedic irregularities, to which the Bhāṣya adds their regular forms. All these regular forms are attested in Vedic texts, but this is irrelevant. To ambe (KāṭhS 5.4.8 etc.) corresponds amba (frequent in Vedic texts); to darvi (KapS 8.8 etc.) corresponds darve (AVŚ 3.10.7 etc.); to satakratvah (RV 10.97.2 etc.) satakratavah (AVP 11.6.2 etc.); to paśve (RV 1.43.2 etc.) paśave (RV 3.62.14 etc.); to kikidīvyā (AVP 11.2.14 etc.) kikidīvinā (RV 10.97.13 etc.). Some of the non-quotations are presented as ‘hapax legomena’. This is true of kṣemasyeśe (KāṭhS 19.12).

Let us now consider the last pair occurring in the list under P. 6.1.9 vt. 4, repeated under P. 8.2.25 vt. 3. The Vedic form is here śivā udrasya bhesajī, which is explained (iti prāpte) as śivā rudrasya bhesajī. This is mysterious because the ‘Vedic form’, i.e. the first half, cannot be traced in the Veda, while its ‘explanation’ can; śivā rudrasya bhesajī occurs TaitS 4.5.10.1. No close parallels exist in Vedic literature. ³ The most plausible explanation is therefore that Patañjali knew the formula as it occurs in the TaitS in the form śivā udrasya bhesajī. This would mean that the change to śivā rudrasya bhesajī in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā did not take place until after Patañjali, or at any rate was not yet known to him. The final redaction of the Taittirīya Saṃhitā did not, in this view, take place until very late, much later than is commonly believed. This in its turn is of course only possible if we assume that the Padapāṭha on the Taittirīya Saṃhitā did not come into existence, or did not gain general currency, until after Patañjali. The peculiarities of the Taittirīya corpus-Saṃhitā, Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka-where brāhmaṇa portions and mantra portions are distributed in a rather haphazard manner, support the view that the final redaction of these texts did not take place until late. ⁴ Rau too (p. 103) wonders whether the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka may have changed after Patañjali, saying: “[es] erstaunt […], das wahrhaftig verlotterte Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka so oft zitiert zu finden. Könnte es erst nach dem 2. Jhr. v. Chr. bis zu seiner jetzigen Gestalt verwahrlost sein?”

The question in how far the reading of all the Vedic texts known to Patañjali had already been fixed in all details arises again in connection with the quotation sūryam te dyāvāpṛthivīmantam in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 8.2.15. In this form the phrase cannot be traced, but with -prthivīvantam it occurs AVŚ 19.18 .5 and AVP 7.17.5. It is unlikely that Patañjali made a mistake in quoting, for the issue of m or v is discussed in that very context. Exactly the same applies to viśvakarmānam te saptarṣimantam, which occurs with -vantam AVŚ 19.18.7 and AVP 7.17.7. Again, a plausible explanation is that the Atharvaveda in both its versions was not finally redacted until late. Rau fails to draw conclusions of this type, yet he proposes, justifiably, the reading ātmann eva nir mimīsva for AVP 5.11.8 on the basis of the quotation in the Mahābhāṣya ātmana eva nirmimīsva, rejecting the surviving Paippalāda reading (p. 18). Moreover, he does not hesitate (p. 54) to propose an emended reading mādbhis tva candro vṛtrahā for AVŚ 19.27.2 and AVP 10.7.2, drawing inspiration from the quotation in the Mahābhāṣya.

The quotation lohite carman, which cannot but correspond to KāṭhS 24.2 rohite carman, is further evidence in support of the incompleted orthoepy of Vedic texts in the days of the Mahābhāṣya. The emphatic assertion that only gosanim is correct, not gosanim which yet occurs RV 6.53.10 (the Padapāṭha has, of course, go’sanim) suggests that even details of the Ṛgveda had not yet been definitely fixed. This is further supported by Patañjali’s quotation of mamahāna, which can only be traced to the Padapāṭha of the Ṛgveda (1.117.17); the Saṃhitāpāṭha has māmahāna. Also the quotation mahāṃ hi sah instead of … ṣah (RV 8.13.1) may have to be explained in this way.

Once we admit the possibility that not all the Vedic texts were fixed at the time of the Mahābhāṣya, the question arises how to interpret the pairs of ‘quotations’ which differ but slightly in points of orthoepy. Is it possible that Patañjali at least in some cases had no preference as to what was the correct reading in a particular text? He states, for example, that the ḻ of kalmasa optionally becomes r in a saṃjñā and in the Veda. ⁵ Kalmasaṃ occurs AVP 19.26.15 and KāṭhS 19.1; karmaşam is untraced. In a similar manner aharpatih (MaitS, VājS, ŚPaBr) is quoted besides ahahpatih (untraced), yajvarīr iṣah (RV, KauṣBr, AitĀr) besides yajvanīr iṣah (untraced), etc. Do we have to assume that Patañjali knew Vedic texts, lost to us, which contained the forms karmaşam, ahahpatih, yajvanīr iṣah etc.? I think the conclusion must rather be that he considered both the members of the pairs, i.e. kalmasam and karmaşam etc., correct in all, or most Vedic texts in which they occurred. The same must then be true of the pair pāmsuram and pāmsulam. As it is, pāmsuram occurs in a number of texts: RV, AV, MaitS, KāṭhS, TaitS, VājS and ŚPaBr; pāmsulam only in the Sāmaveda. But then pāmsulam can no longer be considered a hapax legomenon quoted from the Sāmaveda. Of the pair subāhuh svangulih / subāhuh svangurih the former occurs only AVP 20.10.11 (!), the latter in RV, AVŚ and KāṭhS; yet again subāhuh svangulih may not be a quoted hapax legomenon. The same may be said about the following ‘hapax legomena’; aśvavārah, even though it occurs but once in the Veda (MaitS 3.7.9), unlike aśvavālah; tanuvam pusema (TaitS 4.7.14.1) besides more frequent tanvam pusema; yamim (TaitS 2.1.9.4) besides more common yamyam; śamyam (MaitS 1.10.12) besides more general śamīm; puroḍ̄̄̄ya (KāṭhS 32.7) besides puroḍāśya which occurs twice in the MaitS. Under P. 4.1.32 vt. 1 Patañjali states that in Vedic optionally n(uk) is added, and gives the following pair as example: sāntarvatī devān upait / sāntarvatnī devān upait /. If we correct the first half, as suggested by Rau, into sāntarvatī devān punah parait, it can be traced to KāṭhS 8.10. We may then however have to face the fact that for Patañjali this could also be read as sāntarvatnī devān punah parait.

APPENDIX VI - BRAHMINS IN THE BUDDHIST CANON

Some of the sermons in the Buddhist canon that deal specifically with matters related to Brahmins and their position in society contain indications that suggest that they may have been composed at a relatively late date. Among the sermons of this kind the following may be mentioned in particular: the Assalāyana Sutta, the Madhura Sutta, ¹ the Aggañña Sutta, ² the Vāseṭṭha Sutta, ³ the Tevijja Sutta, ⁴ and the Ambaṭṭha Sutta.

The Assalāyana Sutta reports a discussion which the Buddha is supposed to have held with a Brahmin, Assalāyana (Skt. Āśvalāyana), who is convinced of his superior status. In his reply the Buddha points out that among the Yonas and the Kambojas there are only two classes (vanya / Skt. varna), masters and slaves, and that masters become slaves and slaves masters. ⁵ This reply occurs both in the Pāli and in the Chinese version of the Sūtra. ⁶ Here, then, we find an awareness of social customs in a region far removed from the Buddhist home land. Moreover, there can be no doubt that this reference to the Greeks (yona) indicates that this passage was composed after the time of Alexander of Macedonia. Alexander left Greek settlers in Bactria and north-western India. These settlers managed to keep Greek kingdoms going in these areas until the latter half of the second century BCE, when they were defeated.

The Madhura Sutta, by its own testimony, dates from after the Buddha’s death and is said to have been pronounced by Kaccāna/ Kātyāyana. The Aggañña, Vāseṭṭha, and Tevijja Suttas have the Buddha discuss with the same interlocutors each time, viz. Vāsiṣṭha and Bhāradvāja. This couple only appears in these three suttas in the Pāli canon. ⁷ The Tevijja Sutta, moreover, is the only one that is aware of a distinction between four kinds of Brahmins-viz., addhariyā brāhmaṇā, tittiriyā brāhmaṇā, chandokā brāhmaṇā, bahvārijjhā brāhmaṇa ⁸ - that are unknown elsewhere in the Sutta-pittaka. The Aggañña Sutta is the only one that uses the compound dhammakāya (as an adjective; Skt. dharmakāya), a term that was to become important in more recent developments of Buddhism. ⁹ Further, Collins has pointed out that this Sutta is “permeated by references to the Monastic Code, the Vinaya” (1993: 302; further pp. 326 ff.), another possible indication of its late date.

The Ambatṭha Sutta is most interesting for our purposes. This account of a discussion between Ambatṭha the Brahmin and the Buddha has been preserved, wholly or in part, in Pali, Chinese, Tibetan and Sanskrit. In all versions Ambatṭha’s pride is deflated by the Buddha, who points out that he is not of pure Brahmanical descent but rather a descendant of a union of a male ancestor with a female slave. ¹⁰ The Sanskrit form of the name Ambatṭha, in the one remaining relevant source (Hartmann, 1989: 63), is Ambāṣta. This is not, however, the only sanskritization possible. Equally possible, and more likely, is Ambaṣtha, ¹¹ a term well known in Sanskrit, and one which casts a different light on the discussion between Ambatṭha and the Buddha. In Brahmanical legal texts Ambaṣtha is the name reserved for descendants of a Brahmin father and a mother who is not a Brahmin, usually a Vaiśya. An example is the Mānava Dharma Śāstra: ¹² “From a Brahmin man by a Vaiśya girl is born a son called Ambaṣtha”, and again, ¹³ “As when there is a difference of two classes in a birth, tradition calls them Ambaṣtha and Ugra if the difference is in the direct order, in like manner they are Kṣatṛ and Vaideha, if it is in the inverse order.” According to the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, “sons born from wives two or three classes below the husband are Ambașṭhas, Ugras, and Niṣādas”, ¹⁴ and “a Brahmin fathers a Brahmin from a Kṣatriya wife, an Ambaṣṭha from a Vaiśya wife, and a Niṣāda from a Śūdra wife”. ¹⁵ Similar statements are found in the Gautama Dharma Sūtra (4.16), the Vāsiṣṭha Dharma Sūtra (18.8), ¹⁶ in the Artha Śāstra (3.7.21), ¹⁷ and in various other texts. ¹⁸ All of these passages have one theme in common: the Ambasthas were thought of as descendants of a mixed marriage in which the father belonged to a higher class (varna) than the mother, the father most typically being a Brahmin, the mother a Vaiśyā. This is precisely the truth that Ambatṭha has to swallow in the Buddhist story, with the difference that the only specification we have about his female ancestor is that she was a dāsi, a servant or slave girl. This cannot, of course, be a coincidence, and it allows us to draw a number of conclusions. First of all, there can be no doubt that the sanskritization Ambaṣṭha is correct, Ambāṣta incorrect. The author of this story chose the name Ambatṭha/Ambaṣṭha, because he knew that someone of that name was of mixed descent. Moreover, cultivated early listeners to the story would know, right from the beginning, that Ambatṭha was not what he claimed to be, viz., a pure-blooded Brahmin. They would therefore know immediately that he was an empty boaster.

However, we know more about the Ambasthas. Ambasṭha, we read in Monier Williams’ dictionary, is the name of a country and its inhabitants, as well as the name of the king of that country. The Mahābhārata is among the earliest sources that use the word in this sense. It enumerates the Ambasthas among the western people conquered by Nakula (Mhbh 2.29.6 & 19). ¹⁹ This may be the only passage in early literature which explicitly situates the Ambasthas in the west, yet there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this localization. The Vedic corpus never mentions the Ambasthas, according to Vishva Bandhu’s Vedic Word Concordance.

Many of the names of mixed castes enumerated in the early legal treatises are also names of inhabitants of certain geographical regions. Obvious examples are the Māgadhas, the Vaidehas, the Dravidas and others. The fact that the Ambasthas are presented as both descendants of certain mixed alliances and as inhabitants of western India is not therefore surprising. It is more surprising that the author or inventor of this Buddhist story had heard of the Ambasthas. The Ambasthas, after all, lived far to the west of the area where the Buddha had taught. Once again we are led to think that the story of Ambattha is late, as is the sermon of which it is an essential part.

APPENDIX VII - BRAHMANISM IN GANDHĀRA AND SURROUNDING AREAS

In the Introduction we studied a passage in which the grammarian Patañjali indicated that the land of the Āryas extended westward to the point he called ādarśa. He was followed in this by the authors of some Dharma Sūtras. We also saw that Manu, when enumerating the limits of his Madhyadeśa some centuries later, called what is apparently the same place vinaśana. In both cases the translation “place where the Sarasvatī disappears” appears justified. Indeed, the Mahābhārata states this about vinaśana in so many words (yatra naṣtā sarasvatī). ¹ The Sarasvatī disappears in the Thar desert, near what is now the border between India and Pakistan. It follows that Patañjali looked upon the lands west of that point, i.e., by and large the Indus valley and all that is beyond it, as non-Brahmanical territory. He confirms this by giving two examples of people who live beyond this limit, viz., the Sakas and the Yavanas. ²

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (9.3.1.24) already expresses itself in negative terms about the inhabitants of the domain of the seven rivers that flow westwards, i.e., the Punjab. ³ The Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, in its turn, enumerates the names of several tribes which a Brahmin should not visit, among them the Āraṭtas and the Gāndhāras in the north-west. ⁴ Another passage from this same Śrauta Sūtra (18.44) confirms the separate status of Gandhāra and of the land of theā / Aratṭtas. Witzel (1989: 235) translates it as follows: “Ayu went eastward. His (people) are the Kuru-Pañcāla and the Kāsī-Videha. This is the Āyava migration. (His other people) stayed at home in the West. His people are the Gāndhāri, Parśu and Aratṭa. This is the Amāvasava (group).” Cardona and Jain (2003: 33 sq.) do not accept this translation, and propose the following improvement: “Āyu went eastward. Of him there are these: the Kuru-Pañcālas, the Kāsi-Videhas. This is the going forth of Āyu. Amāvasu (went) westward. Of him there are these: the Gāndhāris, the Sparśa, and the Arātṭtas. This is the (going forth) of Amāvasu.” The precise area of the Āratṭtas remains unknown, that of the Gāndhāras on the other hand is clearly Gandhāra, a region which was therefore situated outside the domain of the orthodox Brahmins. ⁵ The two passages from the Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra clearly show that these areas were outside the heartland of Vedic Brahmanism.

In the middle of the third century BCE, it was Mazdaism, rather than Brahmanism, which predominated in the region between Kandahar and Taxila, according to Émile Benveniste (1958: 4), who bases this conclusion on his analysis of two inscriptions in Aramaic. ⁶ It may also be significant in this context that the Assalāyana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN II p. 149) states that the system of the four varnas does not exist among the Yona (= Greeks) and Kambojas. ⁷

One of Aśoka’s inscriptions observes that the two classes of Brahmins and Śramanas do not exist among the Yonas: “There is no country where these (two) classes, (viz.) the Brāhmanas and the Śramanas, do not exist, except among the Yōnas.” ⁸ (Karttunen (2003: 299) concludes that the Assalāyana Sutta and this Aśokan passage may be “more or less contemporary”.) The Mahābhārata describes the inhabitants of Gandhāra as being beyond the system of varnas, as being fishermen. ⁹ All this indicates that the Brahmanical order of society was not current in these areas. Understandably, the Brahmins considered the Greeks a threat to the order of their society, a fear which finds expression in the Yuga Purāṇa: “Then, having approached Sāketa together with the Pañcālas and Māthuras, the Yavanas - valiant in battle - will reach Kusumadhvaja [Pāṭaliputra]. […] There will be the vilest men, dishonorable and unrighteous. At the end of the Yuga, Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras will be similar in dress, and of similar conduct-there is no doubt. […] Śūdras will also be utterers of bhoh, and Brahmins will be utterers of ārya.¹⁰ Mārkaṇdeya’s discourse in the third book of the Mahābhārata expresses similar fears: “Brahmins do the work of Śūdras, as the yuga expires, Śūdras become gatherers of wealth or practice the Law of the baronage. […] Many barbarian kings, O overlord of men, will rule the earth with false policies, being given to evil and lies. Āndhras, Scythians, Pulindas, Greeks, Kāmbojas, Aurṇikas, Śūdras, and Ābhīras will be kings then, best of men. Not a Brahmin then lives by his own Law, and likewise the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas work at the wrong tasks, O king. […] The Śūdras will say bhoh, and the Brahmins will say ārya.” ¹¹ And again: “No Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, or Vaiśyas will be left, overlord of men: the world will all be one class (ekavarna) at the end of the yuga.” ¹² The same fear also finds expression in some Purāṇic passages. ¹³

It appears the spread of Vedic Brahmanism, already before Patañjali, took place primarily in eastern and southern directions, roughly starting from his Āryāvarta. ¹⁴ This impression is strengthened by recent research on Vedic schools. ¹⁵ These schools migrated toward the east and the south, even the north (Kashmir, ¹⁶ Nepal), but apparently never returned to the north-west. ¹⁷ Several lateVedic texts know Gandhāra as a border region or a remote country, but no Vedic school is situated in it. ¹⁸ Regions west of the domain of the Vedic Brahmins are inhabited by the despised Bāhīkas, lit. “outsiders”. ¹⁹ This term bāhīka, incidentally, is often confused with bāhīka or bādhīka, ²⁰ designating the inhabitants of Bactria.

The history of art confirms the non-Brahmanical nature of Gandhāra. After an analysis of various objects, Mario Bussagli (1984/ 1996: 457) concludes: “Tout ceci nous parle d’une pensée religieuse en ébullition qui se développe en termes plus iraniens qu’indiens et qui […] confère des notations, que je définirais comme irano-centrasiatiques, à la religion intégrée par le langage gandharien, qu’elle soit bouddhique, sivaïte ou autre.”

Western accounts clearly distinguish between the regions to the east, and those to the west of the Indus. Arrian’s Indica contains the following remark (in the translation of Wirth and Hinüber): “Das Gebiet vom Indus nach Osten will ich das Land der Inder nennen, und seine Bewohner sollen Inder heissen.” With regard to the people who live west of the Indus, its states: “Das Gebiet diesseits, im Westen des Flusses Indus bis hin zum Fluss Kophen, bewohnen die Astakener und die Assakener, zwei indische Völker. Sie sind jedoch nicht gross an Wuchs, wie die jenseits des Indus wohnenden, und auch nicht so mutig und so dunkelhäutig wie die meisten Inder.” ²¹ Arrian’s descriptions of the Indian classes, among them the class of sages, whose sole obligation is to offer sacrifices to the gods in the name of the community (Charvet, 2002: 49), only concern the regions east of the Indus, not Gandhāra, and certainly not Bactria. ²²

The Chinese pilgrim Song Yun says about Gandhāra (as cited in Witzel, 1994: 251): “all the inhabitants are Brahmins who respect Buddhist teaching and enjoy reading sūtras”. In spite of the obvious confusion of categories, this observation confirms that the inhabitants of Gandhāra followed Buddhism rather than Brahmanism. ²³

For a more recent period, attention can here be drawn to Kalhaṇa’s Rājatarañgiịī (I. 307), which characterizes the Brahmins of Gandhāra (gāndhārahrāhmaṇa) as being the lowest of the twice-born (dvijādhama). ²⁴

This is not the place to explore the reasons why Brahmanism was only weakly present (if at all) in the very region where its most holy texts had been composed. The fact that this region was politically part of the Achaemenid empire for several centuries, ²⁵ followed by Greek and then “barbarian” domination which lasted until the fourth century CE, may have played a role. ²⁶ It is also interesting to note that the archaeologist Jonathan Mark Kenoyer argues for a presence of indigenous elements in the Indus valley, until after the Mauryas, elements that are independent of both the Achaemenids in the west and the Gangetic basin in the east. ²⁷

APPENDIX VIII - CĀRVĀKAS AND THE ŚĀBARABHĀṢYA

Śabara’s Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra contains a long inserted passage that is commonly known under the name Vṛtikāra-grantha and whose unknown author is referred to as Vṛtikāra. It has been edited and studied in exemplary fashion by Erich Frauwallner (1968), to whose observations I have little to add. There is only one point in his comments which needs to be corrected. Frauwallner rightly points out that the Vṛttikāra-grantha itself contains an inserted passage which deals with the existence of the soul. He attributes the authorship of this inserted passage to the Vṛttikāra himself. The passage argues against an opponent who denies the existence of the soul. Frauwallner thinks this opponent is a Buddhist. It is more likely that he is a Cārvāka.

The insertion into the Vṛttikāra-grantha covers 133 lines in Frauwallner’s edition, from p. 501.5 until p. 601.22 . In the beginning the discussion is straightforward. It addresses such questions as whether our experience of happiness, or of desire, which do not belong to the body, oblige us to conclude that there is a soul to which this experience belongs. Also the issue whether the very use and existence of words like “self” (ātman) and “I” (aham) prove the existence of a soul is dealt with. Memory, too, poses difficulties for those who do not accept the existence of an enduring soul.

With regard to memory, the opponent has the following to say (Frauwallner, 1968: 54 1. 17-23):

pūrvavijñānasadṛśam vijñānaṃ pūrvavijñānaviṣayaṃ vā smṛtir ity ucyate / tac ca drastari vinaṣte ‘py aparedyur utpadyamānaṃ nānupapannam, pratyaksāvaagatatvād eva / anyasmin skandhaghane ‘nyena skandhaghanena yaj jñānaṃ, tat tatsantatijena anyenopalabhyate nātatsantatijena. tasmāc chūnyāh skandhaghanā iti. athāsmin arthe brāhmaṇaṃ bhavati: “vijñānaghana ecaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny eva anuvinaṣyati: na pretya samjñāsti” iti.

Consciousness that is similar to earlier consciousness or that has earlier consciousness as its object is called memory. And it is not impossible that that [consciousness called memory] arises even if that which saw on the earlier day has [meanwhile] disappeared, for it is directly experienced. Knowledge by means of one collection of groups (skandhaghana) [consciousness] with regard to another collection of groups [of consciousness] is perceived by means of one [collection of groups of consciousness] that has arisen in the same sequence (santati), not by means of one that has not arisen in the same sequence. For this reason the collections of groups of consciousness are empty (i.e., they are not associated with a continuing entity, viz., the soul). And there is a Brāhmaṇa about this matter: “The collection of consciousness (vijñānaghana), having arisen out of these elements, disappears again into them: there is not awareness after death.”

The terminology of this passage explains why Frauwallner considered the opponent to be a Buddhist. ¹ The terms santati “sequence” and skandha “group” are frequent in Buddhism; the terms kṣanika “momentary” and vijñannaskandha “group of consciousness” that occur in the lines preceding the passage quoted above have a Buddhist flavour, too.

However, terminology does not decide the issue. Most of what is said in the passage here cited is compatible with what a Buddhist might say, except the end. At the end the opponent cites a Brāhmaṇa. This is by itself surprising enough. Why should a Buddhist cite a Brāhmaṇa to support his point of view? The situation gets worse when we consider the content of the cited passage. It states in no uncertain terms that there is no awareness after death. This is not at all a Buddhist position.

The Buddhists were not the only ones in classical India to deny the existence of a soul or self. The Cārvākas, also called Lokāyatas, did the same. ² The Cārvākas, moreover, did not just deny the existence of the soul; they also denied life after death. And to top it all, numerous authorities testify to the fact that the Cārvākas supported their claims with the same quotation which we also find in the passage from the Śābarabhāṣya cited above. This quotation can be identified. It occurs in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2.4.12).

It has been argued in the main body of this book that the Cārvākas, far from being anti-Vedic, were originally a Brahmanical school of thought, but one that denied life after death; they denied “another world” (para loka). In doing so, they became everyone’s enemy: of the Buddhist and Jainas, of course, who composed treatises to prove the existence of “another world”, but also of most Brahmanical schools of thought, which had accepted the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, and therefore in “another world”. Ritual Mīmāṃsā was the only school to drag its feet: Śabara’s Bhāṣya ignores rebirth and karmic retribution altogether. It even avoids issues concerning heaven, presumably a place where sacrificers end up after death, by denying that there is such a place. Kumārila Bhaṭ̣a, a commentator of the Śābarabhāṣya who lived a few centuries later, complains that Mīmāṃsā was on its way to become indistinguishable from Lokāyata; his commentary is meant to remedy that situation.

The Mīmāṃsā of Śabara’s Bhāṣya, then, is not interested in the philosophical and religious developments that had taken place among other thinkers, be they Brahmanical, Buddhist, or Jaina. There is one exception to this: the Cārvākas. The Cārvākas, it appears, were so close to the Mīmāṃsakas that their position could not be ignored. In Śabara’s Bhāṣya, characteristically, the Cārvāka position according to which there is no “other world” does not receive much attention. The reason, as we have seen, is that this text itself avoids the issue to the extent possible. The other Cārvāka position however, according to which there is no enduring self, receives a full discussion, in the passage of the Vrttikāra-grantha under consideration. A closer look at its contents tells us something more about Cārvāka thought.

The Cārvākas, we learn (p. 52 1. 8-16; p. 56 1. 1 ff.), refused to draw ontological conclusions from verbal usage. The statement “he knows” (jänäti) is no proof for them that there must be something that corresponds to the word “he”, namely a soul. The word “I” (aham) in a statement like “I saw this before” fares no better. Even the existence of the word “self” (ätman) is no proof that such a thing exists. Particularly intriguing is their statement: “There are many people in this world who directly use the word [viz., ätman] that gives expression to the existence of a self (ätman), saying ‘there is a self, there is a self’, and who yet do not succeed in accepting the existence of a self.” (bahavaḥ khalv iha janā ‘asty ātmā, asty ātmā’ ity ātmasattāvādina eva śabdasya pratyakṣavaktāro bhavanti, tathāpi nātmasattām kalpayitum ghatante). All this is very interesting, for verbal usage is often considered in Brahmanical thought a valuable and valid clue as to what there is in this world. In Buddhist thought it corresponds to “conventional truth” (samvrtisatya). Since the Cārvākas are not known to have accepted anything like a “conventional truth”, one wonders whether they completely rejected all links between language and reality. If so, their position in the history of Indian philosophy would be quite extraordinary.

It is also clear from the discussion how the Cārvākas defended themselves against the various arguments trying to prove that there has to be a self, that without a self there could be no happiness, no desire, no memory. They first observe that they perceive no self different from these mental phenomena (p. 50 1. 14) and do not accept the necessity to postulate one. Indeed, whatever reasons one might give to show that these mental phenomena cannot occur, we know from experience that we have them, which puts an end to this discussion (p. 54 1. 4-9).

Most important is the passage which shows how the Cārvākas conceived of mental phenomena. The momentary nature of consciousness, they maintain, is clear from perception (p. 54 1. 7-8: kṣaṇikatvaṃ cāsya [vijñānasya] pratyakṣapūrvakam eva). It is moreover visible (dysta) that “in some cases what has been seen by one, another one desires, in other cases it is not like that; in the same sequence (santati) another one desires, in a different sequence [another one] does not desire” (p. 54 1. 11-12: kvacid anyena drstam anya icchati, kvacin na; samānāyạ̣̄ santatāv anya icchati, santatyantare nechati). The Cārvākas adopt here a terminology which we also find in Buddhism, but this is easily explained by the fact that they are confronted with essentially the same problem. Mental phenomena in different people cannot be distinguished by the assumption that they belong to different selves. They are rather distinguished by the fact that they belong to different sequences. All this seems evident (pratyaksa) to them. It is impossible to determine whether they borrowed the relevant terminology (kṣanika, santati, vijñāna) from the Buddhists, but this assumption is not strictly speaking necessary. To the extent that they spoke about the same things in the same language (Sanskrit), this convergence in terminology might be no more than coincidence.

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INDEX

Abhayanandin 338
Abhidharma xiii, 267
abhiqāti 40
Ābhīra 359, 360
abhyudaya 108
Ācārānga Sūtra 16
Ācārya / ācārya 67, 244, 281, 284, 291, 293, 319
accent 107,184,185,192,346
Achaemenid 209, 362
activity, suppression of 15
ädarśa 1,357
adhrigu 190
adhyātmavidyā 172
ädhvarika 210, 354
Ādiśeṣa 306
Āditya 222, 225
Advaitin 294, 298
āgama xiv, xvi, xvii, 21, 274, 315
Aggañña Sutta 212, 353, 354
Agastya 82, 83, 84
Agni 6, 7, 189, 340
Agnicayana 125
agnikotra 83, 84, 157, 229, 300
agnibotra 83
Agni Vaśvānara 6, 7
Āgniveśya 220, 221, 238
ahimvā, see also non-violence 134, 260, 261, 262
Aitareya Āraṇyaka xiii, 340
Aitareya Brāhmaṇa xiii, 82, 83, 179, 180, 190, 194, 197, 200, 202
Ajātaśatru 3, 254
ajina, see also antelope-skin 82, 84
Ajita Kesakambalī / Keśakambalin 48, 144,145,146,147,149,153
äjivaka 38,43
Ājīvika xii, 3, 5, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,53,69, 105,106
Āj̄̄vikism vii, 3, 5, 9, 28, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41,42,45,49,50,51,69,70,85, 105,106,111
Alagaddūpama Sutta 216, 217
Alexander 209, 353
Allahabad 1, 2
Amāvasu 358
Ambaṣṭha 354, 355, 356
Ambaṭṭha 354, 355, 356
Ambatṭha Sutta 353, 354
Ānanda 208
Ānandagiri 282
anātman 261
Āndhra 359
Añga 8, 91, 254, 293, 345
Añgadinna 150
Añgas 8, 91, 293
Añgiras 211
Añguttara Nikāya xiii, 22
annihilation of former actions 21,22 , 45,49
antakriyā 20
antelope-skin, see also ajina, carman 58, 82, 84
anudātta 244, 346
Anugītā 96
anumāna 315
anumarana 169
Anuśāsanaparvan 96, 97, 98
anuṣyākhyāna xi, 240, 241, 242, 243, 246
anvācasṭe 244, 245
anvākhyāna 242, 243, 244, 245, 246
ānvāśikā 171, 172
anyatarasyām 186, 188, 199
Ānyatareya 335
Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra vii, xiii, 56, 79,80,81,85,86,87,88,89,90,91, 93,193,251
Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra xiii, 81, 193, 194, 201, 228
apavarga 66
Āpiśali 203
Apūrva 305
Arāḍa Kālāma 67
Aramaic 358
āraṃbha 17
Āraṭṭa / Araṭṭa / Ārāṭṭa 358
archaeology / archaeological 4, 13, 248, 251, 254, 266
archetype 71,94,95,96
Arjuna 29, 35, 36, 48, 49, 100, 101, 109, 110
Arrian 361
Ārṣeyapāṭha 350
Ārstịṣeṇa 84
Ārtabhāga, see also Jāratkārava 116, 122, 232
artha 164,165,169,170,171
Artha Śāstra 157, 163, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 223, 271, 272, 287, 355
arthavāda 289, 304
Aruṇa 222, 226
Aruṇa Aupaveśi 193, 226
Āruṇi 119, 128, 226, 227, 229, 230
Āryabhaṭīya 48
Aryan xii, 104, 213, 265, 266, 267, 358
Ārya / ārya 1, 3, 8, 266, 357, 359
Āryaḍeśa 360
Āryaśūra 150
Āryāvarta 1, 2, 269, 360
ascetic 17,24,30,32,38,41,42,43,45, 50,55,56,57,58,61,64,66,68,79, 80,81,82,83,85,87,88,89,90,91, 92,93,99,100,107,109,110,118, 145,166,254,259,260,261,327
asceticism 15,18,19,20,21,22,24,25, 27,28,29,31,32,38,40,41,44,49, 50,52,61,64,65,67,68,72,79,80, 81,82,84,85,88,90,93,99,105, 107,108,109,110,260,273,316
ascetic practices 15,19,24,30,31,50, 67,80,107,312
ascetic rules 259,260,262
Asita 222, 272, 273
Aśoka 3, 5, 209, 358, 359
āśrama 61,86,88,90,163,167,168,170
Assalāyana Sutta 209, 211, 212, 214, 353,358,359
Aṣṭādhyāyī 179, 180, 183, 184, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 243, 246, 257, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 343,345,346,347
Aṣṭaka 211
āstika 152, 153, 310
Āsuri 65, 221, 222, 318, 328
Asura 5, 7, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 267
Aśvaghoṣa 49, 62, 63, 67, 150, 272
Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra 179
Aśvapati Kaikeya 128
atharvāagiras 196
Atharvaveda xiii, 8, 58, 195, 196, 197, 210, 213, 271, 273, 297, 330, 351
ātman 34,47,101,102,116,118,119, 125,126,127,128,129,147,148,
214, 216, 232, 233, 234, 235, 261, 283, 290, 314, 334, 351, 363, 365
ātmasamāropana 80
Ātmasiddhi 291, 296
Auddālaki 164
aupaniṣadika 271
aurdhvadehika 168
Aurṇika 359
Āvaśyakaniryukti 154
yakaniryuktivivarana 155
Aviddhakarṇa 154
Āyāramga xiii, 16, 17, 19, 23, 34
Ayu / Āyu 358
Āyurveda 56, 68, 93, 104, 105, 268, 270
Bactria 209, 353, 360, 361
Bādarāyana 293, 295, 299, 305
bāhīka 269, 360
bāhīika 360
bakvṛca 210, 354
bādhīka 360
Balūra 361
bards 94
Bārhaspatya 150, 153
Bārhaspatya Sūtra 151, 153
Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, xiv, 2, 61, 62,63,64,68,79,80,81,251,259, 260, 354
Baudhāyana Gṛhyaśeṣa Sūtra 68
Bhagavadgītā vii, xiv, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35,36,37,38,46,47,48,49,51,96, 179,180,300
Bhagavatī, see also Viyāhapannatti 21, 43
Bhāmatī 158, 293
Bhāṇaruci 291
Bhāradvāja 211, 221, 353
Bhāradvāja Śrauta Sūtra 190, 194
Bhartṛhari xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii, 96, 189, 281, 286, 291, 338, 340
Bhartṛmitra 153, 156, 291
Bhartṛprapañca 291
Bhāruci 291
bhāṣā 185
Bhāsarvajña 152
Bhāṣāvṛtti 336
Bhāskara 48, 285, 291, 292, 294, 296, 297, 298
bhāṣya 62, 79, 83, 140, 154, 155, 156, 172, 189, 233, 245, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 289, 290, 291, 292,
293, 296, 298, 304, 305, 341, 348, 349,363,365
Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā 293
Bhaṭṭa 152, 154, 155, 156, 158
Bhavadāsa 189, 292
Bhavatrāta 238
Bhavisya Purāṇa 213
Bhāvivikta 154
Bhavya 279, 307
bhikṣukī 166
Bhīma 109, 110
Bhīmasena 103
Bhīṣma 97, 98
Bhṛgu 211
Bimbisāra 3, 254
Bimbisāra 249
Bindusāra 3
Black and Red ware 13
Bodhāyana 291, 292, 293, 294
bottleneck 96
Brahma 280, 281, 282, 283, 288, 289, 292, 293, 297, 298, 300, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307
Brahmā 70, 162, 212, 213, 217, 218
brahmahhūta 218
brahmacārin 66, 81, 83, 86, 166, 170
Brahmadatta 291, 294
Brahmadatta Caikitāneya 8
Brahmadatta Prāsenajita 8
Brahmajāla Suṭta 70, 217, 218
Brahmamīmāṃsā 292, 297
Brahman 26, 31, 32, 36, 63, 66, 108, 113,114,115,116,117,119,124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 196, 216, 221, 222, 225, 228, 231, 254, 271, 302, 305
brāhmaṇa xiii, xv, xvii, xviii, 66, 81, 84, 132, 134, 139, 175, 177, 187, 189, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 203, 204, 206, 210, 213, 214, 215, 225, 228, 237, 238, 240, 243, 254, 258, 267, 301, 329, 332, 350, 359, 364
Brahmānandi(n) 291
brahmanical ascetic 56, 58, 91, 259
brahmanical literature 4,72
brahmanical society 3,95,162
brahmanical territory 2,3,84,97,254, 357
brahmanical tradition 24,28,29,33,71, 77,102,112,137,139,140,154, 268, 275, 319
brāhmaṇya king 98
brahmasakacyatā 218
Brahmasiddhi 284
Brahma Sūtra 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 301, 302,303,304,305,306
Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya xiv, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 289
Brahma Sūtra Vṛtti 291
Brahmin ix, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 35, 57, 58, 61,66,80,82,84,85,91,92,95, 97,98,103,110,113,114,118,119, 120,122,125,128,131,139,142, 145,146,150,153,154,162,163, 164,166,171,172,209,210,211, 212, 213, 214, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 254, 260, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 301, 307, 309, 319, 321, 326,327,353,354,355,358,359, 360,361,362
breath 26,27,43,60,99,112,116,117, 123,128
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad xiii, 28, 115, 116,119,120,121,122,123,124, 126, 129, 130, 131, 139, 154, 179, 180, 201, 217, 218, 219, 224, 227, 229, 230, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 258, 320, 364
Bṛhadaśva 65
Bṛhaspati 151, 157
Bṛhatsaṃhitā 273
Bṛhat-saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad 251
Buddha 4, 6, 13, 18, 21, 32, 42, 52, 60, 63,67,69,143,144,150,166,175, 176, 177, 181, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 218, 219, 223, 237, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 258, 261, 271, 272, 274, 275, 353, 354, 356
Buddhacarita 49, 62, 67, 150, 272
Buddhaghosa 43
buddhi 25, 63, 104, 327
Buddhism vii, xi, xv, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14,15,24,28,32,38,39,50,52, 53,55,56,60,61,69,85,102,104, 105,111,133,134,135,142,143, 175, 176, 177, 207, 212, 216, 248, 249, 250, 255, 258, 259, 261, 262, 267, 273, 274, 275, 279, 318, 354, 361,364,366
Buddhists viii, xviii, 3, 18, 19, 21, 33, 38, 40,41,46,48,53,54,55,93,144,
148, 149, 152, 153, 156, 176, 215, 216, 239, 252, 259, 260, 261, 270, 275, 281, 314, 315, 316, 364, 366
buddhist canon ix, 5, 15, 21, 32, 38, 91, 104, 145, 208, 211, 239, 250, 353, 358
Caikitāneya 8
caitya 6
Cakracara 79
Cakradhara 155, 157
Cambyses 359
Campā 4, 249
Candragupta 3, 92
Candrakīrti 145
capital 4, 162, 251
Carakasaṃhitā 149
carman, see also antelope-skin 107, 351
Cārvāka 309, 363
caterpillar 116
Caturādhyāyikā 335
cāturāśramsa 91
chandas 187, 188, 203, 334
chāndogya 210, 231, 354
Chāndogya Upaniṣad xiv, 66, 112, 114, 115,118,119,120,121,123,124, 125,126,128,131,139,180,196, 216, 217, 230, 231, 235, 304, 305
chronology viii, 6,173,175,177,179, 181, 207, 215, 219, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 347
Citra Gāngyāyani / Citra Gārgyāyaṇi 112, 230, 231
city / cities 4, 162, 163, 164, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 255
confluence (of Gaṅgā and Yamunā) 2, 3,4,13
correlative cosmology 256, 270
correspondence 42, 127, 129, 256, 259, 269, 274
cosmology, see also correlative cosmology 40
court 92,116,120,150,158,162,163, 164, 226, 228, 250, 271, 272, 318, 319
courtesan 164, 166, 169
curse 167, 269, 271, 273
cycle of rebirths 24,38,61,66,68,69, 106, 131
cyclic time vii, 69,70,265,268
dakṣinā 210, 228
dayda 170
Darius 362
Dāsa 266, 267
death 16,17,18,23,24,27,39,40,42, 50,55,89,90,92,97,99,100,101, 107,108,109,110,114,119,121, 122,134,139,140,143,144,145, 146,147,149,152,154,156,168, 169,176,209,233,234,235,236, 309,310,311,312,313,314,316, 317,318,319,320,321,323,324, 325,326,327,353,364,365
demonic people 4,64
Devadaha Sutta 18
Devasvāmin 293, 294
Devatādhikaraṇa 303, 304
Devatākāṇda 292
devotion 31, 36, 37
dhāranā 26, 271
Dharma vii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xviii, 1, 2, 56,61,62,63,64,66,67,79,80,81, 85,86,87,88,89,90,91,93,108, 135,161,164,165,166,167,168, 169,170,171,193,213,251,259, 283, 290, 293, 297, 298, 305, 309, 354,355,357
Dharmaguptaka 32
dharmakāya 274, 354
dhātu 59
Dhundhu 65
Discworld ix, 265, 269, 270, 271, 274
dīkṣā 80, 81, 83, 84, 93
dīkṣāśrama, see also forest-dweller 81
dīkṣita 81, 82, 92, 166
Doab 13, 267
dosa 59
Drāhyāyaṇa Śrauta Sūtra xiv, 330
Dramiḍa 291
Dravida / Dravidā̄cārya 291, 356, 359
Dvaipāyana 105, 106
easterners 5,8
edūka 5, 6
Egyptian 45
Ekadaṇḍin 47
eluka 5
enlightenment 32, 69, 67, 143
Eon 6, 69, 70
epic 13,27,64,88,94,97,98,103
esoteric Buddhism 274, 275
etymology / etymologies, see also fanciful etymologies 204, 256, 257, 269, 274
fanciful etymologies 204, 256, 257, 269, 274
fasting to death 27,90,101
fatalism 105, 111
five fire doctrine 124, 131
forest-dweller, see also dīkṣāśrama 81, 88, 89,90
Four Restraints 42
fundamental (spiritual) ideology of Greater Magadha 53, 98, 106
funerary mounds 15
funerary practices vii, 6,55,265
Gālava 221, 336, 338
Gandak 7
Gandhāra ix, 4, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361,362
Gāndhāra 358
Gandhāri 8, 358
Gāndhāri 358
Gangā, see also Ganges 2, 3, 4
Ganges, see also Gangā 2, 13, 48, 70, 251,267
Ganges valley 2,3,13,103,249,252, 255, 268
Gārgya 221, 335
gārhasthya 84
Gaudapāda 306
Gautama 63, 221, 223, 259, 302
Gautama Dharma Sūtra xv, 251, 259, 355
Gītā Bhāṣya 296
god 5,6,7,17,31,36,43,59,61,62, 63,66,68,72,83,107,108,109, 113,114,115,116,123,127,128, 140,162,164,185,190,213,218, 303,304,305,361
Gosāla Mankhaliputta, see also Makkhali Gosāla 39
Gotama Rāhūgaṇa 6, 7, 21
gotra 164, 223
Govindānanda 282, 293
grammarians of Sanskrit 183
Greater Magadha vii, 1,4,5,9,11,13, 14,15,24,28,29,52,53,55,56,60, 61,64,67,68,69,71,72,75,77, 79,84,85,87,90,91,93,97,98, 101,104,105,106,107,109,111, 112,134,135,137,138,141,176, 204, 215, 216, 217, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270,273,275
Greeks, see also yona, yavana 45, 92, 209, 214,353,358,359
Greek sources vii, 92
grhastha 79, 86, 170
Grhya Sūtras xvii, 139, 179, 180
Guhadeva 291
Gujarat 96, 211
guna 27, 29, 30, 31, 37, 49, 68, 103, 104, 200, 324
Guṇaratna 158
Gupta 68, 71, 154, 252
hapax legomenon / legomena 352
Haribhadra 148, 153, 154
Harivaṃśa 151
heaven, see also svarga 62, 67, 68, 83, 91, 100,110,111,121,156,168,169, 170,301,305,365
he ‘lavo he ‘lavah 7
he ‘layo he ‘layah 8
hermitage 6, 65
Herodotus 45
Himalayas / Himālaya 1, 2, 6
Hinduism 70, 81, 139, 261, 268, 301
Hiraṇyagarbha 62, 63
Hiraṇyakeśin Dharma Sūtra 86
Hiraṇyakeśin Śrauta Sūtra xv, 190
Honey Section 219, 220
householder 65,66,79,80,83,86,128, 133,154,171
Huili 326, 327
humour 59, 60, 104, 215, 218
identification 88,126,196,211,252, 256, 266, 269
immobility 37,42,45
immobilization 24,32,52,72,88,99, 105,108
immutable / immutability 72,129,216, 217, 228, 233, 239, 259, 300, 339
inactivity 22,35,45,99,100,108,127, 130,269
Indica xv, 361
Indo-Aryan 7, 13, 265, 266, 267
Indo-European 134, 180, 265, 266
Indra 68, 128
Indus 163, 357, 361, 362
Indus valley civilization 249
intention 18,19,53,98,99,107,229, 288, 303
iśvaramaharsi 62
itihāsa 196, 240, 241
itihāsapurāna 196
Jābāli 150
Jaimini 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 299, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307
Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 8, 123, 124, 197, 229, 231
Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa xv, 238 jaina asceticism 27, 41
jaina canon, Śvetāmbara 15, 22, 23, 28, 43,77,91,146,147,153
Jainas 3, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 32, 38, 40,44,45,46,48,50,52,53,99, 100,105,146,148,153,156,259, 260, 261, 272, 281, 364
Jainendra Mahāvrrti 338
Jainism vii, xii, 3,4,5,6,9,13,14,15, 18,19,22,23,24,25,28,33,38, 41,42,44,45,49,50,51,52,53, 56,61,69,70,72,85,99,100,105, 142, 143, 255, 258, 261, 262, 272, 274, 318
Jaivali Pravāhaṇa, see also Pravāhaṇa Jaivali 113, 114, 124, 231
Jamadagni 211
Janaka 116, 118, 120, 125, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 238, 309, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323
Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga 232
Jaratkāru 82, 83, 84
jatā, see also matted hair 58
jatādhara 107
Jātaka xv, 68, 210, 217
Jātakamālā 150
Jayāditya xv, 153
Jayanta 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 340
Jayarāśi 151, 153, 154
Jina 5, 6, 13
Jinabhadra 154
jīva 47, 148, 154, 324
jñānendriya 327
Jumna, see also Yamunā 2, 3, 13
Kālaka forest 1, 2
Kālavāda 105, 106
Kalhaṇa 5, 362
Kālidāsa 3
kalpa 43, 44, 46, 50, 69, 70, 193, 200, 237, 238
Kalpasūtra 299, 301
kāma 164, 165, 169, 170, 171
Kamalaśīla 45
Kāma Sūtra 150, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167,168,169,171,190,271
Kamboja 353, 358, 359
Kāmboja 359
kamma 17, 44
Kaniṣka 5
Kāṇva xiii, xviii, 7, 95, 198, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 228, 233, 238, 239, 323
Kāpālika 158
Kapardi(n) 291
Kapila vii, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68,185,268,302
Kapilavastu 63
Kapiṣṭhala Saṃhitā xv, 330
karma 19,20,41,42,43,44,45,46, 50,98,121,132,133,134,140,259, 292, 301, 311, 312
karmakāṇda 290
Karmamīmāṇsā 292
karman 16, 18, 19, 20, 22
karmayoga 29, 30, 31
karmendriya 327
karmic retribution vii, viii, 15, 24, 28, 29,33,35,45,52,53,55,69,72, 73,75,77,87,90,97,99,100,101, 102,105,106,112,115,116,117, 118,119,120,121,122,123,124, 125,126,130,131,132,133,134, 135,137,139,140,142,143,144, 145,146,148,149,150,151,152, 158,161,162,167,168,169,171, 172,176,177,207,215,216,217, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 258, 259, 261, 265, 268, 269, 273, 325,327,328,365
Kāśakṛtsna 292, 299
Kashmir, see also Kaśmīra 64, 96, 322, 360
Kāśī 4, 358
Kāśikā xv, 153, 181, 331, 341, 343
Kaśmīra, see also Kashmir 361
Kaśyapa 211, 222
Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā xv, 190, 198, 330, 349
Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad / Kaṭha Upaniṣad xvi, 25, 30, 87, 139, 300
Kātyāyana xvi, 175, 184, 207, 208, 237, 238, 243, 244, 245, 246, 258, 334, 342, 353
Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa 293
Kauśāmbi 4, 248, 249
Kauṣītaki Āraṇyaka 8
Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa 190, 197
Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad xvi, 121, 123, 124, 125, 139, 230
Keśava Miśra 152
Kevaddha Sutta 358
kevalin 20
Khila-Kāṇ̣̣a 219, 224
king 3,5,7,8,20,27,64,65,68,94, 95,97,98,103,113,114,115,116, 118,119,120,124,125,128,132, 148,149,150,158,162,163,170, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 238, 253, 254, 271, 272, 309, 314, 318, 319, 324,355,359
Kisa Saṅkicca 40, 48
Kosala / Kosalas 4, 6, 8, 9, 211
Kotyārya 154, 155
Krṣṇa 20, 36, 48, 63
Krṣṇa Miśra 151, 158
Kṛtakoṭi 293, 294
Kṣatṛ 354
ksatra 98, 127, 271
Kṣatriya 35,95,110,114,118,131,139, 162,163,213,231,355,359,360
kṣetrajña 63, 324, 325, 327, 328
Kullūka 293
Kumārila 152, 192, 308, 365
Kuru 7, 230, 358, 359
Kurukṣetra 360
Kuṣāṇa period 96
Kusumadhvaja 359
Kuvalāśva 65
Lampā 361
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 150
Lātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra xvi, 330
laukäyatika 150
liberating knowledge 113, 126, 131, 132
liberation, see also mokṣa 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,22,24,25,26,28,29,30,31,32, 33,37,38,40,42,45,46,49,50, 52,53,65,66,67,68,72,87,90, 91,98,99,100,101,102,103,105, 106,109,110,111,114,123,124, 126,131,141,143,144,152,156, 164,165,166,167,168,169,170, 172, 217, 231, 236, 270, 279, 280, 283, 301, 305, 307, 308, 328
lineage 22, 82, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 236, 238
Lokāyata 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,158,162,171,172,325,326, 327,364,365
lokāyatika 149, 150, 155, 326, 327
Lopāmudrā 82
macrocosm 126, 129, 269, 274
Mādhava 155, 157
Madhu-Kāṇ̣̣a 219, 224, 227
Madhura Sutta 353
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 293
madhyadeśa (“Middle Region”) 1, 357
Madhyama xvi, 8
Madhyamakahṛdaya 279
Mādhyandina xiii, xviii, 115, 220, 224, 225, 232, 233, 235, 239, 240
Madra 360
Magadha 3, 4, 8, 9, 238, 253, 254, 255, 267, 269
Māgadha 8
Māgadhī 8, 41, 91, 267
magic 59,167,269,271
magical thought viii, 203, 255, 256, 257
Mahābhārata vii, ix, 5, 25, 27, 30, 31, 51,63,64,65,66,68,70,71,72,80, 81,82,83,84,94,95,96,97,98, 105,106,110,111,119,121,135, 140,149,159,161,162,164,213, 223, 241, 273, 293, 301, 309, 326, 355,357,359,360
Mahābhāṣya ix, xiv, xvi, xviii, 1, 2, 84, 91,96,189,197,202,205,206,207, 223, 243, 244, 245, 246, 332, 338, 339,341,348,349,350,351
Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā xiii, xvi, 338, 340
mahākalpa 44, 47
Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī 223
mahat 327
Mahāvastu xvi, 149
Mahāvīra 4, 23, 41, 42, 50, 250, 261, 274
mahāyajña 79
Mahīśāsaka 32
Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā xvi, 184, 190, 195, 198, 329
Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad xvi, 26, 240, 242
Maitreyī 127, 220, 224, 232, 234, 236, 239, 320, 323
Majjhima Nikāya xvi, 5, 18, 143, 209, 217, 358
Makkhali Gosāla, see also Gosāla Mañkhaliputta 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 223
Mākṣavya 325
Mālavikāgnimitra 3
Malayagiri 155
manas 25, 26, 327
Mānava Dharma Śāstra xvi, 1, 80, 81, 213,354,359
Mānava Śrauta Sūtra xvi, 190
Mandana Miśra 284, 287, 302
Māndūkeya 335
mantra 8, 85, 89, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 210, 240, 241, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 329, 330,331,334,340,350
Manu xvi, 1, 80, 92, 97, 99, 127, 149, 213, 271, 284, 293, 354, 357
manuscript xvi, 94, 95, 96, 97, 180, 199, 243, 274, 291, 321
manuscript tradition 95,96
Mārkandeya 359
Maskarin / Maskarī, see also Makkhali Gosāla 40, 41, 48, 91, 106, 223
materialism 151, 152
Māṭharavṛtti 62
Māthava 6, 7
Mathurā 5, 211, 357
Māthura 359
matted hair, see also jatā 58, 107, 111
maundya, see also munda 110
Maurya 3, 92, 248, 249
Mauryan empire 3, 9, 95
Mazdaism 358
Methātithi 149, 153, 284
medicine vii, 56,57,58,59,60,256, 268, 271, 272, 275
meditation xi, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30,31
Megasthenes 56, 57, 92, 93, 361
mendicant 41,103,118,125,166,251, 273, 326
methodological positivism 132
microcosm 126, 129, 269, 274
Middle Indo-Aryan 265
Mīmāṃsā xii, 32, 140, 142, 152, 153, 156,158,161,162,167,189,270, 279, 283, 285, 287, 289, 290, 291, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302,303,304,305,306,307,308, 365
Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya 233, 284, 285
Mīmāṃsaka 141, 153, 156, 162, 203, 234, 279, 281, 293, 294, 302, 303, 306,307,308,335,336,338,365
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra ix, xvii, 140, 167, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288,
289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 298, 299, 301, 302, 303, 304, 306, 363
Mithilā 25, 27, 319
Mitra 8, 83
moksa, see also liberation 20, 65, 111, 140,164,165,167,169,170,171, 294, 309, 314
moon 112,113,114,115,116,167,272
motionless / motionlessness 15,18,20, 23,24,25,26,27,28,45,56,57,92, 93
Mūjavants 8
Mūlasarvāstivādin 48
munda, see also maundya 58, 107, 111
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad xvi, 300
muni 86, 88, 281, 318
Naciketas 139, 140
nagara 251
Nagarahāra 361
nāgaraka 164
Naṣ̣karmyasiddhi 288
Naiyāyika 279
Nakula 355
Nanda 3, 40, 48
Nanda Vaccha 40, 48
na pretya samjñā 154, 155, 233, 234, 320, 321, 363
Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad 251
Nārāyaṇa 63
nāstika 110, 148, 153, 310, 311, 314, 315
nāstikavāda 146
Nātaputta / Nāthaputta 5, 21, 22, 42
Nātha / Nāthamuni 296
Nepal 360
neti-neti 129
New Age religion 256
Niganṭha 5, 19, 21, 22, 42
Nilakanṭha 100, 241, 242, 321
Nirukta xvii, 203, 204, 257, 337, 340
nirvāna 44, 67
nirveda 313, 314
Nisāda 355
nivṛtta dharma 67
nivṛtti 68, 108
nivṛttidharma 67
Niyati 40, 41, 106
non-attachment 36, 37
non-performing of new actions 21,22 , 45,49,50
non-violence, see also ahimsa 260
Northern Black Polished ware 13
Nyāya 154, 171, 172, 302
Nyāya Bhāṣya xvi, 172
Nyāyamañjarī 155, 156, 158, 340
Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhañga 157
Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa 152
Nyāyaratnākara 153, 155
Nyāya Sūtra 150
Nyāyatattva 296
Old Indo-Aryan 265
omens 272
Original Nature, see also prakṛti 25, 29, 30, 37, 49
Orissa 3, 96
orthoepic diaskeuasis xi, 192, 198, 204, 205
orthoprax / orthopraxy 7, 81, 269, 319
padukāra 340
Padapātha 193, 194, 198, 337, 340, 341, 345,350,351
Padārthadharmasañgraha 79
Padmapāda 289, 290, 296
Paesi 148
Painnaya 17
Painted Grey ware 13
Paiṇpalāda xiii, 96, 195, 196, 197, 351
Paṇṇavaṇā 68
Pañcāla 7, 230, 335, 358, 359
Pañcapādikā 289, 290, 296
Pañcaśikha 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314,315,316,317,318,319,320, 321,323,324,325,328
Pañcaśikha-vākya 309, 327
Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa xvii, 8, 197
Pāṇini viii, ix, xi, 91, 154, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 219, 223, 237, 240, 243, 244, 245, 246, 257, 258, 270, 302, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 335, 337, 338, 339, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347
Panjab, see also Punjab 360, 362
Pārājika 259
paraloka 49, 149
Paralokasiddhi 152
Paramārtha 62, 328
Pāraskara Gṛhya Sūtra 179
parivrāja/parivrā̄aka, see also wandering ascetic 40,68,86,87,88,89,91, 93,170,171
Pāriyātra 1
Parṇotsa 361
Parśu 358
Pārśva 42, 261
Pārthasārathi 153, 155, 156
Pāṭaliputra 3, 92, 359, 361
Patañjali viii, ix, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 40, 84,85,91,97,175,177,184,197, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 223, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 258, 265, 269, 332, 334, 338, 339, 340,341,342,348,349,350,351, 352,357,360
patīana 251
Pautimāṣīputra 222, 223, 224
Pautimāṣya 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 238, 239
Pāyāsi 148
philosopher 57, 58, 92, 134, 139, 154, 156, 158, 233
philosophy ix, xii, xv, 30, 32, 41, 57, 62, 68,92,119,135,141,151,155,156, 157, 158, 172, 213, 268, 279, 280, 298, 307, 320, 327, 365
Pingakesa 148
Prabhākara 140, 141, 308
Prabodhacandrodaya 151, 158
Prahlāda 62, 64, 68
Praisa 191
Prajāpati 5, 62, 63, 116, 128, 164, 213, 222
prakrti, see also Original Nature 25, 29, 30,35,37,49,66,328
Prācya 335
prāna 26, 117, 125
prānāgnihotra 300
prānāyāma, see also restraint of breath 26, 27
Prapañcahṛdaya 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 298
Prasannapadā 145
Praśastapāda Bhāṣya xix, 79
Prātībodhī-putra 8
Prātisāākhya xvii, 184, 204, 205, 335, 337, 338, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347
Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, see also Jaivali Pravāhaṇa 113, 114, 124, 231
pravṛtti 67,68,108
Prayāga 2
pre-Aryan 260
protest movement 261
Pulinda 359
punarmytya, see also second death 134
Punjab, see also Panjab 357, 360
pura 251
purāna 149,150,196,213,241,359,360
Pūraṇa Kassapa / Kāśyapa 40, 47, 48, 211
Purāṇapañcalakṣana 64
pure meditation 22, 23
purīsa 214, 215
purity 31,35,43,48,84,254,269,270, 273
purohita 7,8,162,163,272
puruṣa 47, 51, 213, 242, 328
Puruṣamedha 8
Puruṣa-sūkta 212, 213
Puruṣottamadeva 336, 338
Pūrvakāṇ̣̣a 293, 297
Pūrvamīmāṃsā / Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 279, 280, 281, 282, 288, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 306
Pusyamitra 3
Rājadharmaparvan vii, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103,106,111,326
Rājagṛha 4
Rājapura 361
rajas 68,103,104,324,325,327
Rā̄atarañgiṇī 5, 362
Rājghat 4, 249
Rajgir 4, 249
Rāksasa 103, 273, 326
Rāmānuja 291, 292, 294, 296, 297, 298
Rāmāyaṇa xvii, 150, 213
rātri / rātrī 185
Rāyapaseṇiya (Skt. Rājapraśnīya) 149
ṛc 193
rebirth 18,24,38,45,53,61,66,67, 68,69,72,87,90,99,101,106,110, 114,115,118,119,120,121,122, 131,133,134,141,146,150,152, 156,165,166,167,168,169,172, 176,231,236,269,301,316,319, 320
rebirth and karmic retribution vii, viii, 15,24,28,33,35,52,53,61,69,72, 73,75,77,87,90,97,100,102,112, 116,117,118,119,120,123,124, 125,126,130,131,132,133,134, 135,137,139,140,142,143,144, 145,146,148,149,150,151,152, 158,161,162,167,168,169,171,
172,176,177,207,215,216,217, 228,230,231,232,233,235,236, 258,259,265,267,327,364,365
relics 273,274
renouncer 55,65,86,109,260,268
restraint of breath, see also prāṇāyāma 26, 27
Ṛgveda / Rigveda viii, ix, xi, xvii, 7, 82,83,133,164,175,176,177,183, 184, 186, 192, 193, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 210, 211, 212, 267, 297, 329, 335, 336, 337, 338,339,340,341,342,343,344, 345,347,351
Ṛgveda Bhāṣya 293
Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya xvii, 204, 205, 335, 337,338,341,343,344,345,346, 347
rite 89,127,133,168,180,275,300, 304
ritual 3,7,59,60,82,83,84,90,107, 109,110,121,125,132,133,140, 156,162,185,186,187,188,189, 191, 225, 251, 254, 269, 270, 272, 273, 275, 280, 281, 283, 285, 288, 289, 291, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301,302,303,304,305,306,307, 308,329,331,332,333,360,365
Rṣi / ṛṣi 7,65,81,82,87,210,221,272, 281
Roundworld ix, 265, 269, 270, 271
Rudra 63
rūpakāya 274
Śabara / Śabarasvāmin 83, 140, 156, 189, 283, 285, 286, 304, 305, 363, 364,365
sacrifice 6,8,36,37,48,64,65,67,79, 80,81,83,84,85,89,90,92,115, 118,127,145,156,161,167,190, 194, 210, 214, 229, 266, 283, 300, 301,305,318,319,361
sacrificer, see also yajamāna 36, 80, 81, 90,92,305,365
Sadānanida 155
Sadānīra / Sadanira 6, 7
Saddarśanasamuccaya 153
Sadviṃśa Brāhmaṇa xvii, 242
Sagara 64, 65
Saivism 275
Śaka xv, 357, 359
Śākala 335, 344, 345
śākalization 345
Śākalya 176, 177, 186, 193, 226, 229, 231, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341,343,344,345
Śākalya-pitr 335
Śākaṭāyana 335, 337, 342, 343
Sāketa 4, 359
Sakuntalā 273
Sālīna 79
salt 234, 235
Sāmaññaphala Sutta 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51,145
Samarāicca-kahā 148
Sāmaveda xviii, 196, 210, 330, 351, 352
Sambandhavārttika 290
Saṃgraha 338
samhitä xv, xvi, xviii, 96, 132, 175, 184, 185, 186, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 206, 210, 213, 214, 215, 225, 297, 329, 330, 335, 339, 340,341,342,344,349,350
samhitä-pātha 193, 351
sāmȳ̄̄̄putra 222, 224
samjñā 32, 321, 323, 324, 325, 351
samkalpa 109
Sāṃkhya 30,35,46,47,62,63,67,68, 103, 104, 153, 171, 172, 268, 270, 273, 279, 294, 302, 309, 310, 314, 319,324,325,326,327,328
Sāṃkhyakārikā 62
Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad 251
samnyāsin 68,80,86,268
samsāra 20,43,66,67,69,233,301
sandhi 155,183,184,185,186,192, 193, 198, 199, 200, 204, 336, 337, 338,341,343,344
Śāṇdilya 118, 125, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 225
Saṅghabhedavastu 46, 48, 49
Sañjayī Vairatṭiputra 48, 49
Śankara xiv, 88, 238, 241, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306
Saṅkarsakāṇda 293, 299
S̄ānkhāyana Āraṇyaka xvii, 227
S̄ānkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra xvii, 82, 180, 190
Śāntiparvan 96, 97, 98, 105, 108, 301
Sarasvatī, see also Vinaśana 1, 6, 293, 357
Śārīraka 281, 282, 284, 287, 288, 292, 296, 297
Śārīrakamīmāṃsā Bhāṣya 296
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 155, 157, 158
Sarva(darśana)siddhāntasaṃgraha 292
Śāstra 293, 296, 297
Satakarni inscription 228
Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 55, 82,124,125,197,198,223,225, 226, 228, 237, 332, 340, 350, 357
sattva 47,68,103,104,324,325,327
sattvasamksaya 311, 313, 323
Satyāṣāḍha Śrauta Sūtra 86
Saunāgas 195
Saunakīya xiii, 195
Saundarananda 63
Sāyaṇa 155, 157, 241, 242, 293, 297
Scythian 359
second death, see also punarmrtyu 134
seer 6,62,63,65,82,99,105,127,164, 210, 269, 272, 273, 318, 319
Seleucus 92
self, knowledge of the vii, 28,29,32,52, 67,102,103,124,172,233,305
sepulchral mound 4,5,55
Sīlānka 21,41,47,141,153,154,155
signs 4,6,107,139,167,248,249,270, 272,273,317,322,342
Simhapura 361
Śiva 63,64,330,361
Ślokavārttika 152, 155, 162, 295
society, see also brahmanical society 2 , 3,50,55,58,60,85,95,104,107, 158,162,169,171,209,213,218, 253,254,255,353,359,361
Song Yun 361
sources, archaeological 13
sources, literary vii, xii, 3,13,14,15, 29,38,39,40,61,72,75,79,92,93, 130,150,210,226,248,260,261, 262, 273, 288, 301, 309, 319, 326, 344,355
Sparśa 358
Spitzer manuscript 96, 97
Śramaṇa / śramana 38, 56, 57, 58, 84, 85,92,93,153,270,359
śramanabrāhmaṇan 84
Śrauta Sūtras 8, 81, 139, 188, 189, 191, 194, 201
Śrāvastī 4
Śreṇika Bimbisāra 3, 254
Śrī Bhāṣya 291, 292, 296, 298
Šrīnivāsa 291, 297
S̄rīparāṃkuśa 291
Šrīvatsānka / Srīvatsān̄kamiśra 291
Srotriya / śrotriya 91, 163, 164, 166
Sthānānga 20
Strabo 56, 57, 58, 270
stūpa 5,15,274
Sūdra 6, 35, 213, 355, 359, 360
suffering 17,20,21,31,35,60,105, 214, 318
sun 32,63,113,114,115,116,127, 128,167,272,304
Sunaśepha 180
Sunga 3, 95, 228
Sutigas 3, 95, 164, 223
Supplementary Section 219, 220, 224
Sūravīra 335
Sūravīra-suta 335
Sureśvara 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 296
sūtra ix, xvi, xvii, xviii, 62,81,86,90, 151,164,165,166,167,168,169, 172,186,191,237,240,241,243, 244, 246, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 288, 289, 295, 296, 298, 299,302,303,304,305,334
sūtrādhyakṣa 166
Sūtraḳṭānga 19, 146, 153
Sūtraḳṭāngavṛtti 141, 153, 154
Sūtra-Pitaka 208, 209
Suttanīpāta xviii, 210
Sūyagada 19, 21, 34, 146, 147, 153, 154
svabhāva 35,324
svadharma 35,36,51,170
svādhyāya 86, 89, 90
svarga, see also heaven 83,140,156,170
svarita 244,346
Śvetaketu 119, 129, 164, 230, 235
Śvetaketu Āruṇeya 193
Śvetāmbara 15, 43, 146, 149
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad xvii, 26, 63
Syūmaraśmi 65
taittirīya 194, 210, 214, 243, 340, 350, 354
Taittirīya Āraṇyaka xviii, 193, 194, 350
Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa xviii, 64, 190, 193, 194, 243, 340, 350
Taittirīya Saṃhitā xviii, 185, 186, 193, 194, 213, 214, 215, 297, 329, 350
Taittirīya Upaniṣad xviii, 155
Takṣaśīlā, see also Taxila 361
Țanka 291
Tantra 275, 281, 282, 284, 285, 287
Tantrakāṇda 293
Tantravārttika 190, 192
tantric Buddhism 60, 274, 275
Tantrism 274, 275
tapas 20,66,82,84
tarka 26
tat tvam asi 128
Tattvaratnākara 292
Tattvavaisāradī 62
Tattvopaplavasinpha 151, 153, 154
tamas 68, 103, 104, 324, 325, 327
Taxila, see also Takṣaśīlā 358
Tevijja Sutta 353
Ṭhāṇaṃga xviii, 20, 22, 23, 42
Theravādin 32
Third Reich 352
three humours, see also tridosa 59, 104
tīrthankara 42, 261
town 13, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254
traces of earlier deeds 15,20,42,99, 105
transmigration 44, 98, 117, 121, 139, 169,325
tridosa, see also three humours 59, 60, 104
Tripādī 338, 339
trivarga 164, 165, 169, 170
udātta 244,346
Udbhaṭa 154
Uddālaka 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 122,123,124,125,126,128,130, 131,132,161,164,222,226,227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 239
Udyāna 361
Ugra 354, 355
ūha 188, 189, 190, 191
Ujjain 4, 249
Upadeśasāhasrī 293, 296
Upāli Sutta 34
Upānga 91, 149, 293
Upaniṣads viii, xi, 25,28,60,63,87, 101,112,113,119,120,123,124, 125,126,130,131,132,133,134, 135,139,141,142,155,161,175, 176,177,179,181,196,201,206, 207, 210, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,220,224,225,226,230,232, 238, 240, 242, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 255, 258, 259, 269, 288, 290,
299, 300, 301, 302, 305, 307, 308, 320
Upavarṣa 281, 282, 284, 287, 293, 294
Upaveśi 222, 226
Uraśā 361
urban viii, 4,57,58,161,162,163,164, 169, 172, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254
urbanization, second viii, 4, 9, 163, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255
Uttarādhyayana 19, 68
Uttarajjhayaṇa xviii, 19, 22, 23
Uttarakāṇda 293, 297
Uttaraṃūmāṃsā / Uttara Mīmāṃsā ix, xviii, 279, 280, 281, 288, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 301, 302, 306, 307
Uttarayāyāta section 98, 121
Uvaṭa 346
vā 155, 186, 187, 188, 199, 201, 203, 233, 234, 241, 242, 304, 310, 313, 321,324,325,344
Vācaspati Miśra xvi, 62, 152, 158, 287, 293
Vādhūla Śrauta Sūtra xviii, 243
Vāhaṭa 292
Vaideha 354, 356
Vaiśeṣika 147, 153, 268, 270, 279, 327
Vaiśya 35, 114, 118, 131, 213, 354, 355, 359,360
Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa 293
Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā xviii, 194
Vāmadeva 127, 211
Vāmaka 211
Vāmana xv, 153
vānaprastha 58,80,81,82,86,88,89,91, 171
Varāhamihira 273
Varanasi 4, 249
Vardhamāna 152
varna 163,167,170,213,214,272,353, 355,358,359,361
Varṣākāra 254
vārttika xvi, xix, 195, 207, 237, 238, 243, 244, 245, 246, 332, 334, 342
Varuṇa 83
Vāseṭṭha Sutta 353
Vasiṣṭha 211
Vasiṣṭha Dharma Sūtra xviii, 2, 355
Vassakāra 254
Vāsudeva 63
Vātsyāyana xvi, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 190, 271
Veda viii, xi, 31, 59, 60, 66, 67, 83, 84, 85,87,89,90,91,99,101,107,109, 110,120,127,131,133,155,156, 157, 163, 164, 166, 171, 175, 176, 181, 183, 184, 185, 188, 190, 192, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 214, 223, 241, 255, 256, 257, 258, 267, 272, 273, 275, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 297, 303, 307, 313, 317, 343, 345, 348,349,350,351,352,360,361, 362
Vedamitra 335
Vedānta ix, xii, 119, 129, 135, 141, 161, 268, 279, 287, 290, 291, 298, 302, 306, 308
Vedāntadeśika 294
Vedāntakalpalatikā 293
Vedāntasāra 155
vedāntic 281, 291, 297, 299, 301, 302, 303, 306, 307
Vedāntin 101, 156, 157, 279, 281, 289, 299, 301, 303, 305, 307, 308
Vedārthasamgraha 291
vedic antecedents viii, 122, 130, 131, 132, 266
vedic asceticism vii, 93, 107
vedic ascetics 57,58,61,79,82,90,91, 93
vedic corpus 14,60,104,175,206,355
vedic literature viii, 4,6,8,9,61,120, 126, 130, 133, 175, 176, 182, 183, 184, 187, 198, 199, 201, 206, 210, 211, 218, 219, 229, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 246, 248, 255, 256, 258, 272, 297, 332, 334, 336, 337, 349, 350
vedic religion 5,50,68,81,142,171, 256, 267, 275
Vena 150
vibhāsā 186, 187, 199, 200, 201, 202
Videgha 6, 7
Videha 6,7,9,116,120,150,211,228, 229, 230, 238, 322, 358
Vidiśā 3
vidyā 171, 240, 358
Vijarā 123
vikṭti 66
Vinaśana 2, 357
Vinaya xiv, 32, 57, 209, 354
Vindhya 1, 2, 360
Vipaśyin 272
Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya 154, 155
Viśiṣtādvaita 291
Viṣṇu 62, 64, 188, 213
Viṣnudharmottara Purāṇa 149, 150
Viśvāmitra 211
Viyāhapannatti, see also Bhagavatī xviii, 43
Vrātya hymn 8
Vṛttikāra 285, 292, 363
Vṛttikāra-grantha 285, 286, 363, 365
Vyādi 336, 338
vyākhyāna 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246
Vyāḷi 335, 338
Vyāsa 82, 99, 105, 106, 291, 293
wandering ascetic, see also parivrāja 87, 88,89,90,118,166
waves of immigration 266
weaver 116, 122
writing 45,95,152,208,209,254,279, 281, 298
written version of the Mahābhārata 71, 94,95,96,97,98
Xuanzang 326, 327, 361
yajanāna, see also sacrificer 80, 133
Yājñavalkya 29, 112, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122,125,127,130,131,132,220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238,239,320,323
Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda viii, 28, 29, 116, 119, 120,122,124,125,126,127,129, 130, 131, 217, 219, 220, 224, 227, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 258, 259
Yājñavalkya Section 129, 219, 220
Yājñavalkyasmṛti 241
Yajurveda 8, 188, 194, 196, 210, 227, 228, 240, 254
Yajurveda-Vṛkṣa 360
yajus 187, 193, 196
Yamunā, see also Jumna 2, 3, 4, 267
Yāmuna / Yāmunamuni 291, 293, 296, 297, 298
Yāska 221, 335, 340
Yaśodhara 165, 166, 168
Yatīndramatadīpikā/Yatipatimatadīpikā 291, 297
Yatīsvara 291
Yavakrī / Yavakrīta 84
yavana, see also Greeks, yona 209, 357, 359
Yāyāvara 79, 83
Yoga 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 63, 67, 88, 171, 271, 294, 309
Yoga Bhāṣya 62, 293
Yoga Sūtra 26, 27, 62
yona, see also Greeks, yavana 209, 353, 358, 359
Yudhiṣthira 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,106,107,108,109,110,111, 273, 281, 294, 326
yuga 5, 70, 71, 359, 360
Yuga Purāṇa 359
Yuktidīpikā 62

Mahā-bh I p. 475 1. 3 (on P. 2.4.10); III p. 174 1. 7-8 (on P. 6.3.109); kah punar āryāavartah / prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād daksinena himavantam uttareṇa pāriyātram /. The translation follows Olivelle, 2000: 199. For the date of Patañjali, see Cardona, 1976: 263 ff . ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²² ↩²³ ↩²⁴ ↩²⁵ ↩²⁶
See the discussion in Olivelle, 2000: 571 n. 2.9; further Appendix VII, below. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²² ↩²³ ↩²⁴ ↩²⁵ ↩²⁶
Manu 2.22: ā samudrāt tu vai pūrvāc ā samudrāt tu paścimāt / tayor evāntaraṃ giryor āryāvartaṃ vidur budhāh //. Tr. Olivelle, modified. See Olivelle, 2005: 18 ff., for a discussion of “Manu“‘s date. The Allahabad inscription of Samudragupta still uses, in the fourth century, the expression Āryāvarta to refer to a region whose precise extent cannot be determined, but which included “the greater part, if not the whole, of U. P., a portion of Central India, and at least the south-western part of Bengal.” (Majumdar & Altekar, 1967: 140 ff .) ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²² ↩²³ ↩²⁴
Manu 2.21: himavadvindhyayor madhyaṃ yat prāg vinaśanād api / pratyag eva prayāgāc ca madhyadeśah prakīrtiṭah //. Tr. Olivelle. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²²
Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, in order to reach the confluence of the Gangā and the Yamunā, have to pass through a very large forest (sumahad vanam; Rām 2.48.2). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰ ↩²¹ ↩²²
See Rau, 1957: 61 ff.; 117 ff. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹ ↩²⁰
See Fitzgerald, 2004: 114 ff. Cp. HBI pp. 95-109; 236-285; 385-395; Nagarajaji, 1986: 440 ff . The eastern rivals of the Suingas, the Mahāmeghavāhanas of Orissa (or at any rate their most important king Khāravela), were adherents of Jainism; see Witzel, 2006: 466. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸ ↩¹⁹
This expression is an adapted imitation of “Greater Gandhāra”, for which see Salomon, 1999: 2-3. Note that Lal Mani Joshi remarked already in 1983 that “Buddhism and numerous other forms of ascetically-oriented soteriologies […] flourished in that small area of modern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar at a time when it had not been fully aryanized and brahmanized” (as quoted in Holt, 2004: 10-11). Unlike Mahāvideha, the expression Mahāmagadha does not appear to be used in ancient literature. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
Cf. Oldenberg, 1881/1961: 137. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
From among the fives sites that show, according to Erdosy (1985: 94-95), the earliest signs of urbanization, three (Rājghat, i.e., ancient Varanasi, Campā, and Rajgir) are situated east of the confluence of Gangā and Yamunā, one (Kauśāmbī) is near it, and one (Ujjain) lies somewhere else altogether. Elsewhere (1995a: 114 f.) Erdosy recalls that Buddhist tradition recognizes six cities of outstanding importance which would have been fit to receive the mortal remains of the Buddha-Campā, Kāśī, Śrāvastī, Kauśāmbī, Rājagṛha and Sāketa-and points out that the first five of these correspond to the earliest urban centres reconstructed from archaeological evidence, omitting only Ujjain. Cf. DN II.146; Lamotte, 1958: 9. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
S̄PaBr 13.8.1.5. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
A Jaina stūpa has been identified in Mathurā (Smith, 1901). Dundas (2002: 291 n. 4) recalls that stūpas were regularly built to honour eminent deceased Jaina monks during the late medieval period. Irwin (1979: 799) draws attention to a story in which the Buddhist king Kaniṣka venerates by mistake a Jaina stūpa. Schopen (1996: 568 f.) refers to a passage in the early Buddhist canon (Dīgha et Majjhima Nikāya) in which mention is made of a thūpa (Skt. stūpa) in connection with Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the ‘founder’ (or better, most recent Jina) of Jainism. The Buddhist texts also speak of the stūpa of Pūraṇa, one of the ‘heretics’ of Buddhism with links to Ājīvikism (Schopen, 1996: 571 sq.). See further Schubring, 1962/2000: 48 f. Kalhaṇa’s Rājataranigị̣̄ (1.101-02) speaks of a king named Aśoka “who had freed himself from sins and had embraced the doctrine of Jina (jinaśāsaña), [and who] covered Śuṣkaletra and Vitastātra (two villages) with numerous stūpas”; tr. Stein. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
This appears to be the shared opinion of all scholars who have commented upon this passage. Cp. Simpson, 1888: 61 f.; Shah, 1952: 278-80; Bareau, 1975: 163; Parpola, 1988: 254; Kottkamp, 1992: 9 f.; Witzel, 2003a: 46; Falk 2000: 79. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷ ↩¹⁸
Mhbh 3.188.64; tr. van Buitenen, modified. The term edūka (Buddhist Sanskrit eluka) refers no doubt to stūpas, but our passage does not tell us whether specifically Buddhist, Jaina or Ājīvika stūpas are meant. Cf. Biardeau, 2002: II: 759-60. On the relative age of this passage, see González-Reimann, 2002: 95 ff. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷
Biardeau (2002: I: 597) translates caitya “tumuli des ancêtres”. This is a possible translation, especially in a Buddhist context (cf. Strong, 2004: 19-20, with n. 50), but not the only possible one. Cf. Biardeau, 2002: II: 760. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷
SPaBr 1.4.1.14-17; tr. Eggeling. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵
The Kāṇva version has hailo; cp. Witzel, 1989: 212 (reference to ŚPaBrK 4.2.1.18). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷
Cp. Hinüber, 1986: 108 f., § 214. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵ ↩¹⁶ ↩¹⁷
JaimBr 1.337-38; tr. Bodewitz, 1990: 191. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴ ↩¹⁵
Macdonell-Keith,VI: II: 116-117, s.v. Magadha. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³ ↩¹⁴
These words are again ascribed to Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta and his followers at AN I p. 220-21; MN II p. 214; cf. SĀ^c p. 147c 1. 8 f.; MĀ^c p. 442c 1. 2 f. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹² ↩¹³
Utt 29.72 / 1174. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²
Thān 4.1.69-72 / 247. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²
Āyār 1.9.2.4 / 280. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²
Āyār 1.9.4.14 / 320. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹ ↩¹²
Bhag 18.3. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹
Mhbh 12.294.13-18. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰
KaṭhUp 6.10-11. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹
KaṭhUp 3.6. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹
ŚAśUp 2.8-9. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸
MaitUp 6.18. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸
MaitUp 6.20. The readings atah and tālurasanāgranipīdanād (so Limaye-Vadekar, 1958: 343) seem to make more sense than atha and tālurasanāgre nipīdanād (so van Buitenen, 1962: 112). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷
MaitUp 6.34 (van Buitenen, 1962: 105). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
So van Buitenen, 1962: 133. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 4.29. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Yoga Sūtra 2.49: śvāsapraśvāsayor gativicchedah. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷
Mhbh 12.304.8-10. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷
The reading dhāranam manah is hard to construe grammatically; the v.l. dhārayen manah is better, but not completely satisfactory. Perhaps however we may accept a construction action noun + accusative as permissible for epic Sanskrit, as it is for Pāli (Hinüber, 1968: 54-55). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷
This is maintained by Edgerton (1924: 41 n. 46). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Mhbh 12.207.25. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 3.4-7. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 18.11. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 3.27. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 3.28-29. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Bhag 3.3; tr. Edgerton, 1924: 1 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Different from the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
KaṭhUp 2.24. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵
Mhbh 12.212.14-19. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
This opens the way for practices like the karmayoga of the Bhagavadgītā, devotion to God, etc. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Mhbh 12.232.10-18. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
See further Bronkhorst, 2000c: 44 ff . ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Vin I p. 14; tr. BD vol. 4 p. 20-21. Cp. Vetter, 2000: 85 ff. This passage occurs in the Vinaya texts of the Theravādins, of the Mahīśāsakas (TI 1421, vol. 22, p. 105a 1. 15-24), and of the Dharmaguptakas (TI 1428, vol. 22, p. 789a 1. 12 - p. 789b 1. 1), as well as elsewhere, e.g. SN III p. 67 f.; cp. also SN III p. 48 f. etc. (for further references, see Oetke, 1988: 105; Pérez-Remón, 1980: 158 ff.). The different Vinaya versions have been translated into French by André Bareau (1963: 191 f.). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Āyār I.5.6.176 (B p. 56-57) / I.5.6.170 (D p. 153 f.) / I.5.6.4 (S p. 26 (204)) / I.5.6.127 f. (L p. 47). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Āyār I.5.5.171 (B p. 55) / I.5.5.165 (D p. 151) / I.5.5.5 (S p. 25 (203)) / I.5.5.104 (L p. 45). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴
Āyār I.1.1.3-5 (B p. 3) / I.1.1.5-7 (D, p. 15-16) / I.1.1.5 (S p. 1 (179-180)) / I.1.1.5-7 (L p. 4). Schubring’s translation (1926: 67 / 2004: 78) shows that no activity of the soul is necessarily thought of: “He believes [then] in an I, in a world, in the [repercussion of all] acts and in the freedom of the will. [Since he believes in these he says:] ‘I want to act, I want to cause to act, and I want to approve of him who acts here.’ All these activities through acts in the world have to be recognized [as being injurious].” ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴
Sūy 1.1.1.13-14 (ed., tr. Bollée, 1977: 15 and 66): “Ein (Ātman), der handelt, oder einer der (lediglich) handeln lässt - es wird überhaupt keiner (sc. Ātman), der tätig ist, gefunden. In dieser Weise ist (es gemeint, wenn) der Ātman (als) nicht handelnd (bezeichnet wird)’; zu einer so kühnen (Meinung bekennen sich) einige. Wie würde aber eine (derartige) Welt wie die der Verkünder einer solchen Lehre existieren können? Von Finsternis zu Finsternis gehen sie, die Toren, in ihren Handlungen rücksichtslos.” ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴
Bhag 18.42-44 (= Mhbh 6.40.42-44); tr. Edgerton, 1944: 87, modified. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴
Bhag 2.38 (= Mhbh 6.24.38); tr. Edgerton, 1944: 23. ↩ ↩² ↩³
Bhag 2.49 cd (= Mhbh 6.24.49cd); tr. Edgerton, 1944: 25. ↩ ↩² ↩³
Bhag 9.27 (= Mhbh 6.31.27). ↩ ↩² ↩³
Bhag 3.9 (= Mhbh 6.25.9); tr. Edgerton, 1944: 19, modified. ↩ ↩² ↩³
Bhag 3.30 (= Mhbh 6.25.30). ↩ ↩² ↩³
Bhag 5.10 (= Mhbh 6.27.10). ↩ ↩²
Bhag 9.30-31ab (= Mhbh 6.31.30-31ab). ↩ ↩²
Bhag 3.28-29 (= Mhbh 6.25.28-29). ↩ ↩²
See further Subrahmanya Sastri, 1961: Bhūmikā p. 2 f.; Renou, 1962: 195 [621] n. 2. ↩ ↩²
⁶⁶ In another study (Bronkhorst, 2000b) it has been argued that the term Ājīvika (regularly Ājīvaka in Pāli) is used in the Buddhist canon to refer to naked ascetics in general. Here we are only concerned with the “real” Ājīvikas, who presumably constituted a subset of the group of all naked ascetics and shared, beside nudity, a number of beliefs and, perhaps, the habit of referring to themselves as Ājīvikas. Schopen (2006: 322-23), confusingly, draws attention to a passage from the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya which refers to an Ājīvaka who cannot, by his robes, be distinguished from a Buddhist monk. ↩
Vogel, 1970: 1; see further MacQueen, 1984: 291 f.; 1988: 164 f. Vogel, 1970; Meisig, 1987; and MacQueen, 1988 provide parallel passages from the other traditions. ↩
Similarly MacQueen, 1988: 190: “[the Pāli version] stands out as the most archaic of our texts”. ↩
Perhaps the only passage in the Pāli canon that explicitly, though not directly, associates Makkhali Gosāla with the Ājīvikas is AN III p. 384, where Pūraṇa Kassapa presents - out of six ‘classes’ (abhijāti)—“the white class (sukkābhijāti)” as being “the male and female Ājīvikas (?; āj̄vakā āj̄vakiniyo)”, and “the supremely white class (paramasukkābhijāti)” as Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sañkicca and Makkhali Gosāla. ↩
Dundas, 1992: 26 (2002: 29). Dundas suspects “that the Jains and Buddhists deliberately distorted Ajivika doctrine for their own polemical purposes”. ↩
Note however Roth, 1993: 422: “A comparison of Jaina Pkt. Gosāle Mankha-li-putte and Pāli Makkhali Gosālo with B. Sk. Maskarī Gośālī-putraḥ shows that the latter, though it is closer to the Pāli reading, is of secondary origin. In both cases the words of Jaina Pkt. Mankhali and of Pāli Makkhali, connected with the name of Gosāla, with the ending -li instead of -ri, characterize themselves as variants of the eastern Māgadhī type of Prākrit.” ↩
The reference is (indirectly) to Jacobi, 1880, where it is argued that the position described in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta can be identified as belonging to Pārśva, Mahāvīra’s predecessor. ↩
There can be no doubt that cātu-yāma-samvara-samvuto of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta alludes to the cānjjāma dhamma “the Four Restraints” of the followers of Pārśva, but it has repeatedly been pointed out (e.g. Rhys Davids, 1899: 75 n. 1; Walshe, 1987: 545 n .115 ) that the specification of the Four Restraints in the Buddhist Sutta is quite different from the one found in the Jaina texts. The Jaina Thānamga 4.1.136 / 266, for example, states: “In the Bharahas and the Eravayas the Arhats in the middle, excepting the first and the last, preach the doctrine of the Four Restraints, viz. abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from false speech, abstaining from taking what is not given, abstaining from sexual intercourse” (cp. Deleu, 1970: 256). ↩
DN I p. 53-54 (cited by Basham, p. 14-15 n. 3). ↩
I omit the additions made by Basham on the basis of Buddhaghosa’s commentary. ↩
The Nālandā edition of this passage (as well as the PTS edition elsewhere, e.g. SN III p. 211) has äjivaka-sate; the translation will then be: 4,900 Ājīvikas. This fits in well with the following paribhäjakas. ↩
Franke’s translation (1913: 58) may have to be preferred: “Glück und Leid sind wie mit Scheffeln zugemessen, und die Dauer der Seelenwanderung hat ihren bestimmten Termin”. ↩
Viy 15.101 p. 677 (Ladnun); 15.68 p. 712 1. 1-6 (Bombay). Tr. Basham p. 219 (modified). Note that something very similar to the end of this passage (tao pucchā sijjhai bujjhai muccai pariniwāi savvaduddhānam antan karei) occurs several times in Utt 29. On kammaṇi, cp. Leumann, 1889: 339 (525); Schubring, 1954: 260 (472). Basham, quoting an edition not accessible to me (“with the comm. of Abhayadeva, 3 vols. Bombay, 1918-21”), reads kammāni. ↩
Cp. MacQueen, 1988: 167. ↩
Cp. Pande, 1974: 344-45. Note that something not altogether dissimilar is ascribed (perhaps incorrectly) by Herodotus to the Egyptians. See Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983: 219-220, which translates Herodotus II, 123: “the Egyptians are the first to have maintained the doctrine that the soul of man is immortal, and that, when the body perishes, it enters into another animal that is being born at the time, and when it has been the complete round of the creatures of the dry land and of the sea and of the air it enters again into the body of man at birth; and its cycle is completed in 3,000 years. There are some Greeks who have adopted this doctrine, some in former times, and some in later, as if it were their own invention; their names I know but refrain from writing down.” ↩
As late an author as Kamalaśīla attributes this position to the Ājīvikas (Tucci, 1971: 20); “Now as for the statement ‘No wholesome or other act need be performed’, anyone who speaks like this on this point would be in agreement with the doctrine of the Ājīvikas that liberation results from the ending of karma” (tr. Olson and Ichishima, 1979: 216 (42), modified). I thank Martin Adam for drawing my attention to this passage. ↩
N’atthi atta-kāre n’atthi para-kāre, n’atthi purisa-kāre, n’atthi balam n’atthi viriyam, n’atthi purisa-thāmo n’atthi purisa-parakkamo. For the nom. sg. in -e (-kāre) see K. R. Norman, 1976a: 240 f.; Geiger, 1916/1994: 73 § 80. ↩
Gnoli, 1978: 221-222; Meisig, 1987: 136: nāsti purusakārah, nāsti parākramah, nāsti purusakāraparākramah, nāsty ātmakārah, na parakārah, anātmakāraparakārah. ↩
Sūy 2.6.47 criticizes those who believe in “an unmanifest, great, eternal, imperishable and unchanging purusa” (Bollée, 1999: 426). Sīlāāka ascribes this verse to Ekadandins, which term-as Bollée reminds us-may have covered the Ājīvikas, beside others (Basham, p. 169 f.). Bollée adds the appropriate warning (1999: 435 n. 26): “our commentators are Jains who might have known hardly more of these old and vague views of religious opponents than we”. ↩
The fact that the following line states that all satta, all pāna, all bhūta and all jiva are without strength and without courage is no doubt meant to draw the conclusion that living beings, because their real selves have no strength and courage, don’t really have them either. ↩
He alone-unlike the other five heretics, including Maskarin Gośālīputra - is presented as “chief of five hundred Āj̄̄vikas” (pañcamātrānām Āj̄vikaśatānām pramukhah) in the Saṅghabhedavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (Gnoli, 1978: 217; the views here attributed to Pūraṇa Kāśyapa (p. 220-221) coincide however with those of Ajita Kesakambalī in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta). He is several times presented as an Ājīvika teacher in later texts; cf. Basham, 1951: 80 f. He is also the one who held that Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sañkicca and Makkhali Gosāla constitute “the supremely white class” (see note 69, above). Moreover, “[SN III p. 69] ascribes the first portion of Makkhali’s views (as given in [DN I p. 53])-that there is no cause, no reason for depravity or purity - to Pūraṇa Kassapa” (DPPN II p. 398 s.v. Makkhali-Gosāla n. 1). - It is noteworthy that Maskari(n) and Pūraṇa are mentioned by Bhāskara I as earlier mathematicians (Pingree, 1981: 59); see Shukla, 1976: liii-lv, 71.7 (on Āryabhaṭīya Daśagītikā 1), 671.4 (on Āryabhaṭīya Gaṇitapāda 9). ↩
DN I p. 52-53 (partly cited by Basham, p. 13 n. 1). A résumé of this position in verse is given SN I p. 66. Essentially the same position is attributed to Sañjayī Vairatī̄putra in the Mūlasarvāstivādin Saṅghabhedavastu (Gnoli, 1978: 222-223; Meisig, 1987: 144). ↩
Bhag 2.19-20 (= Mhbh 6.24.19-20). On the interpretation of verse 20b, see Bronkhorst, 1991b: 303. ↩
DN I p. 53 (§ 18). The Gilgit Saṅghabhedavastu attributes this position (akriyā) to Sañjayī Vairattīputra (Gnoli, 1978: 223). Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita (9.57) appears to use the word prakṛti to refer to the force that determines future existences: “Some say there is a future life (paraloka) but do not explain the means of liberation. They teach that there is an essential force of nature (prakṛti) at work in the continuance of activity, like the essential heat of fire and the essential liquidity of water.” (tr. Johnston). ↩
On the development of this concept, see Bronkhorst, 2000a. ↩
For a detailed presentation, see my forthcoming book Buddhist Teachings in India (English translation of Bronkhorst, 2000c). ↩
The striking homogeneity of this ideology in all these religious movements may be an instance of the inherent conceptual systems that are said to characterize religions; cf. Witzel, 2004. ↩
See esp. p. 93, below. ↩
See however the remarks in Part IV. ↩
So already Zysk, 1985: 1, 10-11. Cp. Wujastyk, 1995: 20 f. ↩
Schwanbeck, 1846: 136-139, Fragm. 41; Jacoby, 1958: 636-37. ↩
Zysk, 1991: 32; cp. McCrindle, 1901: 76; Jones, 1930: 122-125. For the original Greek, see Jones, 1930: 122-124; Meineke, 1877: 1001. I thank Bogdan Diaconescu for helping me with the interpretation of this passage. ↩
See p. 82 with note 10 , below. ↩
Tr. McCrindle, 1901: 76. Cp. Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001. ↩
See chapter II.A.1, below. ↩
Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001. ↩
Geography 15.1.71; cf. Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1002; tr. Jones. McCrindle (1901: 77) translates this passage in a manner which suggests that all Indians wear long hair and long beards. ↩
Since Zysk, incorrectly, thinks that the mountain-dwelling philosophers are Śramanas, this passage creates for him serious difficulties of interpretation. ↩
Cp. Zysk, 1985: 8: “In this work […] the concept of magico-religious medicine is understood to be as follows: Causes of diseases are not attributed to physiological functions, but rather to external beings or forces of a demonic nature who enter the body of their victim and produce sickness. The removal of such malevolent entities usually involved an elaborate ritual, often drawing on aspects of the dominant local religion and nearly always necessitating spiritually potent and efficacious words, actions and devices.” On Vedic healing, see further Bahulkar, 1994. ↩
Filliozat, 1949: 154: “la théorie des trois éléments actifs de l’organisme qui, par rupture de leur équilibre ou par anomalies fonctionnelles, deviennent ses trois éléments de trouble (tridosa), le vent, la pituite et la bile, n’était pas encore constituée à l ‘époque des Veda proprement dits.” Some pages later Filliozat (p. 157 f.) mentions the presence of the theory of breaths/winds in the Upaniṣads as proof for the continuity of Vedic medicine and classical Āyurveda. However, this kind of “proof” can only be convincing to those who, like Filliozat (p. 155), believe “C’est […] parce qu’une continuité est nécessaire entre les spéculations du Veda et les doctrines classiques de l’Āyurveda que nous pouvons affirmer avec certitude qu’une tradition intermédiaire a existé.” ↩
SN IV p. 230; AN II p. 87; III p. 131. ↩
AN V p. 218-19. ↩
For the way in which the expression “Vedic society” is here used, see the introduction, above. ↩
It is remarkable that, according to the back cover of Michel Strickmann’s book Chinese Magical Medicine (2002), “the most profound and far-reaching effects of Buddhism on Chinese culture occurred at the level of practice, specifically in religious rituals designed to cure people of disease, demonic possessions, and bad luck”. The “empirico-rational” approach to reality of early Indian Buddhism did apparently not survive the journey to China. See the remarks about Tantric Buddhism in Part IV, below. ↩
BaudhDhS 2.11.28. The translation deviates from Bühler’s in substituting Asura for Āsura; similarly Olivelle, 2000: 281. See further Winternitz, 1926: 225; Längat, 1967: 66. ↩
TI 2137, vol. 54, p. 1245a 1. 5-6; Takakusu, 1904: 979. ↩
Johnston’s most important ms. has -buddhi, which has been changed into -buddhir in the edition. This reading does not however seem to make much sense. Kapila is described as buddha Mhbh 12.290.3. ↩
It is doubtful whether Kapila Gautama, the founder of Kapilavastu according to Aśvaghoṣa’s Saundarananda canto I, is to be identified with this Kapila. ↩
See, e.g., Hume, 1931: 406 with n. 2. ↩
There are Viṣnu images from Kashmir, one of whose four faces has been taken to represent Kapila; this face “is not of a benign sage but clearly demonic or wrathful”. The attribution of this face to Kapila is contested; see Pal, 2005. A divinity called Kapilavāsudeva is attested in Cambodia, already in pre-Angkor times, and there are sanctuaries in his honour; Bhattacharya, 1961: 118. An inscription from Khajuraho dated 953-954 CE speaks, in its introductory stanza, of “the three chief Asuras, Kapila and the rest” (asuranukhyān […] trīn ugrān […] kapilādīn) slain by Vaikuṇtha; see Kielhorn in EI 1 (1892), pp. 122-135. ↩
For a study of this myth in epic-purāṇic literature, see Bock, 1984. ↩
Mhbh 3.195.25. Tr. Doniger O’Flaherty. ↩
Cf. Winternitz, 1926: 225. ↩
Mhbh 12.261.27-32. ↩
Mhbh 12.262.19-20. ↩
Cf. Tsuchida, 1996, esp. pp. 465 ff. On the original interpretation of ChānUp 2.12.1 see further Olivelle, 1996. ↩
Mhbh 12.262.28cd. ↩
The meditative practices taught by Arāḍa ( 12.46 f.) are of Buddhist origin. of the Vedic penance grove. The former is nivrtti, the latter is pravrtti; the former aims at attaining heaven, the latter liberation. ↩
Gonda, 1977: 589. ↩
Fleet, 1970: 114-115. ↩
Jain, 1984: 304. ↩
Note further that that the three so-called guṇas of Sāṃkhya-sattva, rajas, and tamas - are sometimes presented as mental attributes (mānasa guṇa) beside three bodily attributes that correspond to the three humors of Āyurveda; so, e.g., Mhbh 12.16 .11-13. ↩
Strictly speaking the expression “cyclic time” is, of course, a misnomer. Time, in all the cases to be considered, is linear; the units superimposed on this linear time, on the other hand, repeat each other to at least some extent, and account in this way for a certain “cyclicity”. ↩
SN II p. 178; tr. Harvey, 1990: 32. ↩
Bareau, 1963: 75 ff. For a translation of one version, see chapter IIB.2, below. ↩
MN I p. 483. ↩
Harvey, 1990: 33, with references to SN II p. 181-82 and 183-84. ↩
DN I p. 17; tr. Walshe, 1987: 75-76. ↩

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Bronkhorst, Johannes - Greater Magadha, Brill (2007)

Greater Magadha

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

THE SEPARATE CULTURE OF GREATER MAGADHA

PART I - CULTURAL FEATURES OF GREATER MAGADHA

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I.1 - THE FUNDAMENTAL SPIRITUAL IDEOLOGY

Early Jainism

Knowledge of the self

The Bhagavadgītā

Ājivikism

Buddhism

Conclusions

CHAPTER I.2 - OTHER FEATURES

Funerary practices

Medicine

Kapila

Cyclic time

CHAPTER I.3 - CONCLUSIONS TO PART I

PART II - BRAHMANISM VIS-À-VIS REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION

PART IIA - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION HESITANTLY ACCEPTED

CHAPTER IIA.1 - A DHARMA SŪTRA

Vedic asceticism

The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra

Confirmation in Greek sources

CHAPTER IIA.2 - A PORTION FROM THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

The chronological position of the Mahābhārata

The Rājadharmaparvan

CHAPTER IIA.3 - THE EARLY UPANIṢADS

The first occurrences of the new doctrine

Rebirth and karmic retribution in relation to Vedic thought

The self in the early Upanisads

Vedic antecedents

PART IIB - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION IGNORED OR REJECTED

CHAPTER IIB.1 - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION IGNORED

CHAPTER IIB.2 - REBIRTH AND KARMIC RETRIBUTION REJECTED

The Cārvākas

PART IIC - URBAN BRAHMINS

PART III - CHRONOLOGY

CHAPTER III.0 - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER III.1 - LINGUISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER III.2 - THE VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO THE EARLY SANSKRIT GRAMMARIANS

Pānini and the Veda: introduction

Pānini and the Veda (1)

Pānini and the Veda (2)

The Ṛgveda at the time of Pānini

Patañjali and the Veda

Conclusions

CHAPTER III.3 - THE VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO THE EARLY BUDDHISTS

CHAPTER III.4 - SOME INDICATIONS IN LATE-VEDIC LITERATURE

The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇda

A reference to the early grammarians in the Upaniṣads?

Conclusion

CHAPTER III.5 - URBAN VERSUS RURAL CULTURE

The second urbanization

Magical thought in the Veda

CHAPTER III.6 - CONCLUSIONS TO PART III

PART IV - CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV.1 - DISCWORLD MEETS ROUNDWORLD

PART V - APPENDICES

APPENDIX I - THE ANTIQUITY OF THE VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY

Were the Pūrva- and Uttaramīmāṃsā originally one system?

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Uttara-Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the teacher quotations

Conclusions

APPENDIX II - A CĀRVĀKA IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

APPENDIX III - VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO PĀNINI

APPENDIX IV - THE FORM OF THE ṚGVEDA KNOWN TO PĀNINI

APPENDIX V - VEDIC TEXTS KNOWN TO PATAÑJALI

APPENDIX VI - BRAHMINS IN THE BUDDHIST CANON

APPENDIX VII - BRAHMANISM IN GANDHĀRA AND SURROUNDING AREAS

APPENDIX VIII - CĀRVĀKAS AND THE ŚĀBARABHĀṢYA

REFERENCES

INDEX

Footnotes