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Krishan - Buddhism and Belief in Ātman (1984)

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Buddhism and Belief in Ātman

by Y. Krishan

JIABS Vol 7 Issue 2 pp. 117-135

The question whether the Buddhists believed in a permanent entity, soul or ātmā has been the subject of great debate. In fact, many scholars of Buddhism hold that the Buddha upheld the doctrine of anattā or anātmavāda, no soul. As Oldenberg put it, the Buddhists believed in a becoming and not in a being. In consequence, it is concluded “In Buddhism there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words, there is no conscious subject behind consciousness.” 1 This, in short, leads to action (karma) without a doer (kartā). It also repudiates the concept of transmigration and rebirth (punarjanma). To believe in the doctrine of karma without accepting the concepts of jīva and its rebirth is evidently perplexing.

T.W. Rhys Davids 2 expresses the resultant dilemma thus: “We have thus arrived at a deadlock; to save what it holds to be a psychological truth, Buddhism rejects the notion of a soul; to save what it holds to be the necessity of justice, it retains the belief in transmigration.”

The source of this controversy is to be found in the Anatta-lakkhana-sutta of the Vinayapitaka (1.6.38 ff.), wherein the Buddha asserts that neither the body (rūpa) nor any of the psychical factors of existence, feeling (vedanā), ideas (sañña), volition (sankhāras), consciousness (viñ̃ña na) can be said to be attā, the self-the five khandhas or factors of individual existence are perishable, non-enduring, aniccā, impermanent.

At the outset, it would be appropriate to set out the views of different schools and sects of Buddhists on this subject.

The Stharviravādins or Theravādins, Kāśyapīyas (also called Sthavariyas) and Vibhājyavādins had a pluralistic conception of the constitutent elements of the universe, nāmarūpa. As Anurudhācārya explains in his Abhidhammattha samgaho I. 2 (8th-12th Century A.D.), these schools believed that there were four ultimate categories: citta or viñ̃ ñana (consciousness), caitasika (mental properties), rüpa (material qualities) and nirvāna. They admitted of a pudgala (individual self) only at the empirical level of reality and not as an ultimate real. It needs to be noted, however, that while they believed in pudgalaśūnyatā, they also accepted that citta or viñ̃ ñana was one of the ultimate categories. The Majjihimanikāya (1.2.66) speaks of a gandhabba (gandharva) as an essential feature in conception. This gandhabba appears to be a form of pudgala. Buddhaghoṣa, at Visuddhimagga XVII 158-173, speaks of patisandhi viñ̃ ñāna, re-birth-linking consciousness. Patisandhi viñ̃ ñāna appears to be another version of pudgala.

The Mahīśāsakas and the Dharmaguptikas believed in nine asamiskrta dharmas such as pratisamkhyānirodha, apratisaṁkhyānirodha, ākāśa, etc., including pratitya samutpāda tathatā. They also believed in pudgalaśūnyatā.

The Sarvāstivādins held that sarvam asti, all things exist. They also subscribed to the doctrine of nairātmya, non-soul or the absence of any permanent substance in an individual. They believed in the eternal existence of 75 dharmas, 72 material categories, and three asamiskrta dharmas viz., pratisaṁkhyānirodha, apratisaṁkhyānirodha, and ākāśa. They also believed in pudgalaśūnyatā, but surprisingly, believed in antarābhava, a being having intermediate existence between death of a being and its rebirth.

The Vātsīputrīyas and Sāmmitīyas believed in the existence of a pudgala, or a soul, but held that it was avācaya inexpressible (Tattvasaimgraha 337).

Sautrāntikas, also called Saṁkrāntivādins, repudiated the pudgalavāda of the Vātsīputrīyas, and called it a metaphysical fiction, like a sky lotus. They did, however, hold that consciousness, vijñāna, one of the five skandhas, migrates at the death of an individual. They postulated an incorruptible seed (bīa) of goodness, an innate, indestructible and perfectly pure factor which persists throughout all change until emancipation or nirvāṇa.

Vasubandhu, a Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika, discusses the Vātsīputrīya doctrine of anātman exhaustively in the Pudgala viniścaya (also called the Ātmavāda-pratiṣedha) of his Abhidharmakośa, and demolishes it. He cites, inter alia, the Bimbisāra-sūtra to emphasise, “there is no self, nothing mine”; 3 inner life is void, the outer life is void. 4 He explains the parable of the bhārahāra, the carrier of the burden as not justifying the existence of a permanent self. He cites the Paramārtha-śūnyatā-sūtra: actions do exist, and they also fructify or bear consequences, but the doer thereof cannot be found. 5

In the Abhidharmakośabhāsya (AKB) he elaborates: Just as milk and water conventionally describe all their features, like form, etc., likewise, the collection of skandhas, elements of conscious ego, are called pudgala. 6 According to Vasubandhu, a person, e.g., Devadatta is “only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be unity, to which they give the name Devadatta.” But, as noted earlier, Vasubandhu, while repudiating belief in ātmā, or soul, subscribes to a belief in antarābhava, at Abhidharmakośa III.10.12.14-18. Evidently, he only denied the existence of an ātmā as a permanent ego.

Buddhaghoṣa (a Theravādin), in his Visuddhimagga also elaborates the non-ātman doctrine. At Visuddhimagga XVII 162, he observes: there is no transition of the past existence into (consciousness aggregates), nor does it come into existence without a cause. 7 Buddhaghoṣa (ibid. XVII 164) reiterates: (consciousness) does not arrive here from its past existence, nor does it appear without karmas, samiskāras, etc., as the cause. 8 In other words, present-life consciousness does not arise from the previous existence but from past causes, like an echo, a lamp, the impression of a seal and a reflection (Visuddhimagga XVII 166). Buddhaghoṣa goes on to explain: (consciousness) is a continuous series; there is neither identity nor dissimilarity.9 He cites the anology of milk and curds: if there be identity or dissimilarity between the two, the curds cannot be formed from milk (Visuddhimagga XVII 167). It is significant, however, that Buddhaghoṣa also uses the term patisandhi, rebirth, reunion in explaining the phenomenon of transmigration and rebirth, and does not call it a new birth.

Buddhagoṣa goes on to elaborate, at Visuddhimagga XVIII10, that nāma consists of sensation (vedanā), perception (sañña) and samkhāra (volition); consciousness (vin̄̄nāna) however, is not a part of nāma. Rūpa is form, and is composed of the four mahābhūtas, or elements. He explains, “Name has no power of its own, nor can it go on of its own impulse … form is also without power and cannot go on its own impulse.” They are, however, mutually indispensable to each other. Form goes or moves when supported by name (nāma), and name when supported by form. He likens the two to a blind and a cripple; unless they mutually support each other, it is not possible for them to move. 11 In short, consciousness manifests itself only as nāmarūpa (name and form). At Visuddhimagga XX, 12 Buddhaghoṣa asserts that nāma and rūpa do not arise from any material; so, when nāmarūpa ceases to exist (i.e., when a person dies), they do not exist anywhere in a material form.

… just as when a flute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence, it does not come from any such store, and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass; and when it has ceased, it exists nowhere in a stored up state … in exactly the same way, all the elements of being, both those with form and those without form, come into existence after having been non-existent; and having come into existence, pass away.

At Visuddhimagga XIX, 13 he echoes what was said by Vasubandhu: “Of karma there is no doer; nor is there somebody to experience its results. It is nothing but bare states that come to pass.” If there is no kartā, or doer, there is no moral responsibility for any act, good or evil. In consequence, the entire edifice of Buddhist ethics falls. This, in turn, raises very difficult issues relating to Buddhist religious beliefs and metaphysics. There is unanimity among all students of Buddhism, irrespective of their sectarian affiliation, that there is a law of karma and punarjanma (rebirth). It is karma that explains the phenomena of suffering and inequality. The karmas, or actions, of an individual in this life mature in the subsequent births or rebirths. Thus, the doctrines of karma and punarjanma (rebirth) are inseparably linked. If there be no soul or transmigrating entity that takes rebirth, who bears or enjoys the consequences or fruits of karma?

In the Devadūtta-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya (3.178-179) 14 the Buddha claims that with his celestial eye he sees “creatures in the act of passing hence and of reappearing elsewhere, creatures lowly or debonair, fair or foul to view, happy or unhappy, … they fare according to their past.” Those who had done good deeds are either born in states of bliss in heaven or as human beings … creatures given to evil in act, at the body’s dissolution became ghosts, animals or are born in purgatory.

In the Cūla-Kamma-Vibhanga-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya (3.203-206), the Buddha specifically identifies certain actions as leading, after death, to rebirth in purgatory, or among human beings, or in heaven. For example, violence and murder, etc., lead to rebirth in hell, or as a human being for a brief period, or as a human constantly ailing, poor, or of low social status, etc. Likewise, in the Mahā-Kamma-vibhanga-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya (3.207-215), the Buddha identifies the states of existence attained by various living individuals after death with reference to their karma, viz., purgatory, heaven, etc.

On the other hand, the Buddha speaks of pratitya-samutpäda, conditioned genesis. The Samyuttanikāya 15 (2.64-65) states that “The body … is not yours, nor does it belong to others. It should be regarded as former karma effected through what has been willed and felt… .”

Again, ignorance produces samkhāras (samiskāras) avijjāpaccavyā samkhāra (Vinayapitaka16 1.1 and Samyuttanikāya 17 2.1-2, 43, 65). In the Majjhimanikāya 18 (1.54) the Buddha explains that the samkhāras are the kārmic formations of body, speech and thought or mind. In brief, the samiskāras are the psychic roots or substrates of consciousness.

At the same time, the Buddha denounces as erroneous those who believe in an eternal soul (eternalists) or that nothing exists after death (annihilationists). In the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīghanikāya (1.34-35) the Buddha speaks of annihilationists who aver: “Since … the soul has form, mind, space, ideas, etc., is built up of the four elements … it is cut off, destroyed, on the dissolution of the body, and does not continue after death; and then … the soul is completely annihilated.” In the same sutta (1.40) the Buddha rejects as erroneous the view of certain recluses and brahmins who are eternalists, that is, who believe that the soul and the world are eternal and arise without cause. In the Samyuttanikāya (2.19-21) he observes:

“Who so says, ‘He who does (a deed) is he who experiences (its results) is thereby saying that from the being’s beginning suffering was wrought by (the being) himself-this amounts to the Eternity view. Who so says ‘One does (a deed), another experiences (the result)’ is thereby saying that when a being is smitten by feeling, the suffering was wrought by another-this amounts to the Annihilation view.”

The Buddha claims to avoid both these “dead ends.”

In the Samyuttanikāya 19(4.400-401) the Buddha explains his view with greater clarity:

“If I, Ānanda, on being asked by the Wanderer Vacchagotta, if there is a Self, should have answered that there is a Self, this, Ānanda, would have been a siding-in with those recluses and brāhmaṇs who are Eternalists (sāsstavādins). If I, Ānanda, on being asked by the Wanderer Vacchagotta, if there is not a Self, should have answered that there is not a Self, this, Ānanda, would have been siding-in with those recluses and brāhmaṇs who are Annihilationists (ucchedavādins).”

In the Samyuttanikāya 20(1.134-35) it is said:

‘Being’ why does thou harp upon that word?
‘Mong false opinions, Mara has thou strayed
Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this!
No ‘being’ can be here discerned to be,
For just as, when the parts are rightly set,
The word ‘chariot’ ariseth (in our mind)
So doth our usage covenant us to say,
‘A being’ when the aggregates are those.

In other order words, the term sattva, being, is only a conventional designation for impermanent aggregates.

Again, at Samyuttanikāya 21 XXII 22(1), the Buddha explains the burden and the bearer of the burden; the five attachment groups (skandhas) are the burden, the pudgala (individual) is the carrier of the burden. Again, Samyutta 22 XII 61.8 likens the self to a monkey jumping from branch of a tree to another:

“As a monkey faring through jungle and wood catches hold of a bough and, having let it go, takes hold of another, even so that which is called thought and mind and consciousness this by night and day dissolves as one thing and reappears even as another.”

At Samiyuttanikaya 23 XXII 85(6), the bhikṣu Yamaka understands the teaching of the Buddha thus:

“In so far as a brother has destroyed the āsavas (impurities), he is broken up and perishes when the body breaks up, he becomes not after death.”

Sāriputta calls this pāpakam ditṭhigatam (evil heresy). He explains:

“Surely the Bhagavat would not say ‘A brother who has destroyed the āsavas is broken up and perishes when the body breaks up, he becomes not after death.’ ”24

Buddhaghoṣa says at Visuddhimagga 25 XVII. 113 that a man who is confused about these things (rebirth, death and round of births) … does not consider that “every where the aggregates break-up at death,” but thinks that a being dies, and his individuality (consciousness) is transferred to another body. 26 The same text 27 (XVIII 29) observes: “To say ‘the living entity persists’ is to fall short of the truth; to say ‘It is annihilated’ is to outrun the truth.”

The logical implications of the absence of ātmā, ego, pudgala, are set out with great clarity in the Milindapañha. 28 King Milinda asks Nāgasena:

“Bhante Nāgasena, if there is no ego to be found … who keeps the precepts, who applies himself to meditation, who realises the fruit of the discipline (path) that is Nirvāna, who destroys life, who commits immorality, who tells lies, who drinks intoxicating liquor, who commits the five crimes that constitute proximate karma? (As there is no personal responsibility for such lapses) there is no merit, there is no demerit; there is no one who does or causes to be done meritorious or demeritorious deeds; good and evil deeds can have no fruit or result!”

In reply, Nāgasena establishes that the person called Nāgasena cannot be identified with the several components of his body: hair, nails, teeth, skin, bones, blood, form, sensation, perception, consciousness, etc. He could as well have been called Nāgasena, Sūrasena, Vīrasena or Sihasena. He also cites the analogy of a chariot: a chariot cannot be identified with its components: pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, etc. Nāgasena impresses upon the king that the word “chariot” “is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation… .” and that “In exactly the same way … Nāgasena is but a way of counting, term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body … brain of the head, form, sensation, perception, predispositions and consciousness. But in the absolute sense there is no Ego (self) here to be found …” Nāgasena explains at Milindapañha 4029:

“Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self consciousness.”

The Samyuttanikāya 30 (III 3.1.5) explains the concept of rebirth lucidly:

He whose conduct in body, speech and thought is bad, “at the breaking up of the body after dying he arises in the abyss, the bad bourn, the downfall.” On the other hand, a person whose conduct in body, speech and thought is good “at the breaking up of the body after dying, he arises in a good bourn in a heavenly world… .”

Milindapañha 31 46 reiterates the position: “Just so, great king, deeds, good or evil, are done by this name and form and another is reborn. But that other is not entirely released from its deeds (karma).” The Mahāvastu 32 (III 65) states:

“From what cause is a thing born (jayati)? From what cause does a thing endure? From what cause is it broken up? From what cause is it reconstituted?” The Buddha replies, ”… It is because of ignorance, craving and karma; that is why … a thing is born … . It endures because of the karma of life (āyuhkarma) and of the sustenance it gets … . It is broken up because of the decay of life, of karma, and because of the deprivation of sustenance … . It is reconsti- tuted through the non-elimination of ignorance and because of subjection to craving and so it has maturing karma.” 33

The controversy regarding the non-existence of pudgala, soul, is set out with great clarity in the Kathāvatthu 34 (1.1.158) in the question and answers between a Theravādin and Puggalavādin. In brief, the Puggalavādin maintains that the soul of a deceased person transmigrates from this world to another and vice versa, that it cannot be said that the soul in each transmigrating journey is identical with the other, nor can it be said that they are both identical and different. The Theravādin avers that, if they be identical there will be no destruction of life, and concludes that while karmas mature, it is wrong to say that the transmigrating soul is the same. Kathāvatthu 1.1.170 sums up:

“At the dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘person’ doth disintegrate,
Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.
At the dissolution of each aggregate,
If then the ‘soul’ doth not disintegrate,
Eternal, like Nibbāna, were the soul indeed.”

While the Buddha repudiated any belief in an immutable and abiding soul, he also rejected the view that there was no consciousness principle apart from the material body, or that consciousness was only a function of material aggregates. This is conclusively established by the phenomenon of memory of previous births or past incarnations. In the Añguttaranikāya 35 (V.III.23) the Buddha teaches that one can, through self concentration, call to mind one’s various temporary states in a previous existence, such as one birth, two births, three, four … a thousand or a hundred thousand births, and about one’s name, family, caste, mode of earning livelihood, age, etc. This is reaffirmed in another passage in the Añguttaranikāya 36 (X.III.21) wherein it is averred that through yoga ”. . .he calleth to mind the various appearances and forms of his previous births … .” The Visuddimagga 37 (XI 371) also speaks of acquiring insight into repeated births through developing concentration and (XI 372) of desiring to obtain rebirth in the Brahmā world.

It is important to note that all the Buddhist schools unanimously repudiated the materialism of the Cārvākas, who maintained that consciousness was merely a product of the combination of physical elements (mahäbhūtas) and that consciousness ceases absolutely when the physical constituent elements disintegrate. It would be erroneous to interpret the anätman theory of the Buddhists in a manner which will lead to their doctrines being identified with those of Cārvākas.

To sum up, the Buddha denied the existence of any eternal, unchanging self or soul. He also repudiated the belief that there is no self or conscious entity after death. The whole existence both material and “spiritual” has been aptly compared to the current of a river (nadī soto viya), 38 which is constantly changing and yet continuous. This was entirely in keeping with the doctrine of dependent origination (pratitya samutapäda), inasmuch as everything in this universe including the conscious self is, at any moment of time, in the process of continuous change. In other words, there does not exist a continuous, abiding unchanging personal entity: the pudgala of the Buddhists, like dharmas or material categories, is always in a state of flux; only the rate of change differs and is not always patently manifest.

The biological phenomenon of metamorphosis in the case of butterflies and frogs from the time of their birth to the stage of adulthood provides vivid examples of physical changes in an individual. 39 Similar, though less pronounced, changes are also visible not only in the physical characteristics of human beings, but also in their personality, their mental and moral make-up. At birth, the personalities of children are not distinguishable; they have physical differences in their shape, colour, size, weight, etc., but their personality or character as a function of moral and mental nature, are undeveloped, dormant and apparently similar. As they grow, their personality differences, and hence their individuality, manifest themselves. In fact, it can be said that growth means changes in physical and mental characteristics; as a person grows, his personality characteristics, and hence his individuality, become more pronounced, and passion, anger, greed, detachment, fear, courage, etc., exhibit themselves in varying degrees in different individuals. In other words, as a being grows, his body and character undergo change and progressively become more marked and individualized. So, while an individual is undergoing continuous changes of personality, physical, mental and moral, there is a continuity of each personality in his own memory and in the perception of his fellow beings. It is this individuality of an existent being which is a surviving sub-stratum “pudgala,” but which is perishable and which ceases to exist in nirvāna.

Thus, pudgala, self or consciousness undergoes changes in an individual body from the time of birth, in childhood, growth, maturity and death. This pudgala is the sūksama śarīra of the Yoga school. It is the bhūtätman of the Maitri Upanisad. It is this pudgala that transmigrates at death and undergoes rebirth (punarjanma) in accordance with one’s deeds. It is this pudgala 40 that is the storehouse of memory and of accumulated karmas. It is on the sundering of the bonds of the tṛṣṇā (craving for existence) that binds the skandhas, elements of consciousness, together that a person attains nirvāna. There are weighty grounds for arriving at this conclusion.

The Mahāvagga (I. 2. 3) of the Vinayapitaka says that the supreme happiness is attainable by eliminating or driving out (vinayo) the concept or notion (māna) “I am” (asmi): the ego, or ahamkāra. The Alagaddūpamasutta of the Majjhimanikāya (I. 22) (P.T. Society text, p. 139) says that a bhikṣu is emancipated when he abandons (pahīno) the concept of ego (asmi mäno). The context leaves no room for doubt that in this sutta (text, p. 135) the Buddha is speaking of the individual self when he describes the six wrong views (ditthitthānāni) concerning rūpa, vedanā, etc., thus: etam mama, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attā (“this is mine,” “I am this,” “this is my self.”) The emphasis is on the ego or the individual self as distinct from the impersonal, universal self. This is further clear from the same sutta (text, p. 138): Attani vā bhikkhave satilattaniyam-me ti assāsati: “If there is recollection of a self, this is: ‘the self is myself.’ ” Notice that the emphasis is on the self of mine and not on the self which could mean both the great, impersonal, universal self, the paramätman, and the individual self, ātman or ātmā. The Chachakka sutta of the Majjhimanikäya (III.148) (text, p. 284) makes it clear that the rise or origination of the individual self (sakkāyasamudaya) leads to consciousness of individuality: etam mam, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attā. It is reiterated in the same sutta that the absence of the sense of selfhood n’etam mam, etc., suppresses the individual self (saskāyanirodhagāmini).

The Dhammapada draws a distinction between the great self and a self. Dhammapada 160 and 380 say that the self is the lord of the self (attä hiattäno nätho) and the self is the bourn of the self (ätta hi attäno gati). Dhammanada 379 avers that the self stimulates and controls the self (attanā codayattānam pațivāse attamattanā). What does not exist eternally is an individual self. As the Samyuttanikäya (III. 130) says, “There is nowhere to be found in the Khandas, ‘I am.’”

Harivarman (3rd Century A.D.), in the Satyasiddhiśāstra 41 (34-35), discusses the pudgala controversy in the Buddhist schools, and defines ātman as an integration of five aggregates: “Action and fruition are all possible when the five aggregates are at work in succession.” He warns, “If the soul is nominal, simply none would incur the sin in killing a cow.” He also emphasises (ibid., 84) that “the sense of ‘I’ is activity (injita), etc.; wherein exists the sense of ‘I,’ therein is activity, the mind’s act … abode of greed. What is manifested is termed abode of greed.”

Vasubandhu, who, in the Pudgalaviniścaya of Abhidharmakośa, had mounted a massive attack on the doctrine of ātman, recognised that total denial of a self would lead to erosion of responsibility for karmas, 42 and absence of belief in a conditioned self (samurttim) would lead the tender child of moral merit to perish. 43 He recognises that the Buddha did not deny the existence of an empirical self (bhüta prajñaptikah). He continues: obscured by ignorance, the empirical or conditioned self is wandering about in the cycle of existence. 44 Further, the collection of skandhas or elements called sattva (conditioned or empirical self), wanders about on account of the force of craving. 45 Vasubandhu goes on to explain the dangerous implications of a belief in a permanent self or ego. He says that the idea of a self is followed by the idea of “mine.” 46 Again: “Further, where the idea of mine has taken firm hold, there arises bondage to all that is deemed mine and takes a person further away from liberation.” 47

Kamalaśīla, in his pañjikā on Tattavasamigraha 48 3338 of Śāntarakṣita, explains the concept of no-soul as appertaining to egotism:

… . All these afflictions-love, hate and the rest-have their root in wrong notions of the soul, as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; … if … a soul existed, there would be constant appearance of the afflictions of love, etc… . they (the afflictions) really proceed from the wrong notion of the soul. For instance, unless one has the notion of ‘I’, … he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be attached to it as his ‘own’; hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conducive to bringing pain to himself; because there can be no hatred against what is not harmful to what is his own, or against what removes the harm.

He goes on to add that the notion of the “soul” produces notion of “one’s own” and love for one’s own, and this produces hatred and the rest,

and from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clearly known to all men … that all these afflictions-love, etc.have their root in the notion of ‘one’s own’, which proceeds from the notion of one’s self or soul.

Śāntarakṣita (3438-3494) observes “It is only when there are notions of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’ that the whole mass of afflictions becomes operative…” Kamalaśīla explains that the doctrine of no soul is the sole destroyer of afflictions that are the source of “birth and rebirth.” He adds that there is liberation on the cessation of the “I” notion. He observes the notion of “soul” is the very root of the “I” notion and that “So long as the mind is beset with the ‘I-notion’, the series of birth and rebirth does not cease… .”

Again, how can there be an accumulation of previous karmas without a corpus in which they accumulate? This corpus is the empirical self, sūkṣama śarīra, which is anitya and disintegrates on attainment of nirvāṇa. The conception of nirvāṇa, in turn, provides a clear indication of the nature of consciousness, ātmā or soul in Buddhism. For example, Milindapañha 321-322 likens nirvāṇa to a wish-fulfilling tree, which satisfies all desires, causes delight and is full of lustre; to clarified butter, which is beautiful in colour, and has a pleasant odor and taste.

This description of nirvāṇa conceives it as a positive entity and not as a nothingness. According to the schools of the Hīnayāna, nirvāṇa is an asamiskrta dharma, an unconditioned category which has an objective existence and which can be obtained by following the path (mārga). Nirvāṇa consists of two such categories: pratisaṁkhyānyrodha and apratisaṁkhyānirodha. Buddhaghoṣa recognises that nirvāṇa can be attained by intense discipline: ”… it cannot be non-existent, as it is realisable by transcendental intuition, born of unremitting and unflagging perseverance… ” Kamalaśīla, at Tattvasaṁgraha pañjikā 2748-2749, explains pratisaṁkhyānirodha as the dissociation (of the principle of consciousness) from āsravas or kleśas (impurities). The Mahāyānist schools only emphasised dharma śūnyatā, the non-existence of any material categories besides pudgala śūnyatā. Still, they also accept the concept of nirvāna as terminating the transmigrating process. In brief, nirvāṇa necessarily implies belief in an entity which obtains emancipation and, until such consummation, it continues to subsist.

The doctrine of anātmavāda, in short, only taught the unreality of an ego, self-consciousness, jīva, ahamkāra, a personal entity as distinct from an undifferentiated consciousness, a nirguna ātmā. It is the jīva that transmigrates. This alone permits a harmonious interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching about self, ātmā, without compromising the doctrine of personal responsibility for one’s karmas.

The dilemma of the clash between religious belief in karma and retributive rebirth, which was the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and the doctrine of anattā as elaborated by the adherents of the Abhidharma, drove the Buddhist philosophers to invent new concepts, more precisely, new terminology; these were essentially a euphemistic variant of the pudgala doctrine they had repudiated.

The Sthaviravādins adopted the concept of bhavanga, 49 factor of existence, the link in the chain of transmigration and rebirth. The Sarvāstivadins or Vaibhāṣikas speak of avijñapati, unmanifested hidden power, also called prāpti, a force having the quality of adhesion, or binding the skandhas. The Sāmmitīyas evolved the concept of cittaviprayukta, an undifferentiated dharma, so called because it is dissociated from differentiating thought. This cittaviprayukta was also deemed to be indestructible (avipraṇāśa). The Sautrāntikas postulated sarvabījaka, which possesses all seeds of causation and birth, each seed being a sūksmacitta. It was also called ekarasa skandha, that is, that which makes all skandhas one unified or integrated entity. It is also called mūlāntika skandha, that is which is the base of all aggregates.

All these new concepts or terms, bhavañga, cittàviprayukta, avijñapti, prāpti, sarvabīaka, etc., were, in my opinion, semantic inventions or coining of new terminology to provide a carrier of karmas at the death of an individual. Their function was essentially similar to that of the pudgala of the Sarvāstivadins and the sūksama śarīra, kārmana śarīra, or linga deha of the Brahmanical schools. This, however, they could not admit on sectarian grounds. Conze has summarised the position in this respect succinctly and graphically:

All these theoretical contributions were attempts to combine the doctrine of ‘not self’ with the almost instinctive belief in a ‘self’ empirical or true. The climax of this combination of the uncombinable is reached in such conceptual monstrosities as the ‘store-consciousness’ (ālaya-vijñanna) of Asañga and a minority of Yogācārins, which performs all the functions of a ‘self’ in a theory which almost vociferously proclaims the non-existence of such a ‘self’.

A conclusive confirmation of the Buddhist belief in a transmigrating entity after death and which “suffers” the consequences of its karmas is to be found in the exposition of the Buddhist beliefs by the early Chinese Buddhists and in the practices current among the people of Buddhists lands at present.

The pre-Buddhist Chinese did not believe in karma and rebirth, but by the 4th-5th century A.D., the Chinese philosopher Hui-yuan could write, in his Spirit Does not Perish, 50 that the differences among individuals, i.e., diversity in the universe, can be explained on the basis of the doctrine of karma and of the mysterious transmigration of skandhas after death. The Sadddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, 51 translated into the Chinese in the 6th century A.D., also asserts an intermediate state of the soul after a man’s death and before his soul is reincarnated.

The post-mortem practices in vogue in Buddhist lands at present are evidently founded on a belief in the existence of a transmigrating soul. These practices are similar to those of the śrāddha ceremonies observed by the Hindus in India, who believe in the existence of an ātmā, or soul. Thus, in Thailand, 52 gifts are presented, sermons preached and chants uttered to benefit the spirit of the deceased; the religious services are believed to improve the status of a soul in its next birth, and a minimum of seven days must elapse before it can take rebirth. Likewise, in Burma, 53 the death and funeral ceremonies-recitation of paritta and dāna (charity)-have the same objective in view. The relatives of the deceased also seek to transfer their merit to the soul. It is also believed that the soul of the deceased remains near its house for five to seven days after the funeral. The Tibetans 54 also believe that the soul of a deceased exists in the state of “middle being”-intermediate state, antarābhavafor up to 49 days; prayers are offered and rites performed to secure a good rebirth for it.

NOTES

Footnotes

  1. Shwe Zan Aung, Compedium of Philosophy (London, 1956) Introductory Essay, p. 7. ↩

  2. The Contemporary Review, XXIX, 1877 “On Nirvāna and in the Buddhist Doctrine of Groups, the Sankhāras, Karma and the Paths,” pp. 249-70. Quoted by L.A. De Silva, The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity (London, 1979), p. 37. ↩

  3. Na tvatrātmā va ātmīyam ↩

  4. śūnyamadhyātmakam, śūnyam bahiragatam ↩

  5. asti karma, asti vipākah, kārakasti nopabbhyate ↩

  6. Yathā rūpādīnyeva samastāni samuditāni ksiramiti udakamiti vā prajñapyate tathā skandhā eva samastāh pudgala iti prajñapyante iti siddham ↩

  7. tassa ca nāpi atitabhavato idha sainkanti athi, nāpi tato hetum vinā idha pātubhāvo ↩

  8. tadetam nāpi purimabhavā idhagatam, nāpi tato kamma-sankhāra nāpi-visyādhihetum vinā pātubhutam ti veditabbam ↩

  9. etha ca santāna-bandhato nathi ekatā nāpi nānatā ↩

  10. S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi, 1975) Vol. I, pp. 88 and 123. He points out that all the sense functions and the body are rooted in consciousness, and therefore that vinināna (consciousness) is not a part of nāmarūpa ↩

  11. H.C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New York, 1963) p. 184. Also see P. Maung Tin, The Path of Purity (London, 1931) 3 Vols. ↩

  12. Warren, pp. 185-186. ↩

  13. P. Maung Tin, Pt. III, pp. 726-727. ↩

  14. Lord Chalmers, Further Dialogues of the Buddha (London, 1927) Vol. II. See also Añguttaranikāya 3.4.6, Devadūtasuttam, in Devadūtavagga. ↩

  15. E. Conze (ed.), Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (London, 1954), p. 66. See also Oldenberg, Vinayapitaka (London, 1969). ↩

  16. Conze, pp. 66-67. ↩

  17. Conze, p. 67. ↩

  18. Coomaraswamy & Horner, The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha (Bombay, 1956) p. 172. ↩

  19. Coomaraswamy & Horner, p. 176. ↩

  20. Kinnu Satto ti paccesī māraditti gatam nu te // suddhasankhāra punyo yam nagidha sattu palabhati // Yathā hi angasambhārā // hoti saddo ratho iti // evam khandesu santesu // hoti satto ti sammuti // Leon Feer (ed.), The Saimyuttanikāya, V.10, 1884; tr. by C.A.F. Rhys Davids, The Kindred Savings (P.T.S., London, 1917). ↩

  21. Leon Feer (ed.) ibid., 1890. ↩

  22. Seyyathāpi bhikkhave makkato arāññe pavane caramāno sākham ganhati tam muñcitvā aññam ganhati // Evam eva kho bhikkhave yad idam vuccati cettam iti pi mano iti pi viññānam iti pi // // rattiyā ca divasassa ca āññad uppajjati aññam nirujjhati // Leon Feer (ed.), 1888. Coomaraswamy & Horner (tr.), p. 197. ↩

  23. Yathā khīnāsavo bhikkhu Kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati na hote param maranā ti. // ↩

  24. … na hi Bhagavā evam vadedvya Khīnāsavo bhikku Kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati na hoti param maranā ti. Ibid., XXII, 85 (7). ↩

  25. Kathan pana yo etesu vimuyhati … cutiyā tāva vimūlho, sabbattha khandhānam bhedo maranam ti cutim aganhanto, satto marati; sattassa dehantarasan kamanan ti ādīni vikappeti H.C. Warren & D.D. Kosambi (ed.), Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa (Harvard, 1950). ↩

  26. See also P. Maung Tin, Pt. III, p. 650. ↩

  27. … sassato satto ti ganhanto olīyatināma; ucchijjati ti ganhanto atidhāvati nāma. The translation is that of S.Z. Aung, Compedium of Philosophy (P.T.S., London, 1910). ↩

  28. Atho kho Milindo rājā āyasmantam Nāgasenam etad-avoca Sace bhante Nāgasena puggalo no palabbhati … . ko silam rakkhati ko bhāvanam anuyuñjati ko maggaphala nibbānāni saccikarotti, ko pānam hanati, ko adinnam ādiyati, ko kāmesu micchā carati, ko musā bhanati, ko majjam pivati, ko pañca-nantariya kammam karoti tasmā na-tthi kusalam, na-tthi akusalam; na tti kusalā kusalānam kammānam kattā vā karestā vā natthi sukatadukkātanam kammanam phalam vipāko // ↩

  29. Evam eva kho mahārāja dhamma santoti sandahati, añño uppajjati añño nīrujjhati apubbam acarimam viya sandahati, tena na ca so no ca añño pacchima viññanasangham gacchatīti. ↩

  30. So kāyena doccaritam caratā (?) vācāya duccaritam caritvā, manasā duccaritam caritvā kāyassa bhedā param maranā apāyam duggatim vinipātam uppajjati so kāyena … . succaritaim caritvā vācāya succaritaim caritvā manasā succaritam caritvā kāyassa bhedā param maranā suggatim suggam lokam uppajjati. ↩

  31. Evam eva kho mahārāja iminā nāmarūpena kammam karoti subhanam vā pāpakam vā tena kammena aññam nāmarūpam paṭisandahati, tasmā nā mutto pāpa kohi kammehīti. Trenckner (ed.), p. 46 & 72; tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, II-2-6. ↩

  32. J.J. Jones (tr.) (P.T.S., London, 1956). ↩

  33. Karmam cāsya bhavati pakvam ↩

  34. S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids (tr.), Kathāvatthu or Points of Controversy (P.T.S., London, 1915)
    (1) Th. (Theravādin): Does (a person or soul) run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another to this world?
    (2) P. (Puggalavādin): Yes.
    (3) Th.: Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another to this world?
    (4) P.: Nay, that cannot be truly said.
    Th.: Then is it a different soul who transmigrates?
    P.: Nay, that cannot be truly said.
    Th.: Then is it both identical and also a different soul who transmigrates … ?
    P.: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
    Th.: Then is it both identical and also a different soul who transmigrates… .
    P.: Nay, that cannot truly be said.
    Th.: Then is it neither identical soul nor yet a different soul who transmigrates … ?
    P.: Nay, that cannot be said.
    Th.: Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical nor different soul, who transmigrates?
    P.: Nay, that cannot be said
    Th.: Surely if the identical soul, without (becoming) different, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (karma); there is action’s effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very same (person) transmigrates-this is wrong. ↩

  35. Hare (tr.), The Book of the Gradual Savings (P.T.S., London, 1934) Part III. ↩

  36. Woodward (tr.), The Book of the Gradual Savings (P.T.S., London, 1934) Pt. V. ↩

  37. P. Maung Tin, p. 429. ↩

  38. Quoted from S.Z. Aung, p. 8 ↩

  39. In the case of a butterfly, it is first an egg, then a caterpillar, thereafter a pupa (chrysalis) and finally a butterfly. Likewise, a frog passes through following changes from the time of its birth: larva, tadpole with gills, tadpole with a tail acting as a sucker, tadpole with hind legs, tadpole with forelegs when the tail disappears, and finally frog. After reaching adulthood, both are relatively stable, but gradually undergo the aging process, and are therefore in a continuous process of change. In fact, even inanimate objects are also always in a state of flux. ↩

  40. This concept has been explained in Tibetan Buddhism, wherein the enduring and transmigrating spiritual entity is called Rgyud gcig-tu-gyur-pa or Ekotibhāva. Ekotibhāva means the continued connection of one with another without break or division. A vijñāna (consciousness) existing from eternity has undergone numberless transmigrations. In all its births, it has run through an unbroken line of existence until it enters nirvāṇa. As S.C. Das explains, ”… every being (sattva) is the reembodiment of its own resultant sattva, of which the origin is lost in eternity.” Sarat Chandra Das, Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow (Calcutta, 1965) (reprint) pp. 84-85. ↩

  41. N. Aiyaswami Sastri (ed. & tr.), Satyasiddhiśāstra (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1975). ↩

  42. Bhramśam Karmanām ↩

  43. Bhramsam kuśalapotasya. ↩

  44. avidyānivarnānām sattvānām sandhāvatām sansaratām. ↩

  45. Sattvākhyah skandhasamudāyastrṇnopādānah sansarati. ↩

  46. ātmani ca satyātmīyam bhavati ↩

  47. Evamesam drdhatarātmātmīya sneha parigāhita bandhanānām mokṣo dūrībhavet ↩

  48. G. Jha: Tattvasamigraha of Śāntarakṣita with Commentary of Kamalaśila. 2 Vols. (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1937-39). ↩

  49. E. Conze: Buddhist Thought in India (1962), p. 132 terms it “life continuum.” ↩

  50. Richard H. Robinson: Early Mādhyamikā in India and China (1967) pp. 99-108. Hui-Yuan observes ”… the Buddhist doctrine of kārmic inheritance from previous lives decides one’s intelligence, and the body is only adopted after the kārmic forces have selected it.” ↩

  51. E. Conze, Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (London, 1954) p. 283. ↩

  52. Kenneth E. Wells, Thai Buddhism: Its Rites and Activities (Bangkok, 1960) p. 213. ↩

  53. Melford E. Spiro: Buddhism and Society (New York, 1970) p. 253. ↩

  54. Evans Wentz (ed.), Bardo Thodol: The Tibetan Book of the Dead (London, 1957) pp. 6, 39 ff. S.C. Das, ibid., p. 89. L.A. Waddell, Lamaism, or the Buddhism of Tibet (New York, 1974) (reprint) pp. 488-494. ↩

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