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Sharma - Rune E. A. Johansson's Analysis of Citta (2018)

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Rune E. A. Johansson’s Analysis of Citta: A Criticism

by Arvind Sharma

JIABS VOl 4 Issue 1 pp. 101-107

It has been questioned whether the enumeration of the five skandhas 1 in Buddhist psychology is exhaustive of the human personality. 2 As a matter of fact this question underlies the whole doctrine of anatta. In this regard it has been asserted that “If it be true to say that the Buddha has nowhere explicitly stated in so many words, that the ‘being’ (satta) is composed only of the khandhas, it would be a hundred times truer to say that nowhere has he said of ‘being’ that it comprises anything else at all, of any description whatsoever, apart from the five khandhas.” 3

Rune E. A. Johansson has recently raised the question anew. He remarks:

We have also the final question, whether the khandhā are to be considered an exhaustive enumeration of all personality factors. Is there nothing in personality not included in the khandhā? There certainly is. Attä is denied, with good reason, but citta is not denied. 4

He goes on to argue that this citta is “a name for the core of the personality, mainly conscious but including also the subconscious processes on which continuity depends. It is not a soul, but it reminds of the ‘ego’ of Western psychology: the person knows that citta is what he is; he usually identifies himself with it but need not do so; he can observe his citta, discuss with it, train it, punish it, and so on.” 5

Johansson seems to present two kinds of evidence, analytical and empirical, to establish his case for the citta constituting the core of the personality according to Buddhist psychology as found in the Nikāyas.

The analytical evidence turns on the analysis of the skandhas. After an analysis of all the personality factors in relation to Nibbāna and after having identified citta as an independent personality factor, he remarks:

To some extent, it is possible to map the relations between citta and other psychological factors. Sañña and vedanā are called citta-sankhāra, so we know that the perceptual processes affect citta. We also know that the working of citta is called sankhāra. The relation of citta to vin̄̄̄ana is not so clear-cut. 6 There are texts that simply identify vin̄̄̄ana with citta, and other that identify vin̄̄̄āna with sañ̃̃a and vedanā. Viñ̃̃ana is more frequently said to be actively engaged in rebirth, and citta is frequently said to attain nibbāna. Nibbāna is attained through the stopping of viñ̃̃ana. The relations must be close, and probably vin̄̃̃āna is a function of citta, a name for certain citta-processes. When in the case of ordinary rebirth, both are said to undergo this process (never in the same context, always in different), then we may assume a simple identification. In the case of a living person, there should be no identification, because somebody should experience the function of vin̄̃̃ana and also experience that it has stopped: that is citta. Citta can go on functioning (vijjā, pañ̃̃ā, mettā, karuna are still to be found) and can observe viññāna and other khandhā as being still. 7

The empirical evidence is provided, according to Johansson, by the fact that the assertion that the arahant cannot be known either in this life or afterwards “is not a universal truth, since arahants always can recognize each other… . This fact will not surprise us once we have understood that citta is the agency within the person which really attains nibbāna,” 8 and that it is “thought to survive death.” 9 Johansson goes on to stress that “we are not without information about exactly what is thought to survive death in the arahant, although in a form that not everybody can recognize, not even Māra or the gods.”10 He goes on to say:

We know, however, that at least the Buddha himself claimed ability to identify and report about dead arahants: We have, for instance, the story about Vakkali (S III 119 ff ), who was ill and killed himself. The Buddha said about him later: Apatitthitena ca bhikkhavte vin̄̃̃ānVakkali kulaputto parinibbuto ti, ‘with consciousness not established the noble-born Vakkali has attained parinibbāna.’ A similar story is to be found in D II 91 f , where Ananda tells the buddha that a number of people, some monks and some lay people, had died in Nadika, where the Buddha and his disciples had just arrived, and asks what has happened to them. He got detailed information, indeed, and among them one monk was mentioned as arahant. We can take these stories to mean that at least the Buddha himself was able to trace an arahant even after death. After the quotations given earlier, this would not seem to involve any fundamental difficulties, as there seems to be small difference between his state before and after death. One more text is worth quoting to this effect. In SN 1075, the Buddha is asked: Atthan gato so uda vā so n’atthi udāhu ve sassatiyā arogo? ‘The man who has gone to rest, is he no more or is he forever free from illness?’ And he replies: Atthan gatassa na pamānam atthi, yena nam vajju, tam tassa n’atthi, sabbesu dhammesu samühatesu samühatā vādapathā pi sabbe ti. ‘There is no measure of him who has gone to rest, by which to define him: that is not for him; when all dhammā are removed, then all means of recognition are removed.’ This informs us again that the arahant, when dead, cannot be found or recognized, but an explanation is given which is extremely interesting: dhammā are removed. The PTA translation gives the rendering ‘conditions,’ but a more normal translation would be ‘ideations’ or ‘mental contents,’ ‘mental processes.’ This would give an easily understandable psychological meaning. For one of the effects of meditation is to make the mind (citta or viñ̃̃āna) stable and empty of mental contents (dhamma). As we know that citta was thought to survive, it can easily be understood that an empty citta is more difficult to read and recognize than the more complicated and desire-ridden ‘normal’ citta: it is more impersonal. In order to ‘read’ a person’s mind, there must be a mind to read, and this mind must be as differentiated and rich in content as possible. Sabbesu dhammesu samühatesu may well imply the same psychological process as viñ̃̃annassa nirodhena in A I 236, quoted above. 11

Johansson concludes that

the word nibbāna is used because of the fire analogy (to some extent, the word upādāna and related words seem to be used for the same reason). Still, it does not imply annihilation but rather a different type of existence: perhaps a diluted, undifferentiated, ‘resting’ existence, more or less impersonal but still recognizable. 12

Is this evidence adduced by Johansson sufficient to challenge the standard Theraväda position on the question of whether the arahant continues to exist after death? The standard Theraväda position, of course, is that “It does not fit the case to assert existence or non-existence.” 13

It is as much the Theravāda position that one may not assert the existence of the arhat after death, as that one may not posit his nonexistence. This was the elder Yamaka’s view, and was corrected by Sāriputta. 14 Sāriputta asserts that “A Tathāgata cannot be held to be perceived as existing even in this life in truth and reality,” what to say of his post-mortem state! But while Theravādins draw the conclusion of the nonpredicability of the post-mortem state of the arhat from his case, Johansson remarks:

What Sāriputta wanted to stress here is that the anatta doctrine applies also to the arahant and that he cannot be identified with any of the personality factors (khandha). It is therefore not possible to define what an arahant really is even in this life, and so no conclusion can be drawn as to the state after death. The khandhā are anicca and dukkha and therefore dissolved: this is pointed out in the continued discussion. Two things should be noted: first that it is denied that the arahant is annihilated in death, secondly that citta was not mentioned in this discussion. The fact that the arahant cannot be known either in this life or afterwards, is not a universal truth, since arahants always can recognize each other. We find, for instance, in S I 194 that Maha Moggallāna in a company of five hundred arahants could check that they really were arahants: Tesaṃ sudam āyasmā Maha-Moggallāno cetasā cittaṃ samannesati vippamuttam nirupadhim. ‘The venerable Maha-Moggallāna saw with his mind (ceto) that their mind (citta) was freed without basis (for rebirth remaining).’ This can only mean that the arahant has still his citta and that this has kept enough of its individuality in order to be identified. 15

Thus from the analytical point of view Johansson is relying on ‘argument of silence’ which is rather weak, especially as he is himself unsure of the relation of citta to viñ̃ ãna. Moreover, the expression cetovimutti seems to go against it, as “Cetovimutti is … not identical with Nibbāna which is much higher than and completely different from pure vin̄̃ãna.” 16 It is the empirical evidence which seems to argue in favour of the case more strongly. One may first consider the case of Vakkali. “In the Samyutta Nikāya, Buddha referring to the parinibbāna or Vakkali bhikkhu said that the wicked Māra was searching for the consciousness (vin̄̃ãana) of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra’s attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (parinibbuto) with viñ̃ ãna, which needed no support (apatitthita). The sense of apatitthita-viññāna is given elsewhere in the Samyutta Nikāya, where it is explained as consciousness which arises only when attachment (rāga) to material elements of the body (rūpa), and the other four constituents is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. Being free it is steady; being steady it is happy; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse; being fearless it attains parinibbāna.” 17

One may note that the Buddha did not say that he had recognized Vakkali, rather that Māra will not recognize him because his “consciousness is not established.” The fact of his having attained nirvāna is recognised on account of his caitsssika non-recognizability. Obviously here is an alternative explanation of how an arhant recognizes another or a Buddha identifies an arhat-the very noncognizability serves to cognize arhathood. This possibility, it seems, has not been taken into account by Johansson.

To conclude: the evidence adduced by Johansson in favour of citta as the element of the arhat surviving death does not seem to be strong enough to lead one to modify the standard Theraväda position that the post-mortem state of the arhat is unpredictable.

NOTES

Footnotes

  1. S. G. F. Brandon, ed., A Dictionary of Comparative Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), pp. 394-395. ↩

  2. Rune E. A. Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvana (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 68. ↩

  3. G. P. Malalasekera, ed., Encyclopedia of Buddhism Facsimile A-Aca (Government of Ceylon, 1961), p. 475. It is further stated that “Numerous passages can be quoted from the Pitakas which show beyond all possible doubt that, in Buddhist ontology, when ‘being’ (satta) is resolved into the five khandhas, there is no residuum whatever left. It is clearly stated in one passage (e.g., S.III, 46 f.) that “all samanas and brāhmanas, who talk about the world which is variously described by them, talk about it in reference to the five khandhas or one or other of them.’ Buddhaghosa says (Vism. xiv, § 218) that the five khandhas were selected for this very purpose for examination to show tht there was no residual self. So does Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakoia (chap. ix) where it is stated that anätman is synonymous with skandha, äyatana and dhätu” (ibid.). ↩

  4. Johansson, op. cit., p. 68. ↩

  5. Ibid., p. 83. Note, however, that the comparison with ‘ego’ must be made with caution. As Edward Conze has pointed out, it is “Hume’s denial of the existence of the ego as an entity distinct from mental processes” which “comes very near the Anatta-doctrine” (Buddhism: Its Essence and Development [New York: Harper & Row, 1959], pp. 19-20, emphasis added). ↩

  6. Johansson remarks on this ambiguity elsewhere: “It remains to be said about viñ̃ana, that it is probably one aspect of citta or a name for some of the processes of citta. Both are said to be involved in rebirth, but we should of course not understand this as a dual rebirth; the instrumental processes are the viññana-processes of citta. The basis of rebirth (ârammana, upâdâna) is the intense wish (upâdâna) to go on living. When viññana has stopped, there are practically no viññana-processes left in citta, and there is no base for rebirth. Evidently the arahant has conscious processes as long as he lives. This may be explained in two ways, and it cannot be decided which is the more correct. There may be two layers of citta: one surface layer which consists of the everyday processes, perceptions and reflections, and one deeper layer that is undifferentiated. Or perhaps D I 223 really describes the highest level of meditation which was considered the most normal stepping-stone to nibbâna and therefore in this text simply was described as a characteristic of nibbâna itself” (Rune E. A. Johansson, op. cit., pp. 76-77). ↩

  7. Ibid., p. 83. ↩

  8. Ibid., p. 62. ↩

  9. Ibid. ↩

  10. Ibid., p. 63. ↩

  11. Ibid., pp. 63-4. ↩

  12. Ibid. The use of the fire analogy is not without its difficulties, though elsewhere too Johansson suggests that “Perhaps the fire was thought to ‘go back’ to some diluted, ‘calm’ existence, evenly distributed in matter, when it was extinguished (but without ceasing to be fire)” (ibid., p. 61). Normally the danger with the fire-analogy is that it suggested nirvâna involved annihilation, now the problem, from the orthodox Theravâda point of view seems to be that it suggests survival! “Some scholars who inadvertently compared the extinction of the flame of a lamp to Nibbâna, wrongly interpreted it as annihilation. In the line quoted above there is no ambiguity that the constituted mind (viññana), which was normally functioning during Buddha’s life-time through the sense-organs, without, of course, attachment, hatred and delusion, ceased finally, i.e., became fully emancipated. It did not require any more support (anârammana, apatitthita). It is the constituted mind that suffered extinction and has nothing to do with Nibbâna, which therefore cannot mean annihilation. Prof. Keith also relied on the wrong rendering of the statement but he gave is an Upanisadic turn, saying that the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation but rather the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire.’ Prof. Keith’s interpretation is also not acceptable, for, according to the Buddhist philosophy, Nibbâna has nothing to do with anything worldly and unlike the Upanisadic Brahman it can never have worldly manifestation similar to the flame of a lamp” (Nalinaksha Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism [Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Book Agency, 1960], pp. 280-281). ↩

  13. Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1971), p. 128. It should be noted though that the Buddha used the expression “would not fit the case” not in relation to the question does “the saint exist after death, etc.” (see Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations [New York: Atheneum, 1970], p. 122) but in relation to the question “will the saint be reborn” (ibid., p. 127). ↩

  14. See Samyutta Nikâya iii. 109. Edward J. Thomas presents the following abbreviated account: “Here the charge of annihilationism is simply denied. In a 106 discourse attributed to Sāriputta it is discussed and refuted. The elder Yamaka had formed the view, ‘thus do I understand the doctrine taught by the Lord, that a monk in whom the asavas are destroyed is annihilated and destroyed with the dissolution of the body, and does not exist after death.’ Yamaka is made to admit that the body-and all the other constituents of the individual are impermanent, and that, therefore, he cannot say of any one of them ‘this is mine. I am this, this my self.’ ‘What do you think. friend Yamaka, is a Tathagata the body?’ ‘No, friend.’ (And so of feeling, perception, the aggregates, and consciousness.) ‘Do you look on a Tathagata as existing in body, etc.?’ ‘No, friend.’ ‘Do you look on a Tathagata as existing apart from body, etc.-or as consisting of them-or as existing without any of them?’ To all these questions Yamaka answers no. No loophole is left for asserting the existence of a self either within or beyond the five constituents. The conclusion is that ‘A Tathagata cannot be held to be perceived as existing even in this life in truth and reality” (op. cit., pp. 125-126). ↩

  15. Johansson, op. cit., p. 62. It may be noted that the context is one of living arhats. ↩

  16. Dutt, op. cit.. p. 285: also see David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 181-182. ↩

  17. Dutt., op cit., pp. 285-286. ↩

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