🪔🪔🪔 Tidipa

Wayman - The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites (2018)

21 min read

The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites

by Alex Wayman

JIABS Vol 3 pp. 67-76

The sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths are not canonical and are not found in the Abhidhamma of Southern Buddhism. 1 They are a specification resulting from the version of the First Sermon of Buddhism, the Setting into Motion of the Wheel of the Dharma, which, after stating the four Noble Truths, adds a triple turning of the wheel with twelve aspects. This is the triparivartam dvädasáaāaram of the Mahāvastu. 2 The sixteen aspects were possibly represented by the aniconic symbol of the wheel of 16 spokes, four main ones and twelve intermediate spokes. A number of illustrations of these Dharmacakra are collected by Dhanit Yupho in a Bangkok publication. 3 The sixteen aspects are treated in the Northern Abhidharma, as observed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, Chap. VII, verse 13, where a number of theories are presented. 4 Besides, Asanga discusses the 16 aspects in his Śrāvakabhūmi.5 I have found the list in a native Tibetan text, lectures by Tsong-kha-pa on Buddhist logic6, where he presents a list of sixteen that are the opposites or adversaries of the sixteen aspects, agreeing in large part with one of the theories in the Abhidharmakośa. In short, the earliest specification of the sixteen aspects is in the Northern Abhidharma schools, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. However, if the list of terms originated in these Abhidharma schools it is curious that there should remain some obscurity after their explanations.

Asanga’s school contemplates the sixteen aspects in the category of vipasiyanā (discerning), i.e. discerning the truth (satya), after calming the mind (samatha). 7 This agrees with the Abhidharmakośa, which identifies the list with prajña (insight’), 8 since the term prajña is frequently equated with vipasiyanā. 9 Tsong-kha-pa in those lectures refers to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumāna chapter, verse 218 (Sastri’s ed., but verse 217 in the autocommentary and Tibetan version):

“So as to determine the reality of rejecting and accepting together with the means, by virtue of non-deception regarding the chief aim, there is inference (anumäna) in terms of the beyond.” 10 The autocommentary on this mentions the four Noble Truths, and the Vṛtti clarifies that the rejecting is of suffering and the source of suffering, that the accepting is of cessation and the path. The beyond means the paroksa (what is beyond sight), namely, the chief aim, Nirvāna, which therefore has to be inferred. Tsong-kha-pa takes for granted that his audience knows that the sixteen terms and that they have opposites are referred to in the Pramannasiddhi chapter of Pramānavärttika, namely in the block of verses in Miyasaka’s edition 146-283. 11 But Tsong-kha-pa expands to sixteen terms using Abhidharma-type vocabulary, and this is reasonable, since Buddhist logic has an Abhidharma base. 12 The Abhisamayälaṃkära summary of the Prajñäpāramitā includes the sixteen aspects of the four Truths as a concentration in the path of the Śrāvaka (as does Asanga), and a feature of this path is the identification of Nirvāna with the Truth of Cessation (nirodha-satya). 13

While the list of sixteen was included, or generally alluded to, in a variety of texts as mentioned above, there is a question of how viable a classification it is, i.e. to what extent such terms help to explain this cardinal teaching of Buddhism-the four Noble Truths. We should note that not only does the Southern Abhidharma textual tradition not use the sixteen-term system, 14 but also the Satyasiddhiśastra of Harivarman, completely devoted to the four truths, appears opposed to employing this organizational teminology. 15 To arrive at a conclusion about these matters, it will be necessary to treat each of the sixteen separately, using the above works. The Buddhist dictionary Mahäryutpatti (nos. 1190-1205) gives the individual terms as follows: (Noble Truth of Suffering,) duhkham, anityam, śūnyam, anätmakam. (Noble Truth of Source,) samudayah, prabhavah, hetuh, pratyayah. (Noble Truth of Cessation,) nirodhah, śāntah, pran̄itah, nihsaranah. (Noble Truth of Path,) märgah, nyāyah, pratipattih, nairyānikah.

Of the sixteen aspects, the easiest are the four of the set going with the Truth of Suffering, mainly because the terms are so celebrated in Buddhist texts. Leaving out the ‘voidness’ (sünya) term, the other three are the well-known set of three characteristics (laksana) which all constructed things (samskära) have: impermanence (anitya), pain (duhkha), and non-self (anätman). For canonical references, one may consult Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, under Ti-lakkhaṇa. 16 Asanga in the section mentioned writes mostly about this set.17 He introduces a group of ten aspects (äkära) for treating the Truth of Suffering, namely, aspect of 1) transformation (viparinäma), 2) destruction (vinäśa), 3) separation (visamyoga), 4) closeness (samnihita), 5) true nature (dhärmatä), 6) fetters and bondage (samyojanabandhana), 7) the disagreeable (anissta), 8) no security (ayogaksema), 9) non-apprehension (anupalambha), 10) non-independence (asvätantrya). He states that the aspect of impermanence is examined by five of these ten aspects, namely, of transformation, destruction, separation, closeness, and true nature. The aspect of pain is examined by three aspects, namely, of fetters and bondage, of the disagreeable, and of no security. The voidness aspect is examined by one aspect, namely, non-apprehension (of a certain object). The aspect of non-self is examined by one aspect, namely, non-independence.

The Arthaviniścaya-tikä (author unknown, Tibetan Tanjur) briefly explains the four in a description of the samskära personality aggregate (skandha): 18

It is impermanent, because it perishes in each instant. It is painful, because possessing the nature (dharma) of birth, old age, and so on. It is void, because those samskäras are not the self imagined by the heretics. It is non-self because precisely those are not the selfexistence (svabhäva) of self imagined by the heretics.

One should also notice that Harivarman’s work attributes the list to an unnamed sūtra passage: “dharmā anityā duḥkhāh śūnyā anätmānah pratityasamutpannä …” but includes this passage and its discussion not under the first Truth, that of Suffering, but under the third one, that of Cessation! 19 Harivarman stresses pursuant to this passage the voidness of dharmas, but also insists on voidness of self. Here there is a difficulty shared with the Arthaviniścaya-tikä, as cited above, that in the list of four terms including both void (śunnya) and non-self (anätmaka), to interpret the term ‘void’ as denying a self should make one wonder why the term ‘non-self’ is included as a separate aspect. Asanga was apparently appreciative of this point, since for him the voidness aspect is examined just by the aspect of non-apprehension without further qualifying the non-apprehension.

Passing to the coverings or adversaries 20 of these four aspects in Tsong-kha-pa’s list, 21 that the covering of impermanence is permanence, of pain is pleasure, of non-self is self-is simple enough. However, the covering he gives for voidness (śunnya) is with a term gcang, which I correct to bcang, “taking hold (of an object).” This agrees with Asanga’s “non-apprehension” for voidness in the present context. The various explanations in the Abhidharmakośa seem not to take account of a requirement to show some adversity for the terms listed under the Truth of Suffering, and in particular the term I render ‘voidness.’ Presumably the adversity is the sense of ‘voidness’ that it is here the absence of the thing one hunts and looks for, expects to find, leaving one in a kind of despair. Asanga’s ‘non-independence’ for non-self does indeed take account of the adversative intention. It might be for the reason which Vasubandhu gives as one tradition: 22 akämakäritväd iti “because there is no performance of what one wishes.” Harivarman’s placement of the list under the Truth of Cessation of course avoids the implication of adversative sense that placement under Truth of Suffering entails. In support of his placement, there is the set called the four ‘aphorisms of the Dharma’; cf. Mahäyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, SVIII, 80, and commentary: “All samskäras (constructions) are impermanent; all samskäras (motivations) are suffering; 23 all dharmas are non-self; Nirvāna is calm (śänta).” Observe that this set has an entry ‘Nirvāna’ in place of the term ‘void’ of the other list, and that Harivarman practically equates voidness (śūnyatā) with Nirvāṇa. 24

Before leaving the Truth of Suffering, it is well to mention even if briefly the theory of three kinds of duhkhatä (misery). Asanga (Vinissayasaṃgrahaṇi on Cintamayi bhūmi) 25 identifies the three with the three standard kinds of feelings, painful, pleasurable, and neither painful nor pleasurable. The first duhkhatä is the misery of suffering (duhkha), and as the painful kind of feeling, it is the misery experienced and acknowledged in the world, since the pair ‘pain and pleasure’ (duhkha and sukha) are among the eight worldly dharmas, of course comprehended by ordinary persons. The Arthaviniścaya-tikā (Tibetan Tanjur) 26 describes this kind of duhhatä consistently with a detailed list that shows it covers the pains people can do something about, as well as those recognized to be outside of one’s control. The second duhkhatä is the misery of change (viparinäma), and as the pleasurable kind of feeling, it is not recognized as misery by ordinary persons. So Samyutta-Nikäya, Part IV (Salāyatana-Vagga): / yam pare sukhato āhu / tad ariyā ahu dukkhato / “What others call ‘happiness’ that the noble ones call ‘suffering.’” 27 The third duhkhatä is the misery of motivations (samskära), and as the feeling that is neither painful nor pleasurable, it is also not recognized as misery by ordinary persons. Asanga explains: 28 “It was in connection with the misery of motivations that the Lord said: ‘In short, the five grasping aggregates are suffering.’ What is the misery of motivations? These and those bodies with motivations generated by karma and defilement (kleśa) arising, . . ” He also mentions that this misery is evidenced by the four waywardnesses (viparyäsa), i.e., regarding the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, the unclean as clean, the non-self as self; and finally, that this misery is the trace (anuśaya) of nescience (avidyä).

It is clear that the duhkha of the first Noble Truth has a wider scope than the ordinary person can understand, and has a metaphysical side that is comprehensible to the ärga, in the ancient use of this word. Some persons accordingly challenged the translation of duhkha as ‘suffering’ or ‘pain.’ However, the present translator translates the term in those two ways to accord with the various contexts in which the term is found, sometimes in concrete senses to apply to old age, sickness, and death; and sometimes in a metaphorical way. And to leave the term untranslated, as has been recommended by at least one modern author, would entirely defeat any communication of metaphorical nuance.

As we pass to the remaining three Truths, it turns out that the coverings in the list of sixteen adversaries become of greater importance.

The second set going with “Noble Truth of Source (of Suffering)” has the requirement of providing cause or causes for the suffering without constituting suffering. Here there are the aspects cause (hetu), source (samudaya), production (prabhava), and condition (pratyaya). The trouble with the Abhidharmakośa explanations in the main is that they define these terms as various kinds of causes without thereby showing their natures as causes for suffering. Asanga is quite superior here because he faces up to the necessity that they not only be causes, but cause for suffering. 29 One of several variant explanations he furnishes is especially interesting since it relates these terms to Buddhist Dependent Origination (pratitya-samutpäda). 30 This particular solution takes the aspect of ‘cause’ to be craving (trsnaā ), 8th member of Dependent Origination, heading the five members which bring about new destiny. Asanga here says it is the cause of ‘indulgence’ (upädäna), and casts gestation and suffering. The aspect of ‘source’ is indulgence (upädäna), 9th member, which finalizes after the casting. The aspect of ‘production’ is gestation (bhava), 10th member, hence embryonic life, prior to the manifestation of suffering. The fourth aspect, of condition (pratyaya) is birth (jäti), the 11th member, which holds the seed of future suffering, and is the condition for old age, sickness, and death. Notice that in this solution, ‘birth,’ 11th member of Dependent Origination, is counted as a cause of suffering and therefore not itself a suffering. The Mādhyamika tradition of the Pratitya-samutpäda commentary attributed to Nāgārjuna, and a passage in the Daśabhümika-sütra along the same lines, disagrees because it counts ‘birth’ as one of the suffering members of Dependent Origination. 31

Tsong-kha-pa’s list of coverings or adversaries of these four seems to amount to non-Buddhist positions. 32 Thus, for the aspect of ‘cause,’ from his list, positing that there is no cause of suffering amounts to the position of the ancient materialistic Cārvakas, the position called ahetuka (‘having no cause’), which Buddhism always denounced. For the aspect of ‘source,’ positing the unaffiliated as the cause, or positing only a single cause, might be equivalent to the fourth account in the Abhidharmakośa 33 mentioning at this place a Lord (Īśvara), or pradhāna, since the Lord could be considered unaffiliated to the effect, and pradhāna as the Sāṃkhya prakṛti could be considered a single cause. For the aspect of ‘production,’ positing (suffering) as created by the evolution of the Sabdabrahman, would be a Vaiṣnava theory according to S. Dasgupta; 34 while the Abhidharmakośa here mentions the evolutionary theory of the Sāṃkhya called parināma, in which the effect is pre-existent in the cause. For the fourth aspect of ‘condition,’ positing (suffering) as created by a former İśvara-buddhi (cognition of a Lord), is the same as given in the Abhidharmakośa.

When coming to the treatment of the third set under “Noble Truth of Cessation (of Suffering)” and of the fourth set under “Noble Truth of Path (leading to the Cessation),” Asanga contents himself with a few neutral remarks, perhaps reluctant to enter into the controversies involved in a longer treatment. Let us pass first to the coverings in Tsong-kha-pa’s list, 35 namely, for the third set, cessation (nirodha), calm (śänta), the excellent (pranita), exit (nihsarana); and for the fourth set, path (märga), principle (nyāya), accomplishment (pratipatti), way of deliverance (nairyänika).

For the aspect of ‘cessation,’ the covering is the positing by one gone astray that there is no liberation; for the aspect of ‘calm,’ positing that there is a special liberation attended with flux of uncalmed defilements; for the aspect of ‘the excellent’ (usually explained as anuttara, ‘the best’), positing that there is a higher liberation than stopping suffering; for the aspect of ‘exit,’ positing a temporary liberation and that there is no final liberation.

For the aspect of ‘path,’ the covering is the positing that there is no final path of liberation; for the aspect of ‘principle’ (= method), positing that the insight comprehending non-self is not a path of liberation; for the aspect of ‘accomplishment,’ positing the situation of the objectscope while having gone astray; for the aspect, ‘way of deliverance,’ positing that thereby there is no ability to put a final end to suffering.

The ‘coverings’ in Tsong-kha-pa’s list for the third and fourth sets amount to a paraphrase of the fourth Abhidharmakoia explanation. The adversary views do help to bring out the meaning of the aspect terms for these two sets.

Now, a striking feature of the aspects given under “Noble Truth of Path” is that they are not obviously related to the usual statement of the Path, namely, the eightfold members, frequently listed under the three instructions which form the organization of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. These three are the Instruction of Morality, the Instruction of Mental Training of samädhi, and the Instruction of Insight. Even though Asanga does not organize his Yogäcärabhümi along the specific lines of the well-known three instructions (adhiśiksä), these categories are basic for much of his writing. Examining the statements of Tsong-kha-pa’s adversaries for the four of this path group in comparison with the four of the cessation set, a suggestive parallel emerges, which may provide an opening for relating the three instructions. By this I mean to call attention to the covering of ‘cessation’ claiming that in fact there is no liberation, while the covering of ‘path’ is the claim that there is no final path of liberation; then, for the aspect of ‘exit’ claiming that there is no final path of libertion, while the covering of ‘way of deliverance’ is the claim that one cannot put a final end to suffering. These seeming affiliations of statement gave me the idea that the two sets of four terms might be correlated in their given order. Following this suggestion, I may propose that the aspect of path (märga) leads to the aspect of cessation (nirodha); that the aspect of principle (= method) (nyäya) leads to the aspect of calm (sänta); that the aspect of accomplishment (pratipatti) leads to the aspect of the excellent (pranita); finally, that the aspect ‘way of deliverance’ (nairyänika) leads to the aspect ‘exit’ (nihsarana). Then the way of relating the three instructions follows readily, namely, that the instruction of mind training is the principle or method that leads to calm, since samädhi is the standard procedure for calming the mind; that the instruction of morality is the accomplishment that leads to the excellent, which is consistent with ancient Buddhism’s great stress on morality and extolling of its merit; that the instruction of insight (prajñaā ) is the way of deliverance that leads to the ‘exit’ or ‘escape’ from phenomenal life, constituting the Arhat ideal of early Buddhism. 36 Such a correlation would leave the main terms of ‘cessation’ and ‘path’ as headings under which are ranged the respective three aspects that go with the three instructions. This is consistent with the early tradition that takes ‘cessation’ as equal to Nirvāna, and with the Tibetan translation of this term as ‘beyond suffering’ (mya ngan las ‘das pa). This is because the thrust of these Abhidharma-type explanations of the four Noble Truths is that liberation amounts to the cessation of suffering (duhkha).

Besides, a feature of the first sermon, Setting into Motion the Wheel of Dharma, in various versions, is to take the four Noble Truths as objects. Thus, the statement is made: “Suffering, a Noble Truth, is to be fully known (parijñeyam).” Again, “The Source of Suffering is to be eliminated (prahätavyah).” “The Cessation of Suffering is to be realized directly (säksät kartavyah).” “The Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering is to be cultivated (duhkhanirodhagäminī pratipad bhāvayitavyā.” 37 This promptly raises a question: If cessation is to be realized directly, i.e., säksät, as though before the eyes, then how could this cessation be equated to Nirvāṇa, if Nirvāṇa be taken in Dharmakirti’s sense as something to be inferred rather than seen in direct vision? The resolution here would be to take Nirvāna in such usage not to be identified with cessation (nirodha). And we note that Dharmakirti is writing in the mature Mahāyāna Buddhism period, when a Nirvāna of no fixed abode (apratisthitanirvāna) had come to the fore.

Thus, a consideration of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, and their sixteen ‘coverings’ or adversaries, does appear to bring out important features of the four Truths, and to make salient certain striking differences of the traditions. The investigation attests to the teaching of the four Noble Truths as basic to the earliest Buddhism, and to later disputes of what to place under each of the four. Thus, one strong current of interpretation took the sixteen aspects as a guide, while another was either oblivious of, or uncomfortable with the neat list.

NOTES

Footnotes

  1. Confer Louis de La Vallée Poussin, tr. L’Abhidharmakoia de Vasubandhu, Septième … (Paris, 1925), p. 30, note. ↩

  2. Confer Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader (New Haven, 1953), p. 17, introductory note about the two original parts of the Dharmacakrapravartana-sütra; and p. 19, triple turning of the wheel in the second part, namely in the Mahävastu version. ↩

  3. Dhanit Yupho, Dharmacakra or The Wheel of the Law (The Fine Arts Department, Bangkok, Thailand, B.E. 2511 ; third edition, 1968). Among the illustrations, the twelvespoked wheel presumably or possibly symbolizes the twelve-membered dependent origination (pratitya-samutpáda); the sixteen-spoked one, the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths; the thirty-two spoked one, the Buddha himself with thirty-two characteristics. ↩

  4. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., Septième, pp. 30-39. ↩

  5. The lengthy treatment begins with Lokottaramärga and then the exposition of the viparinäma kind of impermanence (anityatä), Śrävakabhümi, K. Shukla, ed. (Patna, 1973), p. 470, where the sixteen aspects are named. ↩

  6. Tsong-kha-pa, collected works (Tashilunpo edition), Vol. Pha, Tshad ma’i brjed byang chen mo (Rgyal-tshab-rje’s notes on Tsong-kha-pa’s lectures), f. 13b, and following. For the comparable Abhidharmakośa theory, confer La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., Septième, p. 38, referred to simply as the ‘fourth explanation,’ which was appealed to by Samghabhadra to demonstrate that the aspects are indeed sixteen. ↩

  7. Confer Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 130-131, for the exposition, in particular, examination of the Noble Truth of Suffering with the kind of discerning (vipasyanä) called ‘special knowledge’ (pratisamvid) of the characteristics (laksana). ↩

  8. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., Septième, p. 39. ↩

  9. Confer Alex Wayman, tr., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York, 1978), p. 28. ↩

  10. / heyopadeyatattvasya sopäyasya prasiddhitah / pradhänärthāvisamvädād anumānaṃ paratra vā //. By ‘auto-commentary’ is meant Dharmakīrti’s Svārthānumāna-pariccheda, edited independently by Raniero Gnoli and by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya; and ‘vrtti’ means the one by Manorathanandin. ↩

  11. This is the edition published in Acta Indologica II (Naritasan Shinshoji, Japan, 1971/72). ↩

  12. At least this is the case in Tibetan tradition, since according to my observation the chief Tibetan commentators on Buddhist logic also wrote commentaries on either Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa or Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya. ↩

  13. Confer E. Obermiller, “The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālamkāra of Maitreya,” Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI (1932), pp. 18-19. ↩

  14. The well-known Pāli exegetical work, the Netti-pakarana (translated under the title The Guide) applies six terms to the four Noble Truths (E. Hardy’s edition, p. 8): Ädinavo phalañ ce dukkhaṃ, assādo samudayo, nissaranam nirodho, upāyo ānatti ca maggo. “Trouble and fruit are suffering; gratification is the source; exit is cessation; means and command are the path.” Here, ‘means’ and ‘command’ might be equivalent to the two kinds of Pātimokkha, by exhortation (ovāda) and by command (ānā); cf. C. S. Upasak, Dictionary of Early Budhist Monastic Terms (Varanasi, 1975), p. 152; and A. Wayman, “Ancient Buddhist Monasticism,” Studia Missionalia, Vol. 28, 1979, p. 199. ↩

  15. N. Aiyaswami Sastri has reconstructed from Chinese to Sanskrit of the Satyasiddhisaastra (Baroda, 1975), and has translated it into English (Baroda, 1978). ↩

  16. Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary (Colombo, 1950), 155-6). The late Edward Conze gave his views on the three, calling them ‘marks’ in his Buddhist Thought in India (London, 1962), Part I, chapter 3. ↩

  17. See the references in notes 5 and 7 , above. ↩

  18. Photo edition of Peking Tanjur (PTT), Vol. 145, p. 162-1,2. ↩

  19. Aiyaswami Śastri, Satyasiddhīśstra, Sanskrit, p. 354. ↩

  20. The ‘coverings’ are indicated by the word āropya in Pramāṇvārttika, Pramānasiddhi chapter, verse 271: ṣodaśāāārān āropya. ↩

  21. See the reference in note 6 , above. ↩

  22. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., Septième, p. 32. ↩

  23. I translate the word samskāra differently in the first two aphorisms, because when samskāra is identified with suffering (duhkha) it is variously said to be the five personality aggregates (skandha) or to be ‘with flux’ (sāsrava). On the other hand, the samskāra said to be impermanent means all of the ‘constructed natures’ (samskrta-dharma). ↩

  24. See N. Aiyaswami Śastri, Satyasiddhīśāstra, Eng. tr., pp. 358-359. ↩

  25. Asaṅga, Yogācārabhūmi, PTT, Vol. 111, p. 28-3,4. ↩

  26. See n. 18, above, op. cit., p. 209-2,3. ↩

  27. In the edition of Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, The Samyutta Nikāya, 4. Salāyatanavagga, p. 116.16 . ↩

  28. See no. 25 , above, p. 28-3,4. ↩

  29. See n. 5, above, op. cit., p. 493, where Shukla wrongly edits duhkhaksema- for hetu; read instead: trsnāyā duhkhāksepakatvād dhetutah. “By cause (hetu) through craving (trsnā) which casts suffering.” The other three aspects are also explained as sources for suffering. ↩

  30. Since there is further confusion in Shukla’s edition (p. 493) at this point, I have consulted the Tibetan translation, PTT, Vol. 110, p. 126-5-4,5,6. ↩

  31. Daśabhūmikañsūtra is cited in Sāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya (Vaidya ed., p. 123.21-22), happening to be in agreement with the Pratityasamutpāda commentary, that of the members of dependent origination, avidyā, trsnā, and upādāna are defilement (kleśa); samskāra-s and bhava are ‘action’ (karma); and the rest are suffering (duhkha). Hence, ‘birth’ (jāti) is counted as a ‘suffering.’ ↩

  32. See n. 6, above, f. 13b-6 to 14a-1. ↩

  33. La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., Septième, p. 38. ↩

  34. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, 1940), Vol. III, p. 58. ↩

  35. See no. 6, above, f. 14a-1 to 14a-4. ↩

  36. Tsong-kha-pa, brjed byang, n. 6, above, f. 13a-5, states: “The ācārya (i.e. Dharmakirti) … took the prajñā that comprehends non-self to be the chief (thing) of the path to liberation from phenomenal life, and the others to be ancillary.” ↩

  37. So in the Lalitavistara, as presented in Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader (n. 2, above), pp. 22-23. ↩

Graph View

Backlinks