6. Pañcavaggiyakathā (The Account of the Group of Five)

28 Oct 2026 · 104 min read

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(10.)

53. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “kassa nu kho ahaṃ paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ? Ko imaṃ dhammaṃ khippameva ājānissatī”ti? Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “ayaṃ kho āḷāro kālāmo paṇḍito byatto medhāvī dīgharattaṃ apparajakkhajātiko; yannūnāhaṃ āḷārassa kālāmassa paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ, so imaṃ dhammaṃ khippameva ājānissatī”ti. Atha kho antarahitā devatā bhagavato ārocesi— “sattāhakālaṅkato, bhante, āḷāro kālāmo”ti. Bhagavatopi kho ñāṇaṃ udapādi— “sattāhakālaṅkato āḷāro kālāmo”ti. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “mahājāniyo kho āḷāro kālāmo; sace hi so imaṃ dhammaṃ suṇeyya, khippameva ājāneyyā”ti.

54. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “kassa nu kho ahaṃ paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ? Ko imaṃ dhammaṃ khippameva ājānissatī”ti? Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “ayaṃ kho udako rāmaputto paṇḍito byatto medhāvī dīgharattaṃ apparajakkhajātiko; yannūnāhaṃ udakassa rāmaputtassa paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ, so imaṃ dhammaṃ khippameva ājānissatī”ti. Atha kho antarahitā devatā bhagavato ārocesi— “abhidosakālaṅkato, bhante, udako rāmaputto”ti. Bhagavatopi kho ñāṇaṃ udapādi— “abhidosakālaṅkato udako rāmaputto”ti. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “mahājāniyo kho udako rāmaputto; sace hi so imaṃ dhammaṃ suṇeyya, khippameva ājāneyyā”ti.

55. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “kassa nu kho ahaṃ paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyaṃ? Ko imaṃ dhammaṃ khippameva ājānissatī”ti? Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “bahukārā kho me pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū, ye maṃ padhānapahitattaṃ upaṭṭhahiṃsu; yannūnāhaṃ pañcavaggiyānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ deseyyan”ti. Atha kho bhagavato etadahosi— “kahaṃ nu kho etarahi pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū viharantī”ti? Addasā kho bhagavā dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena pañcavaggiye bhikkhū bārāṇasiyaṃ viharante isipatane migadāye. Atha kho bhagavā uruvelāyaṃ yathābhirantaṃ viharitvā yena bārāṇasī tena cārikaṃ pakkāmi.

(11.)

56. Addasā kho upako ājīvako bhagavantaṃ antarā ca gayaṃ antarā ca bodhiṃ addhānamaggappaṭipannaṃ, disvāna bhagavantaṃ etadavoca— “vippasannāni kho te, āvuso, indriyāni, parisuddho chavivaṇṇo pariyodāto. Kaṃsi tvaṃ, āvuso, uddissa pabbajito? Ko vā te satthā? Kassa vā tvaṃ dhammaṃ rocesī”ti? Evaṃ vutte, bhagavā upakaṃ ājīvakaṃ gāthāhi ajjhabhāsi—

57. “Sabbābhibhū sabbavidūhamasmi,
Sabbesu dhammesu anūpalitto;
Sabbañjaho taṇhākkhaye vimutto,
Sayaṃ abhiññāya kamuddiseyyaṃ.

58. Na me ācariyo atthi,
sadiso me na vijjati;
Sadevakasmiṃ lokasmiṃ,
natthi me paṭipuggalo.

59. Ahañhi arahā loke,
ahaṃ satthā anuttaro;
Ekomhi sammāsambuddho,
sītibhūtosmi nibbuto.

60. Dhammacakkaṃ pavattetuṃ,
Gacchāmi kāsinaṃ puraṃ;
Andhībhūtasmiṃ lokasmiṃ,
Āhañchaṃ amatadundubhin”ti.

61. “Yathā kho tvaṃ, āvuso, paṭijānāsi, arahasi anantajino”ti.

62. “Mādisā ve jinā honti,
ye pattā āsavakkhayaṃ;
Jitā me pāpakā dhammā,
tasmāhamupaka jino”ti.

63. Evaṃ vutte, upako ājīvako hupeyyapāvusoti vatvā sīsaṃ okampetvā ummaggaṃ gahetvā pakkāmi.

(12.)

64. Atha kho bhagavā anupubbena cārikaṃ caramāno yena bārāṇasī isipatanaṃ migadāyo, yena pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū tenupasaṅkami. Addasaṃsu kho pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ dūratova āgacchantaṃ; disvāna aññamaññaṃ katikaṃ saṇṭhapesuṃ— “ayaṃ, āvuso, samaṇo gotamo āgacchati, bāhulliko padhānavibbhanto āvatto bāhullāya. So neva abhivādetabbo, na paccuṭṭhātabbo, nāssa pattacīvaraṃ paṭiggahetabbaṃ; api ca kho āsanaṃ ṭhapetabbaṃ, sace so ākaṅkhissati nisīdissatī”ti. Yathā yathā kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū upasaṅkamati tathā tathā pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū nāsakkhiṃsu sakāya katikāya saṇṭhātuṃ. Asaṇṭhahantā bhagavantaṃ paccuggantvā eko bhagavato pattacīvaraṃ paṭiggahesi, eko āsanaṃ paññapesi, eko pādodakaṃ, eko pādapīṭhaṃ, eko pādakaṭhalikaṃ upanikkhipi. Nisīdi bhagavā paññatte āsane; nisajja kho bhagavā pāde pakkhālesi. Apissu bhagavantaṃ nāmena ca āvusovādena ca samudācaranti.

65. Evaṃ vutte, bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū etadavoca— “mā, bhikkhave, tathāgataṃ nāmena ca āvusovādena ca samudācaratha. Arahaṃ, bhikkhave, tathāgato sammāsambuddho, odahatha, bhikkhave, sotaṃ, amatamadhigataṃ, ahamanusāsāmi, ahaṃ dhammaṃ desemi. Yathānusiṭṭhaṃ tathā paṭipajjamānā nacirasseva— yassatthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tadanuttaraṃ— brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharissathā”ti. Evaṃ vutte, pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ— “tāyapi kho tvaṃ, āvuso gotama, iriyāya, tāya paṭipadāya, tāya dukkarakārikāya nevajjhagā uttari manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesaṃ, kiṃ pana tvaṃ etarahi, bāhulliko padhānavibbhanto āvatto bāhullāya, adhigamissasi uttari manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesan”ti? Evaṃ vutte, bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū etadavoca— “na, bhikkhave, tathāgato bāhulliko, na padhānavibbhanto, na āvatto bāhullāya; arahaṃ, bhikkhave, tathāgato sammāsambuddho. Odahatha, bhikkhave, sotaṃ, amatamadhigataṃ ahamanusāsāmi, ahaṃ dhammaṃ desemi. Yathānusiṭṭhaṃ tathā paṭipajjamānā nacirasseva— yassatthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tadanuttaraṃ— brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharissathā”ti.

66. Dutiyampi kho pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ…pe… . Dutiyampi kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū etadavoca…pe… . Tatiyampi kho pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ— “tāyapi kho tvaṃ, āvuso gotama, iriyāya, tāya paṭipadāya, tāya dukkarakārikāya nevajjhagā uttari manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesaṃ, kiṃ pana tvaṃ etarahi, bāhulliko padhānavibbhanto āvatto bāhullāya, adhigamissasi uttari manussadhammā alamariyañāṇadassanavisesan”ti?

67. Evaṃ vutte bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū etadavoca— “abhijānātha me no tumhe, bhikkhave, ito pubbe evarūpaṃ pabhāvitametan”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”. “Arahaṃ, bhikkhave, tathāgato sammāsambuddho, odahatha, bhikkhave, sotaṃ, amatamadhigataṃ ahamanusāsāmi, ahaṃ dhammaṃ desemi. Yathānusiṭṭhaṃ tathā paṭipajjamānā nacirasseva— yassatthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tadanuttaraṃ— brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharissathā”ti. Asakkhi kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū saññāpetuṃ. Atha kho pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ sussūsiṃsu, sotaṃ odahiṃsu, aññā cittaṃ upaṭṭhāpesuṃ.

(13.)

68. Atha kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi—

69. “Dveme, bhikkhave, antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā. Katame dve? Yo cāyaṃ kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyogo hīno gammo pothujjaniko anariyo anatthasaṃhito, yo cāyaṃ attakilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anatthasaṃhito. Ete kho, bhikkhave, ubho ante anupagamma majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati.

70. Katamā ca sā, bhikkhave, majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā, cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati? Ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṃ— sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappo, sammāvācā, sammākammanto, sammāājīvo, sammāvāyāmo, sammāsati, sammāsamādhi. Ayaṃ kho sā, bhikkhave, majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā, cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati.

(14.)

71. Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ. Jātipi dukkhā, jarāpi dukkhā, byādhipi dukkho, maraṇampi dukkhaṃ, appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi vippayogo dukkho, yampicchaṃ na labhati tampi dukkhaṃ. Saṃkhittena, pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā.

72. Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ— yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī, seyyathidaṃ— kāmataṇhā, bhavataṇhā, vibhavataṇhā.

73. Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ— yo tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho, cāgo, paṭinissaggo, mutti, anālayo.

74. Idaṃ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ— ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṃ— sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappo, sammāvācā, sammākammanto, sammāājīvo, sammāvāyāmo, sammāsati, sammāsamādhi.

(15.)

75. Idaṃ dukkhaṃ ariyasaccanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ pariññeyyanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ pariññātanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi.

76. Idaṃ dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ pahātabbanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ pahīnanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi.

77. Idaṃ dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ sacchikātabbanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ sacchikatanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi.

78. Idaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ bhāvetabbanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi. Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ bhāvitanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloko udapādi.

(16.)

79. Yāvakīvañca me, bhikkhave, imesu catūsu ariyasaccesu evaṃ tiparivaṭṭaṃ dvādasākāraṃ yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇadassanaṃ na suvisuddhaṃ ahosi, neva tāvāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddhoti paccaññāsiṃ.

80. Yato ca kho me, bhikkhave, imesu catūsu ariyasaccesu evaṃ tiparivaṭṭaṃ dvādasākāraṃ yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇadassanaṃ suvisuddhaṃ ahosi, athāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddhoti paccaññāsiṃ. Ñāṇañca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi— akuppā me vimutti, ayamantimā jāti, natthi dāni punabbhavo”ti. Idamavoca bhagavā attamanā pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandunti.

81. Imasmiñca pana veyyākaraṇasmiṃ bhaññamāne āyasmato koṇḍaññassa virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi— “yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman”ti.

(17.)

82. Pavattite ca pana bhagavatā dhammacakke, bhummā devā saddamanussāvesuṃ— “etaṃ bhagavatā bārāṇasiyaṃ isipatane migadāye anuttaraṃ dhammacakkaṃ pavattitaṃ, appaṭivattiyaṃ samaṇena vā brāhmaṇena vā devena vā mārena vā brahmunā vā kenaci vā lokasmin”ti. Bhummānaṃ devānaṃ saddaṃ sutvā cātumahārājikā devā saddamanussāvesuṃ…pe… cātumahārājikānaṃ devānaṃ saddaṃ sutvā tāvatiṃsā devā…pe… yāmā devā…pe… tusitā devā…pe… nimmānaratī devā…pe… paranimmitavasavattī devā…pe… brahmakāyikā devā saddamanussāvesuṃ— “etaṃ bhagavatā bārāṇasiyaṃ isipatane migadāye anuttaraṃ dhammacakkaṃ pavattitaṃ appaṭivattiyaṃ samaṇena vā brāhmaṇena vā devena vā mārena vā brahmunā vā kenaci vā lokasmin”ti.

83. Itiha tena khaṇena, tena layena, tena muhuttena yāva brahmalokā saddo abbhuggacchi. Ayañca dasasahassilokadhātu saṅkampi sampakampi sampavedhi; appamāṇo ca uḷāro obhāso loke pāturahosi, atikkamma devānaṃ devānubhāvaṃ.

84. Atha kho bhagavā imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi— “aññāsi vata bho koṇḍañño, aññāsi vata bho koṇḍañño”ti. Iti hidaṃ āyasmato koṇḍaññassa “aññāsikoṇḍañño” tveva nāmaṃ ahosi.

(18.)

85. Atha kho āyasmā aññāsikoṇḍañño diṭṭhadhammo pattadhammo viditadhammo pariyogāḷhadhammo tiṇṇavicikiccho vigatakathaṃkatho vesārajjappatto aparappaccayo satthusāsane bhagavantaṃ etadavoca— “labheyyāhaṃ, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ, labheyyaṃ upasampadan”ti. “Ehi bhikkhū”ti bhagavā avoca— “svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāyā”ti. Sāva tassa āyasmato upasampadā ahosi.

(19.)

86. Atha kho bhagavā tadavasese bhikkhū dhammiyā kathāya ovadi anusāsi. Atha kho āyasmato ca vappassa āyasmato ca bhaddiyassa bhagavatā dhammiyā kathāya ovadiyamānānaṃ anusāsiyamānānaṃ virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi— “yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman”ti. Te diṭṭhadhammā pattadhammā viditadhammā pariyogāḷhadhammā tiṇṇavicikicchā vigatakathaṃkathā vesārajjappattā aparappaccayā satthusāsane bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ— “labheyyāma mayaṃ, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ, labheyyāma upasampadan”ti. “Etha bhikkhavo”ti bhagavā avoca— “svākkhāto dhammo, caratha brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāyā”ti. Sāva tesaṃ āyasmantānaṃ upasampadā ahosi.

87. Atha kho bhagavā tadavasese bhikkhū nīhārabhatto dhammiyā kathāya ovadi anusāsi. Yaṃ tayo bhikkhū piṇḍāya caritvā āharanti, tena chabbaggo yāpeti. Atha kho āyasmato ca mahānāmassa āyasmato ca assajissa bhagavatā dhammiyā kathāya ovadiyamānānaṃ anusāsiyamānānaṃ virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi— “yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman”ti. Te diṭṭhadhammā pattadhammā viditadhammā pariyogāḷhadhammā tiṇṇavicikicchā vigatakathaṃkathā vesārajjappattā aparappaccayā satthusāsane bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ— “labheyyāma mayaṃ, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ, labheyyāma upasampadan”ti. “Etha bhikkhavo”ti bhagavā avoca— “svākkhāto dhammo, caratha brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāyā”ti. Sāva tesaṃ āyasmantānaṃ upasampadā ahosi.

(20.)

88. Atha kho bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi—

89. “Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, anattā. Rūpañca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe— ‘evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī’ti. Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ anattā, tasmā rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvattati, na ca labbhati rūpe— ‘evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī’ti.

90. Vedanā anattā. Vedanā ca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ vedanā ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca vedanāya— ‘evaṃ me vedanā hotu, evaṃ me vedanā mā ahosī’ti. Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, vedanā anattā, tasmā vedanā ābādhāya saṃvattati, na ca labbhati vedanāya— ‘evaṃ me vedanā hotu, evaṃ me vedanā mā ahosī’ti.

91. Saññā anattā. Saññā ca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ saññā ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca saññāya— ‘evaṃ me saññā hotu, evaṃ me saññā mā ahosī’ti. Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, saññā anattā, tasmā saññā ābādhāya saṃvattati, na ca labbhati saññāya— ‘evaṃ me saññā hotu, evaṃ me saññā mā ahosī’ti.

92. Saṅkhārā anattā. Saṅkhārā ca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissaṃsu, nayidaṃ saṅkhārā ābādhāya saṃvatteyyuṃ, labbhetha ca saṅkhāresu— ‘evaṃ me saṅkhārā hontu, evaṃ me saṅkhārā mā ahesun’ti. Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā anattā, tasmā saṅkhārā ābādhāya saṃvattanti, na ca labbhati saṅkhāresu— ‘evaṃ me saṅkhārā hontu, evaṃ me saṅkhārā mā ahesun’ti.

93. Viññāṇaṃ anattā. Viññāṇañca hidaṃ, bhikkhave, attā abhavissa, nayidaṃ viññāṇaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya, labbhetha ca viññāṇe— ‘evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ hotu, evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ mā ahosī’ti. Yasmā ca kho, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ anattā, tasmā viññāṇaṃ ābādhāya saṃvattati, na ca labbhati viññāṇe— ‘evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ hotu, evaṃ me viññāṇaṃ mā ahosī’ti.

(21.)

94. Taṃ kiṃ maññatha, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā”ti? “Aniccaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ— etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

95. “Vedanā niccā vā aniccā vā”ti? “Aniccā, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ— etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

96. “Saññā niccā vā aniccā vā”ti? “Aniccā, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ— etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

97. “Saṅkhārā niccā vā aniccā vā”ti? “Aniccā, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ— etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

98. “Viññāṇaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā”ti? “Aniccaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā”ti? “Dukkhaṃ, bhante”. “Yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallaṃ nu taṃ samanupassituṃ— etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā”ti? “No hetaṃ, bhante”.

(22.)

99. “Tasmātiha, bhikkhave, yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ— netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attāti— evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

100. Yā kāci vedanā atītānāgatapaccuppannā ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikā vā sukhumā vā hīnā vā paṇītā vā yā dūre santike vā, sabbā vedanā— netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attāti— evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

101. Yā kāci saññā atītānāgatapaccuppannā ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikā vā sukhumā vā hīnā vā paṇītā vā yā dūre santike vā, sabbā saññā— netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attāti— evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

102. Ye keci saṅkhārā atītānāgatapaccuppannā ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikā vā sukhumā vā hīnā vā paṇītā vā ye dūre santike vā, sabbe saṅkhārā— netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attāti— evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

103. Yaṃ kiñci viññāṇaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ viññāṇaṃ— netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attāti— evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

(23.)

104. Evaṃ passaṃ, bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako rūpasmimpi nibbindati, vedanāyapi nibbindati, saññāyapi nibbindati, saṅkhāresupi nibbindati, viññāṇasmimpi nibbindati; nibbindaṃ virajjati; virāgā vimuccati; vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hoti, ‘khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānātī”ti.

(24.)

105. Idamavoca bhagavā. Attamanā pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandunti. Imasmiñca pana veyyākaraṇasmiṃ bhaññamāne pañcavaggiyānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsu. Tena kho pana samayena cha loke arahanto honti.

106. Pañcavaggiyakathā niṭṭhitā.

Paṭhamabhāṇavāro.

Summary

After realising his first two choices for teaching the Dhamma had passed away, the Buddha (Bhagavā) decided to teach the group of five ascetics who had previously attended him. Journeying to Bārāṇasī, he encountered Upaka, to whom he declared his supreme enlightenment and status as a teacherless Arahant. The five ascetics were initially skeptical of the Buddha, whom they perceived as having reverted to luxury, but he convinced them of his attainment. He then delivered his first discourse, “Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in Motion,” teaching them the Middle Way (Majjhimā Paṭipadā) which avoids the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification, and the Four Realisations (caturāriyasaccāni): suffering, its origin in craving, its cessation, and the path to its cessation: Ariyo Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo (the Noble Eightfold Path). Koṇḍañña was the first to gain the dhammacakkhu (insight into the Dhamma), understanding that whatever is subject to origination is subject to cessation, followed by the other four, all of whom were then ordained. Subsequently, the Buddha taught them the second discourse - the doctrine of anattā (not-self) in relation to the pañcupādānakkhandhā or Five Collections (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness), leading to all five ascetics achieving liberation as Arahants.

Diagram

Deciding who to teach

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Bhagavā

    note over B: reflects on whom to teach the Dhamma

    create participant D as devāta
    B-->>+D: Considers Āḷāra Kālāma (wise, experienced)

    D-->>B: "Passed away seven days ago."

    B-->>D: Considers Udaka Rāmaputta (wise, experienced)

    destroy D
    D->>B: "Passed away last night."

    B-->>B: Consides the group of five ascetics,<br>who had helped him previously.

    note over B: Realised the group is dwelling in Bārāṇasī at Isipatana in the Deer Park <br> and sets out on a journey towards Bārāṇasī.

Upaka

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Bhagavā

    create participant U as Upaka the Ājīvaka
    B-->>U: Journeying on the high road <br>between Gayā and the Bodhi tree.

	note over U: Notices how radiant Bhagavā is

    U->>B: "For whose sake have you gone forth? <br> Who is your teacher? <br> Whose Dhamma do you profess?"

    activate U

    B->>U: "No teacher have I,<br>For I am an arahant,<br>I am a sammāsambuddha (perfectly self-awakened one)<br>Cooled am I, nibbuto (extinguished)<br>To set the Dhammacakka (Wheel of Dhamma) in motion."

    U->>B: "You must be an infinite victor."

    B->>U: "Victors have reached the destruction of āsavas (non-optimal flows),<br>Therefore I am a victor."

    U->>B: "It may be so, āvuso."

    deactivate U

    note over U: Shaking his head, took a side road and departed
    destroy U

The Five Ascetics

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Bhagavā
    participant B5 as the Five Ascetics
    B-->>B5: Arrival at Isipatana, Deer Park in Bārāṇasī

    note over B5: See Gotama approaching, <br>agree not to greet him formally<br/>(believing he reverted to luxury after abandoning austerities)

    B5-->>B: As Bhagavā nears, they break their agreement and serve him,<br>address Bhagavā by name and as 'āvuso' (friend)

    B->>B5: "Do not address the Tathāgata by name or 'āvuso'.<br/>The Tathāgata is an Arahant, a Sammāsambuddha.<br/>The Deathless (Amata) has been attained.<br>I will instruct, I will teach the Dhamma."

    loop 3 times

        B5->>B: "Even with severe austerity, you didn't attain superhuman states.<br/>How can you now, living in luxury,<br> claim such attainment?"

        B->>B5: "The Tathāgata is not given to luxury...<br>is an Arahant, a Sammāsambuddha.

    end

    B->>B5: "Do you recall me ever having spoken like this before?"

    B5->>B: "No indeed, bhante."

    B5->>B: Convinced, they listened, <br> gave ear, <br> and applied their minds to understanding

    note over B, B5: First Discourse: <br>Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta <br>(Setting the Dhamma Wheel in Motion)

The Middle Way (Majjhimā Paṭipadā)

journey
    Pursuit of Sensual Happiness: 1: others
    Pursuit of Self-Mortification: 1: others
    The Middle Way: 5: Bhagavā

timeline
Pursuit of Sensual Happiness
    : low,
    : vulgar,
    : worldly,
    : ignoble,
    : not conducive to welfare
Pursuit of Self-Mortification
    : painful,
    : ignoble,
    : not conducive to welfare
The Middle Way
    : Produces vision,
    : knowledge,
    : leads to calm,
    : direct knowledge (abhiññā),
    : enlightenment (sambodhi),
    : Nibbāna.

The Eightfold Path (Ariyo Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo)

mindmap
root["Ariyo Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo"]
    R1["Right View (sammādiṭṭhi)"]
    R2["Right Resolve (sammāsaṅkappa)"]
    R3["Right Speech (sammāvācā)"]
    R4["Right Action (sammākammanta)"]
    R5["Right Livelihood (sammāājīva)"]
    R6["Right Effort (sammāvāyāma)"]
    R7["Right Awareness (sammāsati)"]
    R8["Right Focus (sammāsamādhi)"]

The Four Realisations (caturāriyasaccāni)

timeline
dukkha ariyasacca (suffering)
    : Birth
    : aging
    : illness
    : death is dukkha
    : association with the unloved
    : separation from the loved
    : not getting what one wants
    : pañcupādānakkhandhā (five collections acting as fuel)

dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca (origin of suffering)
    : taṇhā (craving)
    : leads to renewed existence
    : accompanied by delight and lust
    :  relishing now here, now there
    : kāmataṇhā (craving for sensual pleasures)
    : bhavataṇhā (craving for existence)
    : vibhavataṇhā (craving for non-existence)

dukkhanirodha ariyasacca (cessation of suffering)
    : remainderless
    : fading away
    : cessation
    : the giving up
    : the relinquishing
    : freedom
    : non-reliance on taṇhā

dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca (path leading to the cessation of suffering)
    : sammādiṭṭhi
    : sammāsaṅkappa
    : sammāvācā
    : sammākammanta
    : sammāājīva
    : sammāvāyāma
    : sammāsati
    : sammāsamādhi

graph LR
    subgraph N[caturāriyasaccāni]
        N1[dukkha ariyasacca]
        N2[dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca]
        N3[dukkhanirodha ariyasacca]
        N4[dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca]
    end
    subgraph Aspects
        P1-1[realisation]
        P1-2[is to be fully understood]
        P1-3[has been fully understood]
        P2-1[realisation]
        P2-2[is to be given up]
        P2-3[has been given up]
        P3-1[realisation]
        P3-2[is to be personally experienced]
        P3-3[has been personally experienced]
        P4-1[realisation]
        P4-2[is to be undertaken]
        P4-3[has been undertaken]
    end
    subgraph Arose
        direction TB
        R1["cakkhu <br> (Vision)"]
        R2["ñāṇa <br> (Knowledge)"]
        R3["paññā <br> (Wisdom)"]
        R4["vijjā <br> (Understanding)"]
        R5["āloka <br> (Light)"]
    end
    N1 -->|Phase 1: dukkha realised| P1-1
    N1 -->|Phase 2: dukkha understanding| P1-2
    N1 -->|Phase 3: dukkha understood| P1-3
    N2 -->|Phase 1: cause realised| P2-1
    N2 -->|Phase 2: cause giving up| P2-2
    N2 -->|Phase 3: cause given up| P2-3
    N3 -->|Phase 1: cessation realised| P3-1
    N3 -->|Phase 2: cessation experiencing| P3-2
    N3 -->|Phase 3: cessation experienced| P3-3
    N4 -->|Phase 1: path realised| P4-1
    N4 -->|Phase 2: path undertaking| P4-2
    N4 -->|Phase 3: path undertaken| P4-3
    P1-3 & P2-3 & P3-3 & P4-3 --> R1 & R2 & R3 & R4 & R5

graph
    NT["caturāriyasaccāni<br>(4 realisations)"] --> P3["tiparivaṭṭa<br>(3 Phases)"] --> A12["dvādasākāra<br>(12 aspects)"] --> A & B & C --> D["abhisambuddha anuttara sammāsambodhi<br>(woken up to perfect understanding)"] -->|surpassing| L --> O["*akuppā me vimutti, ayamantimā jāti, natthi dāni punabbhavo*<br>(Unshakeable is my liberation, this is the final birth, there is now no more future existences.)"]
    A["yathābhūta<br>(reality)"]
    B["ñāṇadassana<br>(total understanding)"]
    C["suvisuddha<br>(total purification)"]
    subgraph L["Loka (World)"]
        L1["devas"]
        L2["Māra"]
        L3["Brahmā"]
        L4["ascetics and brahmins"]
        L5["*pajā* (living beings)"]
        L6["*sadevamanussa* (kings and commoners)"]
    end

Koṇḍañña has understood

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Bhagavā
    participant K as Koṇḍañña

    note over B, K: First Discourse: Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta

    activate B

    K->>B: "Whatever phenomena is subject to origination is completely subject to cessation."

    note over K: *viraja* (pure), <br> *vītamala* (stainless) <br> dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) arose

    note over B, K: Sets Dhamma Wheel in motion<br>followed by deity proclamations<br> (see next diagram)

    B->>K: "Koṇḍañña has understood!"

    note over K: Koṇḍañña became known as Aññāsi Koṇḍañña <br>(Koṇḍañña Who Understood)

    note over K: diṭṭhadhamma (seen the Dhamma)<br>pattadhamma (attained the Dhamma)<br>viditadhammo (understood the Dhamma)<br>pariyogāḷhadhammo (deeply penetrated the Dhamma)<br>tiṇṇavicikiccha (overcome uncertainty)<br>vigatakathaṃkatha (free from doubt)<br>aparappaccaya satthusāsane (not relying on another teacher's instructions)

    K->>B: "May I receive the pabbajja (going forth) <br> and the upasampadā (higher ordination)?"

    destroy K

    B->>K: "Come, bhikkhu"<br>*svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya*<br>("the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the pure life of the complete ending of suffering.")

    create participant VB as Vappa and Bhaddiya

    B-->>VB: instructs and exhorts bhikkhus

    VB->>B: "Whatever phenomena is subject to origination is completely subject to cessation."

    note over VB: *viraja* (pure), <br> *vītamala* (stainless) <br> dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) arose

    VB->>B: "May we receive the pabbajja (going forth) <br> and the upasampadā (higher ordination)?"

    destroy VB

    B->>VB: "Come, bhikkhavo"<br>*svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya*<br>("the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the pure life of the complete ending of suffering.")

    note over B: being brought food from 3 bhikkhus,<br>group of 6 lives on food

    create participant MA as Mahānāma and Assaji

    B-->>MA: instructs and exhorts bhikkhus

    MA->>B: "Whatever phenomena is subject to origination is completely subject to cessation."

    note over MA: *viraja* (pure), <br> *vītamala* (stainless) <br> dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) arose

    MA->>B: "May we receive the pabbajja (going forth) <br> and the upasampadā (higher ordination)?"

    destroy MA

    B->>MA: "Come, bhikkhavo"<br>*svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya*<br>("the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the pure life of the complete ending of suffering.")

    note over B: Second Discourse:<br>Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta <br>(Discourse on the Characteristic of Not-Self)

    deactivate B

Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta

---
title: "Second Discourse: Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (Discourse on the Characteristic of Not-Self)"
---
graph
R["*Rūpa*<br>(shape/form/matter/body)"]
V["*Vedanā*<br>(feeling)"]
S["*Saññā*<br>(perception)"]
S2["*Saṅkhārā*<br>(mental formations/volitional activities)"]
V2["*Viññāṇa*<br>(consciousness)"]
D{"Is X *atta*<br>(eternal self)?"}
A["*ābādhāya*<br>(affliction)"]
L["Can be obtained"]
L1["*evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu*<br>('May my X be thus')"]
L2["*evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosi*<br>('May my X not be thus')"]
R & V & S & S2 & V2 --> D -->|yes| L --> L1 & L2
D -->|no| A
D2{"Is X *nicca*<br>(permanent)?"}
Du["*dukkha*<br>(suffering)"]
VP["*vipariṇāmadhamma*<br>(subject to change)"]
E1["*etaṃ mama*<br>(This is mine)>"]
E2["*esohamasmi*<br>(This I am)>"]
E3["*eso me atta*<br>(This is my self)>"]
R & V & S & S2 & V2 --> D2 -->|yes| E1 --> E2 --> E3
D2 -->|no| Du --> VP

graph
R["*Rūpa*<br>(shape/form/matter/body)"]
V["*Vedanā*<br>(feeling)"]
S["*Saññā*<br>(perception)"]
S2["*Saṅkhārā*<br>(mental formations/volitional activities)"]
V2["*Viññāṇa*<br>(consciousness)"]
PFP["*atītānāgatapaccuppanna*<br>(past, future, or present)"]
IE["*ajjhatta* (internal)<br>*bahiddha* (external)"]
CF["*oḷārika* (coarse)<br>*sukhuma* (fine)"]
FN["dūra* (far)<br>*santika* (near)"]
R & V & S & S2 & V2 --> PFP & IE & CF & FN --> Y["*yathābhūta*<br>(in reality)"] & SP["*sammappaññā*<br>(with correct understanding)"] --> E1 & E2 & E3
E1["*netaṃ mama*<br>(This is not mine)>"]
E2["*nesohamasmi*<br>(This I am not)>"]
E3["*na meso atta*<br>(This is not my self)>"]

graph
A["*ariyasāvaka* (disciples)"] --> P["passanta (understanding)"] --> A0["sutavant (having heard)"] --> A1
subgraph A1["nibbindati (give up)"]
    R["*rūpa*<br>(shape/form/matter/body)"]
    V["*vedanā*<br>(feeling)"]
    S["*saññā*<br>(perception)"]
    S2["*saṅkhārā*<br>(mental formations/volitional activities)"]
    V2["*viññāṇa*<br>(consciousness)"]
end
A1 --> A2["virajjati (become detached)"] -->
A3["vimuccati (become liberated)"] -->
A4["ñāṇa (have knowledge and understanding)"] -->
A5["pajānāti (know clearly)"] -->
A6["*khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāya*<br>((Re-)Birth is finished, the pure life is lived, what had to be done is done, there is nothing further for this present state of existence.)"]

Text

(10.)

53. Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “To whom indeed should I first teach the dhamma (teaching)? Who will understand this dhamma quickly?” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “This Āḷāra Kālāma is wise, experienced, intelligent, for a long time of a nature with little dust; what if I were to teach the dhamma first to Āḷāra Kālāma, he will understand this dhamma quickly.” Then an invisible deity informed the Bhagavā: “Bhante, Āḷāra Kālāma passed away seven days ago.” And to the Bhagavā also knowledge arose: “Āḷāra Kālāma passed away seven days ago.” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “Āḷāra Kālāma was of great understanding; if indeed he had heard this dhamma, he would have understood it quickly.”

54. Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “To whom indeed should I first teach the dhamma? Who will understand this dhamma quickly?” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “This Udaka Rāmaputta is wise, experienced, intelligent, for a long time of a nature with little dust; what if I were to teach the dhamma first to Udaka Rāmaputta, he will understand this dhamma quickly.” Then an invisible deity informed the Bhagavā: “Bhante, Udaka Rāmaputta passed away last night.” And to the Bhagavā also knowledge arose: “Udaka Rāmaputta passed away last night.” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “Udaka Rāmaputta was of great understanding; if indeed he had heard this dhamma, he would have understood it quickly.”

55. Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “To whom indeed should I first teach the dhamma? Who will understand this dhamma quickly?” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “The group of five bhikkhū (ascetics) were very helpful to me, who attended me when I was striving in exertion; what if I were to teach the dhamma first to the group of five bhikkhū.” Then this occurred to the Bhagavā: “Where now are the group of five bhikkhū dwelling?” The Bhagavā saw with clear divine vision, surpassing normal human ability, the group of five bhikkhū dwelling in Bārāṇasī at Isipatana in the Deer Park. Then the Bhagavā, having dwelt in Uruvelā as long as he wished, set out on a journey towards Bārāṇasī.

(11.)

56. Upaka the Ājīvaka saw the Bhagavā journeying on the high road between Gayā and the Bodhi tree, and having seen the Bhagavā, he said this: “Your faculties, āvuso, are very clear, your skin-complexion is pure and bright. For whose sake, āvuso, have you gone forth? Or who is your teacher? Or whose dhamma do you profess?” When this was said, the Bhagavā addressed Upaka the Ājīvaka in verses:

57. “All-conquering, all-knowing am I,
In all dhammas (phenomena) undefiled;
All-abandoning, liberated in the destruction of taṇhā (craving),
Having known for myself, whom should I point to?

58. No teacher have I,
One like me is not found;
In the world with its devas,
There is no one to rival me.

59. For I am an arahant (worthy one) in the world,
I am the teacher unexcelled;
Alone I am a sammāsambuddha (perfectly self-awakened one),
Cooled am I, nibbuto (extinguished).

60. To set the Dhammacakka (Wheel of Dhamma) in motion,
I go to the city of Kāsī;
In a world become blind,
I shall beat the drum of the amata (deathless).”

61. “As you, āvuso, declare, you must be an infinite victor.”

62. “Victors indeed are those like me,
Who have reached the destruction of āsavas (non optimal flows);
Conquered by me are evil dhammas,
Therefore, Upaka, I am a victor.”

63. When this was said, Upaka the Ājīvaka, saying, “It may be so, āvuso,” shaking his head, took a side road and departed.

(12.)

64. Then the Bhagavā, journeying by stages, approached Bārāṇasī, Isipatana, the Deer Park, where the group of five bhikkhū were. The group of five bhikkhū saw the Bhagavā coming from afar; having seen him, they made an agreement among themselves: “āvuso, this ascetic Gotama is coming, who is given to luxury, has strayed from striving, and has reverted to luxury. He should not be greeted, nor stood up for, nor should his bowl and robe be received; however, a seat should be prepared, if he wishes, he will sit down.” But as the Bhagavā approached the group of five bhikkhū, the group of five bhikkhū were not able to abide by their own agreement. Not abiding by it, they went to meet the Bhagavā: one took his bowl and robe, one prepared a seat, one brought water for the feet, one a footstool, one a foot-towel. The Bhagavā sat down on the prepared seat; having sat down, the Bhagavā washed his feet. And they addressed the Bhagavā by name and with the term ‘āvuso’.

65. When this was said, the Bhagavā said this to the group of five bhikkhū: “Do not, bhikkhave, address the Tathāgata by name and with the term ‘āvuso’. The Tathāgata, bhikkhave, is an Arahant, a sammāsambuddha. Give ear, bhikkhave, the amata (deathless) has been attained, I will instruct, I will teach the dhamma. Practicing according to the instruction, you will soon — for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from home into homelessness, that unsurpassed—culmination of the brahmacariya (optimal life), realise it for yourselves by abhiññā (direct knowledge) in this very life, and dwell having attained it.” When this was said, the group of five bhikkhū said this to the Bhagavā: “Even with that conduct, āvuso Gotama, with that practice, with that difficult austerity, you did not attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones; how then now, being given to luxury, having strayed from striving, having reverted to luxury, will you attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones?” When this was said, the Bhagavā said this to the group of five bhikkhū: “No, bhikkhave, the Tathāgata is not given to luxury, has not strayed from striving, has not reverted to luxury; the Tathāgata, bhikkhave, is an Arahant, a sammāsambuddha. Give ear, bhikkhave, the amata has been attained, I will instruct, I will teach the dhamma. Practicing according to the instruction, you will soon — for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from home into homelessness, that unsurpassed—culmination of the brahmacariya, realize it for yourselves by abhiññā in this very life, and dwell having attained it.”

66. For a second time, the group of five bhikkhū said this to the Bhagavā: “Even with that conduct, āvuso Gotama, with that practice, with that difficult austerity, you did not attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones; how then now, being given to luxury, having strayed from striving, having reverted to luxury, will you attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones?” For a second time, the Bhagavā said this to the group of five bhikkhū: “No, bhikkhave, the Tathāgata is not given to luxury, has not strayed from striving, has not reverted to luxury; the Tathāgata, bhikkhave, is an Arahant, a sammāsambuddha. Give ear, bhikkhave, the amata has been attained, I will instruct, I will teach the dhamma. Practicing according to the instruction, you will soon — for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from home into homelessness, that unsurpassed—culmination of the brahmacariya, realise it for yourselves by abhiññā in this very life, and dwell having attained it.” For a third time, the group of five bhikkhū said this to the Bhagavā: “Even with that conduct, āvuso Gotama, with that practice, with that difficult austerity, you did not attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones; how then now, being given to luxury, having strayed from striving, having reverted to luxury, will you attain any superhuman state, a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones?”

67. When this was said, the Bhagavā said this to the group of five bhikkhū: “Do you, bhikkhave, recall me ever having spoken like this before?” “No indeed, bhante.” “The Tathāgata, bhikkhave, is an Arahant, a sammāsambuddha. Give ear, bhikkhave, the amata has been attained, I will instruct, I will teach the dhamma. Practicing according to the instruction, you will soon — for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from home into homelessness, that unsurpassed—culmination of the brahmacariya, realize it for yourselves by abhiññā in this very life, and dwell having attained it.” The Bhagavā was able to convince the group of five bhikkhū. Then the group of five bhikkhū listened to the Bhagavā, gave ear, and applied their minds to understanding.

(13.)

68. Then the Bhagavā addressed the group of five bhikkhū:

69. “These two extremes, bhikkhave, should not be cultivated by one who has gone forth. What two? That which is this pursuit of sensual happiness in sensual pleasures, which is low, vulgar, worldly, ignoble, not conducive to welfare; and that which is this pursuit of self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble, not conducive to welfare. Without veering towards either of these two extremes, bhikkhave, the majjhimā paṭipadā (Middle Yay) has been abhisambuddha (fully awakened) by the Tathāgata, which produces vision, produces knowledge, leads to calm, to abhiññā, to sambodhi (enlightenment), to nibbāna (extinguishment).

70. And what, bhikkhave, is that majjhimā paṭipadā (Middle Way) by the Tathāgata, which produces vision, produces knowledge, leads to calm, to abhiññā, to sambodhi, to nibbāna? It is this very ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo (Eightfold Path), that is to say: sammādiṭṭhi (right view), sammāsaṅkappa (right resolve), sammāvācā (right speech), sammākammanta (right action), sammāājīva (right livelihood), sammāvāyāma (right effort), sammāsati (right awareness), sammāsamādhi (right focus). This, bhikkhave, is that majjhimā paṭipadā abhisambuddha by the Tathāgata, which produces vision, produces knowledge, leads to calm, to abhiññā, to sambodhi, to nibbāna.

(14.)

71. Now this, bhikkhave, is the dukkha ariyasacca (realisation of suffering). Birth is dukkha (suffering), aging is dukkha, illness is dukkha, death is dukkha, association with the unloved is dukkha, separation from the loved is dukkha, not getting what one wants is dukkha. In short, the pañcupādānakkhandhā (five collections acting as a fuel) are dukkha.

72. Now this, bhikkhave, is the dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca (realisation of the origin of suffering): it is this taṇhā (craving) which leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, relishing now here, now there; that is to say, kāmataṇhā (craving for sensual pleasures), bhavataṇhā (craving for existence), vibhavataṇhā (craving for non-existence).

73. Now this, bhikkhave, is the dukkhanirodha ariyasacca (realisation of the cessation of suffering): it is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same taṇhā, the giving up, the relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it.

74. Now this, bhikkhave, is the dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca (realisation of the path leading to the cessation of suffering): it is this very ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, that is to say: sammādiṭṭhi, sammāsaṅkappa, sammāvācā, sammākammanta, sammāājīva, sammāvāyāma, sammāsati, sammāsamādhi.

(15.)

75. ‘This is the dukkha ariyasacca’ (realisation of suffering): thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, cakkhuṃ (insight) arose in me, ñāṇaṃ (knowledge) arose, paññā (wisdom) arose, vijjā (understanding) arose, āloko (light) arose. ‘This dukkha ariyasacca should be pariññeyyanti (fully understood)’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkha ariyasacca has been fully understood’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose.

76. ‘This is the dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca’ (realisation of the origin of suffering): thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca should be pahātabbanti (given up)’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhasamudaya ariyasacca has been abandoned’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose.

77. ‘This is the dukkhanirodha ariyasacca’ (realisation of the cessation of suffering): thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhanirodha ariyasacca should be be sacchikātabbanti (personally experienced)’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhanirodha ariyasacca has been personally experienced’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose.

78. ‘This is the dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca’ (realisation of the path leading to the cessation of suffering): thus, bhikkhave, insight concerning dhammas not heard before arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca should be bhāvetabbanti (developed)’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose. ‘This dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā ariyasacca has been developed’: thus, bhikkhave, concerning dhammas not heard before, insight arose in me, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, understanding arose, light arose.

(16.)

79. And as long as, bhikkhave, I did not have yathābhūta (in reality) ñāṇadassana (total understanding) and suvisuddha (total purification) in these four realisations with tiparivaṭṭa (three phases) and dvādasākāra (twelve aspects), then, bhikkhave, I did not claim to have abhisambuddha anuttara sammāsambodhi (woken up to perfect understanding) in this world having devas, Māra, Brahmā, ascetics and brahmins, pajā (living beings), sadevamanussa (kings and commoners).

80. But when, bhikkhave, I had yathābhūta (in reality) ñāṇadassana (total understanding) and suvisuddha (total purification) in these four realisations with tiparivaṭṭa (three phases) and dvādasākāra (twelve aspects), then, bhikkhave, I claimed to have abhisambuddha anuttara sammāsambodhi (woken up to perfect understanding unsurpassed by anything) in this world having devas, Māra, Brahmā, ascetics and brahmins, pajā (living beings), sadevamanussa (kings and commoners). And from my knowledge, the insight arose: akuppā me vimutti, ayamantimā jāti, natthi dāni punabbhavo (“Unshakeable is my liberation, this is the final birth, there is now no more future existences.”) This the Bhagavā said, and the group of five bhikkhū, delighted, rejoiced in the Bhagavā’s words.

81. And while this detailed exposition was being spoken, there arose in āyasmant Koṇḍañña the viraja (pure), vītamala (stainless) dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma): yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman (“Whatever phenomena is subject to origination is completely subject to cessation.”)

(17.)

82. And when the Dhammacakka (Dhamma wheel) had been set in motion by the Bhagavā, bhummā devā (the earth-dwelling devas) raised a cry: “This unsurpassed Dhammacakka has been set in motion by the Bhagavā in Bārāṇasī, at Isipatana in the Deer Park, which cannot be stopped by any ascetic or brahmin or deva or Māra or Brahmā or by anyone in the world.” Hearing the cry of the earth-dwelling devas, the Cātumahārājikā devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Cātumahārājikā devas, the Tāvatiṃsa devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Tāvatiṃsa devas, the Yāma devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Yāma devas, the Tusita devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Tusita devas, the Nimmānaratī devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Nimmānaratī devas, the Paranimmitavasavattī devas raised a cry. Hearing the cry of the Paranimmitavasavattī devas, the Brahmakāyika devas raised a cry: “This unsurpassed Dhammacakka has been set in motion by the Bhagavā in Bārāṇasī, at Isipatana in the Deer Park, which cannot be stopped by any ascetic or brahmin or deva or Māra or Brahmā or by anyone in the world.”

83. Thus indeed, in that moment, in that instant, in that flash, the sound arose up to brahmalokā (the Brahma world). And this dasasahassilokadhātu (ten thousand-fold world system) trembled, trembled, quaked; and an immeasurable and excellent obhāso (radiance) appeared in the world, surpassing the divine majesty of the deities.

84. Then the Bhagavā uttered this inspired utterance: “Indeed, bho Koṇḍañña has understood! Indeed, bho Koṇḍañña has understood!” Thus it was that āyasmato Koṇḍañña came to be known as Aññāsi Koṇḍañña (Koṇḍañña Who Understood).

(18.)

85. Then āyasmā Aññāsi Koṇḍañña, diṭṭhadhamma (who has seen the Dhamma), pattadhamma (attained the Dhamma), viditadhammo (understood the Dhamma), pariyogāḷhadhammo (deeply penetrated the Dhamma), tiṇṇavicikiccha (overcome uncertainty), vigatakathaṃkatha (free from doubt), aparappaccaya satthusāsane (not relying on another teacher’s instructions), said this to the Bhagavā: “May I, bhante, receive the pabbajja (going forth) in the Bhagavā’s presence, may I receive the upasampadā (higher ordination)?” “Come, bhikkhu,” the Bhagavā said, svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyāya (“the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the optimal life of the complete ending of suffering.”) That itself was the upasampadā for that āyasmant.

(19.)

86. Then the Bhagavā instructed and exhorted the remaining bhikkhū with a Dhamma talk. Then, while āyasmant Vappa and āyasmant Bhaddiya were being instructed and exhorted by the Bhagavā with a Dhamma talk, the dust-free, stainless dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) arose in them: “Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation.” They, diṭṭhadhamma (who has seen the Dhamma), pattadhamma (attained the Dhamma), viditadhammo (understood the Dhamma), pariyogāḷhadhammo (deeply penetrated the Dhamma), tiṇṇavicikiccha (overcome uncertainty), vigatakathaṃkatha (free from doubt), aparappaccaya satthusāsane (not relying on another teacher’s instructions), said this to the Bhagavā: “May we, Bhante, receive the pabbajja in the Bhagavā’s presence, may we receive the upasampadā?” “Come, bhikkhavo,” the Bhagavā said, “the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the brahmacariya for the complete ending of dukkha (suffering).” That itself was the upasampadā for those āyasmants.

87. Then the Bhagavā, being brought food, instructed and exhorted the remaining bhikkhū with a Dhamma talk. What the three bhikkhū bring from their alms round, with that the group of six sustain themselves. Then, while āyasmant Mahānāma and āyasmant Assaji were being instructed and exhorted by the Bhagavā with a Dhamma talk, the dust-free, stainless dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) arose in them: “Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation.” They, diṭṭhadhamma (who has seen the Dhamma), pattadhamma (attained the Dhamma), viditadhammo (understood the Dhamma), pariyogāḷhadhammo (deeply penetrated the Dhamma), tiṇṇavicikiccha (overcome uncertainty), vigatakathaṃkatha (free from doubt), aparappaccaya satthusāsane (not relying on another teacher’s instructions), said this to the Bhagavā: “May we, Bhante, receive the pabbajja in the Bhagavā’s presence, may we receive the upasampadā?” “Come, bhikkhavo,” the Bhagavā said, “the Dhamma is well-proclaimed, live the brahmacariya for the complete ending of dukkha (suffering).” That itself was the upasampadā for those āyasmants.

(20.)

88. Then the Bhagavā addressed the group of five bhikkhū:

89. Rūpa (shape/form/matter/body), bhikkhave, is anatta (not-self). And indeed here, bhikkhave, if rūpa is atta (conception of an everlasting permanent self), this rūpa would not lead to ābādhāya (affliction), and rūpa can be obtained: evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu, evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosī (‘May my form be thus, may my form not be thus.’) And because indeed, bhikkhave, rūpa is anatta (not-self), therefore rūpa leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: May my form be thus, may my form not be thus.’

90. Vedanā (feeling), bhikkhave, is anatta (not-self). And indeed here, bhikkhave, if vedanā is atta, this vedanā would not lead to affliction, and vedanā can be obtained: ‘May my vedanā be thus, may my vedanā not be thus.’ And because indeed, bhikkhave, vedanā is anatta (not-self), therefore vedanā leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: May my feelings be thus, may my feelings not be thus.’

91. Saññā (perception), bhikkhave, is anatta (not-self). And indeed here, bhikkhave, if saññā is atta, this saññā would not lead to affliction, and saññā can be obtained: ‘May my saññā be thus, may my saññā not be thus.’ And because indeed, bhikkhave, saññā is anatta (not-self), therefore saññā leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: May my saññā be thus, may my saññā not be thus.’

92. Saṅkhārā (mental formations/volitional activities), bhikkhave, is anatta (not-self). And indeed here, bhikkhave, if saṅkhārā is atta, this saṅkhārā would not lead to affliction, and saṅkhārā can be obtained: ‘May my saṅkhārā be thus, may my saṅkhārā not be thus.’ And because indeed, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā is anatta (not-self), therefore saṅkhārā leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: May my saṅkhārā be thus, may my saṅkhārā not be thus.’

93. Viññāṇa (consciousness), bhikkhave, is anatta (not-self). And indeed here, bhikkhave, if viññāṇa is atta, this viññāṇa would not lead to affliction, and viññāṇa can be obtained: ‘May my viññāṇa be thus, may my viññāṇa not be thus.’ And because indeed, bhikkhave, viññāṇa is anatta (not-self), therefore viññāṇa leads to affliction, and it cannot be obtained: May my viññāṇa be thus, may my viññāṇa not be thus.’

(21.)

94. “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is rūpa nicca (permanent) or anicca (impermanent)?” “Anicca, bhante.” “Now, is that which is impermanent dukkha (suffering) or sukha (happiness)?” “Dukkha, bhante.” “Now, is it proper to regard that which is anicca, dukkha, and vipariṇāmadhamma (subject to change), as: etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me atta (‘This is mine, this I am, this is my attā (self)’)?” “Of course not, bhante.”

95. “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is vedanā permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, bhante.” “Now, is that which is impermanent dissatisfaction or satisfaction ?” “Dissatisfaction, bhante.” “Now, is it proper to regard that which is impermanent, dissatisfying, and subject to change, as: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my attā (self)’?” “Of course not, bhante.”

96. “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is saññā permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, bhante.” “Now, is that which is impermanent dissatisfaction or satisfaction ?” “Dissatisfaction, bhante.” “Now, is it proper to regard that which is impermanent, dissatisfying, and subject to change, as: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my attā (self)’?” “Of course not, bhante.”

97. “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is saṅkhārā permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, bhante.” “Now, is that which is impermanent dissatisfaction or satisfaction ?” “Dissatisfaction, bhante.” “Now, is it proper to regard that which is impermanent, dissatisfying, and subject to change, as: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my attā (self)’?” “Of course not, bhante.”

98. “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: is viññāṇa permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, bhante.” “Now, is that which is impermanent dissatisfaction or satisfaction ?” “Dissatisfaction, bhante.” “Now, is it proper to regard that which is impermanent, dissatisfying, and subject to change, as: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my attā (self)’?” “Of course not, bhante.”

(22.)

99. “Therefore, bhikkhave, whatever rūpa there is, atītānāgatapaccuppanna (past, future, or present), ajjhatta (internal) or bahiddha (external), oḷārika (coarse) or sukhuma (fine), hīna (inferior) or paṇīta (superior), dūra (far) or santika (near), all rūpa daṭṭhabba (should be regarded as) yathābhūta (in reality), sammappaññā (with correct understanding) thus: netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso atta (‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā.’)

100. Whatever vedanā there is, past, future, or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, inferior or superior, far or near, all vedanā should be seen as it really is, with correct understand, thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā.’

101. Whatever saññā there is, past, future, or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, inferior or superior, far or near, all saññā should be seen as it really is, with correct understand, thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā.’

102. Whatever saṅkhārā there is, past, future, or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, inferior or superior, far or near, all saṅkhārā should be seen as it really is, with correct understand, thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā.’

103. Whatever viññāṇa there is, past, future, or present, internal or external, coarse or fine, inferior or superior, far or near, all viññāṇa should be seen as it really is, with correct understand, thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā.’

(23.)

104. Thus understanding, bhikkhave, sutavā (having heard), the ariyasāvaka (the awakened disciples) nibbindati (give up) rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, and viññāṇa; from giving up they virajjati (become detached), being detached they vimuccati (become liberated); through liberation, they have ñāṇa (knowledge and understanding) of liberation; they pajānāti (know clearly): khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāya (“(Re-)Birth is finished, the pure life is lived, what had to be done is done, there is nothing further for this present state of existence.”)

(24.)

105. The Bhagavā said this. Attamana (with independent minds), the group of five bhikkhus abhinandi (approved of) the Buddha’s statement. And moreover, when this veyyākaraṇa (detailed exposition) was being spoken, the citta (minds) of the five bhikkhus, anupādāya āsavehi (not grasping the defilements) vimucci (became liberated). Then, there were six arahants (worthy ones) in the world.

106. The Story of the Group of Five is finished.

First Recitation Section.

Commentary

The first two discourses to the group of five represent the core of the Buddha’s initial teaching, and in this account the teaching was sufficient to result in liberation for all five.

Deciding who to teach

Initially, his internal monologue reflects a rational assessment of potential recipients for his dhamma (teaching), based on their perceived intellectual acuity and experiential readiness. The “invisible deity” and subsequent “knowledge” arising can be understood rationally as moments of intuitive insight or the crystallisation of information, experienced as an external confirmation but rooted in his own cognitive processes.

Encounter with Upaka

His encounter with Upaka showcases the Bhagavā’s profound conviction in his self-achieved, unique understanding. His claims of being “all-conquering” and “all-knowing” refer to a mastery over his own experience and a comprehensive insight into the nature of dhammas (phenomena as experienced), rather than objective omniscience in a metaphysical sense. He describes a state of liberation achieved through direct, personal investigation (“Having known for myself”), a core tenet of phenomenological inquiry.

Upaka, despite being initially interested and receptive, dismisses the Bhagavā for his seemingly arrogant and exalted claims of his achievements. This was a valuable lesson for the Bhagavā - he needed to temper and adjust his elocution style, otherwise he risks alienating potential followers. Later on the Bhagavā adopts an improved approach which brings him great success in educating Yasa, his family and friends, the Bhaddavaggiya group and ultimately King Seniya Bimbisāra.

This story also reinforces that despite the Buddha’s seemingly enhanced perception in deciding who to teach, he is still an imperfect human being, capable of making mistakes. Also, he does not seem to have the ability to read the mind of Upaka, otherwise he would have realised Upaka would be put off by his ostentatious claims.

The Five Ascetics

The initial skepticism of the five ascetics is a rational response based on their prior observation of his ascetic practices. Their eventual persuasion hinges not on supernatural displays, but on the perceived authenticity of his transformed state and the compelling nature of his new experiential framework. The Bhagavā’s argument rests on the observable change in his demeanour and the unprecedented nature of his current assertions. The Buddha has learnt from his mistake in his encounter with Upaka, but is still adjusting and tempering his teaching style.

The Middle Way

The core teaching introduced, the “Middle Way,” is a principle derived from direct experience: avoiding the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification, both of which are found to be unproductive for achieving clarity and insight into the nature of experience. It leads to “vision” and “knowledge” — direct, experiential understanding.

The Eightfold Path

The Middle Way is best undertaken by following the “Eightfold Path” (ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo). Note, the constituents of the eightfold path are not explained in the narrative. (Anālayo, 2019) says the eightfold path, and in particularly sammāsamādhi (right focus) has various conflicting explanations in the Pāḷi Tipiṭaka. It is often explained as the four jhānas in 7D/9.4.5.4 Maggasaccaniddesa, 11M/4.11 Saccavibhaṅgasutta and 14S5/1.1.8 Vibhaṅgasutta. However, other texts offer different explanations. Because of this, Anālayo suggests that these various explanations are all late additions, and it is possible the Buddha originally only provided a “bare listing” of the eightfold path with no further explanation. He writes:

Such bare listing conveys the basic notion that the path of practice involves eight factors which are to be cultivated in conjunction. This much is fairly self-evident and also meaningful, especially when given in the context of an exposition of the four truths, whose formulation appears to reflect an ancient Indian scheme of medical diagnosis. This should have been intelligible, without further exposition. In other words, it seems fair to assume that at least these elements would have been comprehensible to someone in the ancient Indian setting who had as yet no familiarity with Buddhist doctrine and that they could therefore have functioned as triggers for Koṇdañña’s insight leading to his attainment of stream-entry.

In this way, the bare enumeration of the path factors found frequently in the discourses could have originally been a self-sufficient pointer to the path of practice as the fourth truth. Here the first two path factors of view and intention are informed by the basic diagnostic perspective of the four truths, thereby providing the needed directive for ethical conduct in the form of speech, action, and livelihood. The same diagnostic perspective stands in the background of cultivation of the mind, which takes the form of making an effort, establishing mindfulness, and cultivating concentration. In this setting, right concentration emerges quite naturally as an integral component of the path of practice.

In line with the above, I prefer to adopt the conservative position that the Buddha did not originally explain the eightfold path, so the terms used reflect the common meaning of the words rather than the technical meanings in the explanations.

The Buddha may have many reasons for not explaining the path. Firstly, he may have felt the terms are self explanatory (see below). He may also have thought it best to leave the terms unexplained, because the exact implementation of the path may depend on the individual (due to phenomenal and subjective perception). Finally, at this stage in his teaching career, he may not have yet thought too deeply what these terms may imply.

ariya can mean many things, such as “noble”, “distinguished”, of high birth, member of the Aryan race, etc. but in this instance is referring to those who are awakened or liberated. I have decided to leave this word untranslated as it is clear the path that is referred is being expounded by someone who is awakened and liberated and intended for those who wish to achieve the same goal.

Therefore the Buddha is simply saying the path to the cessation of dukkha can be guided by exemplary and optimal behaviour and actions - this is completely consistent with the insight from dependent origination.

sammā according to the PTS dictionary means “properly, rightly; in the right way, as it ought to be best, perfectly”. Some Buddhists have weaponised the eightfold path, ie. they use it as a way of criticising those that do not agree with their views. Ie. if someone is articulating a view that they do not agree with, then they accuse their opponent of having “wrong” views, “wrong” speech etc. This is rather unfortunate, and reflects personal, unconscious bias, opinions and a judgemental attitude which is probably the opposite of what the Buddha was trying to say. sammā is probably better understood as “optimal” rather than “correct” or “ethical”.

Let’s examine the contituents using dictionary definitions:

sammādiṭṭhi (right view): diṭṭhi means “view, belief, opinion; theory, doctrine” so in this context is referring to holding the “right” beliefs or knowledge (which in accordance to dependent origination would be an understanding of the phenomenological framework and perception of reality, and the dependent or causal nature of dukkha).
sammāsaṅkappa (right resolve): saṅkappa means “intention; purpose” and it is clear those who wish to undertake the path should have the commitment and the determination to do so.
sammāvācā (right speech): vācā means “word, speech, saying” and could refer to an ethical manner of speaking (ie. avoiding lies and criticisms) but could simply mean saying the appropriate things at the appropriate times, avoiding unnecessary and untruthful and harmful statements etc. As we saw in 2. Ajapālakathā (The Account of the Goatherd’s Banyan Tree) The Buddha was fond of “twisting” or “adapting” words and redefining their meanings ([S] upāyakauśalya), so perhaps right speech simply means the ability to use words skilfully and cleverly to an advantageous purpose.
sammākammanta (right action): kammanta means “what is done, what one does; deed, act, action” and this simply refers to “doing the right thing” where “right” probably refers to the appropriate or correct action from a rational perspective rather than just from a “moral” or “ethical” perspective.
sammāājīva (right livelihood): ājīva means “livelihood, means of subsistence; way of living” and again this is referring to living a way of life that is optimal for the purposes of liberation, and not necessary a specific class of professions. Nor does it necessarily imply a way of living based on renunciation, becoming a recluse or wanderer, or joining a monastic community. Clearly, some Buddhists have interpreted it this way, but at this stage there was no saṅgha and therefore no formal community, and the Buddha’s path of becoming a renunciate wanderer was not necessarily a path he advocated to others (as implied by the Middle Way).
sammāvāyāma (right effort): vāyāma means “striving, effort, exertion, endeavour” and again it is fairly clear that those who wish to undertake the path should work diligently towards it.
sammāsati (right awareness): sati can mean many things. The primary meaning is “memory, recognition, consciousness” but it can also mean “intentness of mind, wakefulness of mind, mindfulness alertness, lucidity of mind, self-possession, conscience self-consciousness”. This is often mistranslated as “mindfulness” implying a meditative state, but as we understand the Buddha’s experience of awakening was not a result of meditation so this is not an exhortation to achieve meditative “mindfulness” but simply advice to be aware and conscious, remembering, recognising and analysing one’s past and current mental constructions.
sammāsamādhi (right focus): PTS translates samādhi as “concentration; a concentrated, self-collected, intent state of mind and meditation which, concomitant with right living, is a necessary condition to the attainment of higher wisdom and emancipation” but clearly this is an over-reach and based on retro-fitting a meditative interpretation rather than common usage of the word. Probably a common-usage interpretation would be “concentration” or “focus.” Following the eightfold path and replicating the Buddha’s awakening and liberation requires a number of related attributes and disposition, including calmness, composure, reflection, focus, contemplation, self-introspection, and I believe this is what the Buddha intended here.

As can be seen from the above analysis, ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo (the eightfold path of the awakened or liberated) can be perfectly understood using commonplace and ordinary definitions of the underlying words and does not require additional explanation or technical definition.

(Norman, 1997) claims that the eightfold path represents an “alternate” and more “gradual” way towards awakening:

The fourth noble truth is about the path which leads to the destruction of suffering, and this was a more gradual way to release, making use of the precepts of the eight-fold path to gain a better rebirth. This is the so-called kammic way. One might hope in time, after entering the stream, by amassing good kamma, to get to the point where the number of future birth in this world would be limited. Rebirths after that would be heavenly rebirths, leading at last to release from samsāra.

This is certainly the way that a lot of Buddhists have interpreted it. However, I note at this stage in the narrative the Buddha has not really defined kamma so I don’t believe this is an alternate or more gradual path, it simply states the optimal conditions by which awakening can be achieved. For more discussion on kamma see On Kamma and Rebirth.

For a discussion on how the eightfold path could be aligned to a reflective thinking process, see The Eightfold Path as an application of Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle.

The Four Realisations

Next the Buddha explains the well known “Four Realisations” (caturāriyasaccāni). This has often been translated as “four noble truths” but, as (Norman, 1997), (Norman, 2008) and (Harvey, 2009) points out, this is not quite the correct translation or interpretation. sacca can be translated as “truth” but equally it could mean ‘real’, ‘actual thing’, ‘reality’ (according to (Harvey, 2009)). In other words, it is not an eternal or objective “truth” but something that has been realised by the Buddha. As before, I prefer to leave the term ariya untranslated as Norman speculates it is probably a later addition as there are some texts that omit it. Hence caturāriyasaccāni is best understood as “the four realisations of those who are awakened or liberated” which I shall simply refer as the “four realisations”.

The Four Realisations are presented as a structured analysis of lived experience:

Dukkha (suffering/unsatisfactoriness): A phenomenological description of the inherent stress and unsatisfactoriness within conditioned existence, observable in birth, aging, illness, death, and the frustration of desires. The “five collections acting as a fuel” (pañcupādānakkhandhā) - form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness - are identified as the locus of this experienced dukkha. Note that the five collections are often translated as “five aggregates” or even “five clinging aggregates” but again I prefer to use the common place definition - these are five “collections” or five “bundles”.
Samudaya (origin of dukkha): The identification of taṇhā (craving/thirst) as the psychological mechanism, the experiential driver, behind dukkha. This is an observable pattern of attachment and aversion within conscious experience.
Nirodha (cessation of dukkha): The experiential possibility of dukkha ending through the cessation of its cause, taṇhā. Although this could point to a transformed state of consciousness, I prefer to describe it as a disposition, a framing of the conscious and the subconscious to instinctively avoid generating mental constructions based on taṇhā that would inevitably lead to dukkha.
Magga (path to cessation): The Eightfold Path (ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo), a practical guide to optimal conduct, mental discipline, and wisdom, designed to bring about this cessation by directly altering how one engages with and understands one’s own experience.

Are the Four Realisations self-evident?

The Four Realisations need to be understood in the context of dependent origination. This is made clear when Koṇḍañña attains dhammacakkhu (insight into the dhamma) immediately after hearing the four realisations, his “liberating insight” consist of the following words:

yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman
(“Whatever phenomena is subject to origination is completely subject to cessation.”)

Without this context, the Four Realisations can seem banal or self-evident, and perhaps limited in their salvific value. For example, (Frauwallner, 1973) writes:

But in general the emptiness or hollowness, from the point of contents, of this sermon is surprising. Measured according to the standard of that time, there is nothing special in it. The view that everything earthly is full of sorrow lies at the basis of the whole striving for Release which fills that period. To find the source of sorrow in thirst is also no new thought. Because, as we have already seen earlier, the teaching of Yājñavalkya knows the desire as the cause of entanglement in the cycle of births. Only its designation as thirst is a more rare and less common expression. What finally concerns the way to Deliverance — the noble eight-fold path — it is not a clearly sketched out way but merely an undefined frame worded in general colourless expressions. The question now urges itself as to how this emptiness of contents (of the doctrine of four noble truths) is to be explained, and whether there is nothing in the Buddhistic canonical text which completes or supplements the preaching of four noble truths and represents the things taught in it in a more detailed manner.

It would seem Frauwallner has not really appreciated how radical and original the concept of phenomenalism (conceptualised as dependent origination) would have been in Buddha’s time. Confronted with this radical notion, the four realisations would indeed have seemed “earth and heaven shaking” to the five ascetics.

(Polak, 2011) states:

I would like to investigate the issue of the three doctrines, which are supposed to be the theoretical pinnacle of early Buddhism: the four noble truths, the dependant co-arising, and the five khandhas. Whenever one opens any popular book on the early Buddhism, one is due to bump into these concepts. All these concepts have already been evaluated by several scholars, including Schmithausen, Bronkhorst (1986: 101), and Wynne, as later developments not belonging to the earliest stratum of Buddhism. They have noted that insight into the four noble truths during the fourth jhāna, is impossible from the psychological standpoint. I will attempt to show that the acceptation of these concepts as the ‘methods of insight’ caused great problems for the ancient Buddhists. There are suttas, which report that many monks found these ‘theoretical methods’ inefficient in the dispelling of the ‘self-view’ and in attaining the ultimate breakthrough. There are also suttas presenting the four noble truths in opposition to the release from the āsavas, describing them as a preliminary insight attained at the initial stages of the path to liberation. I want to emphasize the fact that these three theories possess a very limited explanative power, when it comes to elucidating the causes of the arising of the ignorance and of the self-view. If we are to accept the fact, that these three concepts are the pinnacle of the theoretical background of early Buddhism, we must also accept the fact that it was a rather crude and primitive doctrine.

There seems to be an assumption in Polak’s article that these concepts do not explain how liberation is achieved, only that it is possible. Let’s question this assumption. The Eightfold Path seems to be clear enough, and can be understood without referencing any spiritual or meditative practice. The Buddha’s “solution” also seems simple enough: it’s basically ceasing or stopping unproductive and non-optimal mental constructs.

Therefore the implied issue seems to be that the Buddha has not provided any instructions on how to cease these mental constructs, or that the cessation of mental constructs did not result in a sense of liberation.

Perhaps the analogy to losing weight may be apt. The Buddha is saying the benefit of ceasing non optimal mental constructs should be self-evident, ie. liberation from dukkha, just like a successful weight loss regimen should be physically observable, in that the subject will no longer be overweight.

So perhaps the issue is the difficulty or lack of guidance on how to cease mental constructs. The Buddha did not provide specific instructions on how to achieve cessation because this depends on the individual. Similarly, losing weight is a combination of eating less and being more physically active - the specifics will depend on the individual’s eating and physical habits. Therefore, ceasing mental constructions will depend on the nature of the mental constructs. In both cases (losing weight and eradicating dukkha), the person’s “willpower” or resolve is important, as are a number of additional factors (enumerated in the Eightfold path).

Based on this, I do not believe the Buddha’s discourse “possess a very limited explanative power” - it would seem the Buddha explained what needed to be explained, and the rest is up to the individual to “figure out” based on their circumstances.

Are the Four Realisations a late addition or synthesis rather than what the Buddha may have originally thought?

Some scholars have speculated that the Four Realisations are a late invention, a synthesis and simplification of dependent origination into a framework reminiscent of a medical diagnosis and cure. Clues that the realisations may have been a later synthesis reformulated as the first discourse include the presence of various anomalies and anachronisms embedded within the text. For example, the five collections (khandhas) are mentioned as part of the the first realisation, yet are not introduced and explained until the second discourse. The five ascetics should have been referred to as samaṇa (recluses or renunciants) rather than bhikkhu, as the saṅgha has not been formalised yet. Thirdly, the introduction of the proclamations of the various levels of deities seem fanciful and potentially inserted at a late stage when the Buddha has been reified and his teachings elevated to a religious doctrine.

(Norman, 2003) also points out many editions that refer to the four realisations contain syntactic and grammatical errors, indicating a less than perfect mastery of the language, or possibly text that have originated in a local dialect and then converted or standardised into Pāḷi. This accounts for the possibly misleading translation of the four realisations as the “four noble truths” which leads to interpretative and translative difficulties.

For example, (Bronkhorst, 2009) comments that ”… in some versions of the first sermon — probably the older ones — the Four Noble Truths or other forms of liberating knowledge are not mentioned at all.” He also adds that the three phases and 12 aspects are “probably later additions.” (Rhys Davids, 1935) points out that the four realisations are absent from the Fours of the Añguttara-nikāya.

(Anderson, 2001) concludes that “the Ariyapariyesana-sutta shows that certain redactors of the canon conceived of the Buddha’s act of teaching without the four noble truths” and ”… the four noble truths emerged into the canonical tradition at a particular point and slowly became recognized as the first teaching of the Buddha … [being] a doctrine that came to be identified as the central teaching of the Buddha by the time of the commentaries”.

However, (Anālayo, 2012) argues against the theory that the Four Realisations are a late addition, proposing instead that the shorter texts are intentional extracts from a longer, multi-part discourse, and that the Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions considered the teaching on the “three turnings” to be the central element that set the wheel of Dharma in motion.

(Gombrich, 2009) speculates that ”… there was an earlier, probably shorter, version, which contained the gist of the present version; and that the entire text rested on a memory in the Sangha, quite likely buttressed by the Buddha while he was still alive, that those were the topics he talked about on that occasion.”

My view is that the Four Realisations would have been “accepted” as part of Buddha’s teachings by the time the Khandhaka was compiled, but may or may not have been incorporated in his very first discourse. Perhaps the author/compiler of the Khandhaka incorporated it into the narrative because he felt this was the “best” way to explain the Buddha’s teachings to a fresh audience, rather than the philosophical concept of dependent origination. In any case, dependent origination was already explained earlier, so there is no need to repeat it in this section. Based on this, it would seem plausible that the entire contents of the First Discourse is an invention of the author/compiler of the Khandhaka, formed from combining various stories and teachings into a single narrative.

The “turning” of the Dhamma Wheel

The Bhagavā’s repeated emphasis on “vision arose in me, knowledge arose” concerning these truths underscores the phenomenological basis of his realisation — it is a direct, unmediated seeing into the structure of his own experience, not a received doctrine. Koṇḍañña’s attainment of the “insight into the Dhamma” signifies a similar profound shift in his own perceptual and conceptual framework, a direct insight into the principle that “whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation.” The subsequent proclamation of devas and “world-system shaking” can be interpreted as powerful metaphors for the profound subjective impact and perceived universal significance of this breakthrough in understanding - the devas represent an internal hierarchy of consciousness states and frames of mind that were released by understanding, giving up, personally experiencing and practising the four realisations.

`anattā` (not-self)

The teaching on anattā (not-self) is a detailed phenomenological deconstruction of the conventional notion of a permanent, independent self. By examining the five collections (rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā, viññāṇa) as they appear in direct experience, their impermanent, conditioned, and uncontrollable nature is revealed. The conclusion that “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my attā” arises from this direct observation. This insight leads to disenchantment with the components of experience previously identified with a “self”, followed by dispassion, and ultimately, a liberation from the suffering caused by clinging to these transient phenomena. This liberation is an experiential state, a fundamental alteration in one’s relationship to one’s own conscious experience.

anattā can be a difficult word to translate. Many take it as meaning “no self” (including, apparently, Buddhaghosa). However, (Norman, 1997) writes:

When the Buddha stated that everything was anattā “not self”, we should expect that the view of attā “self” which he was denying was that held by other teachers at that time. We can, in fact, deduce, from what the Buddha rejected, the doctrine which the other teachers upheld. Once we know that the Buddha was using words in this way, then we are aided in our attempt to understand them and translate them.

The Buddha vigorously denied the brahmanical idea of the existence of the ātman, the idea that there is no difference between us and a world spirit, the standard advaitavāda “non-dual” doctrine, which is expressed in the Upaniṣads with the words tat tvam asi “You are that”. You are that. You are identical with that world spirit - the view that we all have a portion of that spirit in us and when everything which hides that identity is removed then we can be absorbed into ātman/brahman.

The Buddha, on the other hand, specifically condemned the view that the world and the self were the same thing, and that after death one might become permanent, lasting, eternal and not liable to change, and he rejected the idea that one could look at the various aspects of the world and say “that is mine, I am that, that is my self’, which is a clear echo of tat tvam asi, expressed from a different point of view. When the Buddha said: “rūpa ‘form’, etc., are not mine”, he was denying the view that there is no distinction between knower and known.

The Buddha’s rejection of the existence of the attā, i.e. his view that everything was “not self” (anattā), was based upon the brahmanical belief that the ātman was nitya “permanent” and sukha “happiness”. Hence the Buddha could refute this by pointing out that the world, which was supposed to be part of ātman, was in fact anicca “impermanent” and dukkha “misery”[^2-23] - his belief that the world was dukkha was, of course, the first noble truth.

The Buddha’s teaching about this is, however, not always understood. The word anattā is sometimes translated “having no soul”, and various things which are specified to be anattā are thought of as having no soul. We can see the need for better understanding of this vital concept of Buddhism when we survey the range of translations given for the phrase sabbe dhammā anattā which occurs in the Dhammapada and elsewhere: “All forms are unreal” (Max Mūller); “All the elements of being are non-self” (Radhakrishnan); “All things are not self” (Acharya Buddharakkhita); “All phenomena are nonsubstantial” (Kalupahana); “All things are ego-less” (Jayasekera); “All dhammas are without self”, says a very recent translation (Carter and Palihawadana).

Translations such as “without self” and “having no soul” cannot be correct, because the grammar and syntax show that anattā is not a possessive adjective, which it would need to be to have such a meaning. It is a descriptive compound, and if the correct translation for attā is “soul”, then the word would mean that these various things are “not soul”. This, however, cannot be correct, because the Buddha sometimes exhorted his followers to regard these things as parato, i.e. “as other”. We cannot, however, co-relate “as other” and “not soul”. It is clear that the only translation which it is possible to co-relate to “as other” is “not self”. We are not to regard these things as part of the self, and to clarify the point the Buddha asked his followers whether, when they saw wood being burned, they felt any pain. The answer was “No”, and the explanation given was that they did not feel any pain because the wood was not part of the self. It was other than the self. We might regard the Buddha’s refutation of the ātman/brahman idea as being somewhat empirical - as was Dr Johnson’s refutation of Bishop Berkeley’s theory of the non-existence of matter - but it was no less effective for all that.

(Wynne, 2010) also does an extensive analysis of “no self” vs “not self” and concludes the explicit “No Self” interpretation developed later, as seen in texts like the Vajirā Sutta and the Abhidharma, when this subtle philosophy gave way to a “reductionistic realism” that analyzes the person as a collection of essenceless components within an objectively real world, thus shifting the focus from a radical critique of conceptuality to the denial of a specific entity.

Free will

It can be interpreted that if we don’t have “control” over the five collections, and we mistake them for our notion of a “permanent self”, then perhaps we do not have free will. In other words, we are not in control of our destiny, and therefore awakening is not possible until we have cleared ourselves of all impediments.

This is another incorrect interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings. The Buddha is clearly stating that awakening is possible, by us consciously making a decision to cease production of non-optimal mental constructions. This would also agree with the common view that as individuals we do possess the power of free will.

As per the discussion regarding the fallacy of the “no self” view, the Buddha has not claimed that we have “no self” and therefore “no free will.” The Buddha skirts around answering the question whether we do in fact have some notion of “self” that is beyond the five collections, and some have argued that there needs to be a concept of an “individual” possessing “free will” in order for the Buddha’s teachings to be realised. This is a contentious view that has been argued against by many Buddhists who support the “no self” interpretation, but they have avoided answering the question: If there is no self beyond the five collections, then what is the “agent” responsible for ceasing mental constructions, since the Buddha has stated the five collections have no control over production?

For further discussion, (Adam, 2010) argues perhaps it’s not a question of “free will” but the degree of freedom in achieving awakening (due to the “burden” or kamma from past actions), and perhaps true freedom is not realised until after awakening. This is an interesting approach, but one that I ultimately reject since there nothing in the Buddha’s discourses in the Khandhaka that suggests that there are impediments (from past actions, current circumstances etc.) that inhibit the ability to achieve realisation and awakening, and the concept of “kamma” representing such impediments is not a concept articulated by the Buddha in these discourses (notwithstanding that the concept of “kamma” is extensively explored in the suttas and widely believed by Buddhists).

I will take the same approach as the Buddha by deliberately avoiding an answer to whether there is a “self” or “no self” and therefore the question of “will” is also inconclusive. Clearly, however, “the individual” (no matter how we define such a notion) is capable of ceasing production of non-optimal mental constructions, according to the Buddha, so let’s leave it at that.

`yathābhūta` (reality)

This is a phrase that has often been misunderstood by Buddhists as somehow pertaining to a divine or mystical ability to “see things as they truly are”, or perhaps to see things that cannot normally be seen, such as deities and non-human beings in different worlds or realms of existence, the ability to see past lives, other people’s thoughts, the undelying or true nature of the universe, etc.

These are excessive speculations. What is meant here is presumably that the Buddha was able to perceive the phenomenal nature of our subjective and perceptual experience of reality. The “reality” we perceive may be quite different from external reality. Indeed, it could be said we are all living in our own constructed “world”, sharing some features but fundamentally different of other perceptions of their reality. As an extreme, we could even argue we have no definite proof that an actual reality exists, and everything could be a figment of our imagination, including other living beings.

According to (Kalupahana, 1981): yathābhūta pertains to:

‘knowledge of things as they have come to be’ (yathābhüttañāna), not ‘knowledge of things as they are’ isolated from the background. Knowledge of things as they have come to be would involve the past as well as present events conditioned by the past.

Was the Buddha a realist or anti-realist? Ie. did he believe that an “extrinsic reality” exists outside of our perceptual experience, and we may be able to determine what it is, or is “the world an illusion”, purely constructed out of our lived experience?

The answer, as per the Buddha’s opinion of the “self”, is that the Buddha neither confirmed nor denied the existence of “true” reality. (Smith, 2015) argues that the Buddha was probably not an anti-realist but propounded ‘an intentionally incomplete or “inchoate” metaphysics with realist suggestions’.

On one hand, it would seem the Buddha did experience a physical reality post awakening - he experienced sickness, physical pain, aging and eventually death. He still needed to eat, rest and sleep. These are documented in the Khandhaka and various suttas. So it would seem yathābhūta does not exclude these very human experiences. Moreover, this reality was shared with the bhikkhus and bhikkhunis in the community. Living in peace post nibbāna does not exclude potentially unpleasant events. nibbāna probably represents the “unconstructed”, “ungenerated” and therefore “unexperienced.” Physical pain need not result in feelings of suffering - the former is extrinsic reality, the latter are mental constructions.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the ability to perform “magic” or supernatural powers, or the ability to perceive and interact with non-human or celestial beings could imply our reality is “constructed” or “imagined” (having no physical basis), and can therefore be reconstructed or altered by the Buddha. Moreover, it could also imply the Buddha was able to influence the constructed reality of other beings. This is clearly possible if these other beings were also constructed by him, but then the Buddha’s teachings would then be interpreted as him teaching other personality instances of himself.

Generations of Buddhists of different sects have probably speculated on the true nature of reality. Theravādins believe that reality (dhamma) can be ultimately deconstructed into “moments” - atomic mental constructions. The true nature of reality (or “ultimate reality”) are simply these moments and nothing more. There is no other reality (that can be perceived by or known to us). Hence the dhamma of mind moments is reality.

The Sarvāstivādins extended the concept of these dhammas, or “mind moments”, even further - not only do they postulate that ultimately reality is nothing more than these mind moments - they believe the past, present and future are nothing more than these dhammas - they all simultaneously exist in our minds. This is true to an extent - our memories of the past coexist along with our present thoughts and conceptions about the future. However, the Sarvāstivādins are essentially claiming time itself is constructed, and subjectively experienced. This would imply a deterministic universe - that the future can be fully determined from the actions of the past and present. However, it does not necessarily imply we have no free will - by unconstructing these dhammas, we are essentially unconstructing the future.

In a sense, the Sarvāstivādin notion of dhamma resembles the one-electron universe theory, proposed by John Wheeler and further explored by Richard Feynman. This is a speculative hypothesis suggesting that all electrons and positrons (the antimatter counterpart of an electron) are actually manifestations of a single, fundamental entity traversing through time.

The Mahāyānans took this concept to it’s ultimate conclusion: if our reality is nothing more than mind moments, which are constructed by us, then reality is nothing more than an illusion - there is no physical reality, only constructed reality. Therefore, yathābhūta ultimately is the experience of emptiness, or no experience at all. Once we realise everything is constructed, we can deconstruct it all and then there is nothing left (suññatā). This is the fundamental realisation in the Heart Sutra, a highly influential work that have been embraced by many, even today, though not all fully understand it’s core thesis.

The Mahāyānan position may seem extreme, but it does resolve a number of outstanding philosophical issues surrounding the Buddha’s teachings. If everyone around us are constructed, ie. imagined by ourselves or perhaps representing alternate versions of ourselves, then the Buddha is not a real human being but an abstract concept, a construct in our minds. Therefore, the Buddha’s teachings can be regarded as a set of “absolute truths” that will become self evident once we have dispelled ignorance, and the Buddha is an idealised version of ourselves - there is a Buddha within each of us. The “Buddha” can be regarded as an eternal omniscient being living in an idealised “Pure Land” surrounded by a “Buddha field”. The Mahāyānans can disregard the physical nature of the Buddha, and regard his human frailty and failings as yet another illusion caused by our imperfections. It also explains why the Mahāyānans believe true liberation can only be achieved when all living beings are liberated, not just ourselves.

In a sense, the Mahāyānan beliefs in many ways resemble the Simulation Hypothesis proposed by Nick Bostrom, which suggests that reality could be an artificial simulation, such as a computer simulation. If we are living in a simulation, then our reality is indeed constructed, and can be deconstructed.

All these are extensions of the Buddha’s teachings. As can be seen in these early discourses, they are not necessarily implied or explicitly articulated by him. In some ways, Mahāyāna Buddhism has many parallels to Brahmanical and Hindu beliefs, and it is possible that the Mahāyānan doctrines were influenced by these beliefs. The concept of an eternal, abstract Buddha can be seen as a parallel to the Brahmanical concept of an eternal, abstract Brahman. The Mahāyānan concept of śūnyatā (emptiness) can be seen as a parallel to the Hindu concept of maya (illusion). The Mahāyānan concept of buddha-dhatu (Buddha-nature) can be seen as a parallel to the Hindu concept of ātman (self). I have spoken to a number of Hindus who believe Buddhism is simply an extreme, fringe version of Hinduism.

`punabbhavo` (future existences)

akuppā me vimutti, ayamantimā jāti, natthi dāni punabbhavo
(“Unshakeable is my liberation, this is the final birth, there is now no more future existences.”)

This phrase has often been interpreted as the Buddha claiming he is no longer subject to saṃsāra (the endless cycle of births and rebirths).

However, note that up to this point the Buddha has not explicitly mentioned rebirth. Yes, jāti can be used to refer to a rebirth, but what the Buddha is referring to here is the liberation from bhavataṇhā (the craving for existence).

punabbhavo means “existence again, or repeated existence” so is apparently a clear reference to rebirth. However, given the context is vimutti (liberation), the Buddha is referring to the liberation from dukkha, and therefore this phrase could be interpreted as “liberation from (concern about) future existence, or ongoing existence.” This does not necessarily endorse the concept of rebirth, simply that it is no longer something the Buddha is concerned about.

It is important to note that the Buddha did not invent the concept of rebirth, it was already a commonly-accepted notion during his time (see On Kamma and Rebirth). He neither advocated it, nor rejected it, but felt that his soteriology was compatible with it. Here the Buddha is possibly addressing the potential criticism that liberation may not be permanent and the liberated person may be subject to dukkha in future lives, The Buddha is emphasising that if one is truly liberated, then this concern should also have ceased.

Considerations and Interpretation

Points to note:

It would have made more sense for the Buddha to reference dependent origination in the first discourse to the ascetics, as that was the process that led to his own liberation.
It would seem at this stage that it is possible to gain almost instantaneous understanding upon hearing the Buddha teach, which is exemplified by Koṇḍañña. Yet, presumably it took some time (days and possibly weeks) for the rest of the group of five to be liberated, as the text refers to part of the group seeking alms while the others were taught by the Buddha. Even so, it is clear that liberation is achievable within a short period of time for those who are in the right frame of mind and disposition, and certainly achievable within a single lifetime. Contrast this with later teachings which seem to imply it is almost impossible to gain realisation in one lifetime and multiple stages are required (stream enterer etc.)
More importantly, this discourse predates the development of the “four stages of awakening” (sotāpanna (stream-enterer), sakadāgāmī (once-returner), anāgāmī (non-returner), arahant (worthy one)) that would come to dominate Theravāda thinking.
The expansion of the four realisations into three phases and 12 aspects seem overly pedantic and does not really add much to the context. It would seem this may be yet another late addition to align with the notion of rolling out the Dhamma wheel.

In Bronkhorst - The Buddhist four realisations: Are They True? (2023) (Bronkhorst, 2023), Bronkhorst questions if the four realisations are true, using recent neuroscience (Mark Solms’ theory) (Solms, 2021) and psychology. As the truths are presented as verifiable psychological statements, Bronkhorst uses various tools to evaluate their truth claims as scientific hypotheses. Bronkhorst offers a hypothesis that dukkha can be interpreted as unresolved needs arising from perceived threats to an idealised homeostasis. Individual sensitivity to these unresolved needs varies, and it may be possible meditative or absorptive states can suspend awareness of these needs but don’t solve underlying issues. Bronkhorst proposes a potential solution: memory reconsolidation allows consolidated emotional memories to be updated or erased if reactivated and met with a “prediction error” (mismatch) within a specific time window. Therefore, erasing the emotional charge of memories underlying conflicting needs could lead to suffering cessation. Desire or ‘wanting’ (motivation/desire) may create “mini-addictions” (habits/personality traits). Resolving these traits via memory reconsolidation reduces both suffering and ‘wanting’ (desire/thirst). Bronkhorst theorises that accessing these consolidated, often non-declarative, memories is a key challenge as they may reside in the domain of the sub-conscious. Bronkhorst then speculates that deep absorption might allow focus on normally unconscious memories by suspending competing needs/associations. Other elements of the eightfold path may facilitate deep absorption and the necessary mismatch (e.g., equanimity).

I find Bronkhorst’s theory plausible, but question whether absorption allow access to unconscious memories. To me, the key question is how does one rewire and reduce innermost desires and needs embedded in the subconscious? Here the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) in Pessoa - The Entangled Brain: How Perception, Cognition, and Emotion Are Woven Together (2022) (Pessoa, 2022) may prove useful, as discussed in 1. Bodhikathā (The Account of the Bodhi Tree)

However, in Polak - Language, Conscious Experience and the Self in Early Buddhism; A Cross-cultural Interdisciplinary Study (2018) (Polak, 2018), Polak explores how language and concepts shape conscious experience and influence human functioning, particularly the arising of the self (attā). It uses a cross-cultural, interdisciplinary approach, drawing parallels with Western philosophy and cognitive science to reconstruct Buddha’s teachings, and examines the relationship between the five collections (khandhas) and the individual, discussing agency and subjectivity. These ideas form a framework for understanding the Buddha’s second discourse.

In subsequent discourses, the Buddha defines the “world” (loko) not just externally, but primarily in terms of the human cognitive apparatus and experience: the six senses, their objects, consciousness, contact, feeling, and the five strands of sensuality. Apperception (saññā) is a complex mental process involving labelling, categorizing, recognizing based on features (nimitta), interpreting sensory input, and conceptualizing abstract ideas. The common answer that a person is merely the five collections (khandhas) is likely a reductionist interpretation, not the original intent. Khandhas represent aspects of phenomenal experience used for contemplation (understanding anicca, dukkha, anattā), not a complete objective analysis of a human being. (Hamilton, 2000), (Gethin, 1986), (Wynne, 2009)

Khandhas represent subjective, conscious experience. Identifying them as attā reflects the common-sense view that consciousness is the locus of agency and subjectivity. Cognitive science challenges this: most information processing is unconscious, parallel, and modular; consciousness has limited capacity (cf. Global Workspace Theory) (Baars, 2003). Thoughts, decisions, and acts of will largely originate non-consciously; conscious awareness often follows the neural readiness potential (Libet, 1999), (Wegner, 2017). Consciousness serves more for global broadcast and integration into a narrative. The Buddha’s critique of attā aligns with this: the “self” as speaker (vado) and feeler (vedeyyo) arises from misinterpreting the nature and content of conscious experience (khandhas), facilitated by language (saññā, papañca). The actual locus of agency and subjectivity may reside more holistically in the sentient body (saviññāṇaka kāya), not reducible to the khandhas. Concepts like citta and practices like kāyānupassana might point towards this.

Self-delusion isn’t just theoretical; identifying with the narrative self maintained by inner speech causes suffering (dukkha). There’s a correlation between self-reflexive consciousness, the subjective experience of psychological time, and suffering (Zahavi, 2011), (Thompson, 2011). Increased Self-awareness often coincides with time dragging and unhappiness. Moments of happiness or “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) often involve reduced Self-awareness and distorted time perception (absorption). Misunderstanding this, people pursue external objects/activities associated with past pleasure, failing to see pleasure often lies in the temporary absence of Self-consciousness. This pursuit is doomed to fail. Absorption states might not leave declarative memory traces because they lack the self-reflexive conscious experience needed for such encoding (Bronkhorst, 2012). Self-delusion can be seen as a “virus” or harmful “software” running on the “hardware” of the sentient body, possibly an evolutionary adaptation for competitiveness but inherently causing suffering. The Buddha’s soteriology aims to remove this “virus”.

The Eightfold Path as an application of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle

If we agree with Bronkhorst and Polak above, then the eightfold path can be regarded as a guide towards reflective thinking, and consciously revisiting past actions and mental constructs in order to perform “memory reconsolidation” with a view towards future optimal mental constructs and actions.

As such, the eightfold path can be compared to Kolb’s Experiential Learning Theory (Kolb, 1984).

(Kolb, 2013) states:

The ELT model portrays two dialectically related modes of grasping experience — Concrete Experience (CE) and Abstract Conceptualization (AC) — and two dialectically related modes of transforming experience — Reflective Observation (RO) and Active Experimentation (AE). Learning arises from the resolution of creative tension among these four learning modes. This process is portrayed as an idealized learning cycle or spiral where the learner “touches all the bases” — experiencing (CE), reflecting (RO), thinking (AC), and acting (AE)—in a recursive process that is sensitive to the learning situation and what is being learned. Immediate or concrete experiences are the basis for observations and reflections. These reflections are assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts from which new implications for action can be drawn. These implications can be actively tested and serve as guides in creating new experiences.

The following diagram maps the constituents of the eightfold path into the four modes of the Experiential Learning Cycle:

timeline
title Experiential Learning Cycle
section Concrete Experience (CE)
CE : Right Awareness (sammāsati)
section Reflective Observation (RO)
RO : Right Focus (sammāsamādhi)
section Abstract Conceptualization (AC)
AC : Right View (sammādiṭṭhi)
   : Right Resolve (sammāsaṅkappa)
section Active Experimentation (AE)
AE : Right Speech (sammāvācā)
   : Right Action (sammākammanta)
   : Right Livelihood (sammāājīva)
   : Right Effort (sammāvāyāma)

The Buddha’s teachings compared to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)

According to Wikipedia:

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is a form of psychotherapy that aims to reduce symptoms of various mental health conditions, primarily depression, and disorders such as PTSD and anxiety disorders. This therapy focuses on challenging unhelpful and irrational negative thoughts and beliefs, referred to as ‘self-talk’ and replacing them with more rational positive self-talk. This alteration in a person’s thinking produces less anxiety and depression. It was developed by psychoanalyst Aaron Beck in the 1950’s.

The Buddha’s phenomenological framework, definition of dukkha, and the subsequent path to liberation is consistent with the principles of CBT. According to dependent origination, our negative experience of dukkha is a form of cognitive distortion - our craving for pleasure and permanence, as well as our fear and loathing of physical pain, sickness, aging and death are mental constructs, and moreover we are ignorant of the ephemeral and constructed nature of our consciousness. In “reality”, living beings arising and dying are the result of natural processes, and the notion of “self” is a generated mental construct that is impermanent, perennially changing and unstable. Once that is understood, there is no necessity to crave for what we cannot have, or fear what is inevitable. By controlling and curating our mental constructions, we can achieve an optimal living experience devoid of dukkha.

The main assumptions of cognitive therapy used in CBT (Chaloult L, 2008) aligns well with dependent origination, the four realisations and the structure of the saṅgha:

Cognitive Behavioural Therapy assumptions	The Buddha’s Teachings
Human emotions are primarily caused by people’s thoughts and perceptions rather than events.	Dependent origination
Events, thoughts, emotions, behaviors, and physiological reactions influence each other.	Dependent origination
Dysfunctional emotions are typically caused by unrealistic thoughts. Reducing dysfunctional emotions requires becoming aware of irrational thoughts and changing them.	The second realisation (noble truth) concerning the origin of `dukkha`
Human beings have an innate tendency to develop irrational thoughts. This tendency is reinforced by their environment.	Dependent origination, and also the first realisation (noble truth)
People are largely responsible for their own dysfunctional emotions, as they maintain and reinforce their own beliefs.	Dependent origination, and also the first and second realisations (noble truths)
Sustained effort is necessary to modify dysfunctional thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.	third and fourth realisation (eightfold path)
Rational thinking usually causes a decrease in the frequency, intensity, and duration of dysfunctional emotions, rather than an absence of affect or feelings.	third and fourth realisation (eightfold path)
A positive therapeutic relationship is essential to successful cognitive therapy.	the `Saṅgha`
Cognitive therapy is based on a teacher-student relationship, where the therapist educates the client.	the preceptor-novice relationship in the `Saṅgha`
Cognitive therapy uses Socratic questioning to challenge cognitive distortions.	uposatha confessions in the `Saṅgha`
Homework is an essential aspect of cognitive therapy. It consolidates the skills learned in therapy.	fourth realisation (eightfold path) and also the basis for the `vinaya` or rules underpinning the `Saṅgha`
The cognitive approach is active, directed, and structured.	fourth realisation (eightfold path) and also the basis for the `vinaya` or rules underpinning the `Saṅgha`
Cognitive therapy is generally short.	although renunciation and ordination are seen as lifelong commitments, the Khandhaka generally describes liberation as something that is achievable in a relatively short period of time, certainly within a lifetime
Cognitive therapy is based on predictable steps.	fourth realisation (eightfold path)

Typical phases of CBT (Gatchel RJ, 2008) also align well with the eightfold path:

Phases of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy	Eightfold path
Assessment or psychological assessment	Right Awareness (sammāsati)
Reconceptualization	Right View (sammādiṭṭhi) Right Resolve (sammāsaṅkappa)
Skills acquisition	Right Speech (sammāvācā) Right Action (sammākammanta)
Skills consolidation and application training	Right Effort (sammāvāyāma)
Generalization and maintenance	Right Livelihood (sammāājīva)
Post-treatment assessment follow-up	Right Focus (sammāsamādhi)

Although the above alignment could seem artificial or even contrived, the two approaches are clearly different articulations of the same fundamental principles. The Buddha’s teachings are more comprehensive and holistic, and the eightfold path is a more structured approach to achieving liberation. CBT is a more pragmatic approach to achieving mental well-being, and is more focused on specific techniques and strategies.

Parallels

In Anālayo - Meditator Life of the Buddha (2017) (Anālayo, 2017) Anālayo writes:

According to the Mahīśāsaka and Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayas, these five former companions had been sent by the Buddha’s father to look after the bodhisattva. A discourse in the Ekottarika-āgama reports that they had been following the bodhisattva since his birth. An alternative perspective emerges with the Lalitavistara, according to which the five, who were formerly disciples of Uddaka Rāmaputta, had witnessed how the bodhisattva quickly achieved what they had not reached after much practice. The fact that he was not satisfied with what he had achieved was what motivated them to follow him and also leave Uddaka.

Given that these five left the bodhisattva when he gave up his ascetic practices, the presentation in the Lalitavistara fits the narrative context well. Had these five been friends from his early youth or sent by his father to look after him, the fact that he decided to change his mode of practice would not really furnish sufficient reason for them to leave him. Such a decision makes more sense if they had followed him in the hope of benefiting from his realization. In such a case, once he had given up asceticism and thus what they considered necessary to reach realization, it would be natural if they decided to leave him and proceed on their own.

The Ariyapariyesanā-sutta and its Madhyama-āgama parallel continue by relating that, on his way to teaching the five, the Buddha met a wanderer by the name of Upaka.

Upaka was originally appears quite inspired by the Buddha’s impressive demeanour and appearance and seems almost ready for conversion. Yet the Buddha’s claim to be supreme and have no teacher evidently failed to convince Upaka. Anālayo comments:

Perhaps the present episode could be read as pointing to the need for the Buddha to find ways of communicating his realization that will convince others, beyond a simple claim to being the supreme victor.

By contrast, the five former companions made an agreement not to initially show respect to the Buddha. The Ariyapariyesanā-sutta and a partial parallel in the Ekottarikaāgama report a similar agreement made among the five. This episode shows that it was not going to be easy to convince them that, rather than being one who has reverted to a life of luxury, the Buddha had reached the final goal of liberation. Even though the five eventually did not keep their earlier agreement and were more welcoming to the Buddha than they had planned, when he claimed to have reached awakening they were not easily convinced. In the Ariyapariyesanā-sutta they even object three times.

The Pāli version continues right away with the delivery of the teaching on the four truths, which in the Ekottarika-āgama features in a separate discourse. The Madhyama-āgama parallel to the Ariyapariyesanāsutta also just reports the teaching on the two extremes, without proceeding to the four truths. The implication of this difference appears to be that, after the Buddha had first delivered the teaching on the two extremes, a break occurred that would have afforded the five monastics time to reflect and digest this for them rather new perspective, after which only the Buddha disclosed to them the four truths. Two biographies preserved in Chinese translation in fact report that the Buddha, having clarified the two extremes, examined the minds of the five to see if they were ready for the teaching he was to give them next.

Other Opinions

Wayman - The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites (1980) (Wayman, 1980)
The sixteen aspects of the Four four realisations are a non-canonical elaboration found in Northern Buddhist Abhidharma texts, such as those by Vasubandhu and Asanga, but absent from the Southern tradition. This system assigns four specific aspects to each of the four realisations—Suffering, Source, Cessation, and Path—which are treated as objects of insight (prajñā). A key element of this framework is a corresponding list of sixteen “adversaries” or “coverings,” detailed by Tsong-kha-pa, which represent mistaken views that obscure each aspect. Analyzing these aspects and their opposites reveals significant doctrinal debates; for instance, the aspects of Suffering (duhkha, anitya, śūnya, anātman) raise challenges in distinguishing ‘voidness’ from ‘non-self’, while the aspects for the Source of Suffering are linked to Dependent Origination and their adversaries to non-Buddhist theories of causality. The author proposes a correlation where the aspects for the Path lead to the aspects of Cessation, mapping them onto the three core Buddhist instructions of morality, mental training, and insight, thereby showing how the study of this framework illuminates the diverse ways different traditions interpreted their foundational teachings.
Kalupahana - The Philosophy of Early History in Buddhism (1981) (Kalupahana, 1981)
The text explores why early Buddhism, despite accepting the reality of the empirical world, lacked historical writings in the Western sense. It contrasts the Western speculative philosophy of history, which posits an unfolding Absolute, with the critical philosophy that views history as a value-laden discipline. Early Buddhism rejects the speculative approach, categorizing such grand theories as dispositionally constructed “views” (diṭṭhi) based on incomplete evidence and metaphysical assumptions. While aligning with the critical view in recognizing the evaluative nature of historical interpretation, Buddhism values “knowledge of the past” (pubbante ñāṇa) for its pragmatic role in understanding suffering. This understanding is grounded not in an absolute framework or first cause, but in the principle of dependent arising (paticcasamuppāda), a causal process knowable through experience. The ultimate goal is not to construct historical narratives but to use knowledge of causation to pacify dispositions and achieve nirvāṇa, thereby focusing on the present without being bound by speculative reconstructions of the past.
Sharma - Rune E. A. Johansson’s Analysis of Citta: A Criticism (1981) (Sharma, 1981)
In his critique of Rune E. A. Johansson’s analysis, Arvind Sharma examines and refutes the theory that citta (mind) exists as a core personality factor separate from the five skandhas and survives death. Johansson argues that citta is an enduring element, distinct from viññāna (consciousness), which attains nibbāna and continues in a diluted, impersonal state after an arahant’s death, citing as evidence the ability of arahants to recognize one another and scriptural accounts like the story of Vakkali. Sharma contends that this evidence is insufficient to challenge the standard Theravāda position that an arahant's post-mortem state is unpredictable. He counters that Johansson relies on a weak “argument from silence” and offers an alternative interpretation wherein an arahant’s enlightenment is recognized precisely through the non-recognizability of their consciousness, rather than through an identifiable, surviving citta.
Bucknell - The Buddhist Path to Liberation: An Analysis of the Listing of Stages (1984) (Bucknell, 1984)
In his analysis, Rod Bucknell argues that the Noble Eightfold Path is an incomplete representation of the Buddhist course to liberation, as it omits the crucial final stages of “right insight” (sammā-ñāṇa) and “right liberation” (sammā-vimutti). By comparing the Eightfold Path with four other, similar lists of stages found in the Tipiṭaka, including a more comprehensive “tenfold path,” he demonstrates that they all describe a consistent, sequential practice where morality (sīla) and concentration (samādhi) are followed by the development of insight. Bucknell refutes the common interpretation that insight is covered by “right view” (the first stage), positing that this is merely a preliminary understanding, whereas true liberating insight is an advanced practice undertaken only after mastering concentration. He concludes that the Eightfold Path is not the definitive summary of Gotama’s teaching but one of many versions, and possibly a simplified one that omits the most advanced meditative stages.
Krishan - Buddhism and Belief in Ātman (1984) (Krishan, 1984)
The central question in Buddhism regarding a permanent soul, or ātman, presents a significant dilemma: the doctrine of anattā (no-soul) appears to contradict the belief in karma and rebirth, as it leaves no entity to bear the consequences of actions. The Buddha himself rejected the extreme views of both an eternal, unchanging soul and complete annihilation after death, instead advocating a middle path. Various Buddhist schools attempted to resolve this by proposing concepts that function like a soul without being one, such as a “rebirth-linking consciousness” (patisandhi viññāna), an “intermediate existence” (antarābhava), or an inexpressible “person” (pudgala). The author argues that the doctrine of anattā is primarily a rejection of the ego and the notions of “I” and “mine,” which are the root of suffering, rather than a denial of a conscious principle. This is supported by the development of concepts like the “store-consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna) and post-mortem rituals in Buddhist cultures, which imply belief in a transmigrating entity. Ultimately, Buddhism seems to deny a static, eternal soul but affirms a dynamic, impermanent yet continuous empirical self that carries karma and memory, likened to a river’s current, which is only extinguished upon attaining nirvāṇa.
Norman - Aspects of Early Buddhism (1990) (Norman, 1990)
In early Buddhism, the denial of a permanent self (attā) raises the question of what transmigrates through saṃsāra, with the Buddha refuting the idea of a permanent consciousness (viññāṇa) and instead proposing the doctrine of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda). This causal chain explains how suffering arises from conditions like ignorance (avijjā) and craving (taṇhā), and liberation (nibbāna) is achieved by breaking this chain. The Pāli canon presents multiple, sometimes conflicting, paths to this goal, including the Buddha’s own attainment of bodhi through meditative states (jhānas) and the destruction of the āsavas (“afflictions”), and the more widely taught Eight-Fold Path which leads to the cessation of suffering (dukkha-nirodha). Ultimately, nibbāna is not a state of being for a soul but is described as the uncompounded (asaṅkhata) and indescribable reality that remains when the conditioned elements (khandhas) that constitute an individual cease, thus ending the cycle of rebirth.
Vetter - Explanations of dukkha (1998) (Vetter, 1998)
In a philological analysis of the First Noble Truth, Tilmann Vetter argues that the concluding statement on the five aggregates (upādānakkhandhā) is not a summary of suffering (dukkha), but rather another example of it. He bases this on the presence of the coordinating particle pi (“also”) in this final statement in older Pāli manuscripts, such as those used in Hermann Oldenberg’s edition of the Mahāvagga. Vetter contends that later editors and commentators, notably Buddhaghosa, worked from texts where this pi was missing, leading them to develop an anachronistic interpretation of the aggregates as a summary or foundation for all other forms of suffering. He asserts that the original reading with pi is more historically sound, presenting the five aggregates as a distinct, added item in the list of things that are dukkha, with the term sankhittena (“in brief”) indicating it is a concise point requiring further explanation, not a summation of what precedes it.
Norman - The Four Noble Truths (2003) (Norman, 2003)
K.R. Norman’s paper investigates the long-standing grammatical and syntactical problems within the standard Pāli formulation of the Four Noble Truths, specifically the use of neuter/accusative endings for masculine nouns (samudayaṃ, nirodhaṃ) and the uniform use of the neuter pronoun idaṃ. By comparing various textual versions in Pāli and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Norman argues that the original statements were grammatically straightforward and did not include the term ariya-saccaṃ (noble truth). He proposes that the inconsistencies arose historically when ariya-saccaṃ was added, forming syntactical compounds where a sandhi -m- was inserted to prevent hiatus (e.g., *dukkha-samudaya-m-ariya-saccaṃ). Subsequent scribal tradition misinterpreted this structure, leading to a faulty word division that created the anomalous forms, while the pronoun idaṃ was generalized from the first truth to the other three by analogy.
Norman - Why Are the Four Noble Truths Called Noble? (2008) (Norman, 2008)
The common English translation “Four Noble Truths” represents only one of several possible interpretations of the Pāli compound ariyasaccāni and is likely the least significant one according to early Buddhist traditions. The 5th-century commentator Buddhaghosa, analyzing the term’s grammar, offered multiple simultaneous meanings, including “the truths of the Noble One (the Buddha),” “the truths penetrated by noble ones,” and “the truths which cause nobleness” or “the ennobling truths.” Buddhaghosa and other commentators like Dhammapāla prioritized these interpretations over the simple descriptive meaning of “noble truths,” which can be seen as a tautology. The original Pāli term was likely intended to encompass all these meanings at once, highlighting a fundamental difficulty in translation where a single, multifaceted concept in one language must be reduced to a more limited one in another.
Gombrich - What the Buddha Thought (2009) (Gombrich, 2009)
Gombrich argues that literal, word-for-word translations of Buddhist texts are obscure and prevent true understanding, using the doctrine of “No Self” (anātman) as a prime example. The key to clarity, the text suggests, is to understand that for the Buddha’s original audience, the concept of a “self” (ātman) inherently meant something permanent and unchanging. Therefore, the doctrine is more accurately expressed for modern audiences as “no unchanging self” or “no unchanging soul.” This principle extends to all of reality within our experience, forming an interlocking system of thought where nothing has a fixed essence. This is encapsulated by the “three hallmarks”: because everything is impermanent (anicca), it lacks an unchanging essence (anatta) and is therefore ultimately unsatisfactory (dukkha). Ultimately, the author posits that the Buddha’s core teaching is that everything is a non-random “process,” a straightforward idea that was likely expressed figuratively in the original texts because Pali and Sanskrit may have lacked a precise word for this concept.
Wynne - The ātman and its negation - A conceptual and chronological analysis of early Buddhist thought (2010) (Wynne, 2010)
The famous Buddhist “No Self” (anātman) doctrine is largely absent from the earliest texts because the original teachings were founded on a different and more subtle philosophy than the later, standard interpretation. Early critiques, such as the “Not-Self” (anattā) teaching, are grounded in a principle of “epistemological conditioning,” where fundamental concepts including “self,” “existence,” and even space-time are not ultimate realities but are dependently originated through cognitive processes. This is why the early texts pragmatically avoid direct ontological statements like “the self does not exist,” instead guiding practitioners to see that identifying with conditioned phenomena is “unsuitable” and thereby transcend the very conceptual framework that creates a sense of self. The explicit “No Self” doctrine developed later, as seen in texts like the Vajirā Sutta and the Abhidharma, when this subtle philosophy gave way to a “reductionistic realism” that analyzes the person as a collection of essenceless components within an objectively real world, thus shifting the focus from a radical critique of conceptuality to the denial of a specific entity.
Adam - No self, no free will, no problem (2010) (Adam, 2010)
Buddhist teachings, particularly the Anattalakkhana Sutta, reject the concept of a metaphysically free will based on the doctrine of not-self (anattā), arguing that since no aspect of a person — including the volitional formations (sañkhāras) that constitute the will — is subject to ultimate control, there can be no independent, controlling Self. This means that while a person can often do what they want, they cannot ultimately determine what they want, as their desires are themselves conditioned phenomena. Despite this, moral responsibility is upheld because Buddhism treats moral causality (kamma) as an inherent law where voluntary actions (cetanā) have inevitable consequences. Consequently, freedom is reconceived not as a property of the will but as a spiritual attainment of a person, understood as freedom from suffering and delusion, which exists in varying degrees corresponding to an individual’s level of spiritual development from an unfree ordinary person to a fully liberated, enlightened being (arahat).
Anālayo - Right View and the Scheme of the Four Truths in Early Buddhism - The Saṃyukta-āgama Parallel to the Sammāditthi-sutta and the Simile of the Four Skills of a Physician (2011) (Anālayo, 2011)
This article explores the attainment of right view at stream-entry by analyzing the Saṃyukta-āgama parallel to the Sammāditthi-sutta. This discourse demonstrates that right view involves understanding various phenomena, such as the links of dependent arising, through the structural pattern of the four truths - identifying an item, its cause, its cessation, and the path to its cessation. The author then introduces another Saṃyukta-āgama discourse that explicitly compares the four truths to a four-part medical diagnosis - disease (dukkha), pathogen (craving), health (cessation), and cure (the path). The author argues that this parallel, likely adopted from a known medical practice, was used to frame the Buddha’s teachings as pragmatic, therapeutic, and psychological, distinguishing them from abstract philosophical speculation. The slight difference in the sequence of the third and fourth items between the medical and Buddhist schemes suggests that medicine was the source of the analogy.
Anālayo - The Chinese Parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (1) (2012) (Anālayo, 2012)
This paper analyzes Chinese parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, focusing on Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda versions, and reveals significant variations from the Pāli canon and among the parallels themselves. Some versions, such as the Saṃyukta-āgama discourse and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, omit the teaching on the two extremes and the explanation of the four realisations, focusing exclusively on the “three turnings” applied to each truth. Other versions present the teachings as separate components; for instance, the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya includes the two extremes and the three turnings, but places the detailed explanation of the truths only after Kauṇḍinya’s initial awakening. The author argues against the theory that the four realisations are a late addition, proposing instead that the shorter texts are intentional extracts from a longer, multi-part discourse, and that the Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions considered the teaching on the “three turnings” to be the central element that set the wheel of Dharma in motion.
Anālayo - The Chinese Parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (2) (2013) (Anālayo, 2013)
This academic paper analyzes Chinese parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, the Buddha’s first discourse, to understand the text’s development. By comparing versions from the Ekottarika-āgama, Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, and Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, the author argues that variations point to a history of oral transmission and gradual elaboration. The existence of both a short version focusing on the two extremes and a longer one including the four realisations within the same collection suggests the former is an extract, not evidence that the truths were a later addition. The analysis notes that features like the qualifier “noble” for the truths, elaborate miracles like earthquakes, and the full exposition of the “three turnings and twelve modes” may be later developments, while core elements like the celestial acclamations are consistently present. The text also explores the discourse’s internal logic, framing the four realisations as a pragmatic medical diagnosis (disease, cause, cure, treatment), clarifying duhkha as “unsatisfactory” rather than just “suffering,” and emphasizing that the “turning of the wheel” is complete only when an audience member achieves realization.
Smith - Was the Buddha an Anti-Realist? (2015) (Smith, 2015)
In his article, Douglass Smith argues against the view that the Buddha was an anti-realist, a position held by scholars who interpret certain apophatic passages in the Pāli Canon as a rejection of a mind-independent external world. Smith contends that while texts like the Atthakavagga critique “views” and “conceptualization,” these should be understood not as metaphysical denials of reality but as ethical and meditative instructions for overcoming attachment and ending disputes. He reinterprets key passages cited by anti-realists, suggesting they describe deep jhānic states of absorption rather than the ineffability of reality itself. In contrast, Smith points to evidence for a realist-leaning perspective, such as the concept of “contact” (phassa) implying distinct mental and physical objects, the Buddha’s ethical (rather than ontological) arguments against materialism, and the affirmation of objective truths like the four realisations. He concludes that the Buddha propounded an intentionally incomplete or “inchoate” metaphysics with realist suggestions, one that was primarily pragmatic and in service of his soteriological goal of ending suffering, rather than a fully developed anti-realist philosophy.
Polak - Language, Conscious Experience and the Self in Early Buddhism; A Cross-cultural Interdisciplinary Study (2018) (Polak, 2018)
This article reconstructs early Buddhist thought to argue that ordinary conscious experience is fundamentally shaped by language and conceptualization, a process that creates an illusory Self which is the root of suffering. This cognitive distortion begins with saññā (apperception), a labeling function that, through its inherent link to language, imposes a discrete, manifold structure (papañca) onto reality. The mind’s tendency to reify grammatical forms is then misapplied to personal pronouns, constructing a continuous “narrative self” that is mistakenly identified as a real agent — a “speaker and feeler” (vado vedeyyo). Drawing on parallels in Western philosophy and modern cognitive science, the text argues this delusion involves misinterpreting phenomenal consciousness (represented by the five khandha-s) — which is merely a limited, unified representation of vast, non-conscious bodily processes—as the actual source of agency and subjectivity. This fundamental error of identifying with a fictional, linguistically-generated entity is psychologically taxing, distorts the experience of time, and constitutes the core of human suffering.
Anālayo- Definitions Of Right Concentration In Comparative Perspective (2019) (Anālayo, 2019)
Through a comparative analysis of early Buddhist discourses in Pāli and their Chinese and Sanskrit parallels, this article argues that the definition of right concentration as the attainment of the four absorptions (jhānas) represents a later stage of textual evolution. The author demonstrates that parallel versions of key Pāli texts which define right concentration this way either lack a definition entirely or describe it differently, often as a mind unified and endowed with the other seven factors of the Noble Eightfold Path. This historical-critical perspective suggests that the earliest understanding of right concentration was more integrated with the other path factors and did not necessitate deep absorptive states. Consequently, the author concludes that the ability to attain the four absorptions is not a necessary condition for reaching stream-entry, the first stage of awakening.]
Anālayo - The Buddha’s Awakening (2021) (Anālayo, 2021)
The framework of the four realisations was not the literal content of Buddha’s awakening experience but a pragmatic “diagnostic scheme,” analogous to a medical diagnosis, used after the fact to effectively communicate the ineffable event’s implications to others, as demonstrated in the first discourse. Therefore, textual variations, such as the inclusion or omission of the Four Truths, reflect a gradual development in how this experience was conceptualized for teaching, and the impression of doctrinal conflict arises from a later, literal reading of what was originally a metaphorical or explanatory device.
Bronkhorst - The Buddhist Noble Truths: Are They True? (2023) (Bronkhorst, 2023)
The four realisations can be interpreted as scientifically plausible psychological claims when viewed through modern neuroscience and psychology. In this framework, suffering arises from the conscious awareness of conflicting, unresolved needs, a state often masked by temporary distractions like mental “flow.” These conflicts and their associated desires, or “thirst,” are rooted in entrenched emotional memories that form our personality, functioning like “mini-addictions.” The cessation of this suffering and desire is therefore possible through memory reconsolidation, a process where reactivating these core memories allows their emotional charge to be permanently erased. The path to this goal involves accessing these otherwise hidden memories, which the author proposes could be achieved through deep mental absorption, thereby enabling the reconsolidation process to resolve the underlying conflicts at their source.
Polak - Who Identifies with the Aggregates? Philosophical Implications of the Selected Khandha Passages in the Nikāyas (2023) (Polak, 2023)
This paper analyzes the Buddhist concept of identifying with the five aggregates (khandhas) as “I am this,” challenging the traditional view that the aggregates are the objective constituents of a person by proposing they are instead passive, phenomenal representations of subjective experience. Drawing on Nikāya similes that imply a distinction between the individual and the aggregates, the author argues that key cognitive faculties like the mind (citta) operate separately from the khandhas, which are better understood as the end-results of cognitive processes rather than active agents themselves. Consequently, the fundamental error of identifying with the aggregates is interpreted as a mistaken projection of agency and identity onto one’s own phenomenal self-representation, a process which, by attaching to something inherently distorted and unsatisfactory (dukkha), becomes a primary source of suffering.

Go to previous page (5. Brahmayācanakathā) / Go to parent page (Khandhaka) / Go to next page (7. Pabbajjākathā)

References

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6. Pañcavaggiyakathā (The Account of the Group of Five)

Summary

Diagram

Deciding who to teach

Upaka

The Five Ascetics

The Middle Way (Majjhimā Paṭipadā)

The Eightfold Path (Ariyo Aṭṭhaṅgiko Maggo)

The Four Realisations (caturāriyasaccāni)

Koṇḍañña has understood

Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta

Text

Commentary

Deciding who to teach

Encounter with Upaka

The Five Ascetics

The Middle Way

The Eightfold Path

The Four Realisations

Are the Four Realisations self-evident?

Are the Four Realisations a late addition or synthesis rather than what the Buddha may have originally thought?

The “turning” of the Dhamma Wheel

anattā (not-self)

Free will

yathābhūta (reality)

punabbhavo (future existences)

Considerations and Interpretation

The Eightfold Path as an application of Kolb’s experiential learning cycle

The Buddha’s teachings compared to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)

Parallels

Other Opinions

References

Backlinks

`anattā` (not-self)

`yathābhūta` (reality)

`punabbhavo` (future existences)