The Buddha and Buddhism
What the word Buddha means, why some scholars question whether he was a historical person, and the bare-bones life story this site chooses to assume.
The Buddha
Section titled “The Buddha”Buddha is a verbally-derived noun in Pāḷi meaning “understood; known” (Cone’s Dictionary of Pāli), and it can also be used to refer to someone who has understood. Therefore, it is an epithet to refer to the person we call the “Buddha” today. In his teachings he seldom or perhaps never referred to himself as such, so this may be a term that later generations of Buddhists have adopted (particularly modern Buddhists).
These days, some scholars eg. (Schopen, 1997), (Drewes, 2017) argue that the Buddha is “ahistorical” (“lacking historical perspective or context”). By this, they mean we cannot validate any aspect of his life or his teachings, or even whether he existed as a person. Everything we know about the Buddha comes from Buddhist texts, where he is often portrayed as a legendary or mystical figure. Some Buddhists admit a lot of the details around his life seem fanciful and made up, constructed possibly centuries after his death. There are no accounts of him or his life from non-Buddhist sources. Even if he existed, we don’t know precisely where he was born, what his lineage was, his real name, or even what language he spoke. For more details, refer to the section entitled Did the Buddha actually existed in history?.
For the purposes of this website, I would like to assume the Buddha was a real person and accept a “minimum viable biography”. He was allegedly born in Lumbini sometime in the 5th century BCE from the Gotama clan of the Shakya tribe, in present-day Nepal, and spent his life living and travelling around the Ganges Plain (in what has been termed the “Greater Magadha” cultural region in (Bronkhorst, 2007)), near the modern Nepal–India border.
The origin of the Shakya tribe is unclear, and they have possibly mixed Aryan and indigenous lineage. (Levman, 2014) They were an eastern sub-Himalayan ethnic group living on the periphery, both geographically and culturally, of Greater Magadha. The Buddha’s father (Suddhodana) was supposedly a member of the ruling oligarchy but this may have been an invention and he may have had humble beginnings. In any case, the Shakyans, who were organised into a gaṇasaṅgha (an aristocratic oligarchic republic) had become a vassal state in the Kingdom of Kosala by the time of the Buddha, so the Buddha was hardly a prince as portrayed in some accounts. The Shakyans were not well regarded by the brahmins, as narrated in 6D/3 Ambaṭṭhasutta.
(Hinüber, 2006) even claims that he can identify an archaic syntactical structure in the way the opening text of some suttas describes place names as “traceable to Indo-Iranian.” Indeed, some scholars such as Michael Witzel have equated the Shakyas with Central Asian nomads who were called Scythians by the Greeks, Sakās by the Achaemenid Persians, and Śāka by the Indo-Aryans. (Attwood, 2012)
Although the Buddha was sometimes regarded as a khattiya (a member of the royal or aristocratic caste), in reality the Shakyas were probably outside the [S]caturvarṇa caste system. (Levman, 2014) It is unclear whether he had much exposure to Vedic texts or brahmins growing up. Accounts of the Buddha conversing and debating with brahmins, and apparently exhibiting an advanced knowledge of Brahmanism, are probably invented by disciples who are former brahmins, eager to portray the Buddha’s superiority over their former beliefs. It is also likely these accounts are invented for the purpose of winning debates at the royal court, as Buddhism - particularly after the Buddha’s death - was highly dependent on royal patronage. As (Bronkhorst, 2007) wrote, the Greater Magadha region was not settled by brahmins until nearly a millennium after the Buddha’s death, so it is unlikely the Buddha would have encountered many brahmins in his lifetime.
Significant parts of the Buddha’s teaching and biography were subsequently “brahmanised”, presumably to attract brahmin converts. Brahmanisation can be seen even in the Khandhaka, where the author was probably a former brahmin (see The Author of the Khandhaka). (Shults, 2014) gives a few examples of Brahmanical motifs appearing in Buddhist texts. (Levman, 2014) suggests the Buddha, due to his unique heritage, probably stood midway between two cultures, one coming from outside of India, the other from its native soil, and this may be the secret to his success across a broad range of converts, even today.
(Levman, 2014) writes:
Establishing the Buddha’s social space and time is critical to understanding his appeal. He was, in effect, at the ‘middle way’ or juncture between two cultures, the colonizing Aryan vaidikas (Vedists) and the colonized indigenous peoples.
A Minimum Viable Biography of the Buddha
Section titled “A Minimum Viable Biography of the Buddha”According to 7D/1.17 Devatārocana, an “assembly of gods and deities” provides the following short description of the Buddha (translation by me):
Indeed, Bhante, in this very fortunate aeon, the Bhagavā has now arisen in the world, an
arahant(liberated one), a Perfectly Awakened One. The Bhagavā, Bhante, is a Khattiya by birth, born into a Khattiya family. The Bhagavā, Bhante, is Gotama by clan. The Bhagavā’s lifespan, Bhante, is short, limited, and brief; [in this age] one who lives long lives for a hundred years or a little more. The Bhagavā, Bhante, was fully awakened at the foot of an Assattha tree. The Bhagavā, Bhante, had a pair of disciples named Sāriputta and Moggallāna, a chief, excellent pair. The Bhagavā, Bhante, had one assembly of disciples of twelve hundred and fifty bhikkhū. The Bhagavā, Bhante, this one assembly of His disciples consisted entirely of those whose defilements were destroyed. The Bhagavā, Bhante, had a bhikkhu named Ānanda as attendant, the chief attendant. The Bhagavā’s father, Bhante, was a king named Suddhodana. A lady named Māyā was His mother, His birth-mother. A city named Kapilavatthu was His royal capital. Of the Bhagavā, Bhante, thus was the renunciation, thus the going forth into homelessness, thus the striving, thus the full awakening, thus the setting in motion of the Wheel of Dhamma. We, Bhante, having lived the optimal life under the Bhagavā, having eradicated sensual desire for sensual pleasures, are reborn here.’
According to 9M/4.6 Mahāsaccakasutta, as a young man he started to question the nature of existence, of being born and subject to the negative consequences of life such as growing old, falling sick, dying, sorrow. He started to search for a path out of these consequences. He renounced and became a “wanderer” (samaṇa) and followed the practices of various teachers. samaṇa ([S] śramaṇa) was an established feature of Greater Magadha society in the Buddha’s time, and the renunciants can follow various beliefs and practices, including asceticism. The word originally would have a connotation of “weary” (as in someone who is weary of life and looking for salvation). (Shults, 2016) He eventually concluded these teachings did not lead to satisfactory answers.
He ultimately discovered the answers himself and attained “awakening” or “Perfect Awakening” (sammāsambodhi). The story of his life post awakening is told in the Khandhaka.
Out of compassion for other living beings, he taught a way for others to achieve “awakening” too.
It would appear the Buddha’s teachings were successful - thousands of people became awakened as a result of his teachings and became arahant (liberated ones) in his lifetime.
What did the Buddha teach?
Section titled “What did the Buddha teach?”The Buddha can be described as advocating a “soteriology” that prescribes a way of eradicating dukkha, which is often translated as “suffering” in English. However, dukkha has a broader meaning than “suffering”, with nuances ranging from vague discomfort, unease, and lack of satisfaction all the way to pain, loss, illness, old age and eventually death. Dukkha is everything that is “unsatisfactory” with life and encompasses everything “bad” that has ever happened to you, might happen, or will happen.
What does “soteriology” mean? The Oxford Dictionary of English defines it as “the doctrine of salvation”, from the Greek sōtēria (“salvation”) + -logy (“study” or “discourse”).
So the Buddha’s soteriology is the Buddha’s understanding, and description of his “salvation”, which is the release, liberation, cessation and extinguishment from dukkha.
The answer turns out to be both profound and simple, but perhaps not easy to implement.
It is “profound” because the Buddha started by trying to answer two questions: “What causes dukkha?”, and “Who experiences dukkha?” or more colloquially “Who suffers?”
For the first question (“What causes dukkha?”) the Buddha traced the origin of dukkha by progressively working backwards through a set of linked causes. He started by observing that the ultimate “suffering”, ie. ageing and death, is an inevitable consequence of life. All living beings will eventually age and die, therefore the cause of dukkha can be traced right back to the birth of living beings. All the other forms of dukkha, such as sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair, can similarly be traced back to conception and birth, for if we had not been born we would not experience any dukkha.
But what causes birth? The Buddha determined this is the survival instinct, or will to live. This “will to live” is fuelled by a clinging or attachment to life, which in turn is caused by a craving or innate desire to live, and to continue living.
What generates this craving? It is caused by our accumulated feelings, our experiences, originating from our senses, triggered by the external world and from our consciousness itself.
What of consciousness itself? The Buddha tackled this question by asking the second question: “Who experiences dukkha?”
For there to be dukkha, there must be “someone” who is affected by, and experiences dukkha. So the Buddha started to investigate the nature of “the self”, or our notion of personal identity and “selfhood.”
The Buddha came to the (logical) conclusion that our sense of “self” is generated from our subjective experiences (phenomena) and our accumulated thoughts. In other words, our “consciousness” is “constructed” and ephemeral. Furthermore, we are unaware or ignorant of the “constructed” or transient nature of our consciousness, and hence ignorance is the ultimate cause of dukkha.
The Buddha’s concept of consciousness is similar to “artificial intelligence” - we behave like a neural network “trained” on sensory input and generates “responses” that impact our bodies and influence future reactions and responses. Our “self” and “sentience” are therefore also generated - it is a survival instinct to enable us to cope and respond to the world around us.
This was a radical and original idea formulated by the Buddha, different from other beliefs common during his time. It predates many modern philosophical theories. The Buddha was quite possibly the world’s first “phenomenologist”.
According to the Buddha, what we regard as a “self” is nothing more than the sum total of all our accumulated memories of perceptual phenomena, sensory stimuli, feelings, emotions, apperceptions, thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and other mental constructs.
The Buddha’s viewpoint can be described as “phenomenalism” - everything we experience is through our senses and our imagination. Because of that, we are unable to determine whether the real world or physical universe actually exists. Our “world” is effectively a mental construct, formed from previous experiences, apperceptions, influenced and shaped by language (we “name” things that we can perceive). Therefore our “self” also is named and constructed.
The Buddha points out that this “self” and all the mental constructs are impermanent. They have no existence outside of our minds, and disappear when we die. Therefore the “world” that we perceive is also impermanent, because it is nothing more than a mental construction.
It is important to clarify that the Buddha did not deny the existence of the physical universe (contrary to what some Buddhists believe - that the “world” is an illusion), nor did he deny the possible existence of a metaphysical self which is greater than, and possibly separate from, the constructed self. He simply points out that it is impossible for us to verify or refute these abstract or metaphysical concepts. Nor did he deny the possibility of a Creator of the universe, or the existence of other universes and realms, or the existence of beings superior or inferior to ourselves, such as gods and demons. However, I suggest these concepts are ultimately irrelevant in the soteriology - they have no impact on whether we can eliminate or avoid dukkha.
The Buddha’s solution turned out to be surprisingly “simple”. If our sense of self is constructed, then dukkha is also a mental construction. In other words, the “sufferer” self-generates suffering. It is our “ignorance” of the constructed nature of our consciousness that ultimately causes dukkha. Therefore, to avoid dukkha, the “sufferer” simply has to stop generating thoughts or performing actions that will inevitably lead to suffering.
This sounds straightforward, but does it really work? Potentially one can imagine this would work with a sense of unease or dissatisfaction. One also could argue that grief or loss is an emotion that can be dealt with, and even physical pain can be ignored. Can we truly avoid or eliminate sickness, old age and death?
Crucially, this is where the Buddha’s concept of phenomenalism comes in. Given we cannot verify or substantiate the physical universe, illness, old age and death are just concepts in our minds, and we suffer because we find these concepts distasteful. If we can treat them as mere phenomena and not react to them, we avoid dukkha altogether. We accept that whatever happens happens, and at the end of the day everything is just a construction.
The Buddha’s soteriological goal can be likened to giving up smoking. We understand that smoking is bad for us. The solution is deceptively simple: just stop smoking. However, many people find this is difficult to do. Ingrained habits and addiction are hard to change or stop. However, once the objective is accomplished, nothing further needs to be done (apart from guarding against the danger of a relapse).
In the same way, we understand that dukkha is not pleasant. The solution is deceptively simple: just stop generating thoughts or performing actions that will lead to dukkha. However, many people find this is difficult to do. Ingrained habits and desires are hard to change or stop. However, once the objective is accomplished, nothing further needs to be done (apart from guarding against the danger of a relapse).
In other words, the Buddha’s teaching can be summarised as “It’s all in the mind, just let it go.” By doing so, one is relieved from the burden of dukkha, one is no longer concerned by dukkha, one is therefore liberated from dukkha and it is extinguished.
Buddhism
Section titled “Buddhism”The Buddha embarked on a career of teaching upon his “awakening” (or realisation of the soteriology). He travelled around significant parts of today’s India and eventually formed a community of followers which evolved into Buddhism today.
Unfortunately, Buddhism died out in India, where it originated from, due to various reasons (Salomon, 2018). However, the Buddha’s teachings spread throughout much of Asia along trading routes. Even today the Buddha’s teachings are highly appealing to many people, and there has been a surge of interest in the last century or so from industrialised and developed countries.
Although it originated as a philosophy and soteriology, today Buddhism is regarded as a religion (the fourth most popular in the world1, with approximately 500 million adherents).
However, as a percentage of the world population, Buddhism is a declining religion, with the number of adherents expected to reduce from 7.1% of the world population in 2010 to 5.2% by 2050.
Buddhism has been a rapidly growing religion in Australia since the 1980s and now represents about 2.4% of Australia’s population2 based on the 2021 census but the growth has been primarily due to immigration.
According to Norman
Section titled “According to Norman”(Norman, 1997) writes:
We are all familiar with the account of the origin of Buddhism which we find in the Indian tradition. The Buddha-to-be was the son of an Indian king. Despite his father’s attempts to ensure that his son should see no sign of old age, sickness or death, he became acquainted with the suffering existing in the world and the advantages of the ascetic life by seeing four signs at the age of twenty-nine. He left his wife and new-born son and became a wanderer. He tried severe ascetic practices, and followed various teachers, but found that he could not obtain the goal he was seeking. By meditation he obtained nirvāna, and then began to teach to others the way which he had found to be successful, beginning with those with whom he had earlier practised asceticism.
What light can a philological approach throw on this narrative?
It goes without saying that the origins of Buddhism lie in the political, economic, social and religious environment of the time.
The political and economic picture which we gain from early Pāli texts is one where the urbanisation of the Gangetic plain was well under way. There were large, well fortified cities, with powerful rulers. Movement between those cities was easy, and trade between them was flourishing. We read of merchants setting out with large caravans, and there are frequent references to the coinage which must have facilitated the growth of trade. The ksatriyas, the ruling class, had gained a more imposing identity - they were no longer minor chieftains - and the vaiśyas, the mercantile class, had begun to gain wealth, and power arising from that wealth, as opposed to an earlier situation where they were merely itinerant traders. This must have lead to a situation where the ksatriyas and the vaiśyas would be very open to a religion which gave them a social position equal to, or even superior to, that of members of the brahmanical caste. It is very clear that the brahmanical caste was regarded as superior, at least by the members of that caste. As a ksatriya the Buddha might be expected to oppose the brahmanical caste and much of his teaching was devoted to defining the word brāhmana as a moral term, and denying that one became a brahman simply by birth. He insisted that it was actions which made a brahman. A consequence of the Buddha’s teaching about this was that (although there are many references to brāhmanas becoming his followers) the main support for his religion came from ksatriyas and vaiśyas, particularly from the latter. This was presumably because they were wealthy and were well placed to gain merit by dāna “giving, generosity”. They also travelled widely, and were able to act as missionaries, taking the message to other vaiśya communities. It is a striking fact that, as Buddhism spread, it followed the trade routes, being propagated either by “missionary” traders or by bhikkhus who travelled with the caravans under the protection of the traders.
The Buddha was born in Nepal, and his name was Siddhattha. The traditional story states that his father Suddhodana was a king, that is to say a rāja. This word, however, may mean nothing more than a man of the royal tribe or the military caste, i.e. a ksatriya, and in this context, in a place some way away from the Gangetic plain, it is probable that it still meant a minor tribal chieftain, at the head of the Śākya clan. Siddhattha’s gotra name was Gotama, but Gotama is not a ksatriya name, so it probably represents a borrowing of the family purohita’s gotra name. This suggests that the Śākyas were a fairly recent entrant into the caste system, which in turn suggests that perhaps the Buddha’s family was not in origin Indo-Aryan. There are other examples of clans or tribes being assimilated into the caste system in a comparable way. It has been pointed out that important parts of the commentarial tradition concerning the Buddha’s family relations followed Dravidian marriage patterns, which is taken, by some, as proving that the commentarial tradition must have been composed in areas where Dravidian marriage patterns prevailed, i.e. in the southern half of India or in Sri Lanka. The tradition, it is suggested, must therefore be a late story from South India. It is, however, quite arguable and, I think, more likely that it represents the actual clan relationships at that time among non-Indo-Aryan tribes in the North, or among tribes which had until recently been non-IndoAryan.
According to Gombrich
Section titled “According to Gombrich”(Gombrich, 2009) summarises the Buddha and Buddhism:
Since the Buddha lived well before writing was used in India, it is not surprising that the various Buddhist traditions differ widely about his date. The canonical account of his death says that he passed away aged eighty. For a while modern scholarship dated this to 483 BC or thereabouts and this dating is still found in many reference works. But it is too early. He must have died round 405 BC.
For more detail, including an explanation of the limits of possible precision, see my ‘Dating the Buddha: a red herring revealed’, in The Dating of the Historical Buddha/Die Datierung des historischen Buddha, Part 2 (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, IV, 2), Heinz Bechert, editor (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1992), pp. 237-59. For a less technical account, see my ‘Discovering the Buddha’s date’, in Lakshman S. Perera (ed.), Buddhism for the New Millennium, London: World Buddhist Foundation, 2000, pp. 9-25.
The emperor Asoka, who was largely responsible for the spread of Buddhism, ruled from c .269 to c .231 BC.
The Buddha was born close to the modern border between India and Nepal, which did not then exist, into a tribe called the Shakyas. He spent his life in the part of north-east India now known as Bihar (the name is derived from the Buddhist word for ‘monastery’) and the eastern UP. Modern Benares (Varanasi in Indian languages) already existed; Patna (ancient name: Pataliputra), which was to be Asoka’s capital, was founded soon after his lifetime.
Social environment
Section titled “Social environment”The Buddha lived when the first cities were coming up in India. (We ignore the prehistoric Indus Valley civilization.) With this arose larger and better organized states, mostly monarchies, and a great increase in trade, which led to contact with the world beyond India.
A complex religious and cultural system had already been articulated by the brahmins. Their leadership was, however, contested by the new political and mercantile classes, who tended to support heterodox teachers. (‘Heterodox’ means not accepting the authority of the Vedas and hence of their brahmin interpreters.) The Buddha’s contemporary Mahāvira was one of them; he taught, though he did not found, Jainism, a religion still alive today.
Brahmin religion and society
Section titled “Brahmin religion and society”Brahmin ideology posited a hierarchic social structure which we call ‘the caste system’. According to this, society had four strata, which they called ‘colours’ (S: varna). The brahmins (S: brāhmaṇa) were at the top, then came the nobility (S: kṣatriya or rājanya), then the vaiśya, originally stock-rearers and farmers but by the Buddha’s day primarily traders, and then the südra, artisans and labourers. Even below these came the outcastes, who in theory were associated with unclean work dealing with corpses and/or excreta. This brahmin theory is first mentioned in the tenth book of the Ṛg Veda. Kings were supposed by the theory to enforce its rules. In fact, however, enforcement has always been extremely variable.
Early brahmin religious literature is vast. It all carries the name Veda, meaning ‘knowledge’, and is all in an ancient (but not uniform) kind of Sanskrit. It is internally stratified by genre and to some extent the genres also constitute a chronological sequence. The oldest genre is sometimes known in the West as the Vedas, which is confusing. The Ṛg Veda, a collection of 1,028 hymns, is the oldest text in this genre. The latest genre/stratum is that of the Upanisads. These were composed over several centuries; the oldest and longest is the Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad, which was certainly known to the Buddha, though not necessarily in exactly its present form, so it must antedate 500 BC.
Kinds of Buddhism
Section titled “Kinds of Buddhism”There are two main Buddhist traditions in the world today: Theravada and Mahayana. Theravada is a Pali word (Theravāda) meaning ‘Doctrine of the Elders’. Mahayana is a Sanskrit word (Mahāyāna) and means either ‘Great Path’ or ‘Great Vehicle’ - it is ambiguous. The Theravada regards only the Pali Canon as authoritative, the Mahayana arose around the beginning of the Christian era and venerates many other texts. Theravada is dominant in most (not all) of South and Southeast Asia, Mahayana in East and Central Asia.
Did the Buddha actually exist in history?
Section titled “Did the Buddha actually exist in history?”Although many Buddhists would assume the Buddha was a historical person, there is no direct evidence of his existence apart from his teachings, or at least none that have survived.
Some scholars, notably (Schopen, 1997), question the authenticity of Buddhist texts and believe a more historical picture of Buddhism comes from archaeological and epigraphic evidence, and none of these attest the existence of an actual person placed in “historical time”. More recently (Drewes, 2017) argued that the Buddha may have been a legendary or mystical figure, created as a founder persona and imbued with a simple, authoritative origin story, and that in many teachings he is simply a generic, supernatural being and lacks key biographical details. The names commonly associated with him are problematic: “Siddhārtha” is not found in the earliest texts, the Shakya tribe is unverified in non-Buddhist sources, and “Gautama” is a broad clan name used by many figures, not a personal surname. Drewes suggests that the concept of the Buddha as a historical person may be the result of fallacious assumptions and weak arguments by European scholars.
This has been challenged by various scholars including (Wynne, 2019), (Levman, 2019) and (Hinüber, 2019).
(Wynne, 2019) argues that the Buddhist texts consistently depict a “pre-Imperial India” that is seemingly accurate, with the Buddha depicted with human frailties in non-glorifying stories that suggest a historical record rather than an idealised invention. (Levman, 2019) adds that the texts mention historical figures such as kings (Ajātasattu, Bimbisāra) and rival religious leaders (like Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, the founder of Jainism), whose existences are confirmed in non-Buddhist sources. Also, place names correspond to real historical locations. (Hinüber, 2019) makes an interesting argument that inconsistencies and contradictions between what are regarded as early texts vs later, grander versions support the notion that the Buddha was originally portrayed simply as a “human” and was only later mythologised.
(Drewes, 2023) rejects the above rebuttals as not proof of historicity and refutes Hinüber’s examples, contending they are flawed, based on misinterpretation, or self-undermining. (Hinüber, 2023) then provided additional examples citing inscriptions, chronicles, and a personal analogy of family memory, and argues that authentic, if fragmentary, memories of the Buddha could have easily been preserved and passed down by his followers in the century after his death. (Drewes, 2023b) defends his sceptical stance on the historical Buddha, arguing that there is no evidence for how Buddhism originated before the 3rd century BCE and no scholar has ever presented primary textual evidence to prove the Buddha’s historicity.
In conclusion, I do agree with Drewes that there is no proof of the Buddha’s historicity but I also concur with his opponents that the uniqueness and profundity of the Buddhist teachings are best explained by assuming a single founder (with unverified biography) rather than a committee.
Other Opinions
Section titled “Other Opinions”- Norman - A Philological Approach To Buddhism (1997) (Norman, 1997)
In Chapter II (Buddhism and Its Origins) Norman examines the origins of Buddhism through a philological lens, situating it within the socio-political and religious environment of ancient India around 400 BCE. It argues that Buddhism emerged as a challenge to Brahmanical orthodoxy, finding support among the rising merchant and warrior castes by reinterpreting existing concepts and rejecting the Upanishadic universal self (ātman) with the core doctrine of anattā (not-self). The analysis highlights that Buddhism shared significant terminology, ascetic practices, and even titles like ‘Buddha’ and ‘Jina’ with other contemporary śramaṇa movements, particularly Jainism, indicating a common religious background. The path to release (nibbāna) is shown to involve meditative states (jhānas) and an understanding of dependent causation, which was adapted into two systems: a direct path for monastics and a gradual, merit-based path for lay followers, creating a unique synthesis of pre-existing ideas from the broader śramaṇa culture. - Hinüber - Hoary Past And Hazy Memory - On The History Of Early Buddhist Texts (2006) (Hinüber, 2006)
Oskar V. Hinüber argues that early Buddhist texts contain “historical memory” which can be used for dating and cautious historical analysis, challenging the notion that ancient India lacked a sense of history. By examining the evolution of sutta opening formulas, he identifies an archaic syntactical structure, traceable to Indo-Iranian, that refers to obscure market towns (nigamas) and Brahmin villages (brāhmaṇagāmas), representing an older textual layer than the more common references to major cities and monasteries. Applying this critical method to the Mahāparinibbānasuttanta, he posits a pre-Mauryan composition date (c. 350-320 BC) based on its description of Pāṭaliputta as a future commercial hub rather than a political capital and its downplaying of the Moriyas, which contrasts with later Buddhist texts that actively incorporated contemporary rulers like Aśoka and Kaniṣka. This early dating suggests that while the text is primarily hagiography replete with mythology, it may preserve genuine historical details from the decades immediately following the Buddha’s death. - Gombrich - What the Buddha Thought (2009) (Gombrich, 2009)
In What the Buddha Thought, Richard Gombrich argues that the Buddha was a brilliant and original thinker whose coherent system of thought can only be understood by placing it in its historical context as a pragmatic debate with and reaction to contemporary Brahminical and Jain ideas. Gombrich posits that the Buddha was not an essentialist philosopher but a practical teacher focused on how things function, redefining concepts like kamma from ritual action to ethical intention and clarifying “no-self” as the absence of an unchanging essence. A central thesis is that subsequent generations, failing to grasp the Buddha’s use of metaphor, irony, and context-dependent arguments, took his teachings literally, thereby creating new scholastic doctrines—such as misinterpreting the brahma-vihāras as a path to heaven rather than nirvana. This process of misinterpretation, Gombrich contends, explains many apparent inconsistencies in the Pāḷi Canon, which he establishes as the key evidence for understanding how the Buddha used fire as a central metaphor for non-random process and satirised Vedic cosmogony in the Chain of Dependent Origination. - Attwood - Possible Iranian Origins for the Śākyas and Aspects of Buddhism (2012) (Attwood, 2012)
This article explores Michael Witzel’s theory that the Śākya tribe, the Buddha’s clan, had Iranian origins, potentially as an early migration of Scythians (Sakas). The argument rests on circumstantial evidence linking Śākya and early Buddhist characteristics to Iranian or Zoroastrian culture, such as the origin story of sibling marriage (a known Iranian custom), the moral triad of body, speech, and mind, and an ethicised eschatology featuring post-mortem judgement, none of which are prominent in contemporary Brahmanical traditions. The author proposes that these ideas were transmitted via a migration of tribes like the Śākyas into the Central Ganges region around the 9th century BCE, bypassing the main Vedic cultural centres. This thesis challenges the view of Buddhism as solely a reaction to Brahmanism, suggesting instead that it emerged from a broader cultural milieu and that the Buddha may have been a product of his tribe’s assimilated Iranian heritage. - Levman - Cultural Remnants of the Indigenous Peoples in the Buddhist Scriptures (2014) (Levman, 2014)
Bryan Levman’s article argues that Buddhist scriptures contain significant cultural remnants from India’s indigenous Munda, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman peoples, which have been obscured by a later “brahmanisation” that historicised the Buddha within the dominant Indo-Aryan (IA) tradition. The author identifies this indigenous influence by examining the hostility between IA immigrants and eastern ethnic groups like the Buddha’s Sakya clan, whose distinct socio-political organisation (gaṇasaṅgha), rejection of the Brahmanical class system, and non-Aryan marriage customs are evident in the texts. Furthermore, key Buddhist concepts and practices are traced to autochthonous roots, including the idea of the Mahāpuruṣa (Great Man), the veneration of trees and serpents (nāgas), the culture of sacred groves, and the unique funeral rites described for the Buddha’s parinibbāna, all of which differ significantly from Vedic norms. - Shults - On the Buddha’s Use of Some Brahmanical Motifs in Pali Texts (2014) (Shults, 2014)
This paper by Brett Shults argues that Pali texts demonstrate a sophisticated and deliberate engagement with Brahmanical culture by strategically adopting and reinterpreting its motifs to articulate Buddhist teachings. Moving beyond the idea of a shared cultural vocabulary, the author illustrates how early Buddhists repurposed specific Brahmanical elements for their own didactic purposes. Examples range from metallurgical similes, where the Brahmanical concept of refining gold for ritual purity is transformed into a metaphor for mental purification, to the Buddha’s detailed technical knowledge of the Sāvitrī mantra’s gāyatrī metre. The analysis further shows how core Brahmanical practices, such as the agnihotra (fire sacrifice) and the three Vedic ritual fires, are systematically interiorised and ethicised, shifting their focus from external rites to internal development and social responsibilities, thereby challenging and supplanting the original Brahmanical framework using its own terms. - Shults - A Note on Śramaṇa in Vedic Texts (2016) (Shults, 2016)
This article refutes Christopher Beckwith’s claim that the term śramaṇa exclusively meant “Buddhist practitioner” in antiquity by demonstrating its pre-Buddhist origins and broader semantic range within the Vedic tradition. Citing evidence from texts such as the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, and the Rgveda Saṃhitā, the author shows that śramaṇa was used to mean “one who toils,” “weary,” or “unwearying” in contexts describing Vedic seers, sacrificial rituals, cattle, and even stones, all unrelated to Buddhism. The author supports and expands upon Patrick Olivelle’s “development model,” which traces the word’s etymology to the Vedic root √śram (to toil, become weary), arguing that its various meanings developed organically within Brahmanical circles, thus providing the pre-existing conceptual framework for the term to be later applied to the Buddha and other ascetics. - Drewes - The Idea Of The Historical Buddha (2017) (Drewes, 2017)
In a reevaluation of the Buddha’s historicity, David Drewes argues that scholarship has never actually established that the Buddha was a real person and that he cannot be properly considered a historical figure. The author traces the development of the idea from the early nineteenth century, when the Buddha’s existence was an open question, through the pivotal work of scholars like Eugène Burnouf, who separated the final Buddha, Śākyamuni, from his mythical predecessors based on Nepalese tradition rather than new evidence. Drewes contends that subsequent influential scholars, such as T.W. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg, cemented the Buddha’s historicity not through factual discovery but by presupposing it and defending it with fallacious arguments, such as the logical necessity of a founder or appeals to a scholarly consensus that was not yet established. Even major twentieth-century proponents like E.J. Thomas, Étienne Lamotte, and André Bareau admitted that no reliable historical data could be extracted from the legends. Drewes concludes that since early texts depict a generic, supernatural being rather than a specific individual—with names like “Siddhārtha” being late additions and clan names like “Śākya” being potentially mythical—the Buddha belongs in the same category as other ahistorical founders like Vyāsa or Laozi, whose existence is a matter of belief rather than empirical fact. - Salomon - What Happened To Buddhism In India? (2018) (Salomon, 2018)
Richard Salomon’s essay explores the complex and controversial question of why Buddhism disappeared from India around the 13th century after thriving for over a millennium. Critiquing the common practice of listing multiple, disconnected causes—such as loss of patronage, persecution, internal decay, and Muslim invasions—Salomon argues that asking “why” is less fruitful than asking “how” the decline occurred. He contrasts the two dominant scholarly narratives - the “friendly embrace” theory, which posits that Hinduism peacefully assimilated a weakened Buddhism (Monier-Williams, R.C. Mitra), and the opposing view of relentless hostility and persecution (Giovanni Verardi). Through an analysis of several inscriptions, Salomon demonstrates a long and complex process of syncretism and absorption, showing the Buddha’s incorporation as an avatāra of Viṣṇu, the equation of Buddhist and Hindu deities, and the veneration of Hindu gods like Vāsudeva within Buddhist contexts from an early period. Ultimately, he concludes that the most compelling explanation for Buddhism’s demise is its gradual assimilation into the broader Hindu religious milieu, which caused it to lose its distinct identity over time. - Levman - The Historical Buddha (2019) (Levman, 2019)
In response to the hypothesis that the Buddha was a mythical figure, this article establishes his historicity through four main arguments. The Buddhist canon is situated in a verifiable historical context, with its places, rulers, and rivalries corroborated by external sources like the Aśokan edicts and Jain texts, while linguistic analysis of names and cultural terms reveals authentic indigenous roots. The unique, coherent, and profound system of Buddhist teachings is most parsimoniously explained as the product of a single, brilliant individual rather than an invention or organic evolution. Furthermore, the canon’s un-idealised portrayal of the Buddha as a human being who aged, suffered from physical ailments like a bad back, expressed anger, and died a painful death contradicts the notion of a purely mythologised character. Finally, despite later biographical embellishments, a core, unembellished biography of a real person can be discerned in the earliest scriptural layers, suggesting an authentic figure whose life was later aggrandised rather than a complete fabrication. - Wynne - Did the Buddha exist (2019) (Wynne, 2019)
In his article, Alexander Wynne argues against extreme scepticism regarding the Buddha’s existence, presenting evidence that early Buddhist discourses are largely authentic historical records. He refutes claims that the Buddha is a myth by citing the high fidelity of the texts’ oral transmission, archaeological and inscriptional evidence from the Aśokan era that corroborates details about the Buddha’s clan and disciples, and the texts’ consistent depiction of a pre-imperial India before the rise of large cities, coinage, and brick architecture. Wynne’s central thesis is that the teachings reveal a singular and idiosyncratic personality—a quiet, pragmatic, and sometimes reticent teacher—whose unique and coherent philosophical system, characterised by concepts like ‘not-self’ and the dialectic of silence, is too distinctive and complex to have been invented by a committee, pointing instead to a single, historical founder. - Hinüber - The Buddha As A Historical Person (2019) (Hinüber, 2019)
In response to claims that the Buddha was not a historical person, Oskar von Hinüber argues for his historicity by analysing early Pāḷi texts for archaic elements and genuine memories. He posits that details contradicting later, more mythological biographies are unlikely to be inventions and may represent a historical core. Evidence includes the Aśokan inscription confirming Lumbinī as the Buddha’s birthplace; textual accounts of his father as a working farmer rather than a king; and a description of his parents weeping as he left home, which conflicts with later narratives. A key example is the Buddha’s failure to impress the Ājīvika Upaka, an embarrassing episode for the tradition, whose antiquity is supported by archaic linguistic forms and its subsequent alteration or omission in later texts. Further evidence from the Mahāparinibbānasuttanta, such as the obscure name of the Buddha’s last meal (sūkaramaddava) and moments of human frailty, also suggests the preservation of authentic details from the life of a real person. - Drewes - A Historical Buddha After All? (2023) (Drewes, 2023a)
In this paper, David Drewes refutes Oskar von Hinüber’s arguments for the historicity of the Buddha, reaffirming his position that there is no reliable evidence to establish the Buddha as a historical figure. Drewes systematically dismantles von Hinüber’s reasoning, arguing that the earliness of a text does not guarantee its historicity, as the early Buddhist texts are fundamentally concerned with supernatural events rather than historical records. He deconstructs specific claims, such as the interpretation of the Upaka story through the “criterion of embarrassment” and the early dating of the Mahāparinibbānasutta, by providing alternative explanations rooted in literary tropes, polemics, or philological analysis. Drewes concludes that scholarship on the historical Buddha has relied on fallacious arguments from authority and subjective interpretations rather than scientific evidence, and that without such evidence, the Buddha’s existence remains a matter of faith rather than a demonstrable historical fact. - Hinüber - The Historical Dr. Drewes And The Buddha (2023) (Hinüber, 2023)
In a rebuttal to Dr. Drewes’s critique, Oskar von Hinüber defends his argument for the Buddha as a historical person by asserting that Drewes focuses on the opinions of other scholars rather than engaging with primary sources. Hinüber reiterates his own method, which involves analysing the earliest possible texts for linguistic clues and for details that were later suppressed by the tradition, as these are likely to contain fragments of historical memory. He refutes Drewes’s specific counterarguments concerning the Upaka episode and the Jambu tree meditation, defending his philological analysis and dismissing Drewes’s claims of textual corruption and flawed mythological parallels. Ultimately, Hinüber argues that while a full biography is impossible, a vivid historical memory existed in ancient India, distinct from formal historiography, and that traces of this memory of a real person can be found in the oldest Buddhist texts through careful scholarly application rather than abstract debate. - Drewes - Toward Blue Skies Ahead: Reply To Von Hinüber’s Second Response (2023) (Drewes, 2023b)
In this reply, David Drewes defends his thesis on the lack of evidence for the historical Buddha against critiques from Prof. Dr. von Hinüber, clarifying that his original paper targeted the scholarly inconsistency of affirming historicity without proof. Drewes explains that his focus on secondary sources is due to the absence of any primary texts being presented as evidence, and he posits that the origins of Buddhism before the mid-third century BCE are unknowable, cautioning against projecting modern concepts like “mystical experience” onto its prehistory. He systematically refutes von Hinüber’s specific counterarguments by employing detailed linguistic and manuscript evidence to defend his textual emendations in the Dīrghāgama and Sañghabhedavastu, and he substantiates his mythological analysis by showing that numerous Indian myths, including the Sītā story, feature a ritualistic golden plough, thereby connecting a Pali story about the Buddha’s youth to this broader narrative tradition.
Footnotes
Section titled “Footnotes”-
The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050 Pew Research Centre’s Religion & Public Life Project. ↩