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Naḷakalāpīsutta (The Discourse on the Sheaves of Reeds)

· 33 min read

Sāriputta answers Mahākoṭṭhika that ageing and death and the other links are neither made by oneself, nor by another, nor arisen by chance, but have their causes, consciousness and phenomenal objects leaning on each other like two sheaves of reeds. 12S2/1.7.7, translated from the Nidānasaṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya.

Original text: 12S2/1.7.7 Naḷakalāpīsutta 490–499 in the World Tipitaka Edition

At Isipatana, āyasmā Mahākoṭṭhika asks āyasmā Sāriputta whether ageing and death, birth and the other links down to phenomenal objects and consciousness are made by oneself, by another, by both, or arise by chance. Sāriputta answers that each has its cause, and that consciousness and phenomenal objects cause each other, like two sheaves of reeds standing by leaning on one another. Mahākoṭṭhika applauds the statement on thirty-six grounds: for each of the twelve links, a bhikkhu who teaches, practises or is liberated for its disenchantment, detachment and cessation earns a fitting name.

flowchart TB
    Q["Question: made by oneself, by another, by both, or by chance?"] --> A["Answer: neither, each link has its cause"]
    A --> C["jarāmaraṇa ← jāti ← bhava … ← nāmarūpa"]
    C --> M["viññāṇa (consciousness) ↔ nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects)"]
    M --> S["Simile: two sheaves of reeds lean on one another"]
    S --> O["Origin and cessation of the whole mass of suffering"]
    O --> P["Praise on thirty-six grounds: twelve links, three ways"]
    P --> T["dhammakathika, dhammānudhammappaṭipanna, diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatta"]

(67.)

490. At one time āyasmā Sāriputta and āyasmā Mahākoṭṭhika were dwelling at Bārāṇasī, at Isipatana in the Deer Park. Then āyasmā Mahākoṭṭhika, having risen from seclusion in the evening, approached āyasmā Sāriputta; having approached, he exchanged greetings with āyasmā Sāriputta. When they had concluded their courteous and amiable talk, he sat down to one side. Seated to one side, āyasmā Mahākoṭṭhika said this to āyasmā Sāriputta: “Is jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), Āvuso Sāriputta, made by oneself, is ageing and death made by another, is ageing and death made both by oneself and by another, or is ageing and death arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing?” “Ageing and death, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, is indeed not made by oneself, nor is ageing and death made by another, nor is ageing and death made both by oneself and by another, nor even is ageing and death arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with birth as cause, ageing and death [arise].”

491. “Is jāti (birth), Āvuso Sāriputta, made by oneself, is birth made by another, is birth made both by oneself and by another, or is birth arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing?” “Birth, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, is indeed not made by oneself, nor is birth made by another, nor is birth made both by oneself and by another, nor even is birth arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with existence as cause, birth [arises].”

492. “Is bhava (existence), Āvuso Sāriputta, made by oneself … and so on … is upādāna (fuel) made by oneself … is taṇhā (craving) made by oneself … is vedanā (feeling) made by oneself … is phassa (contact) made by oneself … are saḷāyatana (the six sense bases) made by oneself … are nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects) made by oneself, are phenomenal objects made by another, are phenomenal objects made both by oneself and by another, or are phenomenal objects arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing?” “Phenomenal objects, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, are indeed not made by oneself, nor are phenomenal objects made by another, nor are phenomenal objects made both by oneself and by another, nor even are phenomenal objects arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise].”

493. “Is viññāṇa (consciousness), Āvuso Sāriputta, made by oneself, is consciousness made by another, is consciousness made both by oneself and by another, or is consciousness arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing?” “Consciousness, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, is indeed not made by oneself, nor is consciousness made by another, nor is consciousness made both by oneself and by another, nor even is consciousness arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with phenomenal objects as cause, consciousness [arises].”

494. “Just now, indeed, we understand what āyasmā Sāriputta said thus: ‘Phenomenal objects, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, are indeed not made by oneself, nor are phenomenal objects made by another, nor are phenomenal objects made both by oneself and by another, nor even are phenomenal objects arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise].’

495. And just now too we understand what āyasmā Sāriputta said thus: ‘Consciousness, Āvuso Koṭṭhika, is indeed not made by oneself, nor is consciousness made by another, nor is consciousness made both by oneself and by another, nor even is consciousness arisen by chance, neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing. But rather, with phenomenal objects as cause, consciousness [arises].’

496. How then, Āvuso Sāriputta, should the meaning of this statement be seen?” “Well then, Āvuso, I will make a simile for you. By a simile, too, some wise men here understand the meaning of what is said. Suppose, Āvuso, two sheaves of reeds were to stand leaning on one another. In the same way, Āvuso, with phenomenal objects as cause, consciousness [arises]; with consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise]; with phenomenal objects as cause, the six sense bases [arise]; with the six sense bases as cause, contact [arises] … and so on … Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. If, Āvuso, one were to pull away one of those sheaves of reeds, the [other] one would fall; and if one were to pull away the other, the other would fall. In the same way, Āvuso, with the cessation of phenomenal objects comes the cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of phenomenal objects; with the cessation of phenomenal objects comes the cessation of the six sense bases; with the cessation of the six sense bases comes the cessation of contact … and so on … Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”

497. “It is wonderful, Āvuso Sāriputta; it is amazing, Āvuso Sāriputta. And how well this has been spoken by āyasmā Sāriputta! And we rejoice in this statement of āyasmā Sāriputta on these thirty-six grounds:

498. ‘If, Āvuso, a bhikkhu teaches the Dhamma for nibbidā (disenchantment) with ageing and death, for virāga (detachment) from it and for its nirodha (cessation), he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who is a dhammakathika (Dhamma teacher)’. If, Āvuso, a bhikkhu is practising for disenchantment with ageing and death, for detachment from it and for its cessation, he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who is dhammānudhammappaṭipanna (practising the Dhamma according to the Dhamma)’. If, Āvuso, a bhikkhu is liberated, not grasping, through disenchantment with ageing and death, through detachment from it and through its cessation, he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who is diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatta (one who has attained nibbāna in this very life)’. If with birth … if with existence … if with fuel … if with craving … if with feeling … if with contact … if with the six sense bases … if with phenomenal objects … if with consciousness … if with saṅkhāra (mental constructions) … if, Āvuso, a bhikkhu teaches the Dhamma for disenchantment with avijjā (ignorance), for detachment from it and for its cessation, he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who is a Dhamma teacher’. If, Āvuso, a bhikkhu is practising for disenchantment with ignorance, for detachment from it and for its cessation, he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who is practising the Dhamma according to the Dhamma’. If, Āvuso, a bhikkhu is liberated, not grasping, through disenchantment with ignorance, through detachment from it and through its cessation, he is fit to be called ‘a bhikkhu who has attained nibbāna in this very life’.’”

499. The seventh [discourse of the chapter].

  • The chain stops, as in the Nagarasutta and the Mahāpadāna’s part 6, at consciousness and phenomenal objects conditioning each other; the praise counts twelve links, saṅkhāra and avijjā included, three statements each; the teaching is on buddhavacana: dependent origination.
  • The four-way question: “made by oneself, made by another, made both by oneself and by another, arisen by chance”, with asayaṃkāra aparaṅkāra “neither one’s own doing nor another’s doing” (the DPD).
  • The three designations stay in Pāḷi with glosses at first use: dhammakathika “Dhamma teacher”, dhammānudhammappaṭipanna “practising the Dhamma according to the Dhamma”, diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatta “one who has attained nibbāna in this very life”; anupādā vimutto is “liberated, not grasping”, as the Mahāpadāna’s anupādāya.
  • upamaṃ te karissāmi is “I will make a simile for you”; buddhavacana’s devolution page has “I will give you an analogy” for the same words.
  • The arrival formula is the Susima page’s.

SA 288 (蘆, “Reeds”) follows the Naḷakalāpīsutta step by step: two elders meet in the afternoon, one asks whether ageing and death, then the links down to phenomenal objects and consciousness, are made by oneself, by another, by both, or arise without cause; the other answers that each arises conditioned by the next, phenomenal objects by consciousness and consciousness by phenomenal objects; the questioner asks how that is to be understood, and the simile of the reeds leaning on one another is given; praise follows, with the Dhamma-teacher formula for each link (p. 81a–c). The differences are in the setting, the speakers and the counts.

  • The setting: the Buddha is at Rājagaha in the Kalandaka Bamboo Grove and the two elders on the Gijjhakūṭa (耆闍崛山); the Pāḷi has them at Bārāṇasī, at Isipatana in the Deer Park (p. 81a).
  • The roles are reversed: in SA Sāriputta rises from meditation, visits Mahākoṭṭhika, and asks; Mahākoṭṭhika answers and gives the simile. SA adds the request for leave to ask, “I wish to ask; have you the leisure to answer?” (欲有所問,寧有閑暇見答與不), and two preliminary questions, “Is there ageing?” “Is there death?” (有老不 … 有死不), before the four-way question (p. 81a).
  • The four-way question matches, 自作、他作、自他作、非自非他無因作, “made without cause” (無因作) for the Pāḷi’s adhiccasamuppanna (p. 81a); the links from birth to phenomenal objects are compressed into one question, as the Pāḷi’s …pe… (p. 81a).
  • The simile has three reeds standing on open ground (三蘆立於空地): remove one and the two do not stand, remove two and the one does not stand (p. 81b); the Pāḷi has two sheaves, each falling when the other is pulled away. SA applies the simile only to consciousness and phenomenal objects “depending on each other and so growing” (展轉相依,而得生長); the Pāḷi runs the whole chain in origin and cessation from it (p. 81b).
  • The praise is longer in SA: Mahākoṭṭhika is praised as the Bhagavā’s disciple of bright wisdom, like a priceless jewel borne on the head (如無價寶珠,世所頂戴), and Sāriputta says he will praise the statement with “thirty kinds” (三十種讚歎); the Pāḷi has thirty-six grounds, three for each of twelve links, where SA’s list runs from ageing and death to consciousness, ten links, and the third statement reads “does not arouse the defilements, the mind well liberated” (不起諸漏,心善解脫) (p. 81b).
  • SA gives one name, “Dhamma teacher” (法師), for all three statements, where the Pāḷi distinguishes dhammakathika, dhammānudhammappaṭipanna and diṭṭhadhammanibbānappatta (p. 81b).
  • SA ends with Mahākoṭṭhika praising Sāriputta in return and the two “rejoicing in each other and returning each to his dwelling” (更相隨喜,各還所住, p. 81c); the Pāḷi ends with the praise and the sutta’s number.

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