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Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta (The Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving)

· 202 min read

9M/4.8, the eighth discourse of the Majjhima Nikāya's Mahāyamakavagga: the bhikkhu Sāti holds that one and the same consciousness runs on through the round of births, and the Bhagavā corrects him with consciousness arising dependent on conditions, the catechism on dependent origination, the conception and growth of a being, the gradual training and the liberation that is the destruction of craving.

Original text: 9M/4.8 Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta 1282–1392 in the World Tipitaka Edition

The bhikkhu Sāti holds that one and the same consciousness runs on and wanders on; the Bhagavā rebukes him and has the bhikkhū confirm that consciousness is dependently arisen and is named by whatever it arises from, as a fire is named by its fuel. He then takes them through what has come to be and its food, the twelve causes in origin and in cessation, and their own knowledge as the only ground of the teaching, and traces a person from conception through the gradual training to the liberation by the destruction of craving.

flowchart TB
    A["Sāti's view: the same consciousness runs on"] --> B["The bhikkhū dissuade him; he persists"]
    B --> C["Reported to the Bhagavā; Sāti summoned"]
    C --> D["Rebuke: consciousness is dependently arisen"]
    D --> E["Consciousness named by its cause: the fire simile"]
    E --> F["This has come to be, from food, subject to cessation"]
    F --> G["The raft: for crossing over, not for holding on"]
    G --> H["The four foods traced back to ignorance"]
    H --> I["The twelve causes questioned, in origin and in cessation"]
    I --> J["Only what you yourselves have known"]
    J --> K["Conception, growth, the untrained person's craving"]
    K --> L["The Tathāgata and the gradual training"]
    L --> M["Liberation by the destruction of craving"]

(396.)

1282. Thus heard by me — At one time the Bhagavā was dwelling at Sāvatthī, in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now at that time such a harmful diṭṭhigata (misconception) had arisen in a bhikkhu named Sāti, the fisherman’s son: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same viññāṇa (consciousness) that runs on and wanders on, not another.” Several bhikkhū heard: “It is said that such a harmful misconception has arisen in a bhikkhu named Sāti, the fisherman’s son: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.’” Then those bhikkhū approached the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son; having approached, they said this to the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son: “Is it true, Āvuso Sāti, as it is said, that such a harmful misconception has arisen in you: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another’?” “Exactly so, Āvuso, I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā: it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.” Then those bhikkhū, wishing to dissuade the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, from this harmful misconception, cross-questioned, closely questioned and admonished him: “Do not say so, Āvuso Sāti; do not misrepresent the Bhagavā, for misrepresenting the Bhagavā is not good, and the Bhagavā would not say so. In many ways, Āvuso Sāti, the Bhagavā has said that consciousness is paṭiccasamuppanna (dependently arisen); apart from a paccaya (cause) there is no coming into being of consciousness.” Even so, the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, being cross-questioned, closely questioned and admonished by those bhikkhū, obstinately clutching and adhering to that same harmful misconception, kept saying: “Exactly so, Āvuso, I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā: it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.”

(397.)

1283. Since those bhikkhū were unable to dissuade the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, from this harmful misconception, they approached the Bhagavā; having approached, they bowed to the Bhagavā and sat down to one side. Seated to one side, those bhikkhū said this to the Bhagavā: “Bhante, such a harmful misconception has arisen in a bhikkhu named Sāti, the fisherman’s son: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.’ We heard, Bhante, that such a harmful misconception has, it is said, arisen in a bhikkhu named Sāti, the fisherman’s son: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.’ Then, Bhante, we approached the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son; having approached, we said this to the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son: ‘Is it true, Āvuso Sāti, as it is said, that such a harmful misconception has arisen in you: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another”?’ When this was said, Bhante, the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, said this to us: ‘Exactly so, Āvuso, I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā: it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.’ Then, Bhante, wishing to dissuade the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, from this harmful misconception, we cross-questioned, closely questioned and admonished him: ‘Do not say so, Āvuso Sāti; do not misrepresent the Bhagavā, for misrepresenting the Bhagavā is not good, and the Bhagavā would not say so. In many ways, Āvuso Sāti, the Bhagavā has said that consciousness is dependently arisen; apart from a cause there is no coming into being of consciousness.’ Even so, Bhante, the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, being cross-questioned, closely questioned and admonished by us, obstinately clutching and adhering to that same harmful misconception, kept saying: ‘Exactly so, Āvuso, I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā: it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.’ Since, Bhante, we were unable to dissuade the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, from this harmful misconception, we report this matter to the Bhagavā.”

(398.)

1284. Then the Bhagavā addressed a certain bhikkhu: “Come, bhikkhu, in my name summon the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son: ‘The Teacher summons you, Āvuso Sāti.’” “Yes, Bhante,” that bhikkhu replied to the Bhagavā, and he approached the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son; having approached, he said this to the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son: “The Teacher summons you, Āvuso Sāti.” “Yes, Āvuso,” the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, replied to that bhikkhu, and he approached the Bhagavā; having approached, he bowed to the Bhagavā and sat down to one side. The Bhagavā said this to the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, seated to one side: “Is it true, Sāti, as it is said, that such a harmful misconception has arisen in you: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā, it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another’?” “Exactly so, Bhante, I understand the Dhamma taught by the Bhagavā: it is this same consciousness that runs on and wanders on, not another.” “Which is that consciousness, Sāti?” “It is that, Bhante, which speaks and feels, which experiences here and there the result of good and bad kamma (actions).” “To whom, foolish man, do you understand the Dhamma to have been taught by me in this way? Has it not been said by me in many ways, foolish man, that consciousness is dependently arisen, that apart from a cause there is no coming into being of consciousness? And yet you, foolish man, by your own wrong grasp both misrepresent us and uproot yourself and generate much demerit. That will be for your harm and suffering for a long time, foolish man.”

(399.)

1285. Then the Bhagavā addressed the bhikkhū: “Bhikkhave, what do you consider: has this bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, kindled even a flicker [of understanding] in this Dhamma and Discipline?” “How could that be, Bhante? Of course not, Bhante.” When this was said, the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, sat silent, humiliated, slumped over, downcast, brooding and at a loss for words. Then the Bhagavā, having perceived that the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, was silent, humiliated, slumped over, downcast, brooding and at a loss for words, said this to the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son: “You will be known, foolish man, by this harmful misconception of your own. Here I will question the bhikkhū.” Then the Bhagavā addressed the bhikkhū: “Do you too, Bhikkhave, understand the Dhamma taught by me in the way this bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, does, who by his own wrong grasp both misrepresents us and uproots himself and generates much demerit?” “Of course not, Bhante. For in many ways, Bhante, the Bhagavā has said to us that consciousness is dependently arisen; apart from a cause there is no coming into being of consciousness.” “Excellent, excellent, Bhikkhave. It is excellent indeed, Bhikkhave, that you understand the Dhamma taught by me in this way. For in many ways, Bhikkhave, I have said to you that consciousness is dependently arisen; apart from a cause there is no coming into being of consciousness.” And yet this bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, by his own wrong grasp both misrepresents us and uproots himself and generates much demerit. That will be for that foolish man’s harm and suffering for a long time.

(400.)

1286. “Whenever any prerequisite or dependency causing consciousness arises, just by that alone “consciousness” becomes constructed. The eye (faculty of seeing) is a dependency of form causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “visual-consciousness”. The ear (faculty of hearing) is a dependency of sound causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “auditory-consciousness”. The nose (faculty of smelling) is a dependency of smell causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “olfactory-consciousness”. The tongue (faculty of tasting) is a dependency of taste causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “gustatory-consciousness”. The body (faculty of touch) is a dependency of physical sensation causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “tactile-consciousness”. The mind (faculty of thought) is a dependency of mental states causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “mental-consciousness”.

1287. Just as, Bhikkhave, dependent on whatever cause a fire burns, just by that alone it becomes categorised. Dependent on logs a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “log fire”; dependent on wood chips a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “wood-chip fire”; dependent on grass a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “grass fire”; dependent on cowdung a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “cowdung fire”; dependent on husks a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “husk fire”; dependent on rubbish a fire burns, and it becomes categorised just as a “rubbish fire”. In the same way, Bhikkhave, dependent on whatever cause consciousness arises, just by that alone it becomes categorised. The eye (faculty of seeing) is a dependency of form causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “visual-consciousness”. The ear (faculty of hearing) is a dependency of sound causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “auditory-consciousness”, the nose (faculty of smelling) is a dependency of smell causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “olfactory-consciousness”, the tongue (faculty of tasting) is a dependency of taste causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “gustatory-consciousness”. The body (faculty of touch) is a dependency of physical sensation causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “tactile-consciousness”. The mind (faculty of thought) is a dependency of mental states causing consciousness to arise, to become categorised as “mental-consciousness”.

(401.)

1288. “Bhikkhave, do you see: ‘This has come to be’?”

1289. “Yes, Bhante.”

1290. “Bhikkhave, do you see: ‘It has that āhāra (food) as its origin’?”

1291. “Yes, Bhante.”

1292. “Bhikkhave, do you see: ‘With the cessation of that food, what has come to be is subject to cessation’?”

1293. “Yes, Bhante.”

1294. “Bhikkhave, does vicikicchā (doubt) arise in one who is uncertain: ‘Has this come to be or not?’”

1295. “Yes, Bhante.”

1296. “Bhikkhave, does doubt arise in one who is uncertain: ‘Does it have that food as its origin or not?’”

1297. “Yes, Bhante.”

1298. “Bhikkhave, does doubt arise in one who is uncertain: ‘With the cessation of that food, is what has come to be subject to cessation or not?’”

1299. “Yes, Bhante.”

1300. “Bhikkhave, for one who sees yathābhūta (as it really is) with sammappaññā (correct understanding), ‘This has come to be’, is that doubt given up?”

1301. “Yes, Bhante.”

1302. “Bhikkhave, for one who sees as it really is with correct understanding, ‘It has that food as its origin’, is that doubt given up?”

1303. “Yes, Bhante.”

1304. “Bhikkhave, for one who sees as it really is with correct understanding, ‘With the cessation of that food, what has come to be is subject to cessation’, is that doubt given up?”

1305. “Yes, Bhante.”

1306. “Bhikkhave, ‘This has come to be’: in this way too, is there no doubt for you here?”

1307. “Yes, Bhante.”

1308. “Bhikkhave, ‘It has that food as its origin’: in this way too, is there no doubt for you here?”

1309. “Yes, Bhante.”

1310. “Bhikkhave, ‘With the cessation of that food, what has come to be is subject to cessation’: in this way too, is there no doubt for you here?”

1311. “Yes, Bhante.”

1312. “Bhikkhave, ‘This has come to be’: has it been well seen as it really is with correct understanding?”

1313. “Yes, Bhante.”

1314. “Bhikkhave, ‘It has that food as its origin’: has it been well seen as it really is with correct understanding?”

1315. “Yes, Bhante.”

1316. “Bhikkhave, ‘With the cessation of that food, what has come to be is subject to cessation’: has it been well seen as it really is with correct understanding?”

1317. “Yes, Bhante.”

1318. “Bhikkhave, if you were to cling to, cherish, treasure and take as your own this diṭṭhi (view), so perfectly pure, so bright, would you then, Bhikkhave, understand the Dhamma taught by me as like a raft, for crossing over, not for holding on?”

1319. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1320. “Bhikkhave, if you were not to cling to, not cherish, not treasure and not take as your own this view, so perfectly pure, so bright, would you then, Bhikkhave, understand the Dhamma taught by me as like a raft, for crossing over, not for holding on?”

1321. “Yes, Bhante.”

(402.)

1322. “Bhikkhave, there are these four foods for the maintenance of beings that have come to be, or for the support of those seeking to come into being. What four? Physical food, solid or subtle; contact, the second; mental intention, the third; and consciousness, the fourth.

1323. And these four foods, Bhikkhave, have what as their source, what as their origin, are born from what, are produced by what? These four foods have taṇhā (craving) as their source, craving as their origin, are born from craving, are produced by craving. And this craving, Bhikkhave, has what as its source, what as its origin, is born from what, is produced by what?

1324. Craving has vedanā (feeling) as its source, feeling as its origin, is born from feeling, is produced by feeling.

1325. And this feeling, Bhikkhave, has what as its source, what as its origin, is born from what, is produced by what? Feeling has phassa (contact) as its source, contact as its origin, is born from contact, is produced by contact.

1326. And this contact, Bhikkhave, has what as its source, what as its origin, is born from what, is produced by what? Contact has saḷāyatana (the six sense bases) as its source, the six sense bases as its origin, is born from the six sense bases, is produced by the six sense bases.

1327. And these six sense bases, Bhikkhave, have what as their source, what as their origin, are born from what, are produced by what? The six sense bases have nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects) as their source, phenomenal objects as their origin, are born from phenomenal objects, are produced by phenomenal objects.

1328. And these phenomenal objects, Bhikkhave, have what as their source, what as their origin, are born from what, are produced by what? Phenomenal objects have consciousness as their source, consciousness as their origin, are born from consciousness, are produced by consciousness.

1329. And this consciousness, Bhikkhave, has what as its source, what as its origin, is born from what, is produced by what? Consciousness has saṅkhārā (mental constructions) as its source, mental constructions as its origin, is born from mental constructions, is produced by mental constructions.

1330. And these mental constructions, Bhikkhave, have what as their source, what as their origin, are born from what, are produced by what? Mental constructions have avijjā (ignorance) as their source, ignorance as their origin, are born from ignorance, are produced by ignorance.

1331. Thus, Bhikkhave, with ignorance as cause, mental constructions [arise]; with mental constructions as cause, consciousness [arises]; with consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise]; with phenomenal objects as cause, the six sense bases [arise]; with the six sense bases as cause, contact [arises]; with contact as cause, feeling [arises]; with feeling as cause, craving [arises]; with craving as cause, upādāna (fuel) [arises]; with fuel as cause, bhava (existence (constructed self)) [arises]; with existence as cause, jāti (birth (of suffering)) [arises]; with birth as cause, jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure and despair come into being. Thus is the origin of this whole mass of dukkha (suffering).

(403.)

1332. ‘With birth as cause, ageing and death [arise]’: this is what was said; is it with birth as cause, Bhikkhave, that ageing and death [arise], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with birth as cause, Bhante, that ageing and death [arise]; so it is for us here: with birth as cause, ageing and death [arise].”

1333. “‘With existence as cause, birth [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with existence as cause, Bhikkhave, that birth [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with existence as cause, Bhante, that birth [arises]; so it is for us here: with existence as cause, birth [arises].”

1334. “‘With fuel as cause, existence [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with fuel as cause, Bhikkhave, that existence [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with fuel as cause, Bhante, that existence [arises]; so it is for us here: with fuel as cause, existence [arises].”

1335. “‘With craving as cause, fuel [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with craving as cause, Bhikkhave, that fuel [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with craving as cause, Bhante, that fuel [arises]; so it is for us here: with craving as cause, fuel [arises].”

1336. “‘With feeling as cause, craving [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with feeling as cause, Bhikkhave, that craving [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with feeling as cause, Bhante, that craving [arises]; so it is for us here: with feeling as cause, craving [arises].”

1337. “‘With contact as cause, feeling [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with contact as cause, Bhikkhave, that feeling [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with contact as cause, Bhante, that feeling [arises]; so it is for us here: with contact as cause, feeling [arises].”

1338. “‘With the six sense bases as cause, contact [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with the six sense bases as cause, Bhikkhave, that contact [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with the six sense bases as cause, Bhante, that contact [arises]; so it is for us here: with the six sense bases as cause, contact [arises].”

1339. “‘With phenomenal objects as cause, the six sense bases [arise]’: this is what was said; is it with phenomenal objects as cause, Bhikkhave, that the six sense bases [arise], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with phenomenal objects as cause, Bhante, that the six sense bases [arise]; so it is for us here: with phenomenal objects as cause, the six sense bases [arise].”

1340. “‘With consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise]’: this is what was said; is it with consciousness as cause, Bhikkhave, that phenomenal objects [arise], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with consciousness as cause, Bhante, that phenomenal objects [arise]; so it is for us here: with consciousness as cause, phenomenal objects [arise].”

1341. “‘With mental constructions as cause, consciousness [arises]’: this is what was said; is it with mental constructions as cause, Bhikkhave, that consciousness [arises], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with mental constructions as cause, Bhante, that consciousness [arises]; so it is for us here: with mental constructions as cause, consciousness [arises].”

1342. “‘With ignorance as cause, mental constructions [arise]’: this is what was said; is it with ignorance as cause, Bhikkhave, that mental constructions [arise], or not, or how is it here?” “It is with ignorance as cause, Bhante, that mental constructions [arise]; so it is for us here: with ignorance as cause, mental constructions [arise].”

(404.)

1343. “Excellent, Bhikkhave. Thus indeed, Bhikkhave, you too would say this, and I too say this: when this exists, that is; with the arising of this, that arises, namely: with avijjā (ignorance) as cause, saṅkhārā (mental constructions) [arise]; with saṅkhārā as cause, viññāṇa (consciousness) [arises]; with viññāṇa as cause, nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects) [arise]; with nāmarūpa as cause, saḷāyatana (the six sense bases) [arise]; with saḷāyatana as cause, phassa (contact) [arises]; with phassa as cause, vedanā (feeling) [arises]; with vedanā as cause, taṇhā (craving) [arises]; with taṇhā as cause, upādāna (fuel) [arises]; with upādāna as cause, bhava (existence (constructed self)) [arises]; with bhava as cause, jāti (birth (of suffering)) [arises]; with jāti as cause, jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), soka (sorrow), parideva (lamentation), dukkha (pain), domanassa (displeasure) and upāyāsa (despair) come into being. Thus is the origin of this whole mass of dukkha (suffering).

1344. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of avijjā (ignorance) comes the cessation of saṅkhārā (mental constructions); with the cessation of saṅkhārā comes the cessation of viññāṇa (consciousness); with the cessation of viññāṇa comes the cessation of nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects); with the cessation of nāmarūpa comes the cessation of saḷāyatana (the six sense bases); with the cessation of saḷāyatana comes the cessation of phassa (contact); with the cessation of phassa comes the cessation of vedanā (feeling); with the cessation of vedanā comes the cessation of taṇhā (craving); with the cessation of taṇhā comes the cessation of upādāna (fuel); with the cessation of upādāna comes the cessation of bhava (existence (constructed self)); with the cessation of bhava comes the cessation of jāti (birth (of suffering)); with the cessation of jāti, jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), soka (sorrow), parideva (lamentation), dukkha (pain), domanassa (displeasure) and upāyāsa (despair) cease. Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

(405.)

1345. ‘With the cessation of birth comes the cessation of ageing and death’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of birth comes the cessation of ageing and death, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of birth, Bhante, comes the cessation of ageing and death; so it is for us here: with the cessation of birth comes the cessation of ageing and death.”

1346. “‘With the cessation of existence comes the cessation of birth’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of existence comes the cessation of birth, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of existence, Bhante, comes the cessation of birth; so it is for us here: with the cessation of existence comes the cessation of birth.”

1347. “‘With the cessation of fuel comes the cessation of existence’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of fuel comes the cessation of existence, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of fuel, Bhante, comes the cessation of existence; so it is for us here: with the cessation of fuel comes the cessation of existence.”

1348. “‘With the cessation of craving comes the cessation of fuel’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of craving comes the cessation of fuel, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of craving, Bhante, comes the cessation of fuel; so it is for us here: with the cessation of craving comes the cessation of fuel.”

1349. “‘With the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of feeling, Bhante, comes the cessation of craving; so it is for us here: with the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving.”

1350. “‘With the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of contact, Bhante, comes the cessation of feeling; so it is for us here: with the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling.”

1351. “‘With the cessation of the six sense bases comes the cessation of contact’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of the six sense bases comes the cessation of contact, or not, or how is it here? With the cessation of the six sense bases, Bhante, comes the cessation of contact; so it is for us here: with the cessation of the six sense bases comes the cessation of contact.”

1352. “‘With the cessation of phenomenal objects comes the cessation of the six sense bases’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of phenomenal objects comes the cessation of the six sense bases, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of phenomenal objects, Bhante, comes the cessation of the six sense bases; so it is for us here: with the cessation of phenomenal objects comes the cessation of the six sense bases.” “‘With the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of phenomenal objects’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of phenomenal objects, or not, or how is it here?”

1353. “With the cessation of consciousness, Bhante, comes the cessation of phenomenal objects; so it is for us here: with the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of phenomenal objects.” “‘With the cessation of mental constructions comes the cessation of consciousness’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of mental constructions comes the cessation of consciousness, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of mental constructions, Bhante, comes the cessation of consciousness; so it is for us here: with the cessation of mental constructions comes the cessation of consciousness.”

1354. “‘With the cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of mental constructions’: this is what was said; is it, Bhikkhave, that with the cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of mental constructions, or not, or how is it here?” “With the cessation of ignorance, Bhante, comes the cessation of mental constructions; so it is for us here: with the cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of mental constructions.”

(406.)

1355. “Excellent, Bhikkhave. Thus indeed, Bhikkhave, you too would say this, and I too say this: when this does not exist, that is not; with the cessation of this, that ceases, namely: with the cessation of avijjā (ignorance) comes the cessation of saṅkhārā (mental constructions); with the cessation of saṅkhārā comes the cessation of viññāṇa (consciousness); with the cessation of viññāṇa comes the cessation of nāmarūpa (phenomenal objects); with the cessation of nāmarūpa comes the cessation of saḷāyatana (the six sense bases); with the cessation of saḷāyatana comes the cessation of phassa (contact); with the cessation of phassa comes the cessation of vedanā (feeling); with the cessation of vedanā comes the cessation of taṇhā (craving); with the cessation of taṇhā comes the cessation of upādāna (fuel); with the cessation of upādāna comes the cessation of bhava (existence (constructed self)); with the cessation of bhava comes the cessation of jāti (birth (of suffering)); with the cessation of jāti, jarāmaraṇa (ageing and death), soka (sorrow), parideva (lamentation), dukkha (pain), domanassa (displeasure) and upāyāsa (despair) cease. Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

(407.)

1356. Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, would you run back to the past: ‘Did we exist in the past? Did we not exist in the past? What were we in the past? How were we in the past? Having been what, what were we in the past?’”

1357. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1358. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, would you run forward to the future: will we exist in the future? Will we not exist in the future? What will we be in the future? How will we be in the future? Having been what, what will we be in the future?”

1359. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1360. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, would you now, in the present time, be inwardly uncertain: do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from, and where will it be going?”

1361. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1362. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, would you say: ‘Our teacher is respected, and out of respect for the teacher we would say thus’?”

1363. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1364. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, would you say: ‘The wanderer said thus, and we, being wanderers indeed, would say thus’?”

1365. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1366. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, will you appoint another teacher?”

1367. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1368. “Thus knowing and thus seeing, Bhikkhave, will you return to whatever (you regarded as) valuable, such as various religious practitioners, noisy debates and auspicious ceremonies?”

1369. “Of course not, Bhante.”

1370. “Would you say whatever amongst you that you have known by yourselves, seen by yourselves, experienced by yourselves?”

1371. “Yes, Bhante.”

1372. “Excellent, Bhikkhave. Bhikkhave, you have indeed been instructed by me with an evident dhamma (principle interpreting the essential nature of existence and experience) that is verifiable and should be personally experienced by those who are intelligent. ‘This dhamma, Bhikkhave, is evident, immediate, verifiable, leading onward, to be personally experienced by those who are intelligent’ — that which was said thus, it was said in reference to this.

(408.)

1373. Now, Bhikkhave, it is through the coming together of three [things] that conception takes place. Here the mother and father have come together, and the mother is not in season, and the gandhabba (stream of consciousness impelled to be reborn) is not present: then conception does not take place. Here the mother and father have come together, and the mother is in season, and the gandhabba is not present: then conception does not take place. But when, Bhikkhave, the mother and father have come together, and the mother is in season, and the gandhabba is present, then through the coming together of these three conception takes place. Then, Bhikkhave, the mother carries that embryo in her womb for nine or ten months with great anxiety, as a heavy burden. Then, Bhikkhave, after the passing of nine or ten months, the mother gives birth to it with great anxiety, as a heavy burden. Then, once it is born, she looks after it with her own blood. For this, Bhikkhave, is blood in the Discipline of the Liberated One, namely mother’s milk. Then, Bhikkhave, that boy, following his growth and the maturing of his faculties, plays with whatever toys boys have, namely: a toy plough, tip-cat, somersaults, a toy windmill, toy measures, a toy chariot and a toy bow.

1374. Then, Bhikkhave, that boy, following his growth and the maturing of his faculties, endowed and furnished with the five strands of sensual pleasures, indulges in: forms cognisable by the eye that are agreeable, pleasant, charming, alluring, accompanied by sensual desire, and stimulating; sounds cognisable by the ear … smells cognisable by the nose … tastes cognisable by the tongue … tactile objects cognisable by the body that are agreeable, pleasant, charming, alluring, accompanied by sensual desire, and stimulating.

(409.)

1375. When he sees a form with the eye, he is attracted to an agreeable form and repelled by a disagreeable form, and he lives with awareness of the body unestablished, with a limited mind. And he does not know clearly as it really is that mental liberation and liberation by wisdom where those evil, unwholesome characteristics of his cease without remainder. Thus engaged in liking and disliking, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, he delights in that feeling, welcomes it and remains clinging to it. As he delights in that feeling, welcomes it and remains clinging to it, delight arises. Whatever delight there is in feelings, that is fuel; with his fuel as cause, existence [arises]; with existence as cause, birth [arises]; with birth as cause, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure and despair come into being. Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. When he hears a sound with the ear… when he smells an odour with the nose… when he tastes a taste with the tongue… when he touches a tangible with the body… when he cognises a mind-object with the mind, he is attracted to an agreeable mind-object and repelled by a disagreeable mind-object, and he lives with awareness of the body unestablished, with a limited mind. And he does not know clearly as it really is that mental liberation and liberation by wisdom where those evil, unwholesome characteristics of his cease without remainder. Thus engaged in liking and disliking, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, he delights in that feeling, welcomes it and remains clinging to it. As he delights in that feeling, welcomes it and remains clinging to it, delight arises. Whatever delight there is in feelings, that is fuel; with his fuel as cause, existence [arises]; with existence as cause, birth [arises]; with birth as cause, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure and despair come into being. Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

(410.)

1376. Here, Bhikkhave, a Tathāgata arises in the world, an arahant (liberated one), a sammāsambuddha (perfectly awakened one), accomplished in knowledge and conduct, fortunate, knower of the world, unsurpassed trainer of persons to be tamed, teacher of gods and humans, the Awakened One, the Bhagavā. He declares this world — with its deities, Māras, and Brahmās, this generation with its religious practitioners, its gods and humans — having realised it for himself through experiential understanding. He teaches the Dhamma that is good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, meaningful and well-phrased; he makes known the brahmacariya (optimal life) that is wholly complete and perfectly pure. A householder or a householder’s son, or one born in some other family, hears that Dhamma. Having heard that Dhamma, he gains confidence in the Tathāgata. Endowed with that gain of confidence, he reflects thus: ‘Household life is confining, a dusty path. Going forth is the open air. It is not easy for one living in a house to lead the optimal life that is utterly perfect, utterly pure, like a polished shell. What if I, having shaved off my hair and beard, and having put on saffron robes, were to go forth from the home life into homelessness?’” So, at a later time, having given up a small or large pile of wealth, having given up a small or large family circle, having shaved off his hair and beard, and having put on saffron robes, he goes forth from the home life into homelessness.

(411.)

1377. Having thus gone forth, having undertaken the training and livelihood of bhikkhū, giving up the taking of life, he abstains from the taking of life; he lives with rod and weapon laid aside, scrupulous, compassionate, sympathetic for the welfare of all living beings.

1378. Giving up the taking of what is not given, he abstains from the taking of what is not given; he takes what is given, expects only what is given. Not a thief, he lives pure in himself.

1379. Giving up uncelibacy, he practises celibacy, keeps far away from sexual intercourse, abstains from vulgar practice.

1380. Giving up false speech, he abstains from false speech; he is truthful, true to his word, honest, reliable, keeping promises for everyone in the world.

1381. Giving up slanderous speech, he abstains from slanderous speech; having listened here, he does not tell it there to break up these people; having listened there, he does not tell it here to break up those people. Thus he is a conciliator of the broken and a provider of friendly terms; enjoying concord, liking harmony, delighting in unity, he speaks peace-making speech.

1382. Giving up harsh speech, he abstains from harsh speech. Whatever speech is gentle, pleasant to hear, friendly, heart-warming, polite, loved by the people, charming to the people — such speech he speaks.

1383. Giving up gossip, he abstains from gossip; he speaks at the proper time, speaks what is true, speaks what is meaningful, speaks about the Dhamma, speaks about the discipline; he speaks speech worth remembering, timely, reasonable, purposeful, beneficial.

1384. He abstains from harming seed-and-plant life. He eats one meal a day, abstaining from eating at night, abstaining from eating between midday and dawn. He abstains from dancing, singing, instrumental music, and watching shows. He abstains from using garlands, perfumes, oils, adornments and decorations. He abstains from large and luxurious beds. He abstains from accepting gold and silver. He abstains from accepting raw grain. He abstains from accepting raw meat. He abstains from accepting women and girls. He abstains from accepting female and male servants. He abstains from accepting goats and sheep. He abstains from accepting chickens and pigs. He abstains from accepting elephants, cattle, horses, and mares. He abstains from accepting fields and land. He abstains from engaging in messages and errands. He abstains from buying and selling. He abstains from cheating with scales, weights, or measures. He abstains from bribery, deception, fraud, and crookedness. He abstains from cutting, beating, binding, robbery, plunder, and violence.

1385. He is content with a robe to look after his body and alms food to look after his stomach. Wherever he goes, he goes taking only these with him. Just as a winged bird, wherever it flies, flies with its wings as its only burden; in the same way, a bhikkhu is content with a robe to look after his body and alms food to look after his stomach. Wherever he goes, he goes taking only these with him. Endowed with this collection of virtue of the liberated, he experiences blameless happiness within himself.

1386. When he sees a form with the eye, he does not grasp at its representations or details. He practises for the restraint of that eye faculty, through which, if it were unrestrained, evil, unwholesome characteristics of covetousness and displeasure might invade him. He guards the eye faculty; he undertakes restraint of the eye faculty. When he hears a sound with the ear… when he smells an odour with the nose… when he tastes a taste with the tongue… when he touches a tangible with the body… when he cognises a mind-object with the mind, he does not grasp at its representations or details. He practises for the restraint of that mind faculty, through which, if it were unrestrained, evil, unwholesome characteristics of covetousness and displeasure might invade him. He guards the mind faculty; he undertakes restraint of the mind faculty. Endowed with this restraint of the faculties of the liberated, he experiences unadulterated happiness within himself.

1387. He acts with clear comprehension when going forward and returning; he acts with clear comprehension when looking forward and looking around; he acts with clear comprehension when bending and stretching; he acts with clear comprehension when carrying his outer robe, bowl, and robe; he acts with clear comprehension when eating, drinking, chewing, and tasting; he acts with clear comprehension when defecating and urinating; he acts with clear comprehension when walking, standing, sitting, sleeping, waking, speaking, and remaining silent.

(412.)

1388. Endowed with this collection of virtue of the liberated, endowed with this contentment of the liberated, endowed with this restraint of the faculties of the liberated, and endowed with this sati (awareness) and sampajañña (clear comprehension) of the liberated, he resorts to a secluded dwelling: a wilderness, the foot of a tree, a mountain, a ravine, a hillside cave, a charnel ground, a forest grove, the open air, a heap of straw. After his meal, having returned from his alms round, he sits down, folding his legs crosswise, setting his body erect, and establishing awareness in front of him. Giving up covetousness for the world, he dwells with a mind free from covetousness; he purifies his mind from covetousness. Giving up ill will and hatred, he dwells with a mind free from ill will, sympathetic for the welfare of all living beings; he purifies his mind from ill will and hatred. Giving up sloth and torpor, he dwells free from sloth and torpor, with apperception of light, aware and clearly comprehending; he purifies his mind from sloth and torpor. Giving up restlessness and remorse, he dwells undisturbed, with his mind inwardly peaceful; he purifies his mind from restlessness and remorse. Giving up doubt, he dwells having crossed over doubt, without perplexity regarding wholesome characteristics; he purifies his mind from doubt.

(413.)

1389. Having given up these five nīvaraṇā (hindrances), imperfections of the mind that weaken wisdom, secluding himself from sensual pleasures, detaching from unwholesome characteristics, he enters and remains in the first jhāna (mental disposition), accompanied by reflection and consideration, secluded from defilements, with felicity and satisfaction. And furthermore, Bhikkhave, a bhikkhu, with the conclusion of reflection and consideration, [enters and remains in] the second jhāna, accompanied by an inner calming of intention, focused, without reflection, without consideration, born from focus, with felicity and satisfaction … and so on … the third jhāna … and so on … he enters and remains in the fourth jhāna.

(414.)

1390. When he sees a form with the eye, he is not attracted to an agreeable form and not repelled by a disagreeable form, and he lives with awareness of the body established, with an immeasurable mind. And he knows clearly as it really is that mental liberation and liberation by wisdom where those evil, unwholesome characteristics of his cease without remainder. Having thus abandoned liking and disliking, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, he does not delight in that feeling, does not welcome it and does not remain clinging to it. As he does not delight in that feeling, does not welcome it and does not remain clinging to it, whatever delight there is in feelings ceases. With the cessation of his delight comes the cessation of fuel; with the cessation of fuel comes the cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence comes the cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure and despair cease. Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. When he hears a sound with the ear… when he smells an odour with the nose… when he tastes a taste with the tongue… when he touches a tangible with the body… when he cognises a mind-object with the mind, he is not attracted to an agreeable mind-object and not repelled by a disagreeable mind-object, and he lives with awareness of the body established, with an immeasurable mind; and he knows clearly as it really is that mental liberation and liberation by wisdom where those evil, unwholesome characteristics of his cease without remainder. Having thus abandoned liking and disliking, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, he does not delight in that feeling, does not welcome it and does not remain clinging to it. As he does not delight in that feeling, does not welcome it and does not remain clinging to it, whatever delight there is in feelings ceases. With the cessation of his delight comes the cessation of fuel; with the cessation of fuel comes the cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence comes the cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, ageing and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure and despair cease. Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. Remember this, Bhikkhave, in brief, as my taṇhāsaṅkhayavimutti (liberation through the destruction of craving); but [remember] the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son, as caught in the great net of craving, the tangle of craving.”

1391. This the Bhagavā said. Those bhikkhū, delighted, rejoiced in the Bhagavā’s words.

1392. The Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving, the eighth, is finished.

  • The sutta answers Sāti’s view by naming viññāṇa (consciousness) by its cause, then questions the chain of dependent origination link by link, in origin and in cessation; the chain’s analysis is at https://buddhavacana.github.io/sutta/deporig/ and https://buddhavacana.github.io/pali-textbook/3-awakening/.
  • Paragraph 1286 and the catechism 1362–1372 are the author’s own on buddhavacana (https://buddhavacana.github.io/pali-textbook/11-pbt/), kept word for word; their “prerequisite or dependency” for paccaya differs from the glossary’s “cause” elsewhere on the page.
  • The chain is worded as on Bodhikathā and the Mahāpadānasutta’s part 6, with bhava (existence (constructed self)) and jāti (birth (of suffering)) by the glossary’s rule for the chain.
  • āhāra is “food”, as in the Saṅgītisutta’s Fours; sandhāvati saṃsarati “runs on and wanders on”, the DPD’s literal senses; diṭṭhigata “misconception”, the textbook’s token.
  • The edition closes the Bhagavā’s speech before the last two sentences of 1285, which therefore stand outside the quotation marks.

The Chinese parallel is the 𠻬帝經 of the Madhyama Āgama (MA 201, 中阿含經 fascicle 54, CBETA T01, no. 26, pp. 766b–770a; 嗏帝經 in the Song, Yuan and Ming editions), named after Sāti where the Pāḷi is named after the destruction of craving, read here in CBETA’s text. The two agree in frame and sequence: Sāvatthī and Jeta’s Grove; the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son (𠻬帝比丘雞和哆子), who holds that “this consciousness goes on to be reborn and is not another” (今此識,往生不更異, p. 766c); the bhikkhū’s questioning and report, the summons, the Bhagavā’s “which consciousness?” (何者識耶, p. 767a) and his rebuke, “you foolish man” (汝愚癡人); consciousness named by what it arises from, as a fire by its fuel; the catechism on what has come to be and its food; the raft; the four foods traced back through craving to ignorance; the chain questioned link by link in origin and in cessation and recited by the bhikkhū; the questions on the three times, on the teacher’s authority and on their own knowledge; conception from the union of three things, the child’s growth, his reaction to the six senses and the arising of the whole mass of suffering; the Tathāgata’s arising and the trained one’s liberation; and the name “liberation by the destruction of craving” (愛盡解脫, p. 769c). The differences, checked in CBETA’s text:

  • Sāti and the rebuke. The Chinese bhikkhū add that consciousness “arises when there is a condition and ceases when there is none” (有緣則生,無緣則滅) and tell Sāti to give up his evil view quickly (p. 766c); his persistence is “this is true, the rest is false” said three times (此是真實,餘者虛妄 … 如是再三); his consciousness is what “speaks, feels, acts, causes to act, arises and co-arises” (說、覺、作、教作、起、等起, p. 767a) for the Pāḷi’s “speaks and feels” (1284). The Bhagavā asks “from whose mouth did you hear me teach thus?” and “I do not speak one-sidedly; do you?” (我不一向說,汝一向說耶, p. 767a), without the Pāḷi’s question about a flicker of understanding (1285), and Sāti’s silence comes after the fire simile and the charge of “grasping the meaning and the letter upside down” (顛倒受解義及文, p. 767b), not before the teaching.
  • The fire. Two fuels, wood and a heap of grass and dung (草糞聚, p. 767a), for the Pāḷi’s six (1287).
  • The catechism on what has come to be. The Chinese announces beforehand a Dhamma “final, without vexation, without fever, constant and unchanging” (說法究竟,無煩無熱,恒有不變, p. 767b); its second and third statements read “the Tathāgata” (如來真說) where the Pāḷi has “that food” (1290, 1292), and its third round, “is there no doubt?” (無有疑惑耶), is answered “no” where the Pāḷi’s “does doubt arise in one who is uncertain?” (1294–1298) is answered “yes”.
  • The raft and the foods. The raft “taught for a long time” is followed by an exchange the Pāḷi lacks, what to answer followers of other teachings who ask the purpose of this pure view: “for the sake of disenchantment, of dispassion, of seeing and knowing as it really is” (為厭義,為無欲義,為見知如真義, p. 767c). The four foods (摶食麤細, p. 767c) come without the Pāḷi’s purpose, “for the maintenance of beings that have come to be, or for the support of those seeking to come into being” (1322).
  • The chain. The Chinese bhikkhū answer every link with a reason, “why? because with birth as cause there is ageing and death” (所以者何?緣生有老死也, p. 768a), and recite the whole chain themselves (p. 768b); the Pāḷi’s answer is “so it is for us here” and the Bhagavā restates the chain (1332–1343). The Chinese passes from the approval of the origin chain straight to the first cessation question, without the Pāḷi’s statement of the whole cessation chain first (1344).
  • The three times and the further questions. For the present the Chinese asks “what is this? what kind is this? where has this being come from, where will it go? by what cause has it been, by what cause will it be?” (此云何?此何等?此眾生從何所來?趣至何處?何因已有?何因當有耶, p. 769a), without the Pāḷi’s “do I exist? do I not exist?” (1360). The Pāḷi then asks five questions (1362–1370); the Chinese asks eleven (pp. 769a–b): the five heinous deeds (故殺父母,害弟子阿羅訶,破壞聖眾,惡意向佛出如來血), breaking the precepts, seeking another venerable or field of merit, saying what wanderers and brahmins say, taking auspicious rites as purification, holding their rite-bound views, seeking a spell against a grave illness (持一句呪…持此呪令脫我苦), taking an eighth existence (頗受八有耶) and honouring “the wanderer Gotama as our teacher” (沙門瞿曇是我尊師), several of them the marks of a stream-enterer; the last asks whether they answer from what they themselves know, see and have awakened to (自知、自見、自覺).
  • The dhamma. For the Pāḷi’s six qualities (1372) the Chinese has “ultimate, without vexation, without fever, unchanging, known, seen and awakened to by right wisdom” (畢究竟無煩無熱,恒不變易法,正智所知、正智所見、正智所覺, p. 769b).
  • Conception and growth. The Chinese states the union of the three once (三事合會入於母胎 … 香陰已至, p. 769b), with 香陰 for the Pāḷi’s gandhabba and “the mother is full and fertile” (母滿精堪耐) for utunī, without the Pāḷi’s “with great anxiety, as a heavy burden” (1373); its child “eats coarse rice and barley gruel and anoints his body with ghee and oil” (食麤飯麨蘇油塗身) where the Pāḷi’s boy plays with his toys, and it has no five strands of sensual pleasure (1374).
  • Sāti named twice. After the arising of suffering the Chinese asks, “is this not the complete continuity bound by craving, like the bhikkhu Sāti, the fisherman’s son?” (非為具足愛所繫相續,如𠻬帝比丘雞和哆子耶, p. 769c); the Pāḷi names him only in its closing sentence (1390).
  • The gradual training absent. The Pāḷi’s 1376–1389, the Tathāgata’s arising, the going forth, the virtues, restraint, the hindrances and the four jhāna, has as its counterpart only the Tathāgata’s ten epithets (若時如來出世,無所著、等正覺, p. 769c), after which the Chinese passes to the sense restraint that mirrors 1390, with the Tathāgata himself as its subject (彼眼見色,於好色而不樂著).
  • The close. The Chinese adds that the three-thousandfold world system shook three times (此三千大千世界三反震動, p. 769c) and names the discourse “Liberation by the Destruction of Craving” for that reason (是故此經稱愛盡解脫, pp. 769c–770a); the Pāḷi has no earthquake and names the sutta in its colophon (1392).

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