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Tidipa

Kaccānagottasutta (The Discourse to Kaccānagotta)

· 13 min read

12S2/1.2.5: asked by āyasmā Kaccānagotta how far there is right view, the Bhagavā teaches by the middle between the extremes 'everything exists' and 'everything does not exist', through dependent origination.

Original text: 12S2/1.2.5 Kaccānagottasutta 88–91 in the World Tipitaka Edition

Summary

Section titled “Summary”

Asked by āyasmā Kaccānagotta how far there is right view, the Bhagavā answers that the world mostly depends on a duality, existence and non-existence, and that one who sees the origin and the cessation of the world as they really are holds neither; such a one takes no stand on a self and knows for himself that only suffering arises and ceases. “Everything exists” and “everything does not exist” are the two extremes; the Tathāgata teaches by the middle, which is dependent origination (12S2/1.2.5).

Diagram

Section titled “Diagram”
flowchart TB
    Q["Kaccānagotta asks: how far is there right view?"] --> D["the world depends on a duality: existence and non-existence"]
    D --> S["seeing the origin of the world: no non-existence"]
    D --> N["seeing the cessation of the world: no existence"]
    S --> R["right view: no stand on a self; only suffering arises and ceases"]
    N --> R
    R --> E1["one extreme: everything exists"]
    R --> E2["second extreme: everything does not exist"]
    E1 --> M["the middle: dependent origination"]
    E2 --> M

Text

Section titled “Text”

(15.)

88. [The Bhagavā] was dwelling at Sāvatthī. Then āyasmā Kaccānagotta approached the Bhagavā. Having approached, he bowed to the Bhagavā and sat down to one side. Seated to one side, āyasmā Kaccānagotta said this to the Bhagavā: “‘Sammādiṭṭhi (right view), sammādiṭṭhi,’ it is said, Bhante. How far, Bhante, is there right view?”

89. “Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part dvayanissito (dependent on a duality) — both atthitaṃ (existence: that reality exists) and natthitaṃ (non-existence: that it does not). When one sees, Kaccāna, lokasamudayaṃ (the origin of the world) yathābhūtaṃ (as it really is) with sammappaññā (correct understanding), the notion ‘the world does not exist’ does not occur. When one sees, Kaccāna, lokanirodhaṃ (the cessation of the world) as it really is with correct understanding, the notion that ‘the world exists’ does not occur. Indeed, this world, Kaccāna, is for the most part upayupādānābhinivesavinibandho (bound by engagement, fuel and adherence). But this one does not enter that upayupādānaṃ (engagement and fuel), cetaso adhiṭṭhānaṃ (standpoint of the mind), abhinivesānusayaṃ (adherence and inclination); he does not grasp, he does not fixate on: ‘attā me’ (“This is my eternal self.”). ‘When arising, it is only dukkha (suffering) that arises; when ceasing, it is suffering that ceases’ — he does not doubt, he is not perplexed. Herein, knowledge independent of others is found in him. To this extent, Kaccāna, there is right view.

90. ‘Sabbamatthi (everything exists, i.e. there is an extrinsic reality beyond our perceptions),’ Kaccāna, is one extreme. ‘Sabbaṃ natthi (everything does not exist, i.e. reality is an illusion),’ is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these two extremes, Kaccāna, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle [way]: ‘With avijjā (ignorance) as cause, saṅkhārā (mental constructions) [arise]; with mental constructions as cause, viññāṇaṃ (consciousness) [arises] … and so on … Thus is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes the cessation of mental constructions; with the cessation of mental constructions comes the cessation of consciousness … and so on … Thus is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’”

91. The fifth [discourse of the chapter].

Commentary

Section titled “Commentary”
  • The whole sutta is on buddhavacana’s Kaccānagotta page with the author’s analysis of the two extremes; its wording stands here verbatim, including the author’s glosses of atthitā, natthitā, sabbamatthi and sabbaṃ natthi.
  • Two departures from that page, following the edition’s punctuation: the aside “this is a restatement of dependent origination” inside paragraph 90 is dropped, and the extra opening quotation mark before “Sabbamatthi” is omitted.
  • The middle the Tathāgata teaches by is the chain of the Paṭiccasamuppādasutta, abbreviated here with “…pe…”.
  • The sutta has no closing formula: the chain is its last word, followed by “Pañcamaṃ”.

Parallels

Section titled “Parallels”

The frame and the argument are the same: a venerable Kātyāyana (尊者𨅖陀迦旃延, p. 85c) approaches the Buddha, pays homage, stands to one side and asks what right view is and how the Bhagavā lays it down (云何正見？云何世尊施設正見？); the Buddha answers that the world depends on two, existence and non-existence (世間有二種依，若有、若無), that one who sees the origin of the world as it really is has no view of its non-existence and one who sees its cessation no view of its existence, that such a one does not grasp, settle or reckon a self (不取、不住、不計我), sees suffering arising and ceasing without doubt or perplexity and knows this for himself, not through another (不由於他而自知), and that this is the middle way between the two extremes, dependent origination in origin and in cessation (pp. 85c–86a). The differences, read in CBETA’s text:

  • Setting and name. The Chinese places the sutta at Nāḷī village, in a guest hall in the deep forest (那梨聚落深林中待賓舍, p. 85c), and gives the venerable a personal name before the clan name Kātyāyana; the Pāḷi has Sāvatthī and the clan name alone.
  • Order of the argument. The Pāḷi states the two dependencies, then the seeing of the world’s origin and cessation, then the world’s bondage to engagement, fuel and adherence and the one who does not enter it, then right view. The Chinese states the two dependencies “touched by grasping” (為取所觸, p. 85c), goes straight to the one without grasping who does not reckon a self and sees only suffering arise and cease, concludes “this is called right view, this is called right view laid down by the Tathāgata” (是名正見，是名如來所施設正見), and only then gives the seeing of the world’s origin and cessation as the reason (所以者何, p. 85c).
  • The two extremes. The Pāḷi names them, “everything exists” and “everything does not exist”; the Chinese has only “leaving the two extremes, the middle way is taught” (離於二邊說於中道, p. 85c), and prefaces the chain with the abstract formula “this existing, that exists; this arising, that arises” (此有故彼有，此起故彼起), which the Pāḷi lacks.
  • The ending. The Chinese closes with Kātyāyana’s attainment: hearing the discourse he did not give rise to the defilements, his mind was liberated, and he became an arhat (不起諸漏，心得解脫，成阿羅漢, p. 86a); the Pāḷi ends with the chain and “Pañcamaṃ”.

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