Tagged: Buddhist philosophy
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Eltschinger - Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part I (2009)
1In his analysis of the 7th-century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, Vincent Eltschinger argues that Dharmakīrti's epistemology is fundamentally intertwined with his soteriological project, centering on the concept of ignorance (avidyā). Dharmakīrti defines ignorance not as a mere lack of knowledge but as an active, erroneous cognition (mithyopalabdhi) that functions as a counter-knowledge, obstructing the perception of reality. This error is identified with conceptual thought (vikalpa) itself, which, through a process of 'concealment' (saṃvṛti), superimposes unifying constructs onto reality's diverse particulars. To explain how this cognitive error leads to suffering, Dharmakīrti specifies that the most crucial form of ignorance is the 'personalistic false view' (satkāyadrṣṭi)—the innate, conceptual belief in a self. He explicitly equates this false view with ignorance, arguing it is the root of all defilements and rebirth, and that its direct antidote — the perception of selflessness — is the key to liberation. While drawing on earlier scriptural traditions, Dharmakīrti was innovative in systematically equating the two and developing exegetical strategies to defend this unorthodox position.
Eltschinger - Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part II (2010)
2In the philosophy of Dharmakīrti, ignorance (avidyā) is defined as a "counter-knowledge" or conceptual construction that superimposes erroneous ideas onto reality, becoming soteriologically significant as the "personalistic false view" (satkāyadrṣṭi) — the mistaken belief in a "self" and "one's own." This specific form of ignorance is the root cause of all defilements like craving and aversion, thereby generating the cycle of rebirth and suffering (samsāra). Dharmakīrti's path to salvation is built upon two means of valid cognition - perception, which is true, direct, non-conceptual knowledge that grasps reality's selfless and momentary nature, and inference. Although inference is itself a conceptual process and thus part of ignorance, its crucial function is corrective. It does not aim to discover new truths, which perception has already accessed, but rather to eliminate the erroneous superimpositions that obscure perception. By systematically using inference to exclude false notions like permanence and selfhood, a practitioner achieves determinate cognition and purifies the mind, ultimately restoring perception to its inherently radiant and liberated state, free from the counteracting influence of ignorance.
Sopa - The Special Theory of Pratītyasamutpāda (1986)
3The Buddhist concept of Nirvana is fundamentally a metaphysical experience, defined not as an abstract or rational conclusion but as a direct, immediate, and felt knowledge of ultimate reality or "Being." This experience, which transcends sensory perception, is the goal of Buddhism, aiming for a special wisdom (prajñā) or intuitive understanding of the Ultimate Truth that underlies all phenomena. Evidence from early texts like the *Buddha-carita*, which describes the Buddha's enlightenment as a perfect, intuitive knowledge of all things, and interpretations from scholars like D.T. Suzuki, who characterizes Satori as a profound, non-conceptual awakening, both support the view of Nirvana as an experiential encounter with the metaphysical foundation of existence itself.
Wynne - The ātman and its negation (2010)
4The famous Buddhist "No Self" (anātman) doctrine is largely absent from the earliest texts because the original teachings were founded on a different and more subtle philosophy than the later, standard interpretation. Early critiques, such as the "Not-Self" (anattā) teaching, are grounded in a principle of "epistemological conditioning," where fundamental concepts including "self," "existence," and even space-time are not ultimate realities but are dependently originated through cognitive processes. This is why the early texts pragmatically avoid direct ontological statements like "the self does not exist," instead guiding practitioners to see that identifying with conditioned phenomena is "unsuitable" and thereby transcend the very conceptual framework that creates a sense of self. The explicit "No Self" doctrine developed later, as seen in texts like the *Vajirā Sutta* and the Abhidharma, when this subtle philosophy gave way to a "reductionistic realism" that analyzes the person as a collection of essenceless components within an objectively real world, thus shifting the focus from a radical critique of conceptuality to the denial of a specific entity.