Tagged: Sarvāstivāda
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Anālayo - Brahmā's Invitation (2011)
1In early Buddhist texts, the god Brahmā is incorporated through "inclusivism," being either satirized as a deluded creator or depicted as a subordinate protector of the Dharma. The most prominent example of this protector role is the story from the Pāli Ariyapariyesanā-sutta where Brahmā persuades the hesitant, newly-awakened Buddha to teach. This article highlights that this famous episode is completely absent from a parallel version of the discourse in the Chinese Madhyama-āgama. By comparing these texts and noting a similar pattern of absence in other parallel accounts, the analysis concludes that the story of Brahmā's intervention is likely a later addition to the tradition, rather than an original element that was subsequently lost. Therefore, this pivotal narrative, widely found in later texts and art, may not have been part of the earliest autobiographical account of the Buddha's awakening.
Anālayo - The Chinese Parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (1) (2012)
2This paper analyzes Chinese parallels to the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, focusing on Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda versions, and reveals significant variations from the Pāli canon and among the parallels themselves. Some versions, such as the Saṃyukta-āgama discourse and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, omit the teaching on the two extremes and the explanation of the Four Noble Truths, focusing exclusively on the "three turnings" applied to each truth. Other versions present the teachings as separate components; for instance, the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya includes the two extremes and the three turnings, but places the detailed explanation of the truths only after Kauṇḍinya's initial awakening. The author argues against the theory that the Four Noble Truths are a late addition, proposing instead that the shorter texts are intentional extracts from a longer, multi-part discourse, and that the Mūlasarvāstivāda and Sarvāstivāda traditions considered the teaching on the "three turnings" to be the central element that set the wheel of Dharma in motion.
Bronkhorst - Some Uses Of Dharma In Classical Indian Philosophy (2004)
3In classical Indian philosophy, the term *dharma* has two distinct primary uses, one Buddhist and one Brahmanical. In Buddhist Abhidharma, particularly the Sarvāstivāda school, *dharmas* (plural) are the ultimate, irreducible, and momentary constituents of all that exists; this atomistic view posits that only these fundamental elements are real, while complex entities like persons are non-existent composites. In contrast, the Brahmanical Vaiśeṣika school demonstrates a significant evolution in the concept of *dharma* (singular). Initially understood as 'merit' defined by Vedic injunctions, similar to the Mīmāṃsā school's view, *dharma* was later transformed by Vaiśeṣika's ontological concerns. In its classical formulation, *dharma* became a specific quality inherent in the soul (*ātman*), paired with its opposite *adharma* (demerit), absorbing the older, distinct concept of *adṛṣṭa* ('the unseen') to become a precise causal factor in a person's psychological functioning and path to liberation.
Krishan - Buddhism and Belief in Ātman (1984)
4The central question in Buddhism regarding a permanent soul, or *ātman*, presents a significant dilemma - the doctrine of *anattā* (no-soul) appears to contradict the belief in karma and rebirth, as it leaves no entity to bear the consequences of actions. The Buddha himself rejected the extreme views of both an eternal, unchanging soul and complete annihilation after death, instead advocating a middle path. Various Buddhist schools attempted to resolve this by proposing concepts that function like a soul without being one, such as a "rebirth-linking consciousness" (*patisandhi viññāna*), an "intermediate existence" (*antarābhava*), or an inexpressible "person" (*pudgala*). The author argues that the doctrine of *anattā* is primarily a rejection of the ego and the notions of "I" and "mine," which are the root of suffering, rather than a denial of a conscious principle. This is supported by the development of concepts like the "store-consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and post-mortem rituals in Buddhist cultures, which imply belief in a transmigrating entity. Ultimately, Buddhism seems to deny a static, eternal soul but affirms a dynamic, impermanent yet continuous empirical self that carries karma and memory, likened to a river's current, which is only extinguished upon attaining *nirvāṇa*.
Norman - Pāli Literature - A History Of Indian Literature (1983)
5K.R. Norman's *Pāli Literature* provides a comprehensive overview of the literary tradition of Theravāda Buddhism, also encompassing the canonical works of other Hīnayāna schools in Prakrit and Sanskrit. The literature is centered on the Pāli Canon or Tipiṭaka, which is divided into the Vinaya-piṭaka (monastic rules), the Sutta-piṭaka (discourses of the Buddha, organized into five nikāyas), and the Abhidhamma-piṭaka (systematic philosophical analysis). The text details the history of the Pāli language as a standardized Middle Indo-Aryan dialect, its transmission through oral reciters (bhānakas) and councils, and its eventual commitment to writing in Ceylon in the first century B.C. Beyond the canon, a vast post-canonical literature developed, including foundational commentaries (aṭṭhakathās) by figures like Buddhaghosa, sub-commentaries (ṭīkās), historical chronicles (vaṃsas) like the Dīpavaṃsa and Mahāvaṃsa, hermeneutical guides, poetry (kāvya), and grammatical works, which flourished not only in India and Ceylon but also in Burma and Thailand.