Tagged: Yogācāra
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Eltschinger - Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part I (2009)
1In his analysis of the 7th-century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, Vincent Eltschinger argues that Dharmakīrti's epistemology is fundamentally intertwined with his soteriological project, centering on the concept of ignorance (avidyā). Dharmakīrti defines ignorance not as a mere lack of knowledge but as an active, erroneous cognition (mithyopalabdhi) that functions as a counter-knowledge, obstructing the perception of reality. This error is identified with conceptual thought (vikalpa) itself, which, through a process of 'concealment' (saṃvṛti), superimposes unifying constructs onto reality's diverse particulars. To explain how this cognitive error leads to suffering, Dharmakīrti specifies that the most crucial form of ignorance is the 'personalistic false view' (satkāyadrṣṭi)—the innate, conceptual belief in a self. He explicitly equates this false view with ignorance, arguing it is the root of all defilements and rebirth, and that its direct antidote — the perception of selflessness — is the key to liberation. While drawing on earlier scriptural traditions, Dharmakīrti was innovative in systematically equating the two and developing exegetical strategies to defend this unorthodox position.
Krishan - Buddhism and Belief in Ātman (1984)
2The central question in Buddhism regarding a permanent soul, or *ātman*, presents a significant dilemma - the doctrine of *anattā* (no-soul) appears to contradict the belief in karma and rebirth, as it leaves no entity to bear the consequences of actions. The Buddha himself rejected the extreme views of both an eternal, unchanging soul and complete annihilation after death, instead advocating a middle path. Various Buddhist schools attempted to resolve this by proposing concepts that function like a soul without being one, such as a "rebirth-linking consciousness" (*patisandhi viññāna*), an "intermediate existence" (*antarābhava*), or an inexpressible "person" (*pudgala*). The author argues that the doctrine of *anattā* is primarily a rejection of the ego and the notions of "I" and "mine," which are the root of suffering, rather than a denial of a conscious principle. This is supported by the development of concepts like the "store-consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and post-mortem rituals in Buddhist cultures, which imply belief in a transmigrating entity. Ultimately, Buddhism seems to deny a static, eternal soul but affirms a dynamic, impermanent yet continuous empirical self that carries karma and memory, likened to a river's current, which is only extinguished upon attaining *nirvāṇa*.
Sopa - The Special Theory of Pratītyasamutpāda (1986)
3The Buddhist concept of Nirvana is fundamentally a metaphysical experience, defined not as an abstract or rational conclusion but as a direct, immediate, and felt knowledge of ultimate reality or "Being." This experience, which transcends sensory perception, is the goal of Buddhism, aiming for a special wisdom (prajñā) or intuitive understanding of the Ultimate Truth that underlies all phenomena. Evidence from early texts like the *Buddha-carita*, which describes the Buddha's enlightenment as a perfect, intuitive knowledge of all things, and interpretations from scholars like D.T. Suzuki, who characterizes Satori as a profound, non-conceptual awakening, both support the view of Nirvana as an experiential encounter with the metaphysical foundation of existence itself.